the other hand, that William Rigden would particularly desire the union of his niece with a man so notoriously embarrassed as Col. Frederick, his lordship pointed out that there was every reason on both sides why the marriage should in the first instance have been kept secret, and then proceeded to analyse the evidence adduced in the case. Differing from counsel for the respondent, he looked upon the letter of William Rigden to his niece, not as a positive assertion of a belief that there had been no marriage, but of a doubt or fear that no such event had occurred. It was clear, however, that his niece Martha then assured him of her marriage, and not only asserted it, but supplied him with the means to some extent of testing the truth of her statement; that was shown by the memorandum which was found among his papers, for the information as to the facts which it purported to record could only have reached him from his niece. But, however that might be, it was clear that in 1776 both parties, whether truly or falsely, asserted the fact of their marriage, and took up their position of man and wife. It was therefore to be expected that their subsequent language and conduct would be consistent with that position, and no argument could consequently be drawn from the circumstance of their having addressed one another as they did. But whether legally married or not, they were heart and soul man and wife, and in almost every country but this their status would have been that which matrimony gives. This also was to be observed that the statement as to the marriage made by Martha Rigden to her uncle tallied in every respect with the statement which, years afterwards, Col. Frederick mentioned in the correspondence with his sister-in-law as having been made by him to his father at the Hague, and both combined went to show that the certificate, which, it was admitted, was in existence as late as 1870, was not an afterthought, and that it had been left with his wife in India for the purpose alleged by him. Reviewing the correspondence produced in the case, the Judge-Ordinary specially directed the attention of the jury to the circumstance of Mrs. Frederick having twice written in reference to her husband to Sir Charles Frederick, his father, and suggested that it was in the highest degree improbable that she would have presumed to write to him in the tone in which it was stated she had done, had she felt that her position was that of a mistress, and not that of a wife. Coming down to the period of Mrs. Frederick's return to England in 1793, he directed attention to the fact that she at once assumed her position in the Frederick family as the lawful widow of Col. Frederick, and that there was not only a complete recognition of her in that character in the correspondence which then passed between Lenox and Edward Frederick, but that her application to the East India Company was made with the full knowledge and concurrence of the members of both families. Their conduct after her death was of a like character; and as for John Rigden, by his appeal to the East India Company he asserted as plainly as a man could, that they were the legitimate children of his sister. The failure of Charles Frederick to prosecute the claim which he made in 1800 was a fair topic for comment as against the petitioner; but no stress could be laid on the letter in which, as alleged by the aged daughters of John Rigden, Col. Frederick had refused to marry his sister. There could be no question that the testimony of those ladies was conceived in the spirit of truth; but looking to their advanced age, and the contradictions involved in their evidence, not much reliance could be placed on their recollection of the contents of the document. If the version of it given by the eldest sister was correct—namely, that it was a positive refusal by Colonel Frederick to marry her aunt-it should be found that he had not only been guilty of

forging the certificate of his intended marriage, but of the folly of openly declaring his guilt; and that John Rigden, with this declaration of the true position of his sister in his possession, had made a false claim on behalf of her children to the East India Company. On the other hand, if the version of the paper first given, though afterwards departed from, by the second sisternamely, that Col. Frederick declined to go through the second ceremony of marriage with his wife Martha-was to be accepted as the true one, there would then be, so far from an acknowledgement by Col. Frederick that he had not married his reputed wife, an assertion by implication that he had, and John Rigden would also be relieved from the imputation of having lent himself to a fraud. In conclusion, his lordship informed the jury that while in 1773 no marriage could be celebrated without banns or licence, surrogates were intrusted, for general convenience, with the power of issuing licences. It was most unlikely, he said, that the alleged marriage could have been celebrated after the publication of banns; but, on the other hand, Col. Frederick had nothing more to do than to go to a surrogate—and it was to be presumed that there were some in Kent—and, having made a declaration that he and the lady he was about to marry had resided in the parish of Stalisfield for fifteen days, to obtain a licence as a matter of course. He did not say that that was the course which had been pursued, but it was still a matter which was open for their consideration.

After deliberating for about twenty minutes. the jury found as their verdict "that Col. Frederick and Martha Rigden were lawfully married, as alleged, on or about March 20, 1773." They also found in favour of the petitioner on the other formal issues of the case. The court thereupon pronounced a decree in

the terms of the prayer contained in the petition.

Application was then made to have the respondent condemned in costs, but the matter was allowed to stand over, it being doubtful whether, under the Legitimacy Declaration Act, the court has power to make such an order.

