the opium should be landed and delivered up to the Chinese authorities. "Nil fuit unquam sic impar sibi." Here is inconsistency with a vengeance. Had Elliot, however erroneously, been of opinion that interference with the smugglers lay in his province, we could have understood why he thus identified England with them. We find, however, by his proclamation of December the 18th, he thought he did not possess the right to interfere; and by his letter to Lin, that though nothing had apparently occurred to alter his opinion, he had resolved to adopt a diametrically opposite line of conduct. What aggravates the matter is, that there was little or no necessity for such a course. The vessels that held the opium were moored at Lintin, sufficiently far from the Chinese authorities to render them as safe as if lying in Plymouth harbour; and they might have ended the dispute by weighing anchor, and sailing along the coast as far as Amoy, or even farther, if necessary. They

might have disposed of their cargoes, and opened new communications with the Chinese. No one, who has read in Gutzlaff's Voyages along the Coast of China the eagerness with which the Chinese, despite of all impediments, seize every opportunity of trading, can for a moment doubt that such a project was at least extremely feasible. The opium, however, was delivered up, to the amount of upwards of 20,000 chests, of more than three millions sterling in value; the opium smugglers being of course delighted to end all their difficulties by disposing of their goods at so ready a market, with the assurance of the official representative of England that the English nation would pay for his blunder. The result was such as might have been anticipated from pampering Chinese vanity with a spectacle of British humility; and a quarrel in which some sailors were concerned, that took place soon afterwards, afforded Commissioner Lin a pretext for a series of barbarities towards British subjects, that eventuated in a national war.

But we may here be met by the assertion that the immense distance of this country from China having rendered it necessary to intrust the superintendence of our trade, how

ever valuable, to one individual, that personage ought consequently to be invested with considerable discretionary power; and though in this instance it might not have been wisely exercised, still that it would not be fair to charge the government at home with errors which they could neither have foreseen or prevented. Undoubtedly, we reply, a similar case might have arisen with any government. But when we find the line of policy adopted by Captain Elliot acquiesced in here, and himself continued in office, then his acts become by adoption the acts of his government. The nation was well aware that the Duke of Wellington had, in a most valuable and important paper, traced in 1835, the true line of policy which it became this country to adopt in reference to China a line of policy which recommended, as its basis, the severance of the government and official responsibility attaching to our legitimate trade from all the smuggling transactions in opium; and though the individuals composing a government may change, the world has a right to expect that the policy of a great country should not alter, unless from paramount necessity. The tree that renews its leaves each spring alters not its identity; and in matters of foreign policy, a party triumph at home, or a change of the inhabitants of Downing Street, should not, as far as other countries are concerned, alter either the identity of our government, or their course of policy. Were it otherwise, no treaty could be respected, no engagement relied on; and there would be an end to that mutual good faith which forms the foundation of commercial confidence, and consequent commercial enterprise. We have shewn that our commissioner in China did violate the understanding on which alone our legal trade should have been conducted; and that, by his vacillating conduct, he had shewn himself at once incapable and weak. Yet he was neither superseded nor reprimanded; and thus his incompetency became fairly chargeable on the government that adopted his acts. It might not, however, have been much a matter of regret that a quarrel should have arisen between this country and China, as by a proper display of

energy and firmness, it might have been rendered the means of extorting from the Celestial Empire a fair commercial treaty, framed on terms of reciprocal advantage. We were forced to allow that the origin of the dispute was not very creditable to England; but the subsequent atrocities and insolence of Lin had placed the matter on another footing, and had afforded us fair grounds for demanding redress. Thus was our government granted by chance some good cards to play for the recovery of their own and the country's reputation. Their errors, weakness, and vacillation at the commencement of the dispute, might soon have been obliterated by a timely assertion of British rights, and a timely display of British force. From being the aggressors, we had become the aggrieved party; from defendants, we had become plaintiffs. All that was requisite was firmness, and a wellconsidered, energetic_demonstration of the power possessed by this country to enforce a just claim for redress. Yet what have we done? It is now two years and a half, or nearly so, since we surrendered the opium to be destroyed, and again we ask, What has been done? The whole history of our country, we boldly assert, does not exhibit such a pitiful page of vacillation, want of system and energy, ill-advised operations, and ministerial puerilities. From the time we became acquainted with China, we knew its people to be, from ignorance, a vain, haughty, treacherous race-that had previously always yielded to force, but who, when the pressure from without was withdrawn, or ill applied, never failed to have recourse to the most perfidious means for evading any concession they might have been reluctantly forced to yield.

