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are inclined to think that no answer was ever returned by the noble lord to Mr. Forsyth's application for redress in the affair of the Caroline. When Mr. Roebuck asserted, on the 26th of last August, that such was the case, Lord Palmerston did not deny the fact. Now, whether the federal government had a right to demand such redress or not—and we have shewn that with certain limitations they had-there can be but one opinion as to the gross impropriety of treating with neglect a national application of such importance. The fact would appear incredible, but we believe it to be true; and to this astounding carelessness on the part of Lord Palmerston we ascribe in a great measure the difficulties occasioned by M'Leod's arrest. Had the affair of the Caroline been promptly attended to, and the matter arranged by doing at once what was just, or at once refusing to do more, the matter would have been placed on an intelligible footing, and that sore, irritable feeling would probably not have existed, which led to M'Leod's arrest on the 12th of last November; and if we were to have differed, we would at least have had a more simple cause of quarrel.

As the matter at present rests, we consider that the evidence of M'Leod's freedom from all participation in the attack of the Caroline will be so convincing, that when his trial comes on his acquittal must follow. But a grave question will then remain to be solved, namely, what satisfaction is the English nation to insist on for the wrongful imprisonment for nearly a year of a subject of the Queen of England-wrongful by the law of nations, and the admission of the federal government. We have already passed over much: we have never obtained any satisfaction, or even explanation for our soldiers, under Lieutenant Elmsley, having

been fired at by American militia on the 10th January, 1838, from Grand Island. We have never received any satisfaction for the detention of a British subject on the 8th of the same month by officers of the American militia, with whom the rebel leaders supped, and his forced return to the rebel camp.* Yet these are offences against the law of nations of a heinous character; and are we now to add to the catalogue the wrongful imprisonment of a British subject for nearly a year? It cannot be. However much we may regret prolonging such a dispute, justice to our national dignity requires us to demand some reparation. This seemed to have escaped Lord Palmerston's recollection when he declared himself so pleased with the declaration of principles thus readily conceded by the federal government, whilst they retained all the time our unfortunate fellow-subject chained like a felon.

We have now got a strong and a just government. We leave the matter with confidence in its hands; yet confess that we have gloomy forebodings as to the issue, seeing that whether M'Leod be acquitted or no, we must be equally compelled to demand satisfaction for his extraordinary imprisonment in defiance of every principle of justice. On the other hand, we trust that our government will devote their best attention to the consideration of what reparation, if any, the United States may be entitled to claim for the destruction of the Caroline. And now that time has somewhat assuaged the bitter feelings which actuated our generally" calculating" friends, we trust they likewise will exert themselves to restore both nations to the position of mutual good-will which they occupied before this unlucky dispute. To both parties we say, Ask not too much, and yield not too little.

* Vide affidavit of Seth Conklin. Parliamentary Report on the affairs of Canada.

London :-Moyes and Barclay, Castle Street, Leicester Square,

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MEN have now become so familiar with the paradox, that it scarcely gives rise to a remark, when we find, as we commonly do, the greatest lovers of democracy also the greatest admirers of tyrants. The solution of this apparent mystery is found in the natural division of the human race into two great classes-the lovers of order, of subordination, of legitimacy; and the admirers of ultra-freedom, of an unrestrained popular will,-in short, of illegitimacy. The adherents of this latter opinion often shew themselves ready to defend almost any crime, if only it were committed against a lawful sovereign; and, though professed champions of liberty, they universally idolise the vain and selfish despot, Buonaparte, BECAUSE he became a monarch in defiance of all divine and all human laws. Hence, while virtuous and honourable men are found alike among monarchists, aristocrats, and republicans; we may generally feel sure that we are dealing with a man of blunted moral perceptions and unsafe propensities, when we come in contact with an admirer of the Corsican usurper.

One of these writers is now before us. We have sufficiently described his work in the last few sentences; and shall take no further notice of it, than to single out for serious discussion a few passages which bear upon

a topic on which we consider that full justice has never been done to the greatest man of modern times. That topic is, THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.

