DISCOURSE V.

JOHN iii. 16.

God fo loved the world, that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whofoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life.

IN this paffage of Scripture, and in many others,

the redemption of the world by Chrift Jefus is afcribed to the love and goodness of God towards mankind. Whatever other difficulties men may find in the Gospel, one would suppose that it might be admitted to be, at least, a good representation of the divine mercy towards mankind, and fully to display that tenderness and compaffion to our weakneffes and infirmities, which we all hope for, and with some reason expect to receive, from our great Creator, whofe mercy is over all his works.

The cafe being fo, who would expect to hear any objection againft the Gospel derived from the topics of divine mercy and goodness? Yet fome there are, who think the mercy of the Gofpel to be imperfect, and that nature gives far better hopes to all her children. They conceive the infirmities of human nature to be unavoidable, and the mercy of God to be infinite; and from these confiderations they raise hopes as unbounded as they conceive the

mercy to be. As they derive these strong affurances from natural reason, they conceive all promises of mercy to be unneceffary, and therefore to be fufpected; and the argument is worked up not only to be an objection against the Gospel revelation, but against all revelations, either past or to

come.

There is nothing of more confequence to the credit and authority of revelation, than to reconcile it to the natural notions and the natural hopes and expectations of mankind; and indeed the promises of the Gospel and the hopes of nature are founded on the fame common principles. Ask a Chriftian, why did God redeem mankind by fending his Son into the world? he must answer, because men were finners, weak, and miferable, and unable to rescue themselves from their wretched condition. Afk him, what moved God to exprefs fo much concern for fuch worthlefs objects? he must resolve it into the goodness, and tenderness, and paternal affection of God, with which he embraces all the fons of

men.

Afk the Deift, upon what grounds he has hope and confidence towards God? he will reply, that he conceives it impoffible for a beneficent being to be rigorous and fevere towards the crimes and follies of fuch weak, foolish, and impotent creatures, as men: that their iniquities, though against the light of nature, yet flow from a defect in the powers of nature; fince it is no man's fault that he is not stronger, or wifer, or better, than he was made to be and therefore, though the light of reason renders him accountable for his actions, yet

his want of power to do what his reason approves, will make his defects excufable in the fight of his equitable Judge.

You see how nearly natural religion and the Gofpel are allied in the foundation of their hopes and expectations. It is pity fuch near friends, who have one common intereft, should have any disputes. But difputes there are.

Far be from us to weaken the hopes of nature. The Gospel is no enemy to these hopes; so far otherwise, that all the hopes and expectations of nature are so many preparations to the Gospel of Chrift, and lead us to embrace that mercy offered by Chrift, which nature fo long and fo earnestly has fought after.

But the question is, whether these natural hopes can give us fuch fecurity of pardon, and of life and immortality, as will justify us in rejecting the light of revelation? Now, whoever depends on the forgiveness of God, admits himself to be in a cafe that wants pardon; that is, admits himself to be a finner. This being the cafe of mankind in general, let it be confidered,

First, that natural religion could not be originally founded in the confideration of man's being a finner, and in the expectation of pardon.

Secondly, that the hopes which we are able to form in our prefent circumftances, are too weak and imperfect to give us entire fatisfaction.

Thirdly, that the coming of Chrift has fupplied these defects, and has perfected and completed the hopes of nature.

It must be allowed, that the original religion of

nature was agreeable to the original state of nature: and confequently, if natural religion is founded in the confideration of man's fin and weakness, it fellows, that man was originally formed a finner and weak. But farther,

Suppofing men made originally to be what we fee they are, upon what grounds are we to hope for an alteration for the better? For, if it was confiftent with God's goodnefs to put men into this state originally, how is it inconfiftent with his goodnefs to continue that ftate, which was at first his own appointment? He could no more act inconfiftently with his goodness at the beginning of the world, than he can at the end of it. If reafon therefore admits the present ftate of the world to be of God's appointment, it must never afterwards pretend to entertain hopes of being delivered from it; and without fuch hopes all religion is vain and ufelefs.

It may be thought perhaps, that, fuppofing the prefent ftate of things to be of God's appointment, we cannot be answerable for what we do; for why should he blame us for doing the work he has appointed? Allow this reasoning; yet no religion can be built on it; for it can go no farther than to fay that we ought not to be punished for our doings: it can never fhew that we have any title to be put into a better ftate: the utmost it can pretend to prove, is, that we are abfolutely unaccountable ; and, if fo, there is nothing we can do to lefs purpose, than to trouble our heads about religion.

Farther, if the laws of nature are the precepts of natural religion, as without all doubt they are, it

follows, that natural religion can be nothing else but obedience to the laws of nature; and, confequently, the genuine hopes of natural religion must be founded in obedience. This must neceffarily be the cafe; for all laws are made to be obeyed. No prince was ever fo abfurd as to make laws with this view, that his fubjects might break them, and he fhew his goodness in pardoning their tranfgreffions and yet this must have been the fcheme of Providence, if natural religion was nothing else from the beginning but an expectation of pardon for fin.

Secondly, let us take a view of our present state, without inquiring whether any and what change has happened to put us into this condition; and let us confider what may be expected from our present circumftances. Two things may be affirmed with certainty of the prefent condition of mankind: one is, that they have a sense of their obligation to obey the laws of reafon and nature; which is evident from the force of natural conscience: the other is, that very few do in any tolerable degree, and none perfectly, pay this obedience.

Let us examine then how religion will stand upon thefe circumftances. It is impoffible to found the hopes of religion on innocence and obedience; for obedience is not paid. On the other hand, absolute impunity cannot be claimed for all fins; much lefs can any degree of happiness, either present or future, be claimed in behalf of offenders. The utmoft probability to which human reason can arrive in this cafe, is, that, the goodness of God and the