1812.] EFFECTS OF THE WAR UPON COMMERCE-COTTON. amounted only to 2,700,000l., and the total exports to 1,440,000. The internal resources of America were indeed very great, in her unlimited amount of territory, in the adventurous industry of her people, and in the rapid multiplication of the communications between the several States. In 1790 there were under 2000 miles of Post Routes, with 75 Post-offices. In 1815 there were nearly 44,000 miles of Post Routes, with 3000 Post-offices. But the American population would never have quadrupled in half a century without the stimulus of foreign commerce. The great Cotton cultivation of the Southern States was at the period of this war very imperfectly developed, and their slave population was consequently less identified with the ruthless tyranny of the demand for labour than with the milder servitude under the original planters. It might have been supposed that the interruption of our cotton supply by the war of 1812 would have produced an essential derangement of that great branch of our manufacturing industry which had enabled us in a considerable degree to support the pressure of the continental war. But at that period the imports of American cotton were comparatively trifling. The first arrival of cotton wool from America was one bag from Charleston delivered at Liverpool in 1785. In 1791 only 2,000,000 lbs. of cotton were grown in the United States; in 1801 the crop was about 40,000,000 lbs.; in 1811 the crop was estimated at 80,000,000 lbs. The exports of cotton, which had been 62,000,000 lbs. in 1811, were reduced to 28,000,000 lbs. in 1812, and to 19,000,000 lbs. in 1813. When we compare these figures with the 961,707,264 lbs. of raw cotton imported into the United Kingdom from the United States in the year ending 31st of December, 1859, we may estimate the danger and difficulty of a diminished supply now, as compared with the period when the commercial intercourse of the two countries was wholly suspended, except through the extensive operation of that contraband trade which no blockade or embargo could prevent.* It is a singular fact, as showing the notions of commercial policy which prevailed at that period in the legislative mind, that Earl Darnley, in the House of Lords on May 14, 1813, complained that "American Cotton, on a system that could not be too severely reprobated, had, until lately, been allowed to be imported, to the great detriment of our own colonies, and to the great advantage of the territory of our enemies." The cotton-spinners of York at that time addressed a petition. to the House of Commons, in which they said, that having learnt that petitions had been presented to the House in favour of a prohibition on the exportation of cotton-wool, the growth of America, they prayed the House not to adopt any measures which could assist the efforts of foreign nations to supplant our cotton manufacture, and which would prove the entire ruin of the trade of the petitioners. In the Remonstrance of Massachusetts the Congress is asked, "Must we add another example to the catalogue of republics which have been ruined by a spirit of foreign conquests. . . Were not the territories of the United For the preceding statistical facts regarding the United States at the time of the War, we have consulted "Geography of America," published by the Society for Diffusion of Useful Knowledge; Porter's "Progress of the Nation;" Macgregor's "Commercial Statistics,” vol iii. ; the "English Cyclopædia," art. United States; and the "American Almanac," for 1861. + Hansard, vol. xxvi. col. 180. Ibid., p. 203. 8 INVASIONS OF CANADA DEFEATED-INDIANS. [1812. States sufficiently extensive before the annexation of Louisiana, the projected reduction of Canada, and the seizure of West Florida ?" Within a fortnight after the declaration of war, the American general Hull set out for the invasion of Canada with a force of 2800 men. On the 12th of July he crossed the river Detroit, and captured the small open town of Sandwich. From this place he issued a proclamation threatening a war of extermination if the savages were employed in resisting his advance. The English commander, major-general Brock, had, however, collected a force of 700 British regulars and militia, and 600 Indians, with which he repulsed Hull in three attempts against Fort Amherstburg, and compelled him to recross the river to Detroit. On the 16th of August Hull capitulated with 2500 men to Brock and his little army. A second attempt to invade Upper Canada was made by the American general Wadsworth, who, on the 13th of October, carried Queenstown with a large force. In the defence of Queenstown, general Brock, the gallant English commander, fell; but reinforcements of English troops having arrived, Wadsworth was totally defeated, and surrendered with 900 men. At the time of Hull's capitulation to Brock, the American fort in the small island of Michillimackinac was taken by a force of English, of Canadians, and of Indians. The employment of Indians in the first American war had aroused the eloquent wrath of Chatham, when he exclaimed, "Who is the man who will dare to authorize and associate to our arms the tomahawk and scalping knife of the savage?" Not only American but English writers denounce their employment in the war of 1812, as a stain upon our national reputation. Certainly it is to be apprehended that whenever the Indians were acting in detached bodies, as allies of the British and Canadians, their warfare was marked by the reckless destruction of life and property, and by their accustomed cruelty to the vanquished enemy. It is not clear, however, that the charge is unexceptionably just that the British brought into the conflict "savages of too low an order to be under military command.” * It is but fair to state that in the last despatch of general