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grating found; here is no removal of pleasure; and yet here is felt, in every fenfe which is affected,'a pain very distinguishable. It may be faid, perhaps, that the pain in these cafes had its rife from the removal of the pleasure which the man enjoyed before, though that pleasure was of fo low a degree as to be perceived only by the removal. But this feems to me a fubtilty, that is not discoverable in nature. For if, previous to the pain, I do not feel any actual pleafure I have no reafon to judge that any fuch thing exifts; fince pleafure is only pleasure as it is felt. The fame may be faid of pain, and with equal reafon. I can never perfuade myfelf that pleasure and pain are mere relations, which can only exist as they are contrafted; but I think I can difcern clearly that there are pofitive pains and pleasures, which do not at all depend upon each other. Nothing is more certain to my own feelings than this. There is nothing which I can distinguish in my mind with more clearnefs than the three ftates, of indifference, of pleasure, and of pain. Every one of these I can perceive without any fort of idea of its relation to any thing elfe. Caius is afflicted with a fit of the cholic; this man is actually in pain; ftretch Caius upon the rack, he will feel a much greater pain but does this pain of the rack arife from the removal of any pleasure, or is the fit of the cholic a pleasure or a pain just as we are pleased to confider it?

SECT.

SECT. III.

The difference between the removal of PAIN and pofitive PLEASURE.

E fhall carry this propofition yet a step

WE farther. We fhall venture to propose, that

pain and pleasure are not only not neceffarily dependent for their existence on their mutual diminution or removal, but that, in reality, the diminution or ceafing of pleasure does not operate like pofitive pain; and that the removal or diminution of pain, in its effect, has very little resemblance to pofitive pleasure *. The former of these propofitions will, I believe, be much more readily allowed than the latter; because it is very evident that pleasure, when it has run its career, fets us down very nearly where it found us. Pleafure of every kind quickly fatisfies; and when it is over, we relapfe into indifference, or rather we fall into a foft tranquillity, which is tinged with the agreeable colour of the former fenfation. I own it is not at first view fo apparent, that the removal of a great pain does not refemble pofitive pleasure; but let us recollect in what ftate we have found our minds upon escaping fome imminent danger, or on being released from the feverity of fome cruel pain.

* Mr. Locke [Effay on Human Understanding, 1. ii. c. 20. fect. 16.] thinks that the removal or leffening of a pain is confidered and operates as a pleasure, and the lofs or diminishing of pleasure as a pain. It is this opinion which we confider here.

We

We have on fuch occafions found, if I am not much mistaken, the temper of our minds in a tenor very remote from that which attends the prefence of pofitive pleafure; we have found them in a ftate of much fobriety, impreffed with a sense of awe, in a fort of tranquillity fhadowed with horror. The fashion of the countenance and the gefture of the body on fuch occafions is fo correspondent to this ftate of mind, that any perfon, a stranger to the cause of the appearance, would rather judge us under fome confternation, than in the enjoyment of any thing like pofitive pleasure.

Ως δ' αρ ανδρ' άλη πυκινη λαβή, ος εν παρή
Φώλα καλα κλεινάς, άλλον εξίκετο δήμον,

Άνδρος ως αφνεις, θαμβος δ' έχει εισορόωνίας.

As when a wretch, who, confcious of his crime,
Purfued for murder from his native clime,

Juft gains fome frontier, breathless, pale, amax'd;
All gaze, all wonder!

This striking appearance of the man whom Homer
fupposes to have juft escaped an imminent danger,
the fort of mixt paffion of terror and furprize, with
which he affects the fpectators, paints very ftrongly
the manner in which we find ourselves affected upon
occafions any way
For when we have fuf-
any way fimilar.
fered from any violent emotion, the mind naturally
continues in fomething like the fame condition, after
the cause which first produced it has ceased to ope-
The toffing of the fea remains after the ftorm;
and when this remain of horror has entirely sub-
fided, all the paffion, which the accident raised,

rate.

fub

fubfides along with it; and the mind returns to its ufual ftate of indifference. In fhort, pleasure (I mean any thing either in the inward fenfation, or in the outward appearance, like pleasure from a positive cause) has never, I imagine, its origin from the removal of pain or danger.

SECT. IV.

Of DELIGHT and PLEASURE, as oppofed to each other.

BUT

UT shall we therefore say, that the removal of pain or its diminution is always fimply painful? or affirm that the ceffation or the leffening of pleafure is always attended itself with a pleasure? By no means. What I advance is no more than this. ; first, that there are pleasures and pains of a pofitive and independent nature; and fecondly, that the feeling which results from the ceafing or diminution of pain does not bear a fufficient resemblance to positive pleasure, to have it confidered as of the fame nature, or to entitle it to be known by the fame name; and thirdly, that upon the fame principle the removal or qualification of pleasure has no refemblance to pofitive pain. It is certain that the former feeling (the removal or moderation of pain) has fomething in it far from diftreffing or disagreeable in its nature. This feeling, in many cafes fo agreeable, but in all fo different from pofitive plea-. fure, has no name which I know; but that hinders not its being a very real one, and very different from all others. It is moft certain, that every fpecies

of

of fatisfaction or pleasure, how different foever in its manner of affecting, is of a pofitive nature in the mind of him who feels it. The affection is undoubtedly pofitive; but the caufe may be, as in this cafe it certainly is, a fort of Privation. And it is very reasonable that we should distinguish by some term two things fo diftinct in nature, as a pleasure that is fuch fimply, and without any relation, from that pleasure which cannot exift without a relation, and that too a relation to pain. Very extraordinary it would be, if thefe affections, fo diftinguishable in their caufes, fo different in their effects, should be confounded with each other, because vulgar ufe has ranged them under the fame general title. Whenever I have occafion to speak of this fpecies of relative pleasure, I call it Delight; and I fhall take the best care I can, to use that word in no other sense. I am fatisfied the word is not commonly used in this appropriated fignification; but I thought it better to take up a word already known, and to limit its fignification, than to introduce a new one, which would not perhaps incorporate fo well with the language. I fhould never have prefumed the leaft alteration in our words, if the nature of the language, framed for the purposes of business rather than those of philofophy, and the nature of my fubject, that leads me out of the common track of discourse, did not in a manner neceffitate me to it. I fhall make ufe of this liberty with all poffible caution. As I make use of the word Delight to exprefs the fensation which accompanies the removal of pain or danger; fo when I fpeak of pofitive pleasure, I fhall for the moft part call it fimply Pleasure.

SECT.

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