IV.

THE EXETER REREDOS CASE.

BOYD AND OTHERS V. PHILLPOTTS.

THIS was an appeal by the Dean and Chapter of the Cathedral, from a decision of the Lord Bishop of Exeter, ordering the removal of a reredos, with the figures thereon, which had been placed in the choir, and directing a stone screen, with the Ten Commandments thereon, which had been removed, to be replaced.

The case was brought before the Court of Arches, and was argued on three days at the latter end of July, by Dr. Deane, Q.C., and Mr. Walter Phillimore, for the appellants, representing the Dean and Chapter; and Mr. W. C. Phillpotts was counsel for the respondent, Chancellor Phillpotts, who is a Prebendary of the Cathedral.

Two questions were raised before the Bishop of Exeter on his visitation, at

which he was assisted by Mr. Justice Keating, as to his jurisdiction to hear the petition of the Chancellor against the reredos, and whether the images carved therein were illegal, so that he could direct its removal. The Bishop was advised by his learned assessor that he had power to hear the complaint; and, further, as the reredos was erected before a faculty or licence had been obtained, he could direct its removal by the Dean and Chapter; and his Lordship also decided that the images carved thereon, consisting of a representation of the Ascension of our Lord, the Transfiguration of our Lord, and the Descent of the Holy Ghost on the day of Pentecost, could not lawfully be placed in the Cathedral. On appeal to the Dean of Arches the Chancellor appeared under protest, and the Court having decided that it had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, the questions raised by the Dean and Chapter as to the right of the Bishop to order the removal of the reredos, and the legality of the images thereon, were fully discussed.

The Dean of Arches (Sir Robert Phillimore) in giving his judgment, commenced by saying that the case was one of considerable importance. It had been argued with much ability and learning, and he gladly took the opportunity of thanking the learned counsel on both sides for the assistance which their industry and talent had rendered to the Court. After adverting to the principal features of the case, his Lordship said he was of opinion that the Bishop, acting alone, had not the power to order the removal of the reredos any more than he had the power, acting alone, to prevent the Dean and Chapter putting it up. Inasmuch, however, as he thought the parties had a right to the judgment of the Court upon the most important part of the case-namely, upon the legality of the structure itself, he would not shrink from the labour and responsibility of giving his decision on that point also. The learned Judge went fully into the matter. It was, no doubt, legal for the Bishop to hold a triennial or special visitation, and it was at the latter that the Bishop had ordered the removal of the reredos. After mentioning several cases, the learned Dean expressed himself as clearly of opinion that the appeal to this Court was properly brought. The Bishop had held, with the advice of his assessor, that the erection of a reredos without a faculty was illegal, as also were the images thereon. The appellants, as he understood the argument, did not object to the right of the Bishop to visit the Cathedral, but contended that his power was limited; and after the decision in the case of the Dean of York, and the Order in Council as to the diocese of Exeter, it was clear that whatever was to be done in such a matter was to be done not by the Bishop acting alone, but by the proper Court. For instance, as to stealing of the Communion plate, a Bishop would have power on a visitation to inquire into the matter, but the punishment for such an offence would be for a Criminal Court. He had asked, how in this particular case the order of the Bishop was to be enforced on the Dean and Chapter? and he had received no answer. No case had been cited to the Court, of a faculty being obtained by a Dean and Chapter for the erection of a reredos; and before Sir R. Phillimore held his present office he had been chancellor of several dioceses, and could not remember a single instance of a faculty for a reredos in a cathedral. In Exeter Cathedral a reredos was erected in 1823 without a faculty. And if such an authority was necessary, then a citation for the whole diocese of London would be required for the alterations and improvements at St. Paul's Cathedral. According to Lord Coke, the Dean and Chapter formed a council to a Bishop. After a careful consideration of the question, he was of opinion that the absence of an episcopal faculty did not

