trustee can be impeached by any beneficiary on this ground, unless it appears that the consideration for the sale was thereby rendered inadequate; and no sale by a trustee can, after the execution of the conveyance, be impeached as against the purchaser on this ground, unless it appears that the purchaser was acting in collusion with the trustee (r).

Trustees, to whom an estate is devised for the whole estate of the testator therein by will coming into operation after the 12th August, 1859, charged with debts or legacies, but without any provision for raising them, have, under Lord St. Leonards' Act, power to sell or mortgage; but they have not power to do so if the estate is devised to persons beneficially in fee or in tail (s).

From the 28th August, 1860, to the 31st December, 1882, inclusive, trustees had power, under Lord Cranworth's Act, to mortgage for the purpose of raising money required for equality of exchange or for renewal of a lease (t). This provision was repealed by the Settled Land Act, 1882 (u); but by the Trustee Act, 1888, a similar power for the purpose of renewing a lease is given to trustees whenever their trusts were created (x).

Trustees, as persons authorized or required to pay estate duty, appear to have power under the Finance Act, 1894, to raise the amount of duty, and interest, and expenses by sale or mortgage of, or a terminable charge on, the property or any part of it (y).

Before the 1st January, 1882, persons paying money to trustees and having notice of the trust were bound to see to its application, except

(1.) Where the instrument creating the trust provided otherwise.

(2.) Where the receipt was given between the 1st January,

(r) Trustee Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 59), s. 3; Trustee Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 53), s. 14.

(s) 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, ss. 14-18; Re Wilson, Pennington v. Payne, 54 L. T. 600; 34 W. R. 512.

(t) 23 & 24 Vict. c. 145, s. 9.

(u) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 38, s. 64 (1). (x) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 59, ss. 11, 12 (1); Trustee Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 53), s. 19 (2), (3).

(y) 57 & 58 Vict. c. 30, ss. 8 (4), 9 (5).

1845, and the 30th September, 1845, inclusive, unless the contrary was expressly declared by the instrument creating the trust (≈).

(3.) Where the instrument creating the trust was dated subsequently to the 27th August, 1860 (a), or, in the case of purchase or mortgage money, subsequently to the 12th August, 1859 (b), and the contrary was not expressly declared by the instrument creating the trust.

(4.) In certain cases in which the intention to cast upon persons paying money the duty to see to its application could not be reasonably inferred, e. g., where the trust was for payment of debts generally (c). This exception did not, however, apply to trusts for payment of specified debts.

As will be seen from the exceptions stated above, trustees of instruments creating trusts after the 12th August, 1859, could give good receipts for any purchase or mortgage money, unless a contrary intention was declared by the instrument creating the trust (b); and after the 27th August, 1860, trustees had somewhat more extensive powers of doing so (d); and now trustees can give a good receipt for money paid to them after the 31st December, 1882, irrespective of the date of the instrument creating the trust, such receipt exonerating the person paying from seeing to the application of the money (e). A purchaser need not therefore now inquire as to a receipt clause, or whether the property has become absolutely vested, so as to put an end to the efficacy of a receipt clause; but, nevertheless, inasmuch as on some titles questions may arise which depend upon the power of trustees, prior to the 1st January, 1882, is still of importance, and has therefore been given above.

(*) 7 & 8 Vict. c. 76, s. 10; 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 1.

(a) Lord Cranworth's Act (23 & 24 Vict. c. 145), s. 29.

(b) Lord St. Leonards' Act (22 & 23 Vict. c. 35), s. 23.

(c) Elliot v. Merriman, Barn. Ch. 78; 2 W. & T. 896.

(d) Lord Cranworth's Act (23 & 24 Vict. c. 145), ss. 29, 34.

(e) Conveyancing Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 41), s. 36; Trustee Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 53), s. 20.

All the trustees must join in giving a receipt as well as in the conveyance, in order to exonerate the purchaser from seeing to the application of the purchase-money (f).

