whose friendship he defires; he may, after all his endeavours, be miferably disappointed. But now, on the contrary, he who will give up his name to Chrift in faith unfeigned, and a fincere obedience to all his righteous laws, shall be sure to make him a friend for ever; a friend, who will own him in his loweft condition, fpeak comfort to him in all his forrows, counsel him in all his doubts, anfwer all his wants, and will never leave him nor forfake him.

But when all earthly friendships fhall fail us, he will then take us under his protection, will embrace, and cherish, and fupport us; and, as the pfalmift expreffeth it, he fhall guide us with his counfel here, and afterwards receive us into glory.

SERMON

XIV.

Chance directed by God.

[From Dr. SOUTH's first volume.]

PROV. XVI. 33.

The lot is caft into the lap, but the whole difpofing of it is of the Lord.

T

HESE words contain a declaration

of the exactness and univerfal extent of the divine providence, in an instance. which of all others it is the most unlikely to be concerned in; and that is, the cafting of lots: the event of which is looked upon as intirely cafual and accidental.

Some there are, who would have the word chance or accident quite difcarded out of the world, as being of impious and profane fignification. And indeed, if the word chance be taken by us, in that sense, in which it was used by the heathens, so as to make any thing cafual in refpect of God himself, their exception ought juftly to be admitted.

But to fay a thing is a chance or cafualty, as it relates to mankind, is not profaneness, but a great truth; as fignifying no more, than that there are fome events, beyond the knowledge, purpofe, expectation, and power of men; And for this very reason, because they are fo, it is the royal prerogative of God himself, to have all these loofe, uneven, fickle uncertainties under his difpofal.

The fubject therefore, that from hence we are naturally carried to the confideration of, is the admirable extent of the divine providence, in managing the most contingent paffages of human affairs: The lot is caft into the lap, but the whole difpofal of it is of the Lord.

Which that I may the better treat of, I fhall confider the event of a lot, in these two refpects:

I. As it is fubject to God's knowledge. II. As it is fubject to his direction and providence.

.

R

I. Let us confider the event of a lot, as it is fubject to God's knowledge.

The light of man's understanding is but a fhort, diminutive, contracted light, and

looks

looks not beyond the prefent. He knows nothing future, but as it hath fome kind of prefence, in the certain and conftant manner of operation belonging to its cause; as we know, that fummer will caufe heat, and when it is winter there will be cold: but whether God will continue the world to the return of another feason, we cannot know, by any certain argument, either from the nature of God, or of the world.

But when we look upon fuch things, as relate to their immediate caufes, with a perfect indifference, fo that in refpect of them, they equally may or may not be; human reason can then, at the best, but conjecture what will be. And in fome things, as here in the cafting of lots, a man cannot, upon any ground of reafon, bring the event of them fo much as under conjecture.

The choice of man's will is indeed uncertain, because in many cafes it is free; but yet there are certain habits and principles in the foul, that have fome kind of fway upon it, apt to bias it more one way than another; fo that upon the propofal of an agreeable object, it may reasonably be conjectured, that a man's choice will rather

incline

incline him to accept, than to refuse it. But when lots are fhuffled together, in a lap, urn, or pitcher; or a man blindfold cafts a dye; he can have no reason in the world to prefume, that he shall draw this lot rather than another, or throw fuch a dye rather than the contrary.

And these things being out of the compafs of man's knowledge, they must also confequently be out of his power. For no man can govern that which he cannot poffibly know: Since to dispose of a thing, implies both a knowledge of the thing to be difpofed of, and of the end that it is to be difpofed of to.

But now, God knows perfectly every event of the most casual things in the world. He, by reafon of his eternal, infinite, and indivisible nature, is, by one fingle act of duration, present to all the fucceffive portions of time, and confequently, to all things fucceffively exifting in them. Which eternal indivifible act of his existence, makes all future things actually prefent to him. And it is this prefence of the object, which founds the unerring certainty of his knowledge.

But