ratify the convention in spite of the desper- | which had impelled them in the first instance ate state of affairs, the army being not with blind and exaggerated self-confidence merely beaten and scattered, but thoroughly into war; and these influences rested partly demoralized in spirit, and all the principal on a delusive belief in an effective coalition officers loudly proclaiming want of confidence with Austria of the continental, and espei. their general. Nor was the idea of re- cially German powers, but much more on newing the war laid aside when at last it was the fanatical temper of some members of the found impossible to avoid negotiation. It imperial family, particularly the empress, was entered upon solely with the view of who could not be weaned from a passionate gaining time. and unreasoning habit of mind. It must be borne in mind that this crisis coincided with

our Walcheren expedition, the despatch of which was calculated to keep alive expectations of a possible diversion against the

"The resolution has been taken," writes Gentz, on the 22d July, " to bring together in Hungary, and especially at Comorn, the greater part of the army. Twenty-five thousand men have been required from the Arch-enemy. How greatly the hope of such diduke Charles, with the announcement that versions had originally contributed to make the emperor having taken the command into the cabinet of Vienna plunge into war, is his own hands, there was no further need for sufficiently shown in the Diary, and most a generalissimo. Even after this informa- strikingly where it recounts, upon the aution, he did not send in his resignation; still thority of the Prince of Orange and his it appears certain that for the time we shall minister Fagel, the slender grounds whereon be quit of him. . . . Bonaparte is to be asked for his terms of peace, and if they be the Austrian Government was induced for found ever so little burdensome, it is meant awhile to rest its expectations of the coagain to seek the chances of war. And to operation of Russia. Of the Prince of define the word 'burdensome,' it is enough Orange, Gentz says, that he was a man to know that the emperor will not even hear "whose intentions and behavior deserved of yielding the Dalmatian coast-land. When one thinks what the army is on which the whole scheme relies, that amongst the 60,000 men already existing, there are at the outside 25,000 soldiers of the line-that all those who come by the Jablunka have sixty leagues to march-that the archdukes, whom at present one has to try to remove, have their partisans and friends, who by their cabals will know how to destroy the little good spirit that has got the better of the discouragement unavoidable upon so much mischance that all the new machinery would want a deal of time to be put in trim and made to work well-that Bonaparte being with 90,000 men in the middle of the stage between Vienna and Presburg, will never give us the time to bring together and organize our forces

That once beaten it is impossible to conceive where we should get new supplies, and that then all treaty will be out of the question,-one is astounded at the rashness of these designs. If all be sincerely meant, then those who meditate them either have more boldness and greatness of soul than we ever fancied, or it is a case of total and fatal blindness, which will end in wholesale destruction."

It is impossible to be any longer in doubt as to which was the correct explanation. The imperial counsels were at this time still under the action of the very same influences

praise, but whose judgment was confined, and his way of looking at things light and shallow. He was fond of war, pretty much like the emperor." Yet upon the mere authority of some casual words dropped by the King of Prussia to the prince, and by him eagerly reported at Vienna, the Austrian ministers appear to have seriously assumed Prussia's readiness to act with them as established, and to have sent an envoy to conclude with her a convention, who was doomed to find himself despatched on a regular fool's errand. "What is most curious," adds Gentz, "is, that when Steigentesch laid stress upon the promises the king made to the Prince of Orange, the king answered, 'Oh, don't quote the Prince of Orange; he is an enthusiast, who never knows what he says or hears."" And yet the Austrian statesmen of the day were light-headed enough to be forever swayed in their resolutions by reasons so slight as the unweighed utterances of such a hot-headed and thoughtless partisan.

At this particular moment, however, the force of events had for a season put an end to all delusive belief in active assistance from any power except England. Germany was indeed quivering at least with the de