make the erection of the reredos illegal; and he was of opinion that the Bishop had no power to order its removal. For the sake of argument he would assume that the Bishop had the power, and would consider whether the images on the reredos made it illegal. Considering the historical representations on the reredos he thought that they were edifying to the beholder, and by no means obnoxious; but if they were prohibited by law they must be removed. His Lordship proceeded to the consideration of several objections urged by Mr. Phillpotts to the figures on the reredos, and the last one was an appeal to the learned Dean's judicial discretion. There was another objection, that the Ten Commandments which had been removed were to be placed at the east end; and from what had been said by Mr. Justice Keating he apprehended that the Dean and Chapter would replace them, and intended to carry out the suggestions which had been made. After an exhaustive discussion on the several points, and after citing numerous authorities on images, from an early period, he alluded to the appeal made by Mr. Phillpotts as to his discretion; and it was urged that to allow the images to remain would be to adopt the usages of Rome said now to prevail, and on that ground the structure was an appeal to return to such uses, and tended to superstition. If there was such a tendency he deeply lamented it, but he doubted whether the tendency, as alleged, was to be counteracted in the manner proposed; he thought there was great danger in unintentionally doing the work of Rome by denying to the Church of England the innocent aid which the arts of painting and sculpture, within due limits, ministered to religion. Referring to the 30th canon it was stated that the sign of the Cross was greatly abused in the Church of Rome, but the abuse of a thing did not take away the use of it. He did not think that the reredos put up by the Dean and Chapter could be said, to borrow the words of the 30th canon, to 66 endanger the Church of God, nor offend the minds of sober men," any more than the painting on the boss of the Crucifixion, on the roof of the Cathedral, directly over the choir, which was equally obnoxious to almost all the objections made against the reredos, though its removal had not been sought. The prayer of the appellants to the Court was that they might be dismissed from all further observance of justice, and that the respondent might be condemned in costs. It followed from what he had said that he must grant the first part of the prayer, but as to the latter he hesitated. After referring to a statement as to Lynton Church, where a faculty had been refused by the Chancellor, his lordship concluded: "I shall be glad to think that peace is about to be restored to this Cathedral, and that the golden maxim is about to prevail-in necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas, in omnibus caritas. I hope the prayer for costs will be withdrawn."

Dr. Deane was understood not to press for costs.

Sir R. Phillimore said, he must order the sentence of the Court below to be reversed on the question of jurisdiction, as also on the question of the legality of the reredos. The appellants would be dismissed from all further observance of justice, and no order would be made for costs.

Notice of appeal was given shortly afterwards to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and the case will accordingly be heard in the spring of 1875.

V.

MARTIN V. MACKONOCHIE.

THE following is an abstract of the judgment given by the Dean of Arches, (Sir Robert Phillimore) in this case on December 7. The learned judge divided the charges which had been brought against the defendant by permission of the Bishop of London, by Mr. John Martin, into three classes. One, including those which were as yet undecided by a court of law: a second, those in reference to which a decision had already been given by the Court of Arches; and a third consisting of those offences which had been already decided by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In the first of this class was included the charge against the defendant of using lighted candles ceremoniously, or at all events illegally. It had been contended by the defence that the candles were not symbolical of anything, and were, therefore, no cause of offence. His Honour, however, said that the use of the candles in the manner described must either be ceremonious or unnecessary, and he must, therefore, decree that the articles referring to that act were substantiated. In regard to the elevation of the paten and bread, and of the cup and wine, the learned judge mentioned that it was contended by the prosecution that they had been raised to a much greater degree than was sanctioned by the laws ecclesiastical, but the evidence given with regard to this was conflicting. Mr. Todd, who was called on behalf of the prosecution, said that the elevation of the elements took place to such a degree that he considered it would fall under the decision of the Privy Council which was given in the case of Hibbert v. Purchas. Mr. Layman, however, who was called by the defence, and who was in a much better position to form an opinion in regard to the offence than the previous witness, had stated plainly that the act was not performed in such a manner as would be illegal. It must also be remembered that Mr. Proctor, another witness who was called by the prosecution, had not been asked for any evidence by the learned counsel which would substantiate the performance of the act in the manner described in the articles. His Honour, therefore, considered that the offence so charged had not been proved. In reference to the offence contained in the second division, his Honour said the defendant had been charged with bearing lighted candles, a crucifix, and banners containing among other things representations of the Virgin Mary, and also with changing his vestments in the church. These acts had been already forbidden by the Court in the case of Elphinstone v. Purchas, and were proved by the evidence. He therefore pronounced the article proved. The charge of singing the "Agnus Dei," or the hymn "O Lamb of God," immediately after the prayer of consecration, had been contended to have been founded on bad ground, as it was only sung as an ordinary hymn, and was composed of the words of the hymn which was sung after the Communion had been received by the people. He, however, had referred to the Prayer-book, and considering that the alleged offence had been proved, and that it had already been condemned in the case of Elphinstone v. Purchas, he must decree that the article was proved. The further ceremonies of making the sign of the cross and kissing the Prayer-book, the learned