See AGENTS-SETTLED LAND-VESTING DECLARATIONS AND ORDERS-WILLS.

Requisitions.

1. There does not appear to be any trust for sale in the indenture of 18 Unless an order of the Court for sale is obtained, all the debenture-holders and the company must join in the conveyance.

2. It appears that an action for the execution of the trusts of the settlement is pending. Has the sanction of the Court to the proposed sale been obtained?

3. The consent in writing of the tenant for life to the proposed sale must be produced as required by sect. 56 o the Settled Land Act, 1882.

4. A. B., the tenant for life, whose consent to the sale by the trustees is required by the settlement, has, it is understood, been adjudicated a bankrupt. The consent of his trustee in bankruptcy, as well as of A. B., must be obtained by the vendors' solicitors and produced.

5. The power of sale is given only to the trustees and the survivor of them. The purchaser cannot accept a title from the executor of such survivor.

UNCONSCIONABLE BARGAIN.
See EXPECTANT HEIRS.

(f) Boursot v. Savage, L. R. 2 Eq. 134; 14 L. T. 299; 14 W. R. 565.

UNDERLEASE.

See LEASEHOLD PROPERTY.

UNDERTAKING FOR SAFE CUSTODY.
See TITLE DEEDS.

USES.

Before the Statute of Uses, where lands were given to any person to the use of another, the latter took an estate recognized by the Court of Chancery, and similar to a modern equitable estate, but took no estate at law. By the Statute of Uses (h) it was enacted, that where any person or persons should stand or be seised of any lands, tenements, or other hereditaments to the use, confidence, or trust of any other person or persons, such person or persons that have such use, confidence, or trust should stand and be seised and deemed to be in lawful seisin and possession of the same lands, tenements, and hereditaments in the like estates as they have in the use, trust, or confidence.

The intention of the statute was to prevent the legal estate and the beneficial interest being in different persons, but this intention was defeated by the Court of Chancery, which held that the statute only executed the first use, or, as it was expressed, that there could not be "a use upon a use" (i), but recognized and enforced as an equitable estate or interest any use or trust limited or declared upon or out of the first use (k).

The statute enabled the legal estate to be dealt with in the way of creating future estates and otherwise in manner not permitted by the strict rules of the old common law, for by

(h) 27 Hen. 8, c. 10.

(i) 2 Blackstone, 345; Tyrell's Case, Dyer, 155 a; Tu. L. C. 289.

(k) Cooper v. Kynock, L. R. 7 Ch. 398; 41 L. J. Ch. 296; 26 L. T. 566; 20 W. R. 503.

force of the statute, uses, as and when they arise or spring into being, become legal estates or interests.

The statute speaks of one person being seised to the use of another. When, therefore, the person seised to the use is the same person as the cestui que use, the conveyance operates under the common law and not under the statute, except, according to Lord Bacon (1), "there be a direct impossibility or impertinency for the use to take effect by the common law." "If the estate is changed the use is executed by the

statute" (m).

In a grant to uses the statute cannot execute the use for any greater estate than that given to the grantee; if, therefore, the estate given to the grantee to uses be smaller than that expressed to be limited to the cestui que use, the legal estate taken by the latter will be cut down accordingly ("). On the other hand, if the grantee to uses and the cestui que use are the same, and there is any discrepancy between the limitation. in the habendum and that in the declaration of uses, the whole limitation may be looked at to ascertain the estate intended to be limited, and a specific limitation overrides and controls a general limitation (o).

The statute requires a person to be seised to the use of another. Uses declared out of a copyhold or leasehold interest are therefore not executed by the statute, but confer merely equitable interests.

Resulting Use. If in a voluntary conveyance no use is declared, or the uses declared do not exhaust the estate given to the grantee, a use is implied and executed by the statute in favour of the person who conveys, and the whole estate, or the part as to which no use is declared, as the case may be, goes back or results to the person conveying.