On the 20th of October General Burnside reported by letter to General Grant an army of twenty-two thousand three hundred men, with ninety-odd guns, but his returns for November gave a force of twenty-five thousand two hundred and ninety, and over one hundred guns. Eight thousand of his men were on service north of Knoxville and about Cumberland Gap.

To march, capture, and disperse this formidable force, fortified at points, Longstreet had about fifteen thousand men, after deducting camp guards and foraging parties. Marching and fighting had been his almost daily occupation from the middle of January, 1863, when he left Fredericksburg to move down to Suffolk, Virginia, until the 16th of December, when he found bleak winter again breaking upon him, away from friends, and dependent upon his own efforts for food and clothing for his ragged and hungry Confederates.

It is not in the purview of this paper to more than briefly refer to Longstreet's work in East Tennessee in the bitter winter of 1863-64. He has said that Washington's men at Valley Forge did not suffer more than his command on the hard campaigns of that severe winter. Much of the time half-clad and shoeless, the snowcovered ground bore the bloody imprint of their naked feet. They were compelled to dig holes in the frozen ground, which were thawed out by fires to furnish their usual couch. They had nothing to eat but parched corn. But the brave fellows never lost heart. They undertook to make a joke of their dire straits. As General Longstreet rode out among them, they would call cheerily to know if they might not have a little fodder to eat with their corn.

It is now generally conceded that no more valorous service was rendered the Confederate cause during the four years' fighting than Longstreet's work in East Tennessee, cut off from supplies, improperly supported

by his government, and sent with an inadequate force to attack Burnside in his stronghold.

Mrs. Grant, a few years before her death, in discussing the events of those campaigns, said to me that General Grant had come to Nashville to spend Christmas with her. She had scarcely given him greeting when a hurried message came from Knoxville,-" Longstreet is coming!" He was much perturbed at having to forego his Christmas with his family and return immediately to his works about Knoxville. In parting she said to him, "Now, Ulysses, you know that you are not going to hurt Longstreet." Grant quickly replied, “I will if I can get him; he is in bad company.

To "get" Longstreet or to drive him out of Tennessee came to be the chief concern of Grant and his government. General Halleck was much concerned about the Confederate army in East Tennessee, the only strategic field then held by Southern troops. It was inconveniently near Kentucky and the Ohio River. President Lincoln and his War Secretary added their anxiety to Halleck's on account of its politico-strategic bearing. General Halleck urged his views upon General Grant, and despatched General Foster that it was of first importance to "drive Longstreet out of Tennessee and keep him out." General Grant ordered: "Drive Longstreet to the farthest point east that you can." It was easier to issue that order than to execute it. And Grant reported to the authorities:

"If Longstreet is not driven out of the valley entirely, and the road destroyed east of Abingdon, I do not think it unlikely that the last great battle of the war will be fought in East Tennessee. Reports of deserters and citizens show the army of Bragg to be too much demoralized and reduced by desertions to do anything this winter. I will get everything in order here in a few days and go to Nashville and Louisville, and,

if there is still a chance of doing anything against Longstreet, to the scene of operations there. I am deeply interested in moving the enemy beyond Saltville this winter, so as to be able to select my own campaign in the spring, instead of having the enemy dictate it to me."

About the middle of December orders were given the Confederate army, which was on the west bank of the Holston River, to cross and march for the railroad, only a few miles away.

The transfer of the army to the east bank of the river was executed by diligent work and the use of such flatboats and other means of crossing as could be collected and constructed. They were over by the 20th, and before Christmas were in camps along the railroad near Morristown. Blankets and clothes were scarce, shoes more so. But to the hungry Confederates the beautiful country in which they found themselves seemed a land of milk and honey. The French Broad River and the Holston are confluent at Knoxville. The country between and beyond them contains as fine farming-lands and has as delightful climate as can be found. Stock and grain were on all farms. Wheat and oats had been thoughtfully hidden away by the Federals, but the fields were full of maize, still standing. The country around the French Broad had hardly been touched by the foragers. The Confederate wagons immediately on entering the fields were loaded to overflowing. Pumpkins were on the ground in places like apples under a tree. Cattle, sheep, and swine, poultry, vegetables, maple sugar, and honey were all abundant for immediate wants of the troops.

When the Federals found that the Confederates had moved to the east bank, their cavalry followed to that side. They were almost as much in want of the beautiful foraging lands as the Confederates, but there was