who never were, who never will be, capable of attending to abftracted reason. Now this natural evidence, distinguished from the intricacies of philofophy, is the thing which we inquire after, and which will ftand its ground, whatever becomes of the private notions of learned men for nature may be in the right in giving notice of a future life, however men may be mistaken, when they come to confider and ascertain the nature and cause of it; which to do is the mark and aim of philosophy.

But the common confent is the voice and law of nature; for what all agree in muft needs derive itself from fomething that is common to all; and what is fo, but the fenfe and inftinct of nature? When men come to fpeculation, they differ as much in the caft and turn of their minds, as they do in the features and lineaments of their faces; and therefore fpeculative reasoning will never produce a common perfuafion.

This belief and perfuafion of the certainty of a future life arofe from the common fense that men have of the difference of good and evil, and of every man's being accountable for the things done in this world; which account not being taken in this world, as the leaft degree of obfervation will enable men to fee, they concluded, or rather they felt from the very force of reafon and confcience, that there was an account to be given hereafter. Such an internal argument as this, which springs up in the heart and from the heart of every man, has a greater weight in it, than all the reasonings of philofophy put together, and will tie men down, if not to hope for, yet at least to fear a future immortality; either

of which is the filent voice of nature testifying the reality of a life to come.

That this is the true foundation of the univerfal belief of a future life, may be learnt from hence, that the perfuafion of another life was always connected with the fuppofition that there were different ftates for good and bad men; fo that you cannot any where trace the notion of immortality, but you find evidence alfo for the different conditions of men in another life, according as they have behaved themselves in this. Now these two opinions being thus infeparably united, it is easy to judge which is the natural fenfe, and which the confequence: let any man try, and he will find, that it is not the expectation of living, that makes men infer the reasonableness or neceflity of a judgment; but it is the reasonable and natural expectation of judgment, which makes them infer the neceffity and reality of a future life.

Into what great abfurdities this natural notion grew under the management of poets, is well known: they named the princes and the judges, and described the tortures of the wicked, as their fancies led them; and their inventions became the vulgar theology. But this still fhews the truth of what I have afferted; for neither would the poets, whose business it is to raise fine fcenes upon the plan and probability of nature, have so painted the torments and the enjoyments of men departed, neither would the world have received their inventions, had there been no foundation in nature to fupport the ro

mance.

As to fuch as imagine that the notion of a future

life arose from the descriptions and inventions of poets, they may e'en as well fuppofe that eating and drinking had the fame original, and that men had never thought of it but for the fine feafts and entertainments which are defcribed in fuch writers. The poets were the Papifts of antiquity, who corrupted the genuine fentiments of nature, and obfcured the light of reason, by introducing the wild conceits of folly and fuperftition: and, when once they had grafted the flips of fuperftition upon the stock of nature, they throve fo faft, and grew fo rank, that the natural branches were even ftarved by the luxuriancy of this wild olive. But ftill the root was natural, though the fruit was wild. All that nature teaches is, that there is a future life, diftinguished into different ftates of happiness and mifery, in which men will be rewarded or punished, according as they have purfued or neglected the rules of virtue and honour. And this notion prevailed where the fables of Greece had never been heard of; and wicked men felt in themselves the fear of the wrath which is to come, though they had never fo much as learnt the name of Tantalus or Sifyphus, or any other fufferer in the poets' scene of hell.

The natural evidence then of life and immortality ftands equally clear of the inventions of poetry, and the fubtilties and refinements of philofophy; and, though it be allied to both, yet it arose from neither. The truth of the cafe with regard to both is this: the poets found men in poffeffion of the doctrine of a future ftate, with rewards and punishments for good and bad men: upon this foundation they went

to work; and the plain draught of nature was almoft hid under the fhades and colours with which they endeavoured to beautify and adorn it. The philofophers found the fame perfuafion in themfelves and others, and, as their profeffion led them, fought out for phyfical reasons to fupport the cause. This inquiry has furnished us with the various opinions of antiquity concerning the nature and operation of the foul, its manner of acting in the body and out of it, its eternity and immortality, and many other curious pieces of learning. How far any or all of these inquirers into nature fucceeded in their attempt to prove the immortality of the foul from phyfical caufes, is another question. As to the present point, it is plain the natural evidence is not concerned in their fuccefs, whatever it is; for the natural evidence is prior to their inquiries, and ftands upon another foot, upon the common sense and apprehenfion of mankind: and the schools may determine the foul to be fire, or air, or harmony, or what else they please; yet ftill nature will make every man feel that the grave will not fecure him from appearing before the great tribunal, to which he is accountable.

So true is this, that, had it not been for philosophy, there had remained perhaps no footsteps of any unbelievers in this great article for the fenfe of nature would have directed all right; but philofophy mifguided many. For those who denied immortality, did not deny the common sense of nature, which they felt as well as others; but they rejected the notice, and thought it falfe, because they could not find phyfical causes to support the

belief, or thought that they found phyfical causes effectually to overthrow it. This account we owe to Cicero, one of the best judges of antiquity; who tells us plainly, that the reason why many rejected the belief of the immortality of the foul, was, because they could not form a conception of an unbodied foul. So that infidelity is of no older a date than philofophy; and a future ftate was not doubted of, till men had puzzled and confounded themselves in their fearch after the phyfical reason of the foul's immortality. And now confider how the cafe ftands, and how far the evidence of nature is weakened by the authority of such unbelievers. All mankind receive the belief of a future life, urged to it every day by what they feel transacted in their own breafts: but fome philofophers reject this opinion, because they have no conception of a foul distinct from the body; as if the immortality of the foul depended merely upon the strength of human imagination. Were the natural evidence of immortality built upon any particular notion of an human foul, the evidence of nature might be overthrown by fhewing the impoffibility or improbability of fuch notion: but the evidence of nature is not concerned in any notion; and all the common notions may be falfe, and yet the evidence of nature ftand good, which only fuppofes man to be a rational creature, and, confequently, accountable: and, if any philosopher can prove the contrary, he may then, if his word will afterwards pafs for any thing, reject this and all other evidence whatever.

The natural evidence, I fay, fupposes only that a