portions: the wife's estate being withdrawn by decree on the ground of infancy, the younger children were confined, as against the eldest, to half the portion: the articles providing in the event of no issue male, in which case the estates were to separate, that each should bear a moiety: though they also contemplated the case of the wife's refusal to be bound; providing against it by the forfeiture of her interest. Clough v. Clough.

3. The rule, that a limitation to the heirs of the body in
articles shall be carried into execution by a strict settle-
ment, does not prevail, where the concurrence of both
parents would be necessary to bar the intail.

See Construction 5. Contract. Deed 3. Executory Trust
1. 2. 3. Settlement 8. 9. Trust (Executory 1.) Volun-
tary Settlement 12. 17.

ARTICLES OF SEPARATION.
See Baron and Feme (Separation 4. 8.)

ASSETS.

1. Lease; though a proviso against alienation.
2. The object of suit in equity. Distinction at law.
Orphanage share under custom of London.

3.

4.

13. Implied charge of debts and legacies on real estate. 14. Devise" after payment of debts," a charge.

15. Distinction between debts and legacies in implied charge on estate devised.

16. Equitable.

17.

18.

19.

20.

On deficiency annuity valued.

Debt at law the foundation of administration in equity.
Exoneration of the personal estate.

21. Equitable.

22. Sale of real estate on deficiency of personal foreseen. 23. Advancement brought into hotchpot.

24.

Commission in the army an advancement, to be brought
into hotchpot. So an annuity; how.

25. No claim of widow on what is brought into hotchpot.
26. Order of application.

27.

Assigned by executor for his own debt.

28. Order of application.

29. Exoneration of descended estate, though legal, and

that devised equitable, assets.

Vol. Page

V. 710

VII. 390

39. Equitable.

40. Sale of real estate before the state of the personal ascertained.

41. Under decree obtained by separate creditor, the surviving partner a bankrupt, and the joint estate insolvent, the joint creditors entitled only to the surplus of the separate estate.

42. Power of appointment executed for volunteers. Distinction as to a purchaser.

43.

Remittance for a specific purpose not general assets. 44. Sale of real estate without waiting the account of the personal.

45. Conversion for special purposes.

46. Personal estate generally considered in possession a year after the death.

47. Presumption, that the personal estate may be got in within a year.

48. Of testator in India: how the rule for conversion

into 3 per cents. is applied,

49. Leases for lives, when distributed as personal estate.

1. Executors may dispose of a lease for years as assets notwithstanding a proviso or covenant, that lessee slrall not alien. Seers v. Hind.

2. At law the person often sued in respect of the assets: in equity the assets themselves.

3. Orphanage share under the custom of London is subject to debts.

4. Devise in trust to sell for payment of debts and funeral
expenses, with a particular disposition of the surplus
money the personal estate, not being otherwise dis-
posed of than by the appointment of an executor, who
was not one of the trustees, is first liable to the debts,
&c. especially as the produce of the sale was not suffi-
cient for them. Gray v. Minnethorpe.
5. Under a devise to sell and pay funeral expenses the per-
sonal estate was exempted without any express words
upon the evident intention. Burton v. Knowlton.
6. Where there is an express direction in a will, that the
debts, &c. shall be paid out of the real estate, the per-
son, to whom the personal is bequeathed, takes it exempt.
7. To exempt the personal estate under a devise for pay-
ment of debts the intention must appear plainly on the

I. 294

I. 430

II. 254

II. 103

III. 107

III. 111

will: and the Court cannot look to extrinsic circum-
stances. Brummel v. Prothero.

8. Though a general charge of debts upon a devised estate
will not prevent the previous application of an estate
descended, yet if the devised estate is selected and ap-
propriated to the debts, it is liable before the estate
descended: but this arrangement does not bind the
creditors. Manning v. Spooner.

9. The personal property of an intestate, wherever situated, must be distributed by the law of the country, where his domicil was; which is prima facie the place of his residence; but that may be rebutted and supported by circumstances. Bempde v. Johnstone.

Vol. Page

III. 111

III. 114

III. 198

10. Personal estate not exempted from debts, &c. by a charge upon real. Burnaby v. Griffin.

III. 266

11. To exempt personal estate from debts the intention must be manifest.

III. 477

12. Real estates devised held liable to simple-contract debts under a direction in the beginning of the will, that debts and funeral expenses should be first paid: that, which descended to the heir by the failure of the devise, to be first applied. Williams v. Chitty.

III. 545

13. No difference between debts and legacies in an implied charge upon real estate by will.

III. 551

14. Devise after payment of debts: the debts are charged. Shallcross v. Finden.

III. 738

15. Distinction between debts and legacies in an implied charge upon an estate specifically devised.

III. 739

16. An equity of redemption of a mortgage in fee is not equitable assets; at least, as against judgment creditors; who have a right to redeem. Sharpe v. The Earl of Scarborough.

17. Upon a deficiency of assets, administered in this Court, a value must be set upon an annuity at the time of the death; and the annuitant can claim only in respect of that. Franks v. Cooper.

