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A rule of action must be plain and intelligible, or else it is no rule; for we can neither obey nor difobey a law that we cannot underftand: and therefore from this idea of religion, that it is a rule of action, there lies a very plain objection against admitting mysteries in religion: and let the objection have its full force, the Gospel is fecure from the blow; for the rule of life contained in the Gospel is the plaineft, as well as the pureft, that ever the world was acquainted with. In the precepts of Christianity there is no mystery, no fhadow of a mystery, to be feen; they are all fimple, and to men of the lowest understandings intelligible; the duties which it requires us to perform to God, to ourselves, and to our neighbours, are fuch as, when offered to us, we cannot but in our minds and consciences approve and therefore the Gospel, as far as it is a rule of life, is far from being myfterious, fince both the fenfe and the reason of the law are open and plain, and fuch as we cannot but fee, and, when we fee, confent to.

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But, fince this is not the only notion or idea of religion, that it is a rule of life; let us confider whether, according to the other ideas which belong to it, it be equally abfurd to fuppose it in some points mysterious. Let us examine it then under this notion, as containing the means by which God is reconciled to finners.

And first, it is obvious to obferve, that here is not the fame reason against mysteries as in the other cafe: for, though we cannot practife a law without understanding it, yet God may be reconciled to us, and we have the affurance of it, without our being

able to comprehend and account for every thing that was done in order to it. A malefactor may receive a pardon, and enjoy the benefit of it, without knowing what it was that induced his prince to grant it; and would, without doubt, be thought mad to stand out against the mercy, merely because he could not dive into the fecret reasons of it. Could not a finner receive the benefit of God's mercy without understanding all the methods of it, it would then be neceffary indeed, that even this part of religion fhould be free from myfteries, and made plain to every man's understanding: but, fince a finner may be faved by a mercy which he cannot comprehend, where is the abfurdity of offering finners mercy, and requiring them to rely on it, or, in other words, to believe in it, though it be never fo incomprehenfible or myfterious? Were it unreasonable or impoffible to believe things to be, without knowing how they came to be, faith could never be reasonable in religion, or in any thing else: but, fince the knowledge of the effence of things, and of the existence of things, are two diftinct kinds of knowledge, and independent of one another; our ignorance of the effence of things, and of the relation they have to each other, can never be a good argument against the belief of their existence and yet this objection contains all the arguments that unbelievers bring againft the myfteries of Christianity. Why do they, for inftance, refuse to believe Chrift to be the Son of God? only because they cannot comprehend how he can be the eternal Son of God: and, if they will be true to their principle, and carry the objection

as far as it will go, they muft in time come to deny the existence of every thing in the world, themfelves not excepted. Since then to comprehend the reason and nature of things, is neither neceffary to our believing the reality of them, nor yet to our receiving benefit and advantage from them; how comes it to be neceffary, that in religion there fhould be nothing that we do not underftand? Neceffary it cannot be to our falvation, for we may faved by means we comprehend not; nor yet to our faith is it neceffary, for we may, and do daily believe the reality of things without knowing any thing of the nature and reafons of them. And, if mysteries may set forward our falvation, and are not deftructive of our faith, upon what other views they can be excluded from religion, I cannot conceive.

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Thus much then may ferve to fhew, that according to this notion of religion, that it contains the means by which God is reconciled to finners, no argument can be drawn to weaken the authority of any religion, because some parts of it are myfterious but, if you confider it farther, it will appear, that this part of religion must neceffarily be mysterious, and the means of reconcilement such as reafon and nature cannot comprehend. This I partly obferved to you in a former part of this discourse, and shall therefore the more briefly touch it now.

The principles, from which this confequence I think will follow, are thefe: that men are finners: that God must be reconciled to finners in order to their falvation that religion muft contain the words of eternal life, or the certain method by which we may obtain eternal life. The confequence of the se

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principles is evident, that religion must contain the means by which God is reconciled to finners; for, fince this reconcilement is neceffary to eternal life, religion cannot have the words of eternal life without it. Now then, if there be no fuch means of reconcilement, which reason and nature can either difcover or comprehend, this part of religion muft neceffarily be myfterious; fince what reafon cannot comprehend, is myfterious. Now, from the natural notion we have of God and his attributes, there arises such a difficulty in this cafe, as reason cannot get over for it is certain, according to all the natural notions of our mind, that it is just for God to punish finners: it is likewise certain, that God can do nothing but what is juft: if therefore he forgives finners, and receives them to mercy, and remits their punishment; it is then certain, that it is just for God in this circumftance not to punish finners. Now, reason cannot comprehend how it fhould, with respect to the fame individual finners, be just to punish, and just not to punish them. If it be not juft to punish finners, there wants no reconcilement for finners; and, if it be not just not to punish them, no reconcilement can be had, for it is contrary to the nature of God to do what is not just. The fame argument lies from all the attributes of the Deity, which are at all concerned in the redemption of mankind: his wifdom and holiness, and even his mercy, are as indifcernible as his juftice. Now try how far reafon can go towards difcovering the means of reconcilement: lay down firft these certain and allowed principles; that it is just for God to punish finners-that God can do nothing but

what is juft and try how you can come at the other conclufion, which must be the foundation of a finner's reconcilement to God; namely, that it is juft for God not to punish finners, and righteous in him to receive them to favour. If reafon cannot discover nor comprehend how both these propofitions fhould be true at the fame time with respect to the same perfons, it is impoffible that it should discover or comprehend the means which God makes use of to reconcile himself to finners; that is, it is impoffible for God to make use of any means that are not mysterious, that is, above the reach and comprehenfion of human wisdom.

This difficulty muft for ever remain, as long as we attempt to scan the divine juftice by our narrow conceptions of it: and this is the very difficulty that makes many things in the Gospel to be myfterious. The Scripture tells us, that God has been reconciled to finners by the death of Chrift—that he made atonement for the fins of the whole world. These are great mysteries: we cannot fee that there is any proportion between the fufferings of one and the fins of all; or, if there were, we cannot see the juftice of laying the fins of the wicked upon the innocent head. If we could fee the reafons upon which the justice of God proceeds in this case, here would be no mystery: and therefore the mysteriousness of the whole proceeding arifes only from hence, that our finite minds cannot comprehend the reasons and limits of the divine juftice. Moft certain it is, that, if God be reconciled to finners, fatisfaction must be made to his juftice; for he may as well ceafe to be God, as to be juft. Whatever fatisfaction is

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