Brock, addressed to sir George Prevost, Governor in chief of the British provinces of North America, he says, that many of the Indian nations had been engaged in active warfare with the United States, notwithstanding the constant endeavours of the British government to dissuade them from it; that from the breaking out of the war, they took a most active part; and that they were led in the attack upon Hull at Detroit by an English colonel and an English captain. "Nothing," adds general Brock, "could exceed their order and steadiness. A few prisoners were taken by them during the advance, whom they treated with every humanity. Such was their forbearance and attention to what was required of them, that the enemy sustained no other loss in men than what was occasioned by the fire of our battery." + This might have been an exceptional case, in which the common ferocity of Indian warfare might have been controlled by one of the most honourable and the most lamented of the British officers in America. The savages fighting under him cannot be described as of "too low an order to be under military com * H. Martineau, "Introduction to History of the Peace." 1812] NAVAL SUCCESSES OF THE AMERICANS. mand." The British authorities undoubtedly put arms into the hands of the Indian chiefs when the war broke out. The crime was not in arming these daring warriors, with the intent to bring them under the common subjection. of the soldier to his officer; but in leaving them when they were armed to their own uncontrolled action, in which "forbearance" would have been accounted by them weakness and not virtue. The early successes of our land forces could scarcely have been expected. The number of regular British troops in Canada was about 4500 men; the militia of the two provinces was not more in number. The American regular army was equally small. But the prowess of the American militia had been capable in the former war of gaining victories over the disciplined troops of Burgoyne and Cornwallis. The politicians of London were surprised at the victories of 1812. They saw a great host of the militia of the Northern States ready to fight with the warlike enthusiasm of democratic populations. They were unacquainted with the philosophical demonstration, "that when a democratic people engages in a war after a long peace, it incurs much more risk of defeat than any other nation." The first successes of our armies in America begat a confidence that the duration of the war would be attended with similar triumphs. There was surprise when our troops in Canada were beaten. There was universal indignation when, in the last year of the war, the choicest of the Peninsular troops were routed at New Orleans. It was not understood that the chances of success for the army of a democratic people are necessarily increased by a prolonged war; and that such an army, if not ruined at first, would become the victors.* At the commencement of the war of 1812, the naval force of the United States consisted of four frigates and eight sloops, manned by 6000 seamen. The British navy comprised, of ships in commission for sea service, a total of 621; of these, 102 were ships of the line; of frigates, from 44 guns to 32, there were 111; of smaller frigates, sloops, gun-brigs, and cutters, there were more than 300.+ What, thought the people of this country, could the petty American navy effect against such a force? The London Gazette, of the 6th of October, announced the capture of Detroit and the capitulation of Hull. The London Gazette, of the 10th of October, contains a despatch from vice-admiral Sawyer, enclosing "a letter from captain Dacres, of his Majesty's late ship Guerrière, giving an account of his having sustained a close action of near two hours, on the 19th ult., with the American frigate Constitution, of very superior force both in guns and men (of the latter almost double), when the Guerrière, being totally dismasted, she rolled so deep as to render all further efforts at the guns unavailing, and it became a duty to spare the lives of the remaining part of her valuable crew by hauling down her colours." The American frigate Constitution, which captured the Guerrière, was of 1533 tons, whilst the English frigate was of 1092 tons. On the 16th of October the American brig Wasp captured the British sloop Frolic, each being of 18 guns, but the American vessel much superior in tonnage. Both these small vessels were captured soon after the action by the British ship of the line Poictiers. Another disaster quickly * See De Tocqueville, vol. iv. chap. xxiv. + See Tables to James's "Naval History." 10 LARGER BUILD OF AMERICAN FRIGATES. [1812. followed the loss of the Guerrière. The British frigate Macedonian, after a most gallant fight, was captured by the American frigate United States. in the case of the Guerrière, the tonnage of the Macedonian was nearly a third less than the tonnage of the enemy's frigate. Again, on the 29th of December, the Java, of 1092 tons, was captured by the Constitution. The British sloop Peacock, which struck to the American brig Hornet on the 14th of February, 1813, was the fifth ship of our navy, numbering 621 vessels in commission for sea service, which had hauled down its colours in engagements with four ships of that navy which comprised only four frigates and eight sloops. The people of this country were in astonishment, and almost in despair, at this unexpected result. The glory of our navy had departed. "The charm of its invincibility had now been broken; its consecrated standard no longer floated victorious on the main." * France and other nations rejoiced, saying that England's maritime tyranny was at an end. The Admiralty was assailed by denunciations of its incapacity and neglect. It was answered that our naval force on the American stations at the commencement of the