clear in the understanding ofthe Deity; all things lie naked before his eye, having no darkness, obscurity, or difficulty in them. A mystery therefore is no real or pofitive thing in nature; nor is it any thing that is inherent or belonging to the subjects of which it is predicated. When we fay this thing or that thing is a mystery, according to the form of our speech, we seem to affirm fomething of this or that thing; but, in truth, the propofition is not affirmative with refpect to the thing, but negative with respect to ourselves: for, when we fay this thing is a mystery, of the thing we fay nothing, but of ourselves we say, that we do not comprehend this thing. With refpect to our understanding, there is no more difference between truth that is, and truth that is not myfterious, than, with respect to our ftrength, there is between a weight which we can lift, and a weight which we cannot lift: for, as defect of strength in us makes fome weights to be unmoveable, fo likewise defect of understanding makes fome truths to be myfterious.

The complaint then against mysteries in religion amounts to no more than this; that God has done fomething for us, or appointed fomething for us to do, in order to fave us, the reafon of which we do not understand; and requires us to believe and to comply with these things, and to truft him that we fhall receive the benefit of them: for this is all the faith, or pofitive obedience, that is required of us; as will in its due place appear.

But to return to the queftion, whether it can be ever neceffary for God to reveal myfteries, or appoint pofitive duties, in order to perfect the falva

tion of mankind; or, in other words, to ufe fuch means for the falvation of the world, the agreeablenefs of which to the end intended the reason of man cannot difcover? This is certain, that, whenever it is out of our power by natural means to fave ourselves, if we are to be faved at all, it is neceffary that fupernatural means be made ufe of: and, how hard foever it may be to conceive this to be the case of mankind in general; yet of particular men it will not, I prefume, be denied, but that they may fin fo far, and render themselves fo obnoxious to the juftice of God, that it fhall not be in the power of mere reafon and nature to find an infallible method of atoning the juftice of God, and, confequently, redeeming the finner from death: and in this cafe there is a plain neceffity that the finner must perish, or be redeemed by such means as reafon and nature are ftrangers to; fince, in the means that reason and nature can prescribe, there is confeffedly no help for him.

What may confeffedly happen to one man, or to many, may poffibly happen to all: fuppofe then (fince there is no abfurdity in the fuppofition) that all men have fo far finned, as to have loft the rights and pleas of obedient fubjects; that an univerfal corruption has spread through the whole race, and rendered them incapable of performing the duties of reason and nature, or, if they could perform them, precluded the merit and title of all fuch works to reward; for the works of nature, though they may prevent a forfeiture, yet they cannot reverse a forfeiture once incurred: in this cafe what shall be done? Is it unreasonable for God to redeem the

world? God forbid ! and yet by the means of reafon and nature the world cannot be redeemed. Will you allow that God may freely forgive the fins of the world, and remit the punishment, and bestow even on finners the gift of eternal life? How mysterious would even this grace be, and how far beyond the power of reason to comprehend! Could you, from any of the natural notions of your mind, reconcile this method of redemption with the wisdom, justice, and holiness of God? Confider the effential difference between good and evil, the natural beauty of one, and the natural deformity of the other; compare them with the effential holiness of the Deity; and then tell me the ground upon which he reconciles himself to fin, pities and forgives it, and decrees immortal glory for the finner: or, if this way please you not, confider his wisdom, by which he rules and governs the world, and try, by all the notions you can frame of wifdom, whether it be not neceffary for the good government of the rational world, that rewards and punishments should be divided with an equal hand to virtue and vice; and then tell me, where is the wisdom of dropping all the punishment due to fin, and receiving finners not only to pardon, but to glory? There may be wisdom and holiness in this, but not human wisdom, nor holiness that human reason can discern; but infinite mysterious wifdom and holinefs. If from the notions of wifdom and holiness you can have no help in this case, much less will the natural notion of justice affist you. Is not justice converfant in rewards and punishments? Is it not the effence of juftice to diftri

bute both where they are due? Is there not in nature and reafon a connection between virtue and reward, between vice and punishment? How then comes nature to be reversed, and the laws of reafon to be difturbed? and how, as if juftice were more than poetically blind, come finners to be entitled to life and happiness? Even in this cafe therefore, of God's finally forgiving the fins of the world, which is the lowest that can be put, religion would neceffarily be mysterious, and not to be apprehended by reason or nature, but to be received by faith; and our only refuge would be, not in the reafon and nature of the thing, but in the unfathomable goodness and incomprehenfible mercy of God.

But, fhould it really be, as to human reason it appears, inconfiftent with the wisdom and juftice of God, so freely to pardon fin, as not to leave the marks of his displeasure upon it, or to remit the tranfgreffions of men, without vindicating in the face of the whole creation the honour of his laws and government; in what a maze must reason then be loft in searching after the means of reconcilement and redemption! How fhall fin be punished, and yet the finner faved? How fhall the honour of God's government be vindicated in the face of all the world, and yet in the face of all the world the rebels juftified and exalted? These are difficulties. irreconcileable to human reafon and nature; and yet they must be reconciled, or the world, once loft, muft lie for ever under condemnation. The religion that can adjust this difficulty, and give us the clue to lead us through these mazes, in which human reason must for ever wander, can only have

the words of eternal life; which words of eternal life muft neceffarily abound with inconceivable mysteries, but with mysteries of grace and mercy.

So far is it from being an objection against the Gospel of Chrift, that it contains many wonderful myfteries of the hidden wisdom of God, that, as our cafe ftands, without a mystery it is impoffible for us to be faved: for, fince reafon and nature cannot find the means of refcuing finners from punishment, and of making atonement to the juftice of God; fince they cannot prefcribe a proper fatisfaction for fin, in which the honour of God and the salvation of men shall be at once confulted; fince they cannot remedy the corruption that has spread through the race of mankind, or infuse new principles of virtue and holiness into the fouls already fubdued to the luft and power of fin; fince, if they could procure our pardon for what is past, they cannot fecure us for the future from the fame temptations, which by fatal experience we know we cannot withstand: fince, I fay, these things cannot be done by the means of reafon and nature, they must be done by fuch means as reafon and nature know nothing of; that is, in other words, they must be done by myfterious means, of the propriety of which we can have no adequate notion or conception.

If you ftand in need of no new favour, if you aim not so high as eternal life, religion without myfteries may well ferve your turn. turn. The principles of natural religion tend to procure the peace and tranquillity of this life; and the not diftinguishing between religion as a rule of life for our prefent use