not think, according to our idea and use of the words. Yet we have granted essentially that form of intelligence which is all that a large and increasing class of philosophers are willing to allow to man. If man is destitute of intuitive ideas, then he occupies the exact position we have assigned the brute, and is no better furnished than he. Surely, it should be sufficient to give the animal kingdom all that such men as Mill, Spencer, Bain, are willing to grant to man. we still withhold the word thought, it is because we do not believe that thought, strictly so called, is possible on this narrow basis. Man possesses what the brute possesses, and in kind it is in the one exactly what it is in the other. The lower powers have not the same scope in human life, because they are in a measure displaced and overshadowed by the higher. This question demands for its discussion as thorough a mastery of psychology as of zoology; and we submit, therefore, what we have said as much to those who know man as to those who know all save man.

This Article had been prepared before the publication of "The Descent of Man," by Darwin. As that work discusses the relation of human and brute powers, expressing the views of a large school of modern scientists, it commands attention. It presents, however, no new grounds, and no sufficient reasons on which to modify the views we have now put forth. Darwin gives the following instance, as striking as any of those offered by him, of the intelligence of brutes: "Mr. Colquhoun winged two wild-ducks, which fell on the opposite side of a stream; his retriever tried to bring over both at once, but could not succeed; he then, though never known before to ruffle a feather, deliberately killed one, brought over the other, and returned for the dead bird." The question in this and like cases is, what is the character of the mental phenomena that accompanies the action are they reflective-linked by thought; or are they associativelinked by experience? We think the last. Darwin must, to make them examples in point, affirm the first. We do

not believe that the retriever reflected: "I cannot carry over both birds, I must therefore kill one, and then return for it." This rather was the form of the facts: it tried to bring both, found itself unable, and, with the force of life-long associations, as the bird was ready to escape, closed its jaws upon it rather than lose it. What we deny to the state of mind in this dog, and in other like cases, is what may be termed thoughtful perspective; we substitute for it immediate association, as the entire form of life in brutes is more consistent with this view; and, moreover, we are not to attribute higher powers as long as those more primitive and simple can explain the facts. Suppose a carpenter, perfectly conversant with the business, to be engaged in sorting mixed lumber, laying it aside for various purposes. The labor would proceed for the most part without definite consideration, under fixed automatic associations, leaving the mind in a large measure vacant for thought proper. The requisite conclusions follow instantly on vision, having been made familiar by long practice. Deliberate thought arises only now and then, made requisite by some piece less obviously apt for any purpose. Thus the brute, by the established connections of his past experience, unites appropriate action to given conditions, without halting for the distinct recognition of either, or reflection upon them. His states and actions lie together, like colors on the canvass, and it is only the rational mind in looking upon them that interjects the perspective spaces of thought.

That the mental state of the mere animal is expressed by these direct connections is shown by its inability to acquire or use language. Language springs from a perception of relations, and is made necessary by the effort to distinguish and retain them. No brute can be produced that uses language in this its thoughtful aspect; and for the simple reason, that brutes are without thoughts, in this strict sense. The brute is not held back from expression by the want of vocal organs. These, in some cases, could be cultivated, and in other cases this want might be supplied. He does not speak,

because the subjective ground and occasion of speech are lacking. The feelings of the brute are called forth by objects of sense, and find expression in the presence of those objects; but not discerning relations, possessed of no abstract ideas, it finds no occasion for an arbitrary sign with which to designate them. The simplest sentences at once involve these, and therefore are never constructed by the brute. The dog is emotionally cognizant of the absence of his master, and sends up the wailing howl; but he does not say to himself, My master is absent, and thus has no occasion to say it to another. If he did, recognizing the relations of time and space, utter the thought to himself, he would certainly find the need and the method of uttering it to another. We help the brute in vain to language, because in his use of vocal sounds he is stepping into the air: no idea steadies the mind for a second stride.

