that the Italian Socialists are trying to start a revolution. Such an event is announced periodically as definitely decided. Even its exact date is sometimes given. These alarmists assume in their ignorance that social evolution follows an artificial schedule, and that it would be possible to substitute for a historical necessity a voluntary revolution. When an overturn does not occur at the date predicted, they presume that either the Socialists were not ready or that they were unable to carry out their purpose. I take advantage, therefore, of the courteous invitation of this ancient and authoritative Review to confront these distorted misapprehensions with the real facts and the true logic of the situation. I am persuaded that we Socialists and our adversaries will both profit by having it known what our plans and purposes really are. It is by no means my wish to conceal or belittle the revolutionary sentiments and projects that incontestably exist among our party leaders. It is far from my purpose to try to present my party to my readers in the guise of a good child,' or to flatter the hope of my readers that we shall have an indefinite era of peace and repose. But men can be revolutionists without considering it their duty to make or perhaps, better said, to create revolutions. A party with a serious revolutionary programme dismisses at the outset the thought of making a revolution to order. It confines itself to the path pointed out by the eternal law of history, comprehending only too well that revolutions are caused, controlled, and determined by historical conditions and by preëxisting crises, and that revolutionists are merely men who first recognize these conditions, who anticipate coming events, and who prepare the minds of their fellows to seize their opportunity and to turn these forces into a previously designed channel, so that they will contribute to the realization of revolutionary social ideals. Consequently, the project so commonly attributed to our Italian Socialists of improvising a revolution, or provoking such an event by a series of attempted revolts, would contradict our real working plan; although perhaps hasty statements may be quoted, made by some militant and impulsive comrade, which would seem to justify the former assumption. Not long ago L'Avanti published a letter addressed to its editor by Lenin which, after reaffirming an uncompromisingly Bolshevist programme, advised Italian Socialists not to precipitate events, but to smooth the way for them and to emphasize the necessity of coördinating the revolutionary forces of all countries. Unhappily, these revolution ary forces in France and England, for example, as yet are neither determined nor vigorous. Our most decided Bolsheviki in the Italian Socialist party agree fully with their conservative comrades in believing it necessary first of all to coördinate international revolutionary forces. The truth is that in Italy the lamentable prolongation of the war and its results have convinced many people that the country is ready for a political crisis, which can only be terminated by changing the form of government and the social system, and by placing the working classes in control of the state and of industry. Such ideas are making headway even among the bourgeoisie, who are deeply impressed by the disquieting symptoms of social disorganization following the war and by the formidable obstacles that present themselves to reconstruction and the restoration of normal conditions. Naturally, such a feeling is not calcu lated to discourage the projects and prophecies of those who anticipate a speedy victory for the laboring class. The latter see further evidence that the present crisis can be terminated only by radical measures, in the existing vicious circle between the rise of wages and the mounting cost of living. If prices continue to go up while the increase of wages unavoidably meets growing resistance, it is evident that the social crisis will become more acute, and may possibly precipitate a sudden overturn. This vitally serious question, of the ratio between the rise of wages and the rise of prices-in other words between the requirements of the working class and its ability to satisfy those requirements—is still further complicated by a new factor. I allude to the undeniable fact that of late years the standard of living of the working people has risen. I repeat that the normal requirements of a workingman are growing. The latter now insists upon pleasures and comforts that only a few years ago were beyond his range of vision. I shall not pause here to analyze the reasons for this or to defend the fact. But it is perfectly useless to declaim against social phenomena and to reprehend the 'luxury' or 'prodigality' of the working people. The fact is there. The only practical course is to recognize it, and take it into consideration together with the other influences producing the state of unstable equilibrium I have just described. If we should have a political crisis, the Socialist party would neither be able nor desirous of utilizing it to start a revolution. What, then, would be the attitude of the Italian Socialist party - of its executives and its representatives in Parliament — if such a situation arose? I am not certain that my readers will be much interested in the reply, and I can offer little more than a personal opinion. However, I shall try to state, in as matter-of-fact a way as possible, the dominant views in the Socialist parliamentary delegation, of which I have the honor to be a member. People who fancy that they can deduce the sentiments and thoughts of the Socialists in Parliament from occasional noisy demonstrations such as the one that occurred recently when the new ministry took office are led astray by exaggerating the importance of an accidental episode. The truth is that the Socialist