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From this account of the nature of religion, that it is the knowledge of pleafing God, and ferving him acceptably, (I speak of religion now confidered only as a rule,) there are fome confequences which naturally follow, that may be of great fervice to us in directing us in our choice of religion.

First then; Since it is the perfection of religion to inftruct us how to please God; and fince to please God, and to act according to the will of God, are but one and the fame thing; it neceffarily follows, that must be the most perfect religion, which does moft perfectly inftruct us in the knowledge of the will of God. Allow then Nature to have all the advantages that ever the greatest patrons of natural religion laid claim to on her behalf; allow Reason to be as clear, as uncorrupted, as unprejudiced, as even our fondest wishes would make it; yet ftill it can never be supposed, that Nature and Reason, in all their glory, can be able to know the will of God fo well as he himself knows it and therefore, fhould God ever make a declaration of his will, that declaration muft, according to the nature and neceffity of the thing, be a more perfect rule for religion, than reason and nature can poffibly furnish us with. Had we the wisdom and reafon of cherubims and feraphims to direct us in the worship and service of our Maker, nevertheless it would be our highest wisdom, as it is theirs, to fubmit to his laws, that is, to the declarations of his will.

Secondly; From hence it appears, how extremely wrong it is to compare natural religion and revelation together, in order to inquire which is

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preferable; for it is neither more nor lefs than inquiring, whether we know God's will better than he himself knows it. Falfe revelations are no revelations; and therefore to prefer natural religion before fuch pretended revelations, is only to reject a forgery: but to suppose that there is, or may be, a true revelation, and yet to say that natural religion is a better guide, is to fay that we are wifer than God, and know better how to please him without his directions than with them. Upon this ftate of the cafe then, a revelation must be entirely rejected as a forgery, or entirely fubmitted to; and the only debate between natural religion and revelation must be, whether we really have a revelation, or no; and not whether revelation or nature be, in the nature of things, the beft and fureft foundation of religion: which dispute but ill becomes our condition, and is a vain attempt to exalt ourselves and our own reason above every thing that is called God.

Since then revelation, confidered as fuch, muft needs be the fureft guide in religion, every reafonable man is bound to confider the pretenfions of revelation, when offered to him; for no man can justify himself in relying merely on natural religion, till he has fatisfied himself that no better directions are to be had. For, fince it is the business of religion to please God, is it not a very natural and a very reasonable inquiry to make, whether God has any where declared what will please him? at leaft, it is reasonable when we are called to this inquiry, by having a revelation tendered to us, fupported by such evidence, which, though it may

be eafily rejected without reafon, yet to reafon will ever approve itself.

But the inquiry into the evidence for any particular revelation is excluded by thofe who argue against all revelation a priori, as being inconfiftent with the wisdom of God. What they say amounts to this; That God, having given us reason, has bound us to obey the dictates of reafon, and tied himself down to judge us by that rule, and that only: to suppose otherwise, they imagine, would be to maintain that God gave us an imperfect rule at firft, and which wanted to be mended; a thing, they imagine, inconfiftent with his wifdom: and, the rule of reafon being fufficient, all revelation, they judge, must be useless and impertinent, and confequently can never derive itself from God. But, as it is too apparent to be denied, that reafon and natural religion never did in any age univerfally prevail; to help out the argument, it is farther supposed, that whatever happens in the world is agreeable to the original defign of God, and confequently, that those who have leaft of reason and natural religion are in the ftate for which God defigned them; and, if fo, it is abfurd to suppose a revelation fhould be given, to take men out of that state in which God originally defigned to place them.

This is the fum of the argument against revelation a priori: to confider it particularly will take more time than can be allowed: but in brief we may obferve,

1. That to argue, from the perfection of human reason, that we are discharged from receiving any

new laws from God, is inconfiftent with as clear a principle of reafon as any whatever, and which neceffarily arifes from the relation between God and man; which is, that the creature is bound to obey the Creator, in which way foever his will is made known to him and this furely is true with refpect to the highest order of beings, as well as to the loweft; for this plea, now made for human reason, would be presumptuous in the mouth of an angel, and inconfiftent with the fubjection he owes to God.

2. As to the perfection of human reason, it cannot be, nor, I fuppofe, will it be maintained, that human reason is abfolutely perfect; and therefore the meaning must be, that reason is relatively perfect, confidered as the rule of our obedience. But this is true only upon fuppofition that reason is the only rule of our obedience; for, if there be any other rule befides, mere reafon cannot be the perfect rule of our obedience: and therefore this argument is really begging the thing in question; for it supposes there is no other rule but reafon, which is the thing not to be fuppofed, but to be proved. As much may be faid for every law, as is faid in this cafe for human reafon : every law, being the only law in the cafe, is a perfect rule for the fubject's obedience, because the subject is bound to no more than the law requires: but, if the law be amended and enlarged by the fame authority that made it, it is no longer a perfect rule of obedience; but, to make it fuch, it must be taken jointly with the corrections and enlargements made by the proper authority.

3. Hence it follows, that to alter or add to a law once confidered as a perfect rule of obedience, when an alteration of circumftances requires it, is neither useless nor impertinent, but oftentimes the effect of wisdom and neceffity.

4. To fay that revelation is unneceffary, because reason is a perfect rule, and at the fame time to affirm that those who have but an imperfect use of reafon have no need of revelation, is a manifeft contradiction: to fay farther, that those who are in fuch a state that actually they do not obey the laws of reason, and, morally fpeaking, cannot obey, are nevertheless in fuch a ftate as God intended they should be in, is not only making God the author of evil, but it is ascribing to him two inconfiftent intentions: for to argue that God gave men reason to be the rule of their obedience, is fuppofing that his original intention is, that men fhould obey reafon; to argue at the fame time that those who live in difobedience to this law are in the ftate which God intended them to be in, is to suppose that God intended the law should be obeyed, and not obeyed, at the fame time. But to

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We are not now arguing in behalf of any particular revelation, which may be true or false for any thing that has hitherto been faid: but this I urge, that revelation is the fureft foundation of religion; and this wants no other proof than an explication of the terms: religion, confidered as a rule, is the knowledge of ferving and pleafing God: revelation is the declaration of God, how he would be served, and what will please him: and, unless we know

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