The Liberals, using the word in the

usual sense of anti-Clerical, have lost at the expense of the Clericals and Socialists, though they still remain the strongest single group. However, the Socialists and Clericals, both still in opposition, together constitute a majority. It is rumored that Gioletti is manoeuvring to secure a coalition of these apparently antagonistic parties.

Rather strangely, both Clericals and the Socialists come mainly from Northern and Central Italy. Southern Italy

and the Island electorates are antiClerical and Liberal. The Socialists hold 85 of the 187 districts in Northern Italy, and 60 of the 120 districts in Central Italy. Only 11 members of that party were returned from the southern part of the kingdom.

South Italy sent relatively more soldiers to the war than any other part of the kingdom, while Central and Northern Italy kept relatively more of their man power in the factories to turn the wheels of industry. The same contrast of political sentiment between the peasants and the artisans exists in Italy as in France. But in France, during the last campaign, all the ele

ments opposed to Radicalism joined forces, while in Italy, the Liberal and Conservative parties wasted their strength in bitter local contests, inspired in many instances by personal animosities of rival candidates. It was

against these divided forces that the Socialists won so conspicuous a victory.

THE unpopularity of the Versailles Treaty is restoring the prestige of public men who have been under eclipse because they opposed the war and preached skepticism as to the value of its results even for the winners. Former Premier Gioletti, whose partisans gained a marked predominance in the Italian Parliament at the elections of 1913, was opposed to Italy's joining the Allies, and throughout that conflict was regarded by the Germans as a friend of their country. He and several of his followers have been reëlected, and it is freely prophesied that he may be returned to power when the present coalition cabi net breaks up.

We often hear in America reference to a 'French sentiment,' a 'German sentiment,' or an 'Italian sentiment' toward the treaty. There is no such thing. The only attitudes in Europe are party attitudes-not national attitudes.

THE recent death of Professor Heinrich Lammash of Vienna removes from European public and academic life one of the most prominent and consistent pacifists of the war period. Professor Lammash enjoyed the personal friendship of Emperor Charles, and is supposed to have exerted great influence over the young monarch in behalf of peace. He was as conspicuous an exponent of such views in Austria, as was Professor F. W. Foerster in Germany.

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If it is true, as economists and sociologists assure us, that 'a wave of laziness' is sweeping over those European countries that have participated in the war, that may be a phenomenon explained by the law of reaction. We might even assume beforehand the probability of such a result. Nations, like individuals, after over-exerting themselves morally and physically, feel the need of rest before rallying for a new effort. The human