T

HE use of the railway as a means of rapidly moving troops and supplies is essentially of German origin. It was first practically applied in the Schleswig-Holstein campaign of 1849-50, although a considerable military party in Prussia was opposed to the innovation. A French officer, travelling in Prussia in 1851, reports that several generals with whom he discussed the advantages and drawbacks of the new method of transport agreed in condemning the use of the railway except in cases of extreme urgency. It was gravely contended that railway travelling tended to impair the discipline of the troops and to lessen their power of marching. For the cavalry it was especially unsuitable, owing to its injurious effect upon the health of the horses; while munitions of war would be liable to premature explosion or other accidents.

Despite these objections, the railway was used by the Prussian authorities with marked success in 1864, 1866, and 1870, since which time every effort has been made to improve and, so far as possible, complete the arrange ments for concentrating the greatest number of men on any given frontier at the shortest notice.

Austria was prompt to follow the example of Germany; but, until very recently, France was dangerously inferior to both the great empires, alike in the strength and organization of her railway troops. For many years For many years after the Franco-German war, the French authorities were too fully occupied in reforming fundamental abuses, and in thoroughly reorganizing the army as a whole, to spare much time for the consideration of questions of detail. Previous to 1884, the French Railway Corps consisted of only four companies, and even these were imperfectly equipped and organized. The Russians at that time possessed twenty companies, the Austrians and Germans eight companies each. Moreover, while the French had made no arrangements for increasing the effective of the four companies on the outbreak of war, the Germans were prepared at a moment's notice to raise their railway troops to many-fold their peace strength. Lieutenant Nairle, of the Swiss Engineers, in his report to the Swiss Bundesrath on the German railway organization in 1875, estimated that the war effective of the Imperial railway troops, after calling up the Reserve and Landwehr, would exceed 20,000 men.

VOL. VIII.

The weakness of the French Railway Corps was, indeed, so evident, that the authorities were obliged to call upon the great companies to furnish eight field sections of workmen and artificers if war should break out. The paper strength of each of these sections was 1,165 men, giving a total of about 9,320. The section was divided into three divisions. The first, consisting of about 460 men, was employed in traffic duty; the second, comprising about 430 men, in work on the line; and the third, composed of the remainder, in the working and repair of the rolling stock.

The peace strength of each of the regular companies was four officers and 122 non-commissioned officers and men. In order to ensure their efficient training, the four companies, each of which was nominally attached to a regiment of engineers, were permanently quartered at Versailles. The selection of this place was, under the circumstances, extremely practical. The neighbourhood of the extensive practice ground of Satory, the existence of several lines of railway, and a considerable reserve of rolling stock and other material, were advantages of an extremely valuable character.

The French authorities were, however, for a long time, content with the progress thus made, and were either unable or unwilling to still further increase the strength of the Railway Corps. This was, no doubt, due in great part to the frequent changes in the office of War Minister, which occurred towards the close of the last and the beginning of the present decennium. The successive Ministers held their portfolios during too brief a period to permit the elaboration of a thorough scheme of reorganization.

The long expected and much needed change came under the War Ministry of General Campenon in 1884. By a decree of 30th July of that year, the 20th Battalion of Engineers, stationed at Arras, was converted into the second battalion of the Railway Corps, which has since consisted of two battalions, or eight companies. By this measure, the peace effective of the French railway troops was raised to a level with that of the corresponding German units; and since the change, much has been done to ensure their rapid mobilization.

In May last, however, the Germans again drew ahead. The Army Bill of 1887 more than doubled the effective of the railway troops, raising the number of companies to eighteen-14 Prussian, 1 Saxon, 1 Wur

M

tical experience in railway management, in which their French congeners are almost wholly wanting. Towards the end of last October the mobilization of

pensate for its numerical weakness. Moreover, it is generally felt that the exclusive control which the German troops have for years exercised over a considerable section of railroad near Berlin has given them a prac

appointed to take place at the Camp of Satory. As a the 4th Technical Section of Railway Workmen was preliminary parade the troops marched past General Saussier, the Military Governor of Paris, and then

broke off to carry on a series of operations, having for their base the following "general idea" :

"The enemy, who occupied the railway line from Massy-Palaiseau to Valenton, is supposed to be hurled back to the east of Paris.

"On retreating, the enemy leaves a detachment of troops of the Railway Corps between Palaiseau and Wissous to destroy the rails, which are assumed to consist only of a single line.

"The order is given to the Railway Corps to proceed in an armoured train, and make a reconnaissance of the

Our illustrations represent blowing up the permanent way; an attack made on an armoured train; and some varieties of the uniforms worn by the Railway Corps.

Early in the morning a half troop of the 16th Dragoons arrived from Paris at that point of the railway destined for destruction-about one hundred metres from the junction of the Sceaux Railway. Under the personal superintendence of General de Gressot, commanding the Cavalry Division, to which the 16th Dragoons were attached, the troopers blew up the line by means of dynamite and melanite cartridges. Immediately after

CHIEF OFFICER OF TELEGRAPHS.

line; then to repair the damage done to the line by the enemy. This done, necessary steps are to be taken at the Wissous Station to provide for the detraining of troops and material.

"The line restored to a state of efficiency, a daily service of ten trains each way will be established.

"Four of these trains will detrain troops at Wissous Station.

"The chief Etappen station will be Massy-Palaiseau." Following the above general idea, the operations were carried out with marked success under the intelligent irection of the chief officers of the staff.

NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER (TRAFFIC).

them came the Corps of Engineer Railway Workmen, and unpinned the rails from the sleepers for a distance of 180 metres. In the meanwhile, the armoured train carrying the detachment charged to repair the line, started from Versailles, Matelots, at 10 A.M., the workmen furnished with all necessary tools and implements to carry on their works.

At 10.45 A.M. the convoy arrived at Massy-Palaiseau, and occupied the platforms, loaded with plant necessary to effect the repairs of the line. At Palaiseau, the chief Etappen station, the detachment entered into the dangerous zone. So it advanced with extreme care and