18. Upon the administration of assets no question ought to be determined in equity, till it is first determined, whether there is a good debt at law.

19. The personal estate is the natural fund for the debts, and can only be exempted by the intention to exempt it, expressed in the will: a charge upon a real estate, however anxious, is not of itself sufficient.

Tait v.

20. A charge for payment of debts makes equitable assets. Bailey v. Ekins.

21. Simple-contract debts not charged upon real estate by a will, first devising, that all his debts and funeral expenses might be satisfied and paid by his executors; all the real estate being specifically devised. Assets

IV. 538

IV. 763

IV. 815

IV. 816

VII. 319

marshalled, but no sale decreed, until the infant devisee attains twenty-one (a). Powell v. Robins. 22. The old practice, to administer the personal estate before a sale of real estate charged in aid, relaxed. Now if the Master foresees a deficiency, a sale is permitted. 23. Advancement to the eldest son, if personal property, must be brought into hotchpot under the Statute of Distributions. Lord Kircudbright v. Lady Kircudbright. 24. The purchase of a commission in the army is an advancement, to be brought into hotchpot. An annuity is an advancement, to be brought into hotchpot, viz. the value at the date of the grant; or if it has ceased, the payments received; at the option of the child. Lord Kircudbright v. Lady Kircudbright.

25. The widow has no claim upon what is brought into hotchpot among the children. Lord Kircudbright v. Lady Kircudbright.

- VIII. 124, 5

26. In the administration of assets ordinarily the first fund
applicable is the personal estate, not specifically be-
queathed: then land devised or ordered to be sold for
payment of debts; not merely charged: then descended
estates: then lands charged with the debts. The dis-
tinction is between a mere charge upon the real estates,
and proposing the mode, in which the debts are to be
paid.
27. Leasehold estates specifically bequeathed to an executor
were by him assigned as a security for his own debt.
That assignment, no collusion appearing, was estab-
lished against a creditor. Taylor v. Hawkins.
28. Rule as to the application of assets. Where the will,
going beyond a mere charge, creates a particular fund
for payment of debts, that shall be first applied in ex-
oneration of descended estates, whether acquired after
the date of the will, or not, and of the personal estate;
even in favour of the next of kin, taking it for want of
disposition. Milnes v. Slater.

29. The rule as to the exoneration of estates descended by a devise for the payment of debts holds, even though the estate devised may be equitable assets, and the descended estates legal assets.

30. The personal estate can be exempt from the debts only
by declaration plain, or necessary inference.
31. A mere charge upon a devised estate will not protect a
descended estate from being first applied.

32. General residuary bequest, including a leasehold farm, with the stock, to be converted into money as soon as conveniently may be, upon trust to pay the interest, &c. for life, and as to the capital for the children. The stock being considerably increased between the death

(a) See the note, page 211.

VIII. 209

VIII. 295

VIII. 304

VIII. 305

VIII. 306

in April and the sale at Michaelmas, it was decreed,
that the conversion was in a reasonable time; and the
party entitled for life should have interest from the
conversion; and as to the premises, that from a defect
of title could not be sold, that, being for the interest of
all, that they should not be sold, a value should be set
upon them; to carry interest at 4 per cent. from the
death. Gibson v. Bott.

33. General rule, that where personal property is bequeathed for life with remainders over, and not specifically, it is to be converted into the 3 per cents., subject in the case of a real security to an inquiry, whether it will be for the benefit of all parties; and the tenant for life is entitled only upon that principle. Howe v. Earl of Dartmouth.

Vol. Page

VII. 89

VII. 137

VII. 551

34. The Court in laying out money in the funds, does not attend to the difference in the price of stock. 35. To convert real into personal property, as between real or personal representatives, from the state in which it is found at the death, the character of land or money must, by the trust, covenant, &c. be imperatively and definitively affixed to it: otherwise, if there was an option, there is no equity. The bill by the heir claiming the personal property, as real estate, was dismissed without costs. The decree affirmed on a re-hearing: the money, not being impressed with a real character, and clothed with real uses, immediately upon the execution of the deed, was, in the event that happened, not considered as land. Wheldale v. Partridge. V. 388. VIII. 227 36. Money being once clearly impressed with real uses, and

one of those uses being for the benefit of the heir, the impression will remain for his benefit; and to put an end to it, in a question between the heir and executor, either the money must come to the possession of the person from whom they claim in those characters, or, he must, if it is in the hands of a third person, do some act denoting a change of intention. 37. Direction by will to sell real estates, and after the sale to pay certain legacies, held, upon the will, not a conversion out and out; and the surplus produce does not pass by an unattested codicil. Sheddon v. Goodrich. 38. Surplus produce of real estate, converted by will, held to pass only where the will, attested by three witnesses, itself treats the surplus as comprehended in the description under the words "my personal estate;" and an intention is collected from the whole will to give that surplus, after payment of the debts and legacies, in terms primá facie descriptive of personal property only, but upon the whole intended to pass such surplus.

39. A charge makes equitable assets. Shiphard v. Lutwidge.

VIII. 235

VIII. 481

VIII. 495
VIII. 26