What Darwin says of the moral nature discloses in the clearest light the wide chasm between the two views. His purpose is to show, that the rudiments of all rational powers are found in the highest classes of the animal kingdom-that the faculties of brutes are in kind those of men. He establishes his conclusion, however, not by elevating the brute, but by degrading man; not by disclosing the truly rational element in those powers, but by hiding it in these. If our moral nature is nothing more than the present and hereditary force of conventional views of private and public utility, then certainly we are content to find its rudiments in the dog. We disagree with Darwin, not in making brutes lower than he does, but in making men much higher. His philosophy is Spencerian, and, with due deference to the talent expended upon it, we believe radically wrong. With the exception of a brief space devoted to it, Darwin assumes the essential unity of faculties in man and the brute; and his theory of the origin of species postulates a oneness in kind of their endowments. This conclusion, a careful examination of all the facts, we believe, will more and more discredit. To this result a clear recognition of instinct as a normal, constitutional force decidedly tends.

ARTICLE IV.

THE DIVINE AGENCY IN THE ESTABLISHMENT, ADMINISTRATION AND TRIUMPH OF CHRIST'S KINGDOM.

BY SAMUEL HARRIS, PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY, YALE COLLEGE.

THE kingdom of Christ is not originated and advanced by the spontaneous development of humanity; but a redeeming power comes down upon humanity from God, and enters into human history as an always-working energy, quickening men to spiritual life and transforming society into the kingdom of God. This thought is repugnant to the rationalism and naturalism of this age; but it is distinctive and essential in Christianity, and must be recognized in any truly rational philosophy of human history. It is the subject which is now to be considered: The Divine Agency in the Establishment, Administration, and Triumph of Christ's Kingdom.

The historical course of the divine action in redemption, as set forth in the scriptures, is familiar, and needs only to be indicated. The divine energy of redemption enters human history at its very beginning and declares itself in promise. It appears in the call of Abraham and the promise to all the world through his seed, giving a distinct organization to God's kingdom in the call of a chosen people, to be his, as the prophets continually insist, not by outward descent, but by his covenant and promise, and their faith and obedience; a kingdom, as Paul explicitly demonstrates, differing in form, but the same in essence with the same kingdom as it afterwards appeared in the Christian church. Centuries after the call of Abraham the Jewish state appears, itself a Theocracy, within which the germinant kingdom is secluded and protected, as a chestnut in its prickly bur, until it is ready

to drop and become the germ of a great tree. Then God is in Christ, makes propitiation for the sins of the world, subdues the power of darkness and death, and makes worldwide the power of attraction by which, from the Saviour's cross, he draws all men to himself. This saving power is perpetuated in the Holy Spirit "poured out on all flesh." Christ at the right hand of the majesty on high, administers his kingdom by the invisible agency of the life-giving Spirit. By this the energy of redeeming grace widens its scope, intensifies its action, multiplies its agencies, and makes itself more and more manifest as a spiritual power established in human history, quickening a spiritual church, directing human thought and action, guiding the forces of civilization, and transforming society into Christ's kingdom. Finally, Christ will come a second time to judgment and will present his kingdom, completed and glorious, to the Father.

Here is a divine action running through human history, working the redemption of man from sin. We will confine our attention to some of the general characteristics of the divine agency in the establishment, administration. and triumph of Christ's kingdom.

I. The Divine Agency is Historical.

Here is the starting-point of the difference between Christianity and Rationalism.

Christianity, being essentially redemption, is necessarily historical. It is the promised Christ of the Old Testament, the living Christ of the New Testament, the Christ reigning and life-giving in the dispensation of the Spirit. Christianity, therefore, is not primarily doctrine, but history; not philosophy or ethics, but the historical action of divine love redeeming man from sin. It is history in the past, lifegiving energy in the present, promise for the future.

Rationalism, on the contrary, is the doctrine that human reason, without supernatural intervention, is sufficient for all man's spiritual needs. God moves above and before man in the undeviating and majestic movement of nature. Man