arms and munitions of war as the Spanish Government might stand in need of. Portugal was to cooperate by all the means in her power, if her assistance should be found necessary. It was some time before general Rodil, after having concentrated his troops, could commence his operations; and when he did, the Carlists repeated their former tactics. Avoiding the danger of allowing themselves to be drawn into any general engagement, they harassed their opponents by rapid movements and unexpected attacks. Rodil had not more than 20,000 men, whom he was obliged to divide into several corps, each of which had to contend with an enemy superior in numbers and stronger by the advantage of ground and localities, where the skill of disciplined troops was of little avail. The Carlists, however, dispersed and retreated on all sides before him. In Navarre he pushed them to the

supply her Catholic Majesty with such arms and munitions of war as she may stand in need of, and moreover, if necessary, to assist her Catholic Majesty by

the use of a naval force.

"Art. 3. His imperial Majesty the regent of Portugal, in the name of the Queen Donna Maria, wholly animated with the same sentiments as his august allies, and wishing also to show his gratitude for the engagements entered into by her Majesty the Queen regent of Spain by the 2nd article of the treaty of the 22nd of April, 1834, engages to co-operate, in case of need, in assisting her Catholic Majesty with all the means in his power, in the way which may be agreed upon by their said Majesties.

"Art. 4. The preceding articles shall have the same force as if literally in serted in the treaty of the 22nd of April, 1834. of which they are to be considered as forming part; and their ratification shall be exchanged in London in the space of 40 days, or sooner if possible.

French frontiers, and in Biscay towards the sea. He had made himself master of the Bastan; and he fortified, as he advanced, such positions as might afterwards be useful. Don Carlos himself, sometimes along with Zumalacarregui and the main army, sometimes with a separate body, was now retiring into the fastnesses of Biscay, and now seeking safety in the mountains of Navarre. Little blood, however, was shed, except when prisoners were put to death as rebels taken with arms in their hands. The Carlists speedily again assumed the offensive. In the beginning of September, the queen's troops seemed every where to have been victorious, without fighting, and their opponents to have disappeared; but, ere the end of the month, the latter had not only laid siege to Elisondo, which Rodil had converted into a fortified position, but assaulted Tolosa, made an attempt on Vergara, and pressed forward between Pampeluna and Vittoria, into the neighbourhood of Estella. All that Rodil had done seemed in an instant to be undone. He was recalled from the command, and it was given to Mina, whose skill and popularity could not fail, it was thought, to insure success.

Zumalacarregui having descended into the plains of Vittoria in the middle of October, the queen's troops, commanded by general Osma, made preparations for cutting him off But the Carlist chief, ever active and enterprising, penetrated the design, and before the combined movement could become dangerous, cut off a body of 1,400 royalists, under the command of general O'Doyle, on the 27th of October. The queen's troops lost all their artillery, arms, and ammunition; general

O'Doyle himself fell, and nearly the whole of his division was killed or captured. On the 28th, Osma marched from Vittoria with his whole force to oppose the advance of Zumalacarregui. The latter attacked him in the course of the same day; drove him from all his positions, and pursued him to the walls of Vittoria, the fortifications of which were a sure protection against all the means which irregular warfare could supply. On this last occasion the government accounts admitted a loss of 200 men; those of the Carlists stated the killed alone at 600 men. These disasters occasioned great alarm in Madrid, and loud outcries against the want of energy and capacity in the ministry. The

clamour was so general that Zarco del Valle, the minister of war, tendered his resignation. Llauder was appointed to succeed him, retaining at the same time his cap. tainship-general of Catalonia.

It was immediately after these disasters that Mina assumed the command. In his first proclama tion from Pampeluna, November 4th, he announced the plan on which he was to conduct the war as one "of extermination." If those who had been led astray did not immediately submit, and either return to their homes, or enlist in his army, they were assured that no prayers or entreaties, from whatever quarter they might come, would be of any avail to alter the doom he had prepared for them. Every individual who was found at a distance from the highways be tween sunset and sunrise, without being able to give a satisfactory reason for being so, was to be immediately put to death. On the

12th of December a detachment of his troops, commanded by Lorenzo, gained an advantage over the Carlists under Eraso, at the pass of Carrascal, in the immediate neighbourhood of Pampeluna, the head-quarters of the general. On the same day, an engagement took place between Zumalacarregui and the queen's troops at Asarte. The action terminated in the retreat of Zumalacarregui. Mina stated the loss of the insurgents in these two affairs at 1,500 men; and the language used in the proclamation in which he announced these successes to the inhabitants of Navarre, was calculated to produce the impression, either that there had been neither wounded nor prisoners, or that the wounded and prisoners had been butchered. "Mark well my words," said he, "for you know I do not speak in vain. I declared

a

war of extermination against those who should obstinately persevere, and in one day 1,500 of them were exterminated." Zumalacarregui was so far from being routed, that, two days after the engagement of the 12th, he was again at Campeza, not far from the place where that action had been fought, and attacked the division of general Cordova, who did not escape without loss. One of Zumalacarregui's children, an infant still under the charge of its nurse, was seized by the royalists, and actually sent to Pampeluna. Madame Zumalacarregui passed into France to place her other children in safety. So soon as she crossed the frontier, she was made a prisoner, and placed under the custody of French centinels.

T the close of 1833, the cause of Don Miguel in Portugal, had ceased to wear a promising appearance. The government of the Queen was in possession of the capital, as well as of Oporto: it had an efficient army, now accustomed to service, and commanded by able officers; it had the means of procuring money; it was recognized by foreign states, and supported by their alliances. The authority of Don Miguel, indeed, was obeyed over a large extent of country; many important fortresses were still in his possession, and he was at the head of a respectable army; but his navy, which secured to him reinforcements from abroad, had been destroyed the course which events had taken in Spain had deprived him of the aid which would have been most immediate and effectual; he had no ally; he had no money; and, worse than all, the population shewed no disposition to make a

voluntary effort in his favour. He remained shut up in his strong position at Santarem, apparently the unpopular as well as the unsuccessful candidate for the crown, and making no exertion even to communicate with and support the commanders who still maintained his cause in different provinces of the kingdom.

