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in the Union line. Jenkins's brigade was conspicuous among the Confederates in pursuit. Jenkins exclaimed to those around him, “I am happy; I have felt despair of the cause for some months, but am relieved, and feel assured that we will put the enemy back across the Rapidan before night." A few minutes later he fell mortally wounded. In the general mêlée Longstreet was leading in advance of his troops, and in the midst of close firing was shot by his own men. This caused the Confederate lines to slow up in their advance. Orders were given General Field by Longstreet to push on before the enemy could have time to rally, but in the midst of the general confusion, General Lee ordered the broken lines to be reformed, and the advantage already gained was not followed up.

General Field, in his subsequent account of the day, said,

"I was at Longstreet's side in a moment, and in answer to my anxious inquiry as to his condition, he replied that he would be looked after by others, and directed me to take command of the corps and push on. Though at this moment he could not have known the extent or character of his wounds (that they were severe was apparent), he seemed to forget himself in the absorbing interest of the movement he was making.

“Had our advance not been suspended by this disaster, I have always believed that Grant would have been driven across the Rapidan before night; but General Lee was present, and ordered that our line, which was nearly a right angle, should first be straightened out. The difficulty of manoeuvring through the brush made this a tedious operation, so that when we did advance with large reinforcements from Ewell's Corps placed under my orders, the enemy was found awaiting us behind new breastworks, thoroughly prepared."

In a letter touching this subject to General Longstreet, Colonel Fairfax said,—

"On reaching the line of troops you were taken off the horse and propped against a tree. You blew the bloody foam from your mouth and said, ' Tell General Field to take command, and move forward with the whole force and gain the Brock road,' but meantime hours were lost."

A Northern historian* said, on the same point,

"It seemed indeed that irretrievable disaster was upon us; but in the very torrent and tempest of the attack it suddenly ceased and all was still. What could cause this surcease of effort at the very height of success was then wholly unknown to us.”

Some years after, General Hancock said to General Longstreet,

"You rolled me up like a wet blanket, and it was some hours before I could reorganize the battle."

THE CURTAIN FALLS AT APPOMATTOX

IN discussing the war, General Longstreet always dwelt with peculiar tenderness on the last days that culminated with the surrender at Appomattox. His mental belief for two years before the surrender was that from the very nature of the situation the Union forces would in all probability finally triumph, but his brave heart never knew how to give up the fight, and the surrender was at last agreed upon while he was still protesting against it.

The incident is well known of a number of the leading Confederate generals, who, having decided that further resistance was useless, went to General Lee and suggested surrender upon the best terms that could be had as the wisest thing to do. General Longstreet declined

* Swinton, Decisive Battles of the War, p. 378.

to join with them. General Pendleton was spokesman for the party. His account of the conference is thus related by General A. L. Long in his Memoirs of Lee:

“General Lee was lying on the ground. No others heard the conversation between him and myself. He received my communication with the reply, 'Oh, no; I trust that it has not come to that,' and added, 'General, we have yet too many bold men to think of laying down our arms. The enemy do not fight with spirit, while our boys do. Besides, if I were to say a word to the Federal commander, he would regard it as such a confession of weakness as to make it the condition of demanding an unconditional surrender, a proposal to which I will never listen. I have never believed we could, against the gigantic combination for our subjugation, make good, in the long run, our independence, unless some foreign power should, directly or indirectly, assist us. . . . But such considerations really make with me no difference. We had, I am satisfied, sacred principles to maintain, and rights to defend, for which we were in duty bound to do our best, even if we perished in the endeavor.'

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"Such were, as nearly as I can recall them, the exact words of General Lee on that most pitiful occasion. You see in them the soul of the man. Where his conscience dictated and his judgment decided, there his heart was."

No words of eulogy show up so clearly the characters of Lee and likewise of Grant as their own direct words and deeds. On the evening of April 7, 1865, General Grant wrote General Lee as follows:

"The results of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate army known as the Army of Northern Virginia."

General Longstreet was with General Lee when he received this note. It was handed to General Longstreet without a word. After reading it General Longstreet handed it back, saying, "Not yet." General Lee replied to General Grant that same evening:

"I have received your note of this day. Though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender."

While this correspondence was pending, both armies, under the respective directions of Grant and of Lee, continued their preparations for battle as if there was no thought of cessation. The next day, April 8, General Grant wrote General Lee as follows:

"Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of the same date asking the conditions on which I will accept surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply I would say that, peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon,-namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the United States government until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you might name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received."

To this General Lee replied, under the same date:

"I received at a late hour your note of to-day. In mine of yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army, but as the restoration to peace

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