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Debate on the Second Reading of the Constitution Bill.

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proposed changes of the Constitution. | bition. I repudiate the gross aspersion, Now, a more fallacious, a more errone- not only for myself, but for every hon. ous, a more unjust and false charge, member of this House. I fling it back was never made. So far from this being to its vile and contemptible authors with the case, I broadly assert the present indignant scorn. (Loud cheers.) I Legislative Council was elected chiefly assert, and before I sit down I will prove in reference to this very purpose. Aye, to the satisfaction of every calmly reI will go further, and aver that amongst flecting man, that it has been the most all those who have any real knowledge anxious desire of the committee enof the political position of the colony, it trusted to frame this measure, to take was elected exclusively with reference to the sense of the country upon the Conthis very object(cheers)—that the sole stitution to be adopted-to obtain the function for which they were and ought real sense of the country, and, having to have been elected, was to frame the obtained the sense of the people, to give Constitution, which for the first time it a local habitation and a name. the Minister and Parliament of Great (Cheers.) It is perfectly easy to show Britain had given them power to make that the committee and the Council for themselves. (Cheers.) I believe have never had any feeling inimical to the minister who bestowed upon the the rights and privileges of any class in representatives of the people in this the community. The Council, I repeat, colony the power to exercise this func- under the Constitution of 1850, was tion, believed that the attention of the elected for the express purpose of framCouncil, elected under the present con- ing a Constitution for this colony. stitution, would in the first instance be Well, what did it do in its first session? turned to it alone. And I further be- It simply did nothing in the matter but lieve that the mind of that minister re-affirm the petitions and remonstrance must be filled with astonishment to find of the previous session. And how was that three years have been allowed to this deference to the opinion of this elapse without any fruit having been country met? Not a single voice was matured from the great and important heard to offer a suggestion. The result power bestowed upon us. (Cheers.) I of the delay was nothing but universal contend, therefore, that there is not the silence. (Cheers.) And what conclushadow of foundation for this proposi- sion, I ask, had this Council a right to tion in the petition; but that, on the draw-were, I contend, compelled to contrary, it was to this body—this very draw--from this universal silence? Why, Council, that the duty of framing a Con- that the country had the fullest confistitution has been exclusively entrusted: dence in the Legislative Council; that and that it was with the knowledge that they believed the representatives they the Council had to perform the greatest had elected, in discharging the great and highest functions ever entrusted to duty cast upon them by the Parliament them that its present members have of Great Britain, would fulfil that duty been returned by the constituencies conscientiously to themselves, and satisthroughout the country. (Cheers.) The factorily and beneficially to the public whole tenor of the petitions and speeches at large. It evinced, also, that the which have been made against the Elec- opinions of the constituencies of the toral Act under which the Council has colony remained the same as they were been elected, and also against the Bill some four or five years ago, when, with now under consideration, is plainly that one voice echoing throughout the length they both went to further the private and breadth of the land, they repudiated interests of a party who were inimical the proposition of Lord Grey of a Conto the welfare of the country, or who stitution based on this very principle of were prepared to sacrifice that welfare double election now so loudly but so to their own personal aggrandisement, rashly demanded. The moment that or the furtherance of their private am- mischievous proposition was published,

the tocsin of alarm was sounded throughout the colony. Never before, never since, had there been so great a manifestation of political feeling as took place on that occasion. Sydney, the metropolis of the colony, took the lead in the movement; but throughout the towns, the small remote inland towns of the colony, the feeling extended, until every district had spoken out unmistakably that the people of New South Wales would not have this mischievous principle introduced into their civil government, but that they would have a constitution assimilated, as nearly as circumstances would allow, to the glorious constitution of their Father Land. (Great applause.) That was the opinion declared by the people of Sydney then, reiterated throughout the colony, and echoed, I believe, from the heart of every colonist. (Cheers.) This was four years ago, and there had been no expression of public opinion since to show that any reaction had taken place, or that the feeling of the country had changed in any way; and seeing this, the committee that framed this measure, and the House which appointed that committee, have a right to believe that it is the feeling still. (Cheers.) Now the next step taken by the Council in the performance of this duty, thrown expressly upon them by the Act of Parliament, and to perform which they had been elected by the country, was taken by myself. In the second session of Council under the Constitution of 1850, I, thinking it necessary and desirable that the Council should adopt some measure to take advantage of the boon conceded to them, and about which the great body of the people seemed so apathetic, moved for a select committee to inquire into and report upon the form of Constitution best suited for this colony. That committee sat for some months, anxious to receive all the opinions and information that could be afforded from out of doors. On the 17th Sept. it brought up its report, and a Bill, embodying its recommendations, which were in favour of a double legislature, consisting of a Representa

