The condition of the garrison was in the eyes of all Europe desperate; but the French, to whom the praise of spirit and activity cannot be denied, resolved to make an effort for the honour of their arms. Maillebois was at that time encamped with his army in Westphalia. Orders were sent him to relieve Prague. The enterprize was considered as romantick. Maillebois was a march of forty days distant from Bohemia, the passes were narrow, and the ways foul; and it was likely that Prague would be taken before he could reach it. The march was, however, begun: the army, being joined by that of count Saxe, consisted of fifty thousand men, who, notwithstanding all the difficulties which two Austrian armies could put in their way, at last entered Bohemia. The siege of Prague, though not raised, was remitted, and a communication was now opened to it with the country. But the Austrians, by perpetual intervention, hindered the garrison from joining their friends. The officers of Maillebois incited him to battle, because the army was hourly lessening by the want of provisions; but, instead of pressing on to Prague, he retired into Bavaria, and completed the ruin of the emperor's territories.

The court of France, disappointed and offended, conferred the chief command upon Broglio, who escaped from the besiegers with very little difficulty, and kept the Austrians employed till Bellisle by a sudden sally quitted Prague, and without any great loss joined the main army. Broglio then retired over the Rhine into the French dominions, wasting in his retreat the country which he had undertaken to protect, and burning towns, and destroying magazines of corn, with such wantonness, as gave reason to believe that he expected commendation from his court for any mischiefs done, by whatever means.

The Austrians pursued their advantages, recovered all their strong places, in some of which French garrisons had been left, and made themselves masters of Bavaria, by taking not only Munich the capital, but Ingolstadt, the strongest fortification in the elector's dominions, where

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they found a great number of cannon and a quantity of ammunition intended in the dreams of projected greatness for the siege of Vienna, all the archives of the state, the plate and ornaments of the electoral palace, and what had been considered as most worthy of preservation. Nothing but the warlike stores were taken away. An oath of allegiance to the queen was required of the Bavarians, but without any explanation whether temporary or perpetual.

The emperor lived at Francfort in the security that was allowed to neutral places, but without much respect from the German princes, except that, upon some objections made by the queen to the validity of his election, the king of Prussia declared himself determined to support him in the imperial dignity with all his power.

This may be considered as a token of no great affection to the queen of Hungary, but it seems not to have raised much alarm. The German princes were afraid of new

broils. To contest the election of an emperor once invested and acknowledged, would be to overthrow the whole Germanic constitution. Perhaps no election by plurality of suffrages was ever made among human beings, to which it might not be objected that voices were procured by illicit influence.

Some suspicions, however, were raised by the king's declaration, which he endeavoured to obviate by ordering his ministers to declare at London and at Vienna, that he was resolved not to violate the treaty of Breslaw. This declaration was sufficiently ambiguous, and could not satisfy those whom it might silence. But this was not a time for nice disquisitions; to distrust the king of Prussia might have provoked him, and it was most convenient to consider him as a friend, till he appeared openly as an enemy.

About the middle of the year 1774, he raised new alarms by collecting his troops and putting them in motion. The earl of Hindford about this time demanded the troops stipulated for the protection of Hanover, not perhaps because they were thought necessary, but that the king's designs

might be guessed from his answer, which was, that troops were not granted for the defence of any country till that country was in danger, and that he could not believe the elector of Hanover to be in much dread of an invasion, since he had withdrawn the native troops, and put them into the pay of England.

He had, undoubtedly, now formed designs which made it necessary that his troops should be kept together, and the time soon came when the scene was to be opened. Prince Charles of Lorrain, having chased the French out of Bavaria, lay for some months encamped on the Rhine, endeavouring to gain a passage into Alsace. His attempts had long been evaded by the skill and vigilance of the French general, till at last, June 21, 1774, he executed his design, and lodged his army in the French dominions, to the surprize and joy of a great part of Europe. It was now expected that the territories of France would in their turn feel the miseries of war: and the nation, which so long kept the world in alarm, be taught at last the value of peace.

