that they are represented in common with their fellow-subjects, have also a separate parliament of their own; that their incapacity to sit in the House of Commons, has been confirmed by repeated decisions of that House; and that the law of parliament, declared by those decisions, has been, for above two centuries, notorious and undisputed. The author is certainly at liberty to fancy cases, and make whatever comparisons he thinks proper: his suppositions still continue as distant from fact, as his wild discourses are from solid argument.

The conclusion of his book is candid to an extreme. He offers to grant me all I desire. He thinks he may safely admit, that the case of Mr. Walpole makes directly against him; for it seems he has one grand solution in petto for all difficulties. "If (says he) I were to allow all "this, it will only prove that the law of election "was different in Queen Anne's time from what "it is at present."

This, indeed, is more than I expected. The principle, I know, has been maintained in fact; but I never expected to see it so formally deelared. What can he mean? Does he assume this language to satisfy the doubts of the people, or does he mean to rouse their indignation? Are the Ministry daring enough to affirm, that the House of Commons have a right to make and unmake the law of parliament at their pleasure? Does the law of parliament, which we are often told is the law of the land, does the common right of every subject of the realm, depend upon an arbitrary, capricious vote of one branch of the legislature? The voice of truth and reason must be silent.

The Ministry tell us plainly, that this is no longer a question of right, but of power and force alone. What was law yesterday is not law to-day and now, it seems, we have no better rule to live by, than the temporary dis

F

cretion and fluctuating integrity of the House of Commons.

Professions of patriotism are become stale and ridiculous. For my own part, I claim no merit from endeavouring to do a service to my fellow. subjects. I have done it to the best of my understanding; and, without looking for the approbation of other men, my conscience is satisfied. What remains to be done, concerns the collective body of the people. They are now to determine for themselves, whether they will firmly and constitutionally assert their rights, or make an humble, slavish surrender of them at the feet of the Ministry. To a generous mind there cannot be a doubt. We owe it to our ancestors, to preserve entire those rights. which they have delivered to our care. We owe it to our posterity, not to suffer their dearest inheritance to be destroyed. But, if it were possible for us to be insensible of these sacred claims, there is yet an obligation binding upon ourselves, from which nothing can acquit us; a personal interest, which we cannot sur render. To alienate even our own rights, would be a crime as much more enormous than suicide, as a life of civil security and freedom is superior to a bare existence: and if life be the bounty of Heaven, we scornfully reject the noblest part of the gift, if we consent to surrender that certain rule of living, without which the condition of human nature is not only miserable but contemptible.

JUNIUS.

LETTER XXI.

TO THE

Printer of the Public Advertiser.

SIR,

August 22, 1769. I MUST beg of you to print a few lines in explanation of some passages in my last letter, which, I see, have been misunderstood.

1. When I said, that the House of Commons never meant to found Mr. Walpole's incapacity on his expulsion only, I meant no more than to deny the general proposition, that expulsion alone creates the incapacity. If there be any thing ambiguous in the expression, I beg leave to explain it, by saying, that, in my opinion, expulsion neither creates, nor in any part contributes to create the incapacity in question.

2. I carefully avoided entering into the merits... of Mr. Walpole's case. I did not inquire whether the House of Commons acted justly, or whether they truly declared the law of parliament. My remarks went only to their apparent meaning and intention, as it stands declared in their own resolution.

3. I never meant to affirm, that a commitment to the Tower created a disqualification.---On the contrary, I considered that idea as an absurdity, into which the Ministry must inevitably fall, if they reasoned right upon their own principles.

The case of Mr. Wollaston speaks for itself. The Ministry assert, that expulsion alone creates an absolute, complete incapacity, to be re-elected to sit in the same Parliament. This proposition they have uniformly maintained, without any condition or modification whatsoever. Mr. Wollaston was expelled, re-elected, and ad mitted to take his seat in the same parliament.

I leave it to the public to determine, whether this be a plain matter of fact, or mere nonsense or declamation.

JUNIUS.

LETTER XXII.

TO THE

Printer of the Public Advertiser.

September 4, 1769. ARGUMENT against Fact; or, a new system of Political Logic, by which the Ministry have demonstrated, to the Satisfaction of their Friends, that Expulsion alone creates a complete Incapacity to be re-elected; alias, That a Subject of this Realm may be robbed of his common Right, by a Vote of the House of Commons.

FIRST FACT.

Mr. Wollaston, in 1698, was expelled, re-elected, and admitted to take his seat.

ARGUMENT.

As this cannot conveniently be reconciled with our general proposition, it may be necessary to shift our ground, and look back to the cause of Mr. Wollaston's expulsion. From thence it will appear clearly, that," although he was "expelled, he had not rendered himself a cul"prit, too ignominious to sit in parliament: and "that, having resigned his employment, he was "no longer incapacitated by law." Vide SeriOr thus: "The ous Considerations, page 23. "House, somewhat inaccurately, used the word "expelled; they should have called it a motion." Vide Mungo's Case considered, page 11. Or, in short, if these arguments should be thought insufficient, we may fairly deny the fact. For example: "I affirm that he was not re-elected. "The same Mr. Wollaston, who was expelled,

" was not again elected. The same individual, "if you please, walked into the House, and "took his seat there; but the same person, in "law, was not admitted a member of that par"liament, from which he had been discarded."

SECOND FACT.

Mr. Walpole, having been committed to the Tower, and expelled, for a high breach of trust, and notorious corruption in a public office, was declared incapable, &c.

ARGUMENT.

From the terms of this vote, nothing can be more evident, than that the House of Commons meant to fix the incapacity upon the punishment, and not upon the crime; but, lest it should appear in a different light to weak, uninformed persons, it may be advisable to gut the resolution, and give it to the public, with all possible solemnity, in the following terms, viz. "Resolv"ed, That Robert Walpole Esq. having been

that session of parliament expelled the House, "was, and is incapable of being elected a mem"ber to serve in that present parliament." Vide Mungo, on the Use of Quotations, page 11.

N. B. The author to the answer to Sir William Meredith seems to have made use of Mungo's quotation: for, in page 18, he assures us, "That "the declaratory vote of the 17th of February, "1769, was, indeed, a literal copy of the resoin. "tion of the House in Mr. Walpole's case."

THIRD FACT.

His opponent, Mr. Taylor, having the smallest number of votes, at the next election, was declared not duly elected.

ARGUMENT.

This fact we consider as directly in point, to prove, that Mr. Luttrell ought to be the sitting member, for the following reasons: "The bur