tive Assembly and an Upper House nominated by the Crown, not, I admit, in the same form as is proposed by the present Bill, but in principle exactly similar. This report and Bill were published; and on the 28th Septemberagain in deference to public opinion, to give time for approval of, or dissent from, the substantive proposition then brought before them-the House adjourned till November. This adjournment was made for the express purpose of eliciting the opinion of the country on the Bill prepared by the former committee. And the period of the adjournment passed away not only without the slightest opposition, but without the slightest expression of opinion from any section of the community. (Cheers.) If those who framed that Bill had been actuated by the sinister and selfish motives which had been so broadly imputed to them, they had, when the House met, the most glorious opportunity ever offered to evil-minded men to carry out sinister and selfish designs. (Cheers.) Why, if I had chosen to have done so, I could have carried that Bill, which so far as the elective principle is concerned was quite as objectionable as the present one, through the House triumphantly. There would have been no one to oppose it. (Cheers.) But at the suggestion of my hon. and learned friend the member for Cumberland (Mr. Darvall) who acted with me on that occasion, I consented to withdraw the Bill for the Session, in order to give still further time for the expression of public opinion, and to allow the measure to be more extensively discussed by the press. I was further induced to this course, because I thought it was prudent that we should wait until we were made acquainted with the fate of our petition of rights and our remonstrances, forwarded to the Queen and Parliament. In our then state of ignorance as to what concession the Minister of England was prepared to make, it was difficult, if not dangerous, for us to proceed with the measure; and for this reason, and for the purpose of giving further time for the expression of public feeling, the subject was allowed,

as the wisest and most patriotic course, to stand over till this session. But again, the same universal silence prevailed. There was no feeling displayed of opposition to the Bill, which in principle I again contend was identical with that which is now before us. The public had only a right to expect that the same measure would be re-introduced. The Council had given them no anticipation that further enquiry and deliberation would take place on the subject, but the impression out of doors must have been, that as no opposition had been manifested against it, it would be again brought in and adopted. They had no right to think anything else to imagine there would be any difference between the Bill of last session and that of the present; but till the beginning of the present session the public out of doors has been silently acquiescent in the proceedings of the Council, and in the Constitution proposed for them, which, I again repeat, was identical in principle with the present measure. (Cheers.) How could the House avoid coming to the conclusion, under circumstances such as these, that the nominative principle contained in both bills met the approbation of the country? We found that it was in accordance with the spirit of those petitions sent to the foot of the Throne, four years ago, from all parts of the colony. We had heard of no alteration in the opinions of the people; we had waited patiently for the country to say what it would have; we had submitted a constitution which had neither been rejected nor opposed; and what course was open for the Council but the continuance of that course which had so constantly met the silent acquiescence of the country? (Great cheering.) If there were any blame to attach to the production of this measure, it fell, not upon the members of the committee, nor upon any member of this House, or on any member of the Government, but on those only who, having all along failed in their duty, became now the impugners, not only of our measures but of our motives. (Loud cheers.) I

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do not know whether it is worth my while to refer at all to the proceedings out of doors yesterday in regard to this question. But I cannot help expressing my deep regret that so many members of this House should, by taking part in these proceedings, have forgotten alike what was due to themselves and to the dignity of the Council. (Cheers.) I feel that by the part they have taken in this matter they have destroyed the freedom of the representatives of the country: they have degraded the position which the Legislature of the country ought to occupy; and I lament much to see some hon. members, my friends, and who have on most occasions acted with me, consent to sink from the rank of representatives to that of mere miserable delegates. (Loud applause, and no, no," from Mr. Darvall.) My hon. and learned friend says No, no; but I ask the House can any hon. members who have identified themselves with the proceedings of yesterday act in this House as free agents? (Cheers.) Why, if the arguments they have put forward were refuted to their own absolute conviction-if the declarations and reasonings, if they could be called such, used at that meeting, could be utterly demolished-blown into thin air—if it could be proved to demonstration that the Constitution this Bill offered was calculated to secure on the most permanent basis the free institutions, and the moral, social, and material interests of the colony, they could not now support it. They had become the delegates, the pledged delegates, of a noisy and intemperate faction, and they must continue in that degraded position to the end. (Cheers.) But, feeling all this deeply, I have also another duty to perform-I have to express my gratitude to the hon. and learned member for Cumberland (Mr. Darvall) for the chivalrous defence he made of the purity of my motives, at the meeting yesterday. I feel the hon. gentleman is the more entitled to my gratitude, because I am quite sure the generosity he displayed must have exposed him to considerable obloquy, and considering the parties he

had around him, I have little doubt to some personal risk. (Laughter and cheers.) I can assure the hon. and learned member the good intention he exhibited of creating a favourable impression in my behalf in the minds of my constituency will be of no avail, for long before I shall stand before that constituency again, all that my hon. and learned friend has said in my behalf will be unsaid by somebody else who for the moment may be the oracle of the mass. (Cheers.) I do feel regret, however, of no common kind, that the hon. and learned member should have committed himself in a manner so inconsistent with constitutional freedom, and that he should have descended from his high estate to degrade himself to the rank of a mere delegate. (Cheers.) I will now proceed to advert to the much abused measure which I have had the honor to bring up, and to explain some of the principles on which it is founded. In doing this I shall not consider it my duty to take the course which is generally followed in reference to Bills at this stage, of drawing attention to all its important clauses. I shall not advert to those clauses which, not having been opposed out of doors, may be taken to have met with general assent. It will be enough for me to state briefly that these clauses embody the following great principles: Entire freedom on the part of the colony from taxation by the British government—a repudiation of the schedules reserved by act of the British Parliament--the entire disposal of all the revenues of the colony, whether ordinary, casual, or territorial—the control of the Customs Department, with the power, as it were, to use the pruning knife in cutting down that department the investment of all colonial patronage in the Governor for the time being and the Executive Council-the plenary power of legislation so long contended for by the Council, and the want of which has so often impeded the passing into law of measures which were essential to the welfare of the country, and as a necessary consequence of these, responsible government; and in con

