Stationed in the palatinate of Plock, they formed the enemy's extreme right wing, and any Polish attack upon them would be eminently favoured by the rivers Bug and Narew, and the fortress of Modlin. Another powerful inducement was the demand of the Lithuanians, who had now been long in arms, for troops, and especially for able officers. Their request had been urged in vain by Prince Czartoryski, but the misfortune of Dwernicki at length decided the general-in-chief to send a reinforcement, in the hope that it might encourage the Lithuanians to form a new corps in the rear of the enemy. Skrzynecki commenced his operations skilfully. He despatched General Chlapowski with the 1st lancers, accompanied by 100 officers and 100 mounted infantry, to make their way into Lithuania, between the Russian army and the guards, taking good care, though with much affectation of secrecy, to make their departure public. Diebitch accordingly sent notice of it to the Grand Duke, in order to secure to him the honour of capturing the little band. The various detachments of the guards which had been stationed at intervals between Lomza and Vysokie-Mazowieckie, were, in consequence, collected, and a division of cavalry, with one of infantry, marched upon Vonsew, while the Grand Duke, having the Narew on his rear, continued at Zambrowo with the remainder of the troops, believing himself secure of his prey; whilst, in fact, the very position he had chosen exposed him to

complete defeat. Quitting the environs of Kaluszyn on the 12th, Skrzynecki, to cover his manœuvre, left there 12,000 men, under General Uminski, with orders, in case of attack, to resist the enemy as long as possible, but if needs must, to fall back on the walls of Praga, and there renew the contest, assisted by the garrison (6000 men), and the national guard of Warsaw. Diebitch, although aware that only a detachment had departed for Lithuania, advanced on the 13th, with his whole force, towards Kaluszyn, to reconnoitre the Polish army. Upon this the advanced-guard of the Poles immediately abandoned the town, and joined Uminski, who was advantageously posted, with the main body, at Yendrzeyow. The enemy proceeded straight forward, and attacked them. The Poles stood firm for eight hours, and then retired, without any pursuit, Diebitch imagining from their resistance, Skrzynecki to be on the ground; and little suspecting that he was, on the contrary, advanced two days' march in an opposite direction, returned to his camp at Siedlce.

This success enabled Skrzynecki to pursue his plan without molestation. He received the intelligence of it on the 15th at Serock, where he made the following distribution of his forces. General Dembinski, with 4000 men, marched along the right bank of the Narew, with orders to dislodge Sacken's corps from the bridge opposite Ostrolenka; and in the event of the guards endeavouring to retreat in that direction, to cut off their passage, by destroying

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DISTRIBUTION OF POLISH TROOPs.

it. Twelve thousand men, under General Lubienski, on the right bank of the Bug, were directed to observe Diebitch's movements, and to throw a bridge across the river for Uminski's corps, which was to follow Diebitch, step by step, and then join Skrzynecki, who, with the remainder of the forces, consisting of three infantry divisions and two of cavalry, was to advance in three separate columns. Towards the evening of the 16th a vanguard of the guards was met at Przetycza; but being too weak for resistance, it retired, in haste, with the loss of some prisoners. The next day all the detachment of the guards assembled at Sokolow, and the Poles took a station in face of them, but night prevented further operations.

The Grand Duke Michael was, no doubt, surprised to find himself so far repulsed by a little corps which he had considered as his certain prize; but he was undeceived as to the small number of his adversaries by a Polish officer, who was taken prisoner on the night of the 18th, and revealed that Skrzynecki himself was present with his force. The intelligence, however, came too late to be of any use. He was enclosed with his corps on an elbow formed by the Narew between Ostrolenka and Lomza; and although there was a bridge at the latter place, yet, owing to its being surrounded by marshes, and only accessible by a dike a mile long, the retreat in that direction could not be effected without the greatest peril. There was also another

road open to them, leading from Sniadow to Tykocin, but in passing that way there was great reason to apprehend that the Poles, who lay encamped within the distance of a cannon-shot, would be able to drive them into the marshes of the Narew, which extend along it. Thus even nature joined to favour the enterprise, but fortune in war smiles only on the bold.

The morning of the 18th dawned on the Polish army, awaiting with general impatience the signal for attack. The day passed in disappointed expectation-that day which they trusted had been destined to carry consternation to Nicholas on his blood-stained throne. Skrzynecki remained passive in the presence of the enemy, after having marched 150 miles with the sole object of engaging them. He had conceived the unseasonable apprehension that Sacken, stationed at Ostrolenka, about ten miles off, would attack him in the rear; and having, in consequence, deprived himself of 10,000 men, whom he sent, under General Gielgud, to assist Dembinski to dislodge that corps, he could no longer hope that his remaining force, thus diminished by a third of its infantry, would be victorious over the guards whose resistance would be rendered still more resolute by despair. This was the consequence of not having listened to Chrzanowski, who had objected to the troops under Lubienski being sent away; and proposed, by falling on the Russians with an overpowering force, to crush, on the same day, both

the guards and Sacken's corps. Gielgud found Dembinski in Ostrolenka, Sacken having withdrawn in alarm at his approach to occupy Lomza, from whence he could reinforce the guards with 8000 Skrzynecki was thus compelled to wait another day until the return of Gielgud, which delay gave time for the guards to execute their retreat in perfect order.

men.

Early in the morning of the 20th the Polish army broke up, and towards the close of the day overtook a rear-guard of the enemy in the great forest of Rudki. Skrzynecki immediately attacked them, but owing to the night, and the thickness of the forest, could only capture one battalion. The same day Gielgud entered Lomza, which Sacken had quitted in great haste, leaving behind him 2000 soldiers sick or wounded, and a quantity of baggage and ammunition. He then advanced along the chaussée on the right of the Narew, hoping to intercept the guards at Tykocin, but a portion of them crossed the river there early on the 21st, and the rest at Zoltki; but not having time to destroy the bridge, they were closely pursued by the Poles, who, however, could not get possession of a long dyke, all the bridges over which had been broken up, and which was defended by several battalions and a powerful artillery. During the night the Russians evacuated Tykocin, and so ended the expedition against the guards.

On the 22nd of May Skrzynecki assembled his