war was in no degree insufficient; that from Halifax to the West Indies there were stationed ships seven times more powerful than the whole of the American navy. Our government was evidently ignorant of the great inequality in the comparative size of what were called American frigates. The Constitution, the United States, and the President, were intended for line-of-battle ships. Although only single-decked vessels, they had the same tonnage and capacity for carrying men as the greater number of British two-deckers. They were ships of the line in disguise. The Americans no doubt knew that the captain of a British 32-gun frigate was bound to fight any single-decked ship, and that he would be liable to a court-martial if he shrank from such an engagement. Our government, which prescribed the rule, shut its eyes to the inevitable danger. Scarcely a frigate of our navy in the Atlantic was sailing with a consort. As in the outset of every other war, and too often during its continuance, the British Admiralty was the slave of routine. It neither built frigates, nor cut down line-of-battle ships, capable of meeting these enormous American vessels called frigates. It sent the captains and crews of ordinary frigates to fight single-handed against such disparity of force. There were numerous fast two-deckers that might have been employed on the American stations, ready for meeting these vessels on equal terms. The Admiralty believed that a frigate was a frigate, and ought to contend with any other frigate. The government was, in truth, too busy with the European war to pay much attention to an enemy regarded with an official feeling approaching to contempt. Seven years only had elapsed since the glories of Trafalgar, when the British navy felt degraded and humiliated by these unforeseen triumphs of an enemy with whom that generation of seamen had never measured their strength. A spirit of emulation was quickly roused. The commanders and crews of ships in the Atlantic knew that it would not be enough to make prize of merchant vessels and sweep privateers from the seas, but that the honour of the British flag would be impaired unless some achievement could * Earl Darnley in the House of Lords, May 14, 1813-(Hansard, vol. xxiv. col. 182.) 1813.] THE SINGLE COMBAT OF THE SHANNON AND THE CHESAPEAKE. 11 restore its old prestige. There was a captain of a frigate on the Halifax station whose chivalrous feeling prompted him to some exploit in which, with an equal enemy, he might rely upon a sound ship and upon well-trained men. Captain Broke, of the Shannon, had, by careful training, brought his crew into the highest state of efficiency. He had been long watching the frigate Chesapeake in the harbour of Boston. These frigates were of nearly equal strength in their weight of metal and their number of men. Captain Broke, in his desire to fight a duel with the American frigate, had sent away his consort, the Tenedos, and had then despatched a courteous challenge to captain Lawrence of the Chesapeake, in which he says:-"I request you will do me the favour to meet the Shannon, ship to ship, to try the fortunes of our respective flags. All interruption shall be provided against." This challenge was sent on the 1st of June, and immediately afterwards the Shannon lay-to under Boston lighthouse. Captain Lawrence had not received Broke's letter when he sailed out of the harbour, followed by many seamen and other inhabitants of Boston in barges and pleasure boats, who expected that this daring demonstration of the hostile frigate would be followed by its speedy capture. At half-past five in the afternoon the American hauled up within hail of the Englishman on the starboard side, and the battle began. After two or three broadsides had been exchanged, the Chesapeake fell on board the Shannon, her mizen chains locking in with her adversary's fore-rigging. Broke immediately ordered the two ships to be lashed together, and the select men to prepare for boarding. His own pithy narrative tells the result more effectively than any amplification. "Our gallant bands appointed to that service immediately rushed in, under their respective officers, upon the enemy's decks, driving everything before them with irresistible fury. The enemy made a desperate but disorderly resistance. The firing continued at all the gangways, and between the tops, but in two minutes' time the enemy were driven sword in hand from every post. The American flag was hauled down, and the proud old British union floated triumphant over it. In another minute they ceased firing from below, and called for quarter. The whole of this service was achieved in fifteen minutes from the commencement of the action." This single combat, fought on the anniversary of Howe's great victory, had as much effect in restoring the confidence of England in her naval arm as if an enemy's squadron had been brought captured into her ports. Captain Broke sailed off with his prize for Halifax, where captain Lawrence, who had fought his ship with real heroism, died of his wounds, and was followed to the grave by the officers of the Shannon. The details of the campaigns in Canada would have small interest for the present generation. The vicissitudes of this warfare, the advance of the Americans one week and their retreat the next, the skirmishes, the surprises, scarcely excited the attention of the public of this country, coming close upon the stimulating narratives of the retreat of Napoleon from Moscow, or the march of Wellington from Torres Vedras to Madrid. The battle of "Chrystler's Farm" could scarcely compete in interest with the victory of Salamanca. In 1813 the British were compelled to evacuate York (now Toronto), the capital of Upper Canada. The Americans there burnt the public buildings; which act was alleged as the justification for a more |