people of the Jews: but he that understands them not, has this comfort, that his falvation, his religion, depends not upon any controversy that concerned the Jews only, but upon the plain declarations of God made to all mankind.

Thus much may ferve to fhew, how far the difficulties and obfcurities, which really are found in the holy Scripture, do affect the common cause of religion and I think it is evident, that our common religion stands clear even of these difficulties.

Other difficulties there are, which more properly belong to religious men, than religion: fuch are the disputes and nice inquiries of the schools, which often enter into the debates of learned writers. But it is strange to find these urged as objections against the Gospel, by any fober-minded For what are these disputes to the Gospel? God has promised his affiftance to all who endeavour to serve him: is there any difficulty in underftanding this? Let the schools confider the nature of

man.

grace, and how it influences the mind, and divide it into an hundred forts, what is that to the Gofpel? or what is it to a man who is affured that God will affift him, and who knows that God cannot want means to make good his promise?

In like manner there are many doubts about the facraments of the Gofpel, and how and what grace they confer but, difpute as you will, this one point is clear, He that believes and is baptized shall be faved.

Suppose this, you will fay, to be true, and that thefe doubts and difficulties do not affect the authority or truth of the Gofpel; yet they are fo

blended with the cause of religion, that they are not easily separated from it by unlearned and unfkilful men and this at least renders the Gofpel of little ufe, fince it is a rule, the straightness of which cannot be discerned by the generality of mankind. And this brings me to my fecond head,

To confider thefe difficulties with refpect to ourfelves.

From what has been already faid it is evident, that the Scriptures contain a plain and intelligible fyftem of religion: and would men follow the directions of what they do and may understand, and not think themfelves under direction of what they do not understand, there would be no great difficulty in this cafe. But the misfortune is, that men often fancy they understand what they do not, and raise rules and principles of religion to themselves out of places of which they are perfectly ignorant: and how can this be avoided? In the first place, it is at every man's peril, if he makes any rule to himself, contrary to the plain exprefs commands of God, which he does or may eafily understand. In human laws, the main of the subject's duty is plain; and if he mistakes any dark paffages, yet fo as to keep ftrictly to his known duty, the confequence perhaps may be tolerable, and he excufable: but if a man from any dark statute should infer a right to rob and murder his neighbour, and act accordingly, (which acts of violence are plainly forbid in the law,) he ought to fuffer, not for misunderstanding the obfcure law, but for tranfgreffing the plain. one. The fame reason holds as to the divine law :

if a man takes care to observe what he does underftand, his mistakes may not be dangerous: but if he forms to himself a liberty from the obfcure places, inconfiftent with the plain intelligible laws of the Gospel, and acts accordingly; those plain laws, which fhould have been his rule, will be his condemnation.

But plain places are not equally plain to all ca pacities; and therefore even in this there may be a latitude; a latitude which we cannot determine, but which God, who is to be the judge, both can and will and the great difficulty which men make to themselves in this case, seems to me to arise from a misapprehenfion of the judgment of God. Among men all are judged by the fame rule, one law comprehends all, and is of the fame interpretation and extent in all cafes. That it is fo, is the effect of human weakness; for in truth and equity, if we could come at them, no two cafes are perhaps exactly alike, or equally fubject to the fame rule: but men cannot allow for the different capacities and circumftances of men, which they cannot judge of; and therefore all who are esteemed to have reason enough to govern themselves, are concluded under one law; and only children, ideots, and madmen are excepted cafes. Though in truth the degrees by which men approach to madness, or folly, could they be limited, which they cannot, would deferve a diftinct confideration.

Now, if you conceive the judgment of God to be like the judgment of man, and that all fhall be tried by one and the fame rule; no wonder you

ask, how ignorant men fhall come to the knowledge of their duty under the present doubts and difficulties which cloud religion.

But the truth is this; God, who gave all men one law, gave every man that share of reason which he enjoys fools are capable of receiving no law; and no man is farther capable than in proportion to the degree of reafon which God has given him: and consequently, in truth and equity, the law is no farther a law to him, than his reafon is capable of receiving it. And fince reason comes as much from God, as the law itself; it is wrong to imagine that the true fenfe of the law is the only and the fingle rule by which God will judge: fince it is evident in equity and juftice, that the fentence on every man must arife from the complex confideration of the law that was before him, and the degree of reafon which he had to apply it.

This great difficulty therefore, I beseech you, truft with God; and doubt not but that the righteous Judge of the world will do righteously,