A succession of writers, some French, some English, have come before the public within the last twenty years, all contributing more or less of misrepresentation to this page in modern history; and we regret to say that the few competent historians, such as Sir Walter Scott and Mr. Lockhart, who have in general done justice to the main narrative, have in this particular point fallen lamentably short. Hence it is, probably, that the Buonapartist now before us is emboldened to go somewhat farther than others had usually done; and to represent in a work which, from its numerous and valuable pictorial illustrations, must command a considerable sale, that little or no honour was reaped by either England or her great commander on that well-fought field!

The three points which are adroitly put forward by Mr. Horne, and which, if admitted by the reader, must lead to this conclusion, are these:

1. That the two opposing armies on the 18th of June-the French, and the Anglo-Belgian, irrespective of the Prussians were of equal strength; or, that if any preponderance ex

*The History of Napoleon. Edited by R. H. Horne. In 2 vols. royal 8vo. Tyas. 1841.

VOL. XXIV NO. CXLIII.

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isted, it was on the side of the English.

2. That the Duke of Wellington, and the army under his command, were nevertheless "beaten to a standstill," and were only "saved" by the arrival of the Prussians.

3. That Buonaparte's final defeat was owing to his not being properly supported by Grouchy, and to the Duke's being more than amply supported by Blucher.

It is abundantly clear, that he who fully credits these three statements, must believe, that neither the Duke of Wellington nor the British army gathered any laurels at Waterloo. But cach one of these allegations we intend to meet by a direct negative; and we feel no doubt of being able to shew the fallacy of the whole representation. We begin with the

first point, namely,

The Comparative Strength of the two armies, on the 18th of June, 1815. Mr. Horne's statements are as follows:

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Scarcely any two historians agree upon the point; for the French differ from the English, and from each other; and it is the same with our own writers. This circumstance seems to have been felt of late years in England; and, as if to settle the dispute, it has been tacitly decided to agree that the numbers were equal on both sides, namely, seventy thousand. It may be proper to say, that none of the French historians agree in this estimate."-P. 393.

Here the reader is taught to believe, that the English historians would gladly compound for a belief, that the two armies were of equal strength; but that none of the French admit this to have been the

case.

A little farther on, we are informed, that on commencing the engagement Buonaparte said, "The enemy's army is superior to ours by nearly a fourth.” And the writer adds: "It seems unlikely that he should have overrated the enemy's force." Thus, by first remarking, that the English historians admit an equality, but that none of the French writers allow this to have been the case; and then introducing this alleged observation of Buonaparte's, with a remark tending to blish its truth, Mr. Horne contrives

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to leave an impression on the reader's mind, that in all probability, without including the Prussians, the AngloBelgian army was superior in force to that under the command of the usurper.

The truth is, that this pretended saying" is a mere fragment of that elaborate fiction, the Historical Memoirs, Book IX., which was written at St. Helena, by Buonaparte, in 1818, for the express purpose of wiping off the disgrace of Waterloo, and of making it appear that he was merely overpowered on the 18th of June by vastly superior numbers. Of the character of that work we shall say more presently. Let us first begin by collecting together the ascertained facts of the case.

Now, on one side of the question there will not be the least difficulty. The British force on the field of Waterloo is as fully and as satisfactorily ascertained as any one historical fact can be.

The principal account of the battle, which was produced in England at the time, was the Circumstantial Details, compiled and published by Mr. Booth. That work was little else than a collection of all the facts, accredited statements, and official documents, connected with the history of the campaign, that the editor could get together. Among other details, it naturally occurred to him to apply in the proper quarter for an authorised account of the actual strength of the British army on the day of battle. This document appears in the later editions of the work; it is dated “ Adjutant-General's Office," and it is headed,

66

Effective Strength of the several Regiments of the British Army, present at the Battle of Waterloo, June 18, 1815."

Of the genuine character of this picce of evidence no doubt can exist. No controversy had then been raised, no discussion was carrying on, nor could any motive exist, for the concealment of the truth or the fabrica tion of a falsehood, even were such tricks imaginable in our public offices. But what does this document state?

Each regiment is separately given; but it is needless here to go into these details. The totals, or general results, are as follows:

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