ministers, as also a commander-in-chief, but that he should not be eligible to that office himself. During the debate, the palace was surrounded by cannon, the gunners standing ready with matches lighted. The astonished deputies anxiously inquired of each other the cause of this precaution, some conceiving it to be

device of Dembinski to terrify them into electing him president, whilst the greater part attributed it with more reason to Krukowiecki. Aware of their apprehensive state of mind, he had circulated lists of certain deputies whose lives were threatened, and this stratagem, added to their exaggerated idea of his influence over the citizens, secured to him a majority of votes.

At the moment of Krukowiecki's usurpation, scarcely any part of their country, excepting Warsaw, Modlin, and Zamosc, remained in the possession of the Poles. General Rozycki being appointed governor of the palatinates of Kalish, Sandomir, and Cracow, had departed with his small band for Sandomir on the 4th of August, but arrived too late to prevent Rudiger from crossing the Vistula with 14,000 men and eighteen cannon. Having collected from the various depots, eight cannon and about 5,000 men, amongst them C. Rozycki's Volhynian regiment, he awaited the Russians at Ilza on the 9th, and for seven hours resisted their overwhelming superiority of force. C. Rozycki, at the head

usual, in single rank,

of his cavalry, drawn up as advanced against the dragoons of Colonel Gienich,

RESPECTIVE FORCE OF HOSTILE PARTIES. 387

They

a man not less chivalrous than himself. seemed to seek each other out, and whilst their troops made a sudden pause, they amazed them by a single combat, recalling those of Homer. Russian fell, and his men were

Rozycki, however, retired during the

At length, the

cut to

cut to pieces. night, in order

to guard 14,000 Russian prisoners in the palatinate of Cracow.

The Russian army now poured in from all quarters, and encompassed Warsaw. Paszkiewicz lay encamped before the walls with 70,000 men and 350 cannon. Kreutz was marching in from Lithuania, with 25,000,-Rosen, with 16,000, was stationed a few miles from Praga,-Kayzaroff and Rudiger, with their respective corps of 10,000 and 14,000 men, were in the palatinate of Lublin, and Sandomir; and Rott was daily expected from Volhynia with 16,000. The Polish army at Warsaw, including the garrison of Praga, reckoned about 60,000 regulars, with 140 field pieces, besides 5000 national guards, and the garrisons of Modlin and Zamosc; and thus the forces of both nations were as numerous as at the commencement of the war, and, as then, a defeat of either would have been decisive, since both had put at stake all their available resources. But it was no longer with the Poles as at Grochow, when they had four unoccupied palatinates to fall back upon. Now shut up in Warsaw, their provisions and ammunition exhausted, their only hope was, by one last great struggle, to recon

quer their country, or to perish in the attempt. But to Krukowiecki the insurrection seemed already at an end, and he was desirous to retain his power, with the sole view to employ it in the final pacification, and monopolise an advantageous result of the catastrophe. On the 19th, summoning a council of war, he invidiously asked what remained to be done in the situation to which Skrzynecki had reduced the country? Chrzanowski advised battle on the plains of Warsaw, before the enemy could collect their force, though the dismounted state of the cavalry rendered this measure hazardous. Dembinski proposed to abandon Warsaw, and march into Volhynia; a bold plan, which, if adopted, would at least have protracted the war six months longer. The rejection of both these alternatives did but afford another proof of the inefficiency of military councils, and it was resolved to adopt the more practicable, but less vigorous proposition of the three, and send two corps, one against Rosen, and the other into the palatinate of Plock, each with the object of providing the army and the city with provisions. Krukowiecki was so much alarmed by the plan of Dembinski, which must necessarily have brought his reign to a speedy close, that he immediately dismissed him, under the pretext of disobedience to orders in suffering Skrzynecki to remain in the camp*, and induced Malachowski to take his

*

Skrzynecki was then compelled to take refuge at the Austrian consul's residence.

place, by assurances that he should be relieved from all responsibility on every important occasion by the decision of a council of war.

On the night of the 20th, Lubienski, with 4000 cavalry, departed for the Plock palatinate; and 20,000 men, with 40 cannon, under General Ramorino, marched against Rosen in Podlachia. Prince Czartoryski, the guiding star of the insurrection, accompanied them, exchanging his late dignified station for the fatigue and danger of a camp. Ramorino, admirable for his personal valour, and precision in executing a plan, showed himself so utterly incapable of concerting one, that the prince, at the very commencement of the march, found himself compelled to apply to Krukowiecki for a more able commander. Prondzynski was accordingly dispatched from Warsaw, and would at once have attempted to cut off Rosen from Brzesc Litewski; but this general, forewarned by Rudiger with promises of succour, that Ramorino was approaching, hastily withdrew to Miedzyrzec, destroying all the bridges behind him. He had got so far, that Prondzynski, losing hope of overtaking him, detached a division of infantry towards Kock, for the chance of enticing Rudiger to cross; and, on the 29th, with the remainder of his force, followed in the track of Rosen. The latter, reinforced at Miedzyrzec, awaited the Poles there in a strong position; but Prondzynski, amusing him by a show of intending to attack the town, sent an infantry division and two cavalry regiments through

the wood to Rogoznica, situated behind Miedzyrzec, upon the chaussée of Brzesc Litewski, and where there was an equally strong party of the enemy. Exulting in the thought of at length encountering their foe, the Poles rushed on them at the point of the bayonet, and for a long time refusing to give quarter, killed 3000 of them in an entrenched cemetery, and took 2000 prisoners, whilst Rosen availed himself of the darkness to quit Miedzyrzec. The object of the expedition was effected, for the capital was now furnished with two months' provisions; but Ramorino, after Prondzynski's return thither, still continued to pursue Rosen, who, but an hour's march in advance, succeeded in crossing the Bug at Brzesc Litewski.

In the meantime, the Lelewel party at length woke from their delusion, and perceiving that Krukowiecki would hasten the ruin of the country, conspired against his life. He discovered their plot, and employing one regiment to guard his residence, he sent away the best part of the national guard to Karczew, upon the pretext, that the enemy were about to throw a bridge there across the Vistula, and prohibited the arming of 14,000 of the guard of safety; a measure to which even the Diet had assented. Thus did Lelewel twice injure his country; first, in bringing Krukowiecki into power; and then, by his treasonable intrigues, depriving the capital of its best defenders.

When Kreutz joined the Russian army on the 27th, Paszkiewicz determined on assaulting Warsaw during the absence of Ramorino's corps. Desirous