We

knew all this-Whigs and Tories— Europeans or Americans-every one knew it; and yet again we ask, What have we done? We commenced by an action with some Chinese war-junks, in which one of her majesty's vessels (the Volage) was engaged. The incapable Elliot was unfortunately on board; and though he caused the first shot to be fired, yet, with the strange weakness that distinguishes all his conduct, he caused the Volage to draw off before

the completion of the action, and thus gave, at the very commencement of the war, a pretext to the Chinese to claim the victory-a pretext of which their admiral amply availed himself. It matters little whether his assertions were lies or not; there was still some shadow of truth sufficient to conceal the falsehoods-enough to render the Chinese government still more unyielding and haughty. Most singularly has this "little war" been carried on in the spirit with which it was begun. At great expense, we equip a powerful armament; our vessels were of heart of oak; and our sailors were British. Full 15,000 bayonets were there to second the eloquent thunders of our cannon; and the world watched in suspense the progress of the squadron that was to unbar the gates of the prison in which two hundred and fifty millions were shut out from communion with their kind. From below Canton that squadron sailed upon its glorious mission-for as such the philosopher must regard it-attended by a nation's hopes. We were somewhat startled by the news that the first display of our prowess was the occupation of a useless and unhealthy island, and the slaughter of a few helpless wretches; but we were revived by the intelligence that our gallant fleet had started for the Gulf of Pekin, and that at the gate of the emperor alone the envoys of England were to treat. Thus had our ships traversed the seas for months, and sailed sixteen parallels of latitude more north than Canton. What was our dismay, therefore, when the next express brought us the intelligence, that after all our expense, all our hopes, we had retraversed the sixteen parallels of latitude, and returned to Canton, for the purpose of arranging a treaty, which could only be ratified at Pekin! Humiliating spectacle !— a powerful British force traversing the globe to discuss at Canton a "chop," which should be cooked at Pekin. Need we wonder at the result? A child might have foretold it. We get civil words at first; next, procrastination and delays; thirdly, we display our valour again by knocking down some wretched forts; and at last the ministry announce triumphantly, that the result of our

expedition is to be a restoration of commercial privileges, the surrender of the only place we had conquered, the gift of a barren rock, and a déjeuner given to our authorities at Canton. Matters, however, were not yet sufficiently disgraceful. It was not yet apparent how much more expense and dishonour we were to incur. But our next advices informed us that our Canton treaty was, as might have been expected on the celestial council recovering from their panic, disavowed by the authorities at Pekin-that Keshen, who had presumed to conclude it, was in chains-our trade interdicted-ourselves consigned to extermination and, finally, that the sixteen parallels of latitude must be traversed again!

Nor is it necessary that we should go so far as China for proofs of Whig incompetency in their superintendence of the interests of this country. Even in their very triumphs, that dazzled for a time, but never deceived, the nation-even in Syria and the Levant, we look in vain for that decided and firm course which befits those at the helm in stormy times. In what has their boasted pacification of the Levant-their propping of the falling Turkish empire-resulted? In virtually detaching from it for ever its most powerful province, and converting Mehemet Ali from a rebel into the monarch of an hereditary kingdom-in restoring to complete anarchy that Syria, which, from a nest of robbers, Mehemet Ali had rendered as safe to the traveller as Tottenham Court Road or Pall Mall. Do we not read every day of murders and insurrections-of governors declaring themselves independent in that country, which is to confer by its reannexation to Turkish dominion so much new life on the mouldering remnant of Mussulman sway? We have destroyed an unfortunate Egyptian army, and occasioned the loss of 50,000 lives. We have knocked down walls, and blown up regiments and citadels; and, at a recent dinner at Portsmouth, Sir Robert Stopford praised Sir Charles Napier, and Sir Charles Napier praised Sir Robert Stopford. But, beyond affording an opportunity for the noble Scotch game of "Scratch me, and I'll scratch you," what have we done? Most wonderful have been our feats, only