sideration of all these privileges gained by the colony the bill gives to her Majesty a civil list securing certain fixed salaries to the different heads of departments of the public service. To these rights and these concessions there did not seem to be any opposition, either in the House or out of doors, and I shall therefore proceed at once, and confine myself to those clauses only the introduction of which into the Bill has subjected me to so much obloquy and abuse. These are simple and few in number, and involve, first, the principle that the Constitution to be fixed by the measure shall not be altered, except by a majority of two-thirds of the members of both houses of the Legislature; second, the distribution of the eighteen representative members required to bring the number of the House of Representatives up to its present number, when the eighteen members who now hold seats as nominees are taken away; and third, the composition of the Upper House, which the 4th and 5th clauses of the Bill proposed to erect. These three points, I take it, are the battle field of this question, and it is therefore unnecessary for me to refer to any thing else. On the first of these points, in respect to which so much clamour has been made, I will state, in passing, that there is not a single paltry joint stock company in the colony in which the same principle is not introduced. But, passing over this, I will turn for a precedent and authority for it to the constitution of those model States which seemed to be adopted as the climax of all that is excellent in constitutional freedom by the most vehement opponents of this measure; those States the name of which was in every man's mouth in reference to the Constitution fitted for this colony: I mean the United States of America. I find that this same principle prevails in their Constitution. The fifth article of that Constitution provides :

Congress, whenever two-thirds of both amendments to the constitution, or, on the houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a convention

to pieces by every blast of popular opinion. What community of men could, I ask, be brought to live together under such a government as this would be? What security for person or the rights of property, or the administration of the law, or social order, would there be under such a Constitution? It has been argued against this clause, that there was no such principle as it contains in the British Constitution. This I admit to be true; but it arises out of circumstances entirely different from those which obtain here. The British Consti

for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this constitution, when ratified by the legislature of three-fourths of the several States, or by conventions in threefourths thereof, as the one or the other may be proposed by Congress: provided that no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner effect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article; and that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate. Now from this it will be seen that I have not adopted the power of impeding organic changes in the Constitution of this colony which exists in the Constitution contains an original and inherent tution of the United States. If I had power of legislation. Our power, on done so it would have been necessary the contrary, is merely derivative. It that all such changes should have been is not in the power of Parliament to agreed to by three-fourths, while in this make such a provision, and even were Bill the majority required is reduced to it made it would not be binding on any two-thirds. But I will proceed still subsequent Parliament. That is the further to quote from a book of high reason why no such provision is to be authority on this point, the work of found in the English Statute-book. And one of the most wise and distinguished in fact all the more important measures of American statesmen-I allude to carried through Parliament of late Mr. Calhoun. Speaking of the power years, such as the Test and Corporaof the Legislature to modify the Con- tion Act, the Catholic Emancipation stitution, Mr. Calhoun says: Bill, and the Reform Bill, have been carried by very slender majorities. Yet slender as these majorities were, the House must recollect that these great measures so essential to the freedom and advancement of the people, were only carried after considerable impediments and delay had been interposed by the great Conservative principle of the constitution. This great princple, though sometimes obstructive in a certain sense, has been productive, upon the whole, of the utmost good, and I confess that it is the object of my veneration. And I am of opinion, that no modification of the British Constitution will be perfect without it. I shall not adduce any further authorities in support of this clause of the Bill; enough has been said to show that those rapid and empty declaimers who are ready to pick a hole in any man's jacket (a laugh), and who opposed this necessary provision, neither understood the principles or the practice of the belauded model about which they talk and prate so much. (Laughter.) Such people are

That it still continues to exist in the several States, in a modified form is clearly shown, by the fifth article of the Constitution, which provides for its amendment. By its provisions, Congress may propose amendments, on its own authority, by the vote of two-thirds of both houses; or it may be compelled to call a convention to propose them by twothirds of the legislature of the several States; but, in either case, they remain, when thus made, mere proposals of no validity, until adopted by three-fourths of the States, through their respective legislatures; or by conventions called by them for the purpose. Now I will ask whether these are not high authorities in support of the principles of the Bill-a principle which if there were no precedents at all, is, I believe, absolutely necessary in a Bill like this. Can it be right, can it be rational, I would ask, that organic changes should be made in the Constitutions of great countries by bare majorities? (Cheers.) It was the object of the committee who framed this Bill to frame a Constitution in perpetuity for the colony-not a constitution which could be set aside, altered and shattered

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