The government, on the other hand, resolved to pursue its military operations with vigour. It was not deemed prudent to attack Santarem itself, which could not be carried without heavy loss, while a check might have been productive of very mischievous consequences. The plan adopted seemed to be, to establish the queen's government as extensively. as possible by crushing the smaller bodies of men who were still in arms for the cause of the pretender in other parts of the kingdom, till there should be no Miguelites but those who were around

himself.

In pursuance of this plan, the duke of Terceira, joined the queen's army before Santarem in the beginning of January, in order that Saldanha might undertake other operations. The first attempt of the latter was against the portant town of Leyria, between Lisbon and Coimbra, which was occupied by a Miguelite garrison of 1,500 men. Marching from Santarem with between four and five thousand men, on the 12th of January, he reached Leyria on the 15th, approaching it with the great body of his army, from the side of Coimbra, while another division advanced more directly to the attention of the occupy garrison. The latter prepared at first to resist this division; but on learning that the main army had got between them and Coimbra, they lost courage, evacuated the town, and attempted to retreat. It was too late: Saldanha was upon them, and they were utterly routed. The victors disgraced themselves by wanton bloodshed; they gave no quarter: and their commander was under the necessity of assigning this as the reason why, after such a route, there were so few prisoners. Saldanha then marched towards Santarem from the north, and on the 25th of January made himself master of Torres Novas, where the same system of massacre was renewed. Saldanha was compelled to write in his dispatches, "It was very difficult to prevail on our soldiers to grant quarter, and consequently the number of killed was very considerable, and we have only seventy-eight prisoners." The killed were five times

more numerous.

The army of Saldanhano w

1

separated Miguel from the north, while the army of the duke of Terceira pressed upon him from Lisbon. No operation of any consequence, however, took place till the 18th of February, when the Miguelite army made an effort to relieve itself by attacking Saldanha in his position at Almoster. The royalist commander allowed them to execute their plan to such an extent, as brought them within the operation of the scheme which he had formed to defeat it. He permitted them to advance to a considerable distance from their own position, and to approach, and even form, till they had crossed a stream, which lay between the two armies, and a narrow bridge across which was now their only way of retreat. He then attacked them; broke across their lines with the bayonet, and compelled them to give way. They fled in confusion to the bridge which presented but an inefficient means of escape, and were slaughtered almost without resist. ance. The fact seems to be, that the queen's troops were following out their practice of giving no quarter, although Saldanha, while he described the carnage as something which he had never seen equalled in all his campaigns, except in the "breach of St. Sebastian," ascribed it to a different, and a somewhat singular cause. "A kind of torpor," said he, "seized the rebels. They scarcely made any resistance, and yet could not determine on surrendering; and our soldiers, enraged at such per tinacity, made a dreadful slaugh-" ter." Notwithstanding this loss, however, the enemy repeated the attack on different parts of the line, but on all they were repulsed, and were compelled to continue

Events equally favourable to the queen took place in the north, where considerable numbers of Miguelites were still in arms, though their main body had been called to the defence of the positions on the Tagus. A division of the garrison of Oporto marched from that city on the 25th of March, to clear the north of the Douro, destroying as they advanced, the works which the army of Miguel had erected during the siege of Oporto. On the 27th they entered Guimaraens, not only without opposition, but with welcomes and congratulations on the part of the inhabitants. Thence they marched, with equal good fortune to Braga, the enemy retreating without fighting into Tras os-montes, and towards the frontiers of Spain. In the course of a few days, the whole province of Minho had declared for the queen. To co-operate with these movements, and aid this spirit, the duke of Terceira had marched to the north with a division of the army. In the beginning of April, he entered Lamego, in Beira, which had followed the example of the towns in the neighbouring province. The Miguelites still remaining in this quarter had intended, when driven out of Minho, to defend themselves along the line of the Tamega; but this movement behind them from the south, while the army of Oporto was in front, obliged them to retreat, after they had attempted in vain to maintain a position at Amarante. The retreat became a dispersion. The militia laid down their arms, and returned to their homes; desertions from the regular troops were VOL. LXXVI.

Martha himself, who had been commander-in-chief of the Miguelite army, saw that the cause of his patron was hopeless, presented himself at the head-quar ters of the duke of Terceira, and made his peace with the government.

The provinces north of the Douro being thus cleared of the enemy, the duke retraced his steps to expel the partizans of Miguel from the positions which they still held between the Douro and the Tagus, particularly Coimbra on the Mondego, and Figueiras at the mouth of that river. The reduction of the latter was intrusted to a naval expedition commanded by Admiral Napier. He appeared before it on the 8th of May. On learning his approach, the garrison had evacuated the town, and the inhabitants immediately hoisted the standard of the queen. On the same day, the duke of Terceira reached Coimbra, having encountered scarcely any opposition in his march from the Douro, except at Castro d' Ayre, where the enemy suffered a total defeat. Coim bra, itself, opened its gates; and thus the dying hopes of Don Mi. guel could linger only in the isolated position which he occupied, or the fortresses on the Spanish western frontiers which still remained in his hands.

But it was from this very quarter that his destruction was approaching. Miguel had been doing nothing for himself; he seemed incapable of doing anything for himself, and to have nobody about him who could do any thing for him. While he allowed himself, almost without an effort to be thus shut up be◄ [2 F]