equalled by our consistency-at one time blowing up the Turkish fleet at Navarino, and a few years after blowing up Acre to recover it. We have been very busy-running up and down the world-but "cui bono?" What has the row been about? Strange to say, Mehemet Ali seems just as strong as ever-and whilst Turkey regains Syria, she appears likely to lose Crete; and the man with whom we went to war is now all-powerful in the Divan-hand and glove with his recent foes; whilst we should not be surprised to hear ere long of his becoming the virtual head of the empire by being appointed grand vizier. Do the Whigs suppose the nation so simple as to be gulled by exploits like the capture of Acre ? Whilst naturally pleased at the success of their countrymen, the people never wronged them so much as to suppose that they could not take any fort if desired to do so. Consequently, they are not now, with the memory of Trafalgar in their hearts, to be astonished by any feat, however brilliant, which is performed by British tars; but the question naturally arises, to what purpose this outlay of our blood and gunpowder ? How simple, how natural, and yet how puzzling, a question! Has the influence of England's only enemy in the Levant-Russia-been diminished? Has she not, on the contrary, sat quietly by, a sneering spectator of efforts that have produced literally no result, save the exasperation of France, and the arming of Europe? From one end of the Continent to the other, we have succeeded in kindling a flame which is not yet quenched; and this-this "hum of gathering armies" is the only result of Whig "pacification" in the Levant. We have literally broken up the cordial union between this country and France, which formed the best equipoise to Russian influence in Europe, and preservation of the balance of the West against the East. We shall give the Whigs credit for really effective diplomacy, when we hear that they have had the moral courage to appoint a consul at Cracow, or do any other act, and exercise any other privilege conferred on this nation by treaty, to which Russia may object. Then, but not till then, shall we give the Whigs credit for having over

come that influence which has been proved to have been exerted against us in the East,-to have caused the suspension of our intercourse with Persia,―caused our Affghanistan expedition,-cost us millions of money, and forced us to an unnatural and hazardous extension of the frontier of our Indian empire. Never was any policy so inconsistent and absurd, if not dastardly, as the foreign policy of the Whigs has been for the last ten years. When they first came

into office, or soon after, Poland, goaded to desperation by unparalleled atrocities, rose against her despotic master. Shortly before this occurred, England had at once recognised the French "three day" revolutionary government. Her fleets were sailing in harmony with those of France; and England soon after looked on with complacency at the latter country knocking to pieces the stronghold of our old ally, the King of Holland. The Marquis of Wielopowski, deputed by the national government of Warsaw, arrived in this country, and addressed a most able memorial (March 1831) to Lord Palmerston, requesting the good offices of England. Our "liberal" ministry took not even commonly civil notice of the Marquis or his application, and though fawning on the revolutionary rabble that had (we say not whether rightly or wrongly) turned out their legitimate king, disdained to interpose their good offices, either for political or humane purposes, in behalf of a chivalrous people gallantly contending against an illegitimate tyrant. The glorious opportunity of annihilating Russian influence for ever was allowed to slip by; and Poland again consigned to her tomb, there to await a more happy resurrection. Where, we ask, is the consistency here? and, indeed, we might add, where was the sound policy? For we assert that Poland, whose children are starving in our streets, or half fed on the national bounty of a guinea a month, is equivalent for us, as far as Russia is concerned, to a powerful standing army; and what is better still, a powerful standing army that does not cost us one sixpence. In peace, she employs 150,000 Russian soldiers, not one of whom dare the latter country move out of

Poland. And if England were to fire one shot in anger against Russia, she would, as she has proved already, give employment to 200,000 more. Let the country reflect on this, which is a case too clear to need farther illustration; and then recollect how their liberal Reform ministry treated the representative of that gallant people, when he arrived here to appeal to our sympathies as a race of

freemen.

So far as we have proceeded, we have seen how these professors of liberality-these men, whom neither policy nor humanity could rouse to make one effort in behalf of chivalrous Poland, could assist in putting down the only semblance, however faint, of a liberal or enlightened government that Egypt or Syria had possessed for centuries; we have seen them encouraging, when in opposition, and at first not energetically repressing when in power, the braggadocio followers of the coward, Papineau; we have glanced at their puerile and vacillating conduct in China, whilst we have noticed their constant subserviency to powerful Russia ;- we have beheld them at one time grasping and avariciousthen again prodigal and plunging the country in debt-a strange compound of liberality in words, and petty tyranny in practice; and we own that we can no longer separate as we had intended, their incompetency and their shabbiness. The two are blended too closely together for us to treat of them separately; but nowhere more palpably united than in their recent budget.