delegation in Parliament faces a rather difficult and confusing situation. Our party has soughtrepresentation in the legislative body solely as a necessary evil. It is a phase of our work which we have undertaken without cherishing any illusions as to its futility in the way of securing positive results. We have been induced to enter Parliament by the belief that it would harm our cause to renounce all participation in political life. Furthermore, Soviet theories, so prevalent in our Bolshevist wing, persuade us to use our position in Parliament to disorganize that body and to prevent its safeguarding the present democratic system. This plan contemplates creating a series of crises, that will so weaken Parliament that it cannot act as a necessary check upon the executive branch of the government. Evidently this policy of simply tolerating parliamentary institutions prevents our delegates from participating in ordinary legislation, compels them to renounce all initiative, and forbids acts likely to be interpreted as collaboration with the bourgeois government, even though such collaboration might not imply direct or indirect ministerial responsibility. This uncompromising allegiance to our theories constantly comes in conflict with the eager desire of our mem bers to accomplish something positive along Socialist lines. Opportunity for this often presents itself in political and parliamentary life. The result is that our people often make compromises - compromises deeply lamented by our more radical leaders between unswerving loyalty to our principles and an imperative desire to influence law making. That large section of our parliamentary Socialist delegation that favors legislative action within the limits prescribed by an uncompromising party and class attitude, has recently promulgated its views at an important convention in Milan, affirming among other things the necessity of constructive service. And I ask myself personally whether, if the day comes when a better government government sincerely desiring to carry out immediately important and specific reforms - lays before Parliament a programme of social reconstruction, our parliamentary Socialist delegation could continue in its present attitude of opposition; or whether we might not be compelled to present our own programme of reforms against the one presented by the government. This latter course would involve changing from negative opposition to positive opposition, and would that not be itself a kind of collaboration? a Our parliamentary delegation at present, however, is a unit in its opposition to all ministries. No possibility exists, or promises to arise, of our delegation or any part of it supporting a cabinet led by Mr. Nitti or by any conceivable successor of that gentleman. Our delegation is agreed upon this, although it is extremely probable that in the not distant future political crises will arise which will result in Socialists coming into power as an independent party with its own ministry and its own programme. If our party should get control of the government, this would not necessarily imply, even in the opinion of our Bolshevist members, a wholesale adoption of the institutions and political organization of the Bolsheviki. In other words, it would not mean copying exactly the Russian system. Lenin's régime is a result not only of Socialist theories in their most extreme form, but of conditions peculiar to the Russian revolution. It is a form of social organization engendered of its fierce conflicts at home and abroad which have forced that government to organize in the fashion best designed to preserve its own existence. It is eloquent testimony of this fact that the Soviet Government, as soon as the Entente relaxed the blockade and domestic dangers were diminished by the defeat of the counter-revolutionary armies, abrogated the death penalty. I do not mean by that to state that a change in the form of government in Italy would occur smoothly to waltz music. I mean merely to point out certain considerations indicating that it is, to say the least, an arbitrary assumption to suppose that a future Socialist Government in our country would follow the Russian model. Those who object to any suggestion of future Socialist rule in Italy, who say that economic conditions in our country are not suitable for. 'Socialist experiments,' should remember that we Socialists are not proposing to make a revolution next week. We merely do not intend to be surprised by events which are the inevitable outcome of social conditions, so as to have them overtake us unprepared. Let us assume that such political and social overturns do not occur in Italy-such an hypothesis is perfectly worthy of consideration-and that the present succession of crises may gradually produce in an organization capable of resisting revolutionary forces by satisfying their demands for reform. In such a case what would be the attitude of the Socialists and their representatives in Parliament? I might answer this question by saying I do not personally believe, as circumstances are at present, that we can have such peaceful evolution, or that we can recover in this manner from the disintegrating effects of the war. But I do not wish to deal with the suggestion in so summary a fashion. Even though political and economic institutions in Italy might undergo a pacific and essentially legislative transformation, that could never occur unless inspired or directed by the two most vital and powerful forces in the country - Socialism and Catholicism. Although the impossibility of an actual revolution in Italy might be demonstrated, the task of social reconstruction could not be committed to any party without the constant support of the Socialists and the Catholics. This makes it important to determine how far it is likely that the Catholic People's party and the Socialists could combine in this labor. Personally, I do not think that it is practicable. The People's party and its representation in Parliament, from the very character of the sources from which it draws its strength, is always conservative at heart, no matter how progressive its pronouncements. A certain proportion of its members in Parliament are known to represent the interests and passions of the bourgeoisie. We are justified in assuming that several of these delegates have joined the People's party for the express purpose of watching over such interests, because they distrust the capacity of the old Liberal and Conservative parties to do so. It would only be in case that those elements of the People's party which represent proletarian groups organized on a class basis, should separate themselves from the contingent representing bourgeoisie and Conservatives, that the way would be open for eventual coöperation between the former elements and the Italian Socialists. But I consider such a possibility very remote. In conclusion, the Socialist delegation in Parliament will continue its present uncompromising attitude and refrain from taking any part in the government, until the day when the Socialist party and the proletarian organizations are able to assume full control. Until that time the Socialist party will devote itself in Parliament to increasingly vigorous attacks upon the ruling classes, in order to force them to introduce radical reforms. There are very influential Bolsheviki among us to-day, who advocate throwing our strength in the direction of bourgeois reform, because they believe the effect will not be to make the bourgeoisie more capable of bringing about reform than they have been in the past, but to demonstrate to all the world the absolute incapacity of that class to improve social conditions. It remains to be seen whether such a policy will develop from the existing crisis a situation that renders Socialism inevitable, or whether it may not result in a progressive betterment, a social reconstruction that will ultimately enlist the influence and coöperation of the Socialist party. [The Neue Freie Presse (National Liberal ROME, in January. A FEW weeks ago the electric trams in every large city in Italy suddenly stopped running about mid-day. Immediately afterward business houses were closed, and holiday quiet settled upon these towns. There was a general strike. An English friend darted an understanding glance at me from a neighboring café table, and came over to convince me with despairing satisfaction that the thing had started.' Of course, that is the way it would start and everyone recognized that trouble was coming. The English Press Service had prophesied that the Italian revolution would begin within a few weeks. Since then I have frequently discussed that possibility with my English friend. He was firmly convinced that the English Press Service could not make a mistake in such an important matter. I am willing to acknowledge that the English are experts in judging sentiment in foreign countries, but I insist vigorously that the English Press Service in this case is betting on the wrong horse. Unhappily, I am a first-hand expert in revolutions. I have had experiences which I can match against the theories of any authority; so I insist on disbelieving in an Italian revolution. The first afternoon of the general strike passed. Toward evening wild rumors arrived that the water works had been destroyed, though I was still getting water without interruption. Another day passed: it was a very quiet one. It was far quieter than any Sunday in Italy, for on Sundays the fruit shops and barber shops are generally open. Then the strike was over, and life resumed its usual round. The revolution did not occur. My English friend admitted that I was right for this once. But belief in an Italian revolution persists so obstinately throughout Western Europe that the Italian Premier considered it necessary, several weeks later, to give an elaborate interview to the foreign correspondents in Rome, pointing out why a revolution could not occur in Italy. The arguments of the Italian Premier were very good ones for the people to whom they were addressed; but a man who has actually lived through a couple of revolutions in his own country has a much better argument. Italy did not go hungry for five years of war, and is not now starving. In those days in 1918 when the line of people waiting to get bread in Vienna, Budapest, and Berlin was constantly growing longer, any man who knew the history of the classical prototype of all revolutions that of France- could see clearly something to which the rulers of Austria, Hungary, and Germany were blind; that serious things were brewing and we were going to have a general turnover. Now the converse of the idea I have just suggested is equally true. As a broad generalization, no country will start a revolution as long as the common people are well fed. The question is whether the Italian common people have enough to eat. To be sure, you can read bitter attacks upon the food administration in some newspapers. Prices have risen 50, 100, and, in cases of a few articles, 150 per cent. But wages have risen likewise. We see not only in the newspapers of Austria, but also in the bourgeois papers of Italy, that street sweepers have larger incomes than school teachers. The Italian workingman is not really starving. During the day of the general strike, I spent hours wandering around the suburbs of Florence. I tried to read the countenances and the eyes of the men I met to see whether they were really alight with the fire of revolution. It was just after the midday meal. Small groups of Trade Unionists stood round on the streets smoking. They warmed themselves in the mid-day sun: and they stood round quietly and smoked. Most of them smoked cigars- for cigarettes have |