sire to rise against the foreigner, but it was minister ought ever to accept, and singua desire which for the present was forcibly larly illustrates the weakness which ruined repressed by the triumphant positions of the political career of this thoroughly highNapoleon. No German prince in the pos- bred and chivalrous nobleman. Following session of any strength dared at this con- his own propensities, and led away by repjuncture to follow his true sympathies, and, resentations against which his easy temper allying himself with the shattered power had not been sufficiently on its guard, Count of Austria, confront the overwhelming might Stadion had deliberately embarked the emof France. However much at one time the pire in war; and now, although perfectly reimperial government did without doubt solved never to compromise his reputation reckon upon being joined by the whole force by remaining in office, and carrying out a of Germany in the struggle it took up, now, new policy on the conclusion of peace, he at all events, it no longer derived from this was as firmly resolved to stand by his sQvmistaken calculation the particular hopes ereign in the difficulties into which he had that still made it hang back from seeking fallen, through the consequences of the war peace. The stubborn indisposition to treat which he had himself mainly helped to bring proceeded mainly from the sluggish charac- on. Without illusion as to the condition of ter of the emperor, who, nursed in preju- the empire, and the value of the men with dice, was slow to understand the true nature of his position, clung to false notions of dignity, and moreover was surrounded by persons who, talking a language congenial to his narrow intellect, tended to keep up in him an exaggerated conception of the power and condition of the empire, in spite of such glaring defeats. Of all these persons, the one who was most vehemently opposed to peace at the cost of sacrifice was the empress; and we find so competent a witness as Prince John Liechtenstein expressing the opinion that her influence "was certainly a chief cause of the madness which has come over the emperor. This princess, seeing herself unable to be a happy woman," he goes on to say, seems to have resolved on becoming a great woman, and to die as a heroine. This romantic idea drives her into all kinds of eccentricities, and makes her embrace, with a sort of transport, the phantom of a glorious end, until she aims perhaps rather at the vision than at victory." Around this excitable and intemperate prinIt is difficult to say, indeed, who at this precess there congregated, therefore, a batch of cise moment really had in hand the direction fanatical courtiers and frantic nobles, who of the imperial councils. Everything was at dreamt of nothing but war, and could not hap-hazard and adrift. Comorn was the supeven at this hour be convinced of the vul- posed seat of government; and there, we are nerability of Austrian valor. It is certain, told, "no one rules in the true sense. There however, that these men were, with few ex- is no centre and no combination. A wish ceptions, individually of no real note, and there is, but no will. Everybody shirks rethat Count Stadion, who still figured as sponsibility, and the emperor is much too prime minister, and had identified himself weak to take a decision. Thus time is lost, in his policy with the war party, by no means and there is a complication of contradictions." approved of the suggestions of these unrea-Yet, weak and incapable of independent acsoning counsellors. Count Stadion's position as the emperor was by nature, it was tion at this time was indeed one such as no the peculiarity of his character never to sub

whom he had to deal, it was characteristic of Count Stadion's noble, though weak, nature that he should willingly lend himself, in deference to what he considered a call upon his honor, to carry on the duties, and bear the responsibilities of office, under circumstances which, as he himself well knew, must make it impossible for him to do any good, and must do him personally an infinity of harm. In fact, Count Stadion was at this moment but the shadow of a minister, good-naturedly consenting against his wiser conviction to sacrifice himself, from a high sense of duty, to a sovereign who showed but small appreciation of this disinterested conduct. Nor did Stadion entertain any illusions about his own position, or the consequences that would result therefrom to him personally: "I look upon myself as one dead, or as existing but for my children,” said he once to Gentz; who remarks, "such words were not calculated to inspire much confidence in his fitness for a war minister."

;

66

mit steadily to any one dominant influence, through our forces sent to Walcheren; while
but to be perpetually tossed to and fro by Napoleon, aware of the strength of his vic-
contrary gusts, which rendered it absolutely torious position in the heart of the empire,
impossible for him ever to fulfil his engage- and thoroughly informed of the disorganized
ments. The picture which is given of this condition of the Austrian army, the leading
monarch in the pages of a Diary that at all officers of which were animated with feelings
events reflects what was daily felt and spoken against their commander that virtually
by the men who thronged the court, presents amounted to mutiny, reckoned on time to
him as such a singularly mean and ignoble teach the enemy his utter helplessness, and
hero, that one remembers with astonishment thus render him in the end meekly subservi-
the glory of patriarchal goodness which it has ent. Nowhere before have we been shown,
been since sought to shed around his memory. as in this Diary, how perfectly well founded
For eveu Gentz often pours out the anguish were these calculations of Napoleon upon
of his heart at some new "miserable," the internal confusion and dissatisfaction
"mean," underhand," "cowardly" pro- that pervaded the most influential sections
ceeding on the part of the emperor, who of Austrian society. The facts enumerated
seems to have been particularly destitute of on this head by Gentz are true revelations
any true warmth of feeling under an exterior of a most startling kind; for if there has
of homely kindliness. With a monarch of been one impression generally abroad, it has
such slippery character, Count Stadion was been this, that, throughout the great strug-
not the minister to acquire the influence that gle against Napoleon, the Austrian nobility
had to be inspired. "It is out of the ques- and Austrian army were unswervingly, yea
tion to count on that man," writes Gentz, stolidly, loyal to the imperial house, and,
"for a quarter of an hour; to be sure of above all, even unreasonably attached to its
him, would require never to leave him for a chief commander, the Archduke Charles.
minute during the whole twenty-four hours, To our great surprise, we are now taught,
as was the case with the late Colloredo. It that, so far from this being so, an intense dis-
is not enough to have got his promise to satisfaction prevailed, particularly amongst
sign;
the rescripts already prepared for sig- the officers, against the members of the im-
nature are often changed in a minute, if the perial family, and that the Archduke Charles
one or the other new speaker is an intriguer, in particular was spoken of with feelings of
or happens to come in and stop the execu- unmitigated bitterness and contempt for his
tion."
conduct in the field. Nor are such opinions
to be laid to the account of Gentz's particu-
lar bias. They are the expressions of men
of the highest rank and position, who in their
conversations utter the convictions of their
hearts, the value of which we can test, as
their names are given. The pervading bur-
den of complaint is, that the Archduke Charles
has been the bane of the army, and that it
is absolutely necessary that he should be re-
moved from the command, together with all
the members of the imperial family. It is
not our purpose here to inquire into the mil-
itary accuracy of the strictures passed upon
the strategical measures of the commander.
We would draw attention to the potitical
importance of the existence in Austria, at
that critical conjuncture, of a feeling of pro-
found and decided dissatisfaction, which is
incontrovertibly proved by the unreserved
utterances of men by birth and professional
position standing in the closest relations with
the government. This is a fact well worthy

Under such circumstances as these, it was out of the question that the negotiations going on with Napoleon should be conducted with energy, and much more so that they should lead to any result. On the part of Austria, they had been confided to General Nugent and Metternich, who was then already generally looked at as Stadion's successor in office, in the event of peace. These plenipotentiaries met Napoleon's minister Champagny at the small town of Altenberg, on the confines of Hungary, and were soon engaged in the discussion of interminable propositions and counter-propositions, which offered no prospect of settlement, and necessitated repeated prolongations of the armistice, originally concluded but for a month. The truth is, that both parties thought that time would act in their favor. The Emperor of Austria, unable to bring himself to make concessions, and still thinking of renewing war, kept spinning out negotiations, because he hoped for assistance

of consideration, and pregnant with instruc- the most energetic men in the army, like tive inferences. Count O'Donnell himself, Wartensleben, young Prince Reuss, etc., etc. aide-de-camp to the Archduke Maximilian, He says that the army, composed one-third and an officer" of great distinction, who cov- of militia and Landsturm, and another third ered himself with glory," expresses his con- of recruits, cannot cope with the enemy, even viction that the Archduke Charles "has if he should not have the immense advanthrottled the empire. What hope," adds he, tages which are given him by our deplorable "is there of influencing a man who is with- flight. He says that, were we to win a batout any solid foundation, without any basis tle, we should still be in the most cruel emwhereon to work? ... His conduct in the barrassment; while, were we to lose it, this first part of the campaign is to be explained would involve the total dissolution of the army by one circumstance. As soon as he knew and State. He says that the emperor, all the that Bonaparte was with the army, he was archdukes, and all who govern under them, put out of countenance, and fell from fault are to such a degree inefficient, that all idea to fault.... He is like a cock which you of withstanding Bonaparte with instruments set on a table with his beak put against a of this kind is the highest pitch of folly. He chalked line. The cock thinks himself bound says that John Liechtenstein is wanting in to the line, keeps moving and fluttering, but almost all the qualities for a great command; fancies himself unable to lift his beak." The that the new council is worth nothing; finally same kind of language is used over and over-but why write what certainly will never again by other persons. Amongst the Aus-fade from my mind?" Yet the Prince trian officers held in high esteem for his Liechtenstein thus spoken of was the officer strategical capacities was General Hiller, who generally considered as fittest to carry out was charged with an important command the practical duties of the command nomiunder the archduke, and was present during the whole campaign. His opinion is, that, through gross dilatoriness, the archduke lost two valuable days, and that he only fought the drawn battle of Aspern "when forced to do so with the knife at his throat." Again, we have Prince Esterhazy bearing testimonials that there is but one opinion as to the gen-ble to put the army on a new footing. Every eralissimo in the army. But the most curious evidence of the overwhelming feeling against the Archduke Charles, and of the utter inefficiency of the Austrian army, is that given by so highly distinguished an officer as General Wallmoden. His character and soldier-like qualities require no com

ment.

nally assumed by the emperor; while the council so summarily condemned was regarded by its author as a board of salvation, which, by the mere fact of its institution, had secured a radical reform.

Granting the purpose to renew war, there was but one feeling, that it was indispensa

one was loud, even in the emperor's favorite circles, in acknowledging and crying out against the mismanagement which had marked the course of the campaign. There were those who still insisted that the army was one which could meet the French with success, but all were vehement in denounc"He had been one of the men most ing the incapacity that had directed it, and outspoken for war, and one of the chief ad- insisted upon the necessity of making a visers in the preparatory steps. At Wagram change therein. The language heard on all he behaved with the greatest distinction; he sides was the very same which has again it was who took from the French the eleven been so generally heard in Austria since guns they lost there. He got the cross, Magenta and Solferino. The army had and was named lieutenant-general; certainly, been sacrificed by the incapacity of its comtherefore, he has not been bribed to declare manders and the defects of its organization, against war." Yet this distinguished soldier, and, as at present, the government admitted the pride of the Austrian army, told Gentz the fact, and professed to be doing all that things about its state" which froze him with was necessary for a radical remedy of the horror." "He is," writes Gentz, "decidedly discovered deficiencies. Yet it is very cerfor peace, and peace even on any terms; tain that, in spite of the general admission and this is, according to him, the opinion of of the need for thorough reform, the measall the generals of mark-the two Stutter-ures actually adopted were wofully inadeheims, Radetzky, Kolowrat, Bellegarde; of quate to the wants of the crisis, and would

not have given the Austrian army an organ- | alive to many of the exigencies of the moization on which, had war broken out again, ment, were never in a condition to give any it would have been reasonable to found effective impulse to combined and comprehopes of better success than before. The hensive action of any kind. "This new principal outcry was above all directed council," General Stutterheim tells Gentz, against the archdukes in a body, who were "of which so much noise has been made, is accused of being animated by a spirit of a mere phantom. It has never even drawn personal jealousy against each other, which up a plan. Meyer, who alone has enough made them deliberately refuse to act in con- activity to make one, is too learned, too cert, and wilfully disappoint the commander- pedantic, too diffuse; he begins with Cyrus in-chief. To obviate this fatal state of to end with Bonaparte. Bellegarde never things, the emperor himself was to supersede explains himself; Duca does not open his the Archduke Charles, as the only person mouth. Prince John, when he attended the in the empire who could impose the necessary duty of military subordination upon these privileged individuals. But the emperor was a man of such weak temper that he was quite unable to exert an effective control over his unruly relatives. "To such a degree," are we told by Gentz, "had the emperor compromised his authority over his brothers, that their disobedience to his orders was a daily occurrence. Often he had been advised to make the Palatin come, under some plea or other, to headquarters, and so put an end to all the harm he is doing in Hungary. I myself had strongly dwelt on this measure in several letters. Well! now we find that the emperor did what we wished, but without ever attaining his object. He has actually summoned the Palatin, and more than once; but he never obeyed his orders; under one pretext or another, he has always avoided coming." Of all the imperial princes, the Archduke Ferdinand, at the head of the troops in Bohemia, was looked upon as the most thoroughly objectionable and incompetent. Yet he was not removed from his important command; and the reason was, according to Count O'Donnell, that the emperor feared to wound the feelings of the empress by removing her inefficient brother.

meetings of the said council, generally went to sleep. The most unfortunate part is, that the emperor employs this new machine for issuing a quantity of orders about which Prince Liechtenstein knows nothing, and which mar the most essential matters; sometimes he also issues them through the Aulic Council for War at Pesth. Had war been renewed, the emperor would have gone on in this same way, to the great injury of the army and its operations. Prince Liechtenstein, it is true, in sheer despair, would have left with his staff without paying any further attention to the council; but then he would have had to act by himself, which he could not do; and Radetzky, a good officer, a good quarter-master general, in the ordinary sense, would not have been able to make up for what was wanting. The confusion would have been immense." Nor was the want of immediate executive authority, which is here so vividly shown, the only thing that made this council unfit to impart a direction suitable to a vigorous resumption of hostilities with success. The members who composed it were many of them thoroughly infected with a conviction of the hopelessness of war under the circumstances that then prevailed in the empire, and particularly in the existing relations of The emperor's supreme command being the imperial family. Their hearts were not avowedly a matter of mere title, that coun- only bent on peace, but actually beset with cil had been instituted for the practical thoughts that ran upon the impossibility of direction of military matters, of which Wall- ever doing anything creditable to their charmoden's soldier-like bluntness spoke with acter as soldiers, as long as they had to deal so little respect. Still it comprised the with a sovereign and with princes of such officers most highly thought of for profes- a stamp. Full as our minds now are of the sional capacity in the army, as Bellegarde, great and loyal services since rendered to Meyer, Duca, John Liechtenstien, and Ra- the house of Hapsburg by Radetzky, it is detzky, then chief of the staff. But these with a feeling of wonder, which takes away men, though professional soldiers, and, as the breath, that we read the following paswe learn from their conversations, perfectly sage: "5th October: I have had long con