The minister who proposes to a country mighty changes in its laws, its system of finance-changes which he intends should affect all, from the humble mechanic to the opulent and powerful duke-ought to occupy a high position, not merely of moral dignity, but also of actual power, practically to lend effect to the working of the new system which he has originated. But when Lord Grey was minister no longer, when the country had begun to appreciate at their true value the much vaunted promises made to them by the Whigs, where was this high position, this moral dignity? In its stead, we find a gradual decay coming over their cabinet, and their popularity decreasing,

till Sir Robert again, for a brief but brilliant period, recovered office in 1835. Then we find the Whigs in possession of power, and retaining it with continually decreasing majorities, till 1839, when they introduced a most tyrannical act to suspend the constitution of Jamaica. The Conservatives, and ten of the usual followers of the ministry, resisted this despotic bill; and it was carried at the second reading by the scanty majority of five; and the result was the resignation of the Melbourne cabinet. In another week, however, we find them reinstated in office,-Sir Robert Peel being unable to form an administration, in consequence of her majesty having declined to insist on the customary change in the appointments of the royal household. However graceful and expressive of a kind heart it may have been in her majesty to decline parting with those female friends to whom custom had attached her, the unlucky ministry cut but a sorry figure in returning to office, not called to it by the nation, but dragged out of the mire-clinging to the petticoats of their fairer, and we do believe their better, halves. We shall now examine the unconstitutional position occupied by the Whigs from the memorable epoch of the bedchamber counterplot down to the late dissolution.

It is no doubt the leading principle of our constitution, that the crown should call to its councils those ministers who have the confidence of the people. This is the vital-the allimportant point on which our muchboasted liberty depends. Violate it, and we might as well live under the despotic sway of the Czar as under that of a monarch governing in spite of the declared inclinations of the country. So long as parties are balanced, or nearly so, we hold that the crown may select its ministers from either, but an attempt to rule with majorities in both houses against the responsible advisers of the crown can only end in the stoppage of the supplies, and the paralysation of public business and confidence. Such were the principles of Fox, Burke, and the old Whigs of the school of 1688. Such were the principles that actuated Lord North when, in 1782, he retired with majorities in the lower house of

9 and 10 in his favour. Such were the principles that induced the resignation of Lord Sidmouth with a majority of no less then thirty-seven in his favour. Such the principles that led to the resignation of the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel in 1829 with a majority of twenty-nine against them; and, acting on these very principles, Lord Melbourne himself resigned in 1839 on possessing a majority of only five in favour of his government of Jamaica bill. When Pitt, in 1783, resisted a motion of want of confidence in his administration, it was not that he questioned the soundness of the principles we have laid down, but because he could hardly have been considered in office at the time, and he awaited the decision of the nation, as pronounced by the new parliament, which he immediately summoned. It was reserved for the Melbourne ministry to give a new tone to our constitution, and to endeavour to destroy the fundamental principle-the great bulwark of our freedom-by advising the crown to retain ministers who possessed the confidence of neither house of legislature. We shall quote from the "Mirror of Parliament" the principal majorities against them on their recovery of office by the very singular "bedchamber" dispute.

On the 18th of June, 1839, we find them in a majority of only two; yet though a short time previously they had resigned when possessing a majority of five, in this instance they determined on NO RESIGNATION.

Four days previously they again had, on the 20th of June, their old majority of five on the third reading of the Jamaica bill-but this time

NO RESIGNATION.

1st July (1839), on the Factory Regulation-bill, there was a majority of forty-four against them, but NO

RESIGNATION.

On the 26th of the same month there was a majority of sixteen against them on the subject of reducing the chief magistrates' salary in the Metropolitan Police-bill. This being, however, a trivial point, we must not wonder that there was NO RESIGNATION.

We come now to the year 1840. And on the 29th of January in that year we find them in a minority of no less than 104 on Colonel Sibthorpe's motion for reducing Prince Albert's