The king of Prussia now saw the Austrian troops at a great distance from him, engaged in a foreign country against the most powerful of all their enemies. Now, therefore was the time to discover that he had lately made a treaty at Frankfort with the emperor, by which he had engaged, "that as the court of Vienna and its allies appeared backward to re-establish the tranquillity of the empire, and more cogent methods appeared necessary; he, being animated with a desire of co-operating towards the pacification of Germany, should make an expedition for the conquest of Bohemia, and to put it into the possession of the emperor, his heirs and successors, for ever; in gratitude for which the emperor should resign to him and his successors a certain number of lordships, which are now part of the kingdom of Bohemia. His imperial majesty likewise guarantees to the king of Prussia the perpetual possession of Upper Silesia; and the king guarantees to the emperor the perpetual possession of Upper Austria, as soon as he shall have occupied it by conquest.'

It is easy to discover that the king began the war upon other motives than zeal for peace; and that, whatever respect he was willing to shew to the emperor, he did not purpose to assist him without reward. In prosecution of this treaty he puts his troops in motion; and, according to his promise, whilst the Austrians were invading France, he invaded Bohemia.

Princes have this remaining of humanity, that they think themselves obliged not to make war without a reason. Their reasons are indeed not always very satisfactory. Lewis the Fourteenth seemed to think his own glory a sufficient motive for the invasion of Holland. The czar

attacked Charles of Sweden, because he had not been treated with sufficient respect when he made a journey in disguise. The king of Prussia, having an opportunity of attacking his neighbour, was not long without his reasons. On July 30th, he published his declaration, in which he declares:

That he can no longer stand an idle spectator of the troubles in Germany, but finds himself obliged to make use of force to restore the power of the laws, and the authority of the emperor.

That the queen of Hungary has treated the emperor's hereditary dominions with inexpressible cruelty.

That Germany has been overrun with foreign troops which have marched through neutral countries without the customary requisitions.

That the emperor's troops have been attacked under neutral fortresses, and obliged to abandon the empire, of which their master is the head.

That the imperial dignity has been treated with indecency by the Hungarian troops.

The queen declaring the election of the emperor void, and the diet of Frankfort illegal, had not only violated the imperial dignity, but injured all the princes who have the right of election.

That he had no particular quarrel with the queen of Hungary; and that he desires nothing for himself, and

only enters as an auxiliary into a war for the liberties of Germany.

That the emperor had offered to quit his pretension to the dominions of Austria, on condition that his hereditary countries be restored to him.

That this proposal had been made to the king of England at Hanau, and rejected in such a manner as shewed that the king of England had no intention to restore peace, but rather to make his advantage of the troubles.

That the mediation of the Dutch had been desired; but that they declined to interpose, knowing the inflexibility of the English and Austrian courts.

That the same terms were again offered at Vienna, and again rejected; that therefore the queen must impute it to her own councils that her enemies find new allies.

That he is not fighting for any interest of his own, that he demands nothing for himself; but is determined to exert all his powers in defence of the emperor, in vindication of the right of election, and in support of the liberties of Germany, which the queen of Hungary would enslave.

When this declaration was sent to the Prussian minister in England, it was accompanied with a remonstrance to the king, in which many of the foregoing positions were repeated; the emperor's candour and disinterestedness were magnified; the dangerous designs of the Austrians were displayed; it was imputed to them as the most flagrant violation of the Germanick constitution, that they had driven the emperor's troops out of the empire; the public spirit and generosity of his Prussian majesty were again heartily declared; and it was said, that this quarrel having no connexion with English interests, the English ought not to interpose.

Austria and all her allies were put into amazement by this declaration, which at once dismounted them from the summit of success, and obliged them to fight through the war a second time. What succours, or what promises, Prussia received from France was never publickly known;

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