ADDRESS ON THE KING'S SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF THE SESSION.

FEBRUARY 2d, 1826.

MR. J. STUART WORTLEY moved the Address, which was seconded by Mr. Green.-Agreeably to long established usage, it was an echo of the King's speech. A protracted discussion took place on the various topics relating to the embarrassment which had occurred in the commercial transactions of the country since the close of the last session of Parliament. The recognition of South America-the successful mediation of England in the conclusion of a treaty between the crowns of Portugal and the Brazils—and the state of Ireland, were also touched upon in the course of this discussion.

MR. SECRETARY CANNING* said, that although he had not expected that any difference of opinion would have been excited by the speech of his right honourable friend, (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) still, as some strange misconception had arisen upon several of the topics contained in it, he was anxious to state to the House the manner in which he had himself understood them. The House had been addressed by two honourable members from different sides of the House, who had both evidently misconceived the meaning of his right honourable friend. The misconception of one of the honourable gentlemen (Mr. Hume) was perhaps natural, and at any rate might be accounted for; but, how the misconception of the other (Mr. Pearse) had arisen, it was impossible

for him to imagine. The honourable gentleman opposite seemed to apprehend that his right honourable friend had a plan for erecting joint-stock banking companies or corporations, which would swallow up all the existing establishments. Now, the plan of his right honourable friend went no further than to take off, with the consent of the Bank of England, a few years sooner than it would otherwise expire, a prohibition, of which the effect, by the concurrent opinion of all who had spoken upon the subject, was to make weakness, instead of strength, an inherent quality in the system of country banking. It required not the agency of his right honourable friend, that the evil which the honourable gentleman apprehended should take place in the year 1833; that there should then be no longer any privilege in the Bank of England to prevent more than six persons from becoming partners in the same banking concern; that that privilege should then cease with the existence of the bank charter; and that such corporations and joint-stock companies as the honourable gentleman appeared so much to dread, should then rise up in all parts of the country. But, under what circumstances, he would ask the honourable gentleman, would that evil occur, supposing the present law to remain unaltered? On the one hand, the privilege of the Bank of England, which prevented the spreading of a wider basis for the transactions of country banks, would continue to exist till the year 1833; and on the other, there was, by law, in the country banks an unlimited power to issue small notes up to precisely the same period. Now, if the undoing of the privilege of the Bank of England was so fraught with mischief as the honourable gentleman seemed to think, how would that mischief be aggravated, if it were to operate upon an unlimited and unrestricted issue of country bank notes? His right honourable friend had two objects in view in the measure which he proposed. The

first was, to accelerate the period at which the prohibition was to be removed, which, as he had before said, entailed weakness upon the country banks; and the second was, by limiting the issues of those banks, to make the new power given to them operate with less suddenness upon the existing establishments. Whether the consequence of withdrawing the privilege of the Bank of England would be that new banks would be created all over the country, or that the ancient and long established ones would widen their foundations by coalescing with new partners, he could not pretend to decide positively at present. The honourable gentleman seemed to assume that the latter consequence would take place, but, as appeared to him, without sufficient reason. He could see no reason why, when the power of widening the basis of country banks was given, it should not operate to add a seventh, or an eighth, or even a tenth partner to the existing establishments, rather than to create new establishments all over the country, to rival and extinguish the old ones. Surely, every establishment would have the power, either by an accession of strength, or a consolidation of interests, to guard against the evil which the honourable gentleman appeared to apprehend.

With respect to the idea of his right honourable friend pressing his measure unawares upon the country, he must say that nothing had fallen from him which indicated any such intention; and, if his right honourable friend had not dwelt more at large upon the details of his measure, it was, that it had been so often before Parliament, or at least so long before the public, that it was only necessary to refer to it, to bring it to the minds of gentlemen who were at all acquainted with the subject. There was another point which the honourable gentleman appeared to have overlooked in his view of the question. If it were an evil, it was one that the Bank could create at present on any day in the week; for it could create branch

banks in all parts of the country; and if there was a necessity for a more solid system of banking, the alternative was, either that the Bank of England should establish branch banks throughout the country, or that power should be given to other parties to establish banks for themselves. Now, if the establishment of either were likely to be ruinous to the existing establishments, which he denied, that ruin was equally inevitable, whichever side of the alternative was taken, whether the Bank of England was the agent for such branch establishments, or whether advantage was taken of the Bank of England withdrawing its privileges for the purpose of allowing others to establish banks, taking and absorbing the old banks, or coming into collision with them, if so it turned out; which he for one considered very unlikely. The country was in this situation, that one of these measures it must embrace-either it must permit the Bank of England to exercise its privilege of establishing branch banks all over the country-which would be equally fatal, if the competition of confidence and capital can be fatal, to the old establishments, with the creation of new banking corporations,—or, it must adopt the plan of his right honourable friend for taking advantage of the Bank of England's surrender of its privilege to establish new banks on a wider basis, not so formidable as rivals to the Bank of England, nor possessing that quality of repulsion to existing establishments which it did; or, thirdly, the country must remain in its present situation, with a clear view of all the mischief resulting from its present insecure and insufficient system of banking. Between these three alternatives, if he might be permitted to use such a solecism, the House and the country had now to choose. As to the last of them, he believed that there would be no difference of opinion. The House seemed inclined to agree, that it was not that measure to which it would resort. As to the other two, it was

clear that the latter he meant that of incorporating more than six partners into each establishment-would, even on the principle avowed by the honourable gentleman himself, be more effectual for the purpose which it was intended to answer, would be established with the least shock, and would be best calculated to save the interest of existing establishments. It was impossible to discuss this subject without feeling it to be due to the Bank of England to say, in addition to the praises which had been bestowed on it with no niggard hand for its conduct in the administration of its affairs, that nothing became it more than the grace with which it had consented to strip itself of this part of its privileges. It was idle to say that the privilege was odious; it was idle to say that it was a monopoly: it might be both odious and a monopoly; still it was an inherent privilege of the establishment. By law they had it; and from the possession of it not even the boasted omnipotence of Parliament could disturb them. It was an unfair view of human nature, and of the principle of possession, to treat such a sacrifice with levity. Such a rare occurrence as the voluntary abandonment of a possession, which was not merely a grace or ornament, but was valuable as a source of profit, deserved the highest panegyric. The Bank of England might have kept it, because they had it-because the law had given it to them--because no man could extort it from them. The Bank of England might have kept it, in order to make a bargain with the public for some other consideration. The Bank of England might have kept it, in order to prevent the rivalry of the country banks, which they might apprehend in those parts of England of which they had hitherto had the exclusive possession. They might have kept it without assigning any cause for so doing, except their own will; but they had yielded it up to the public for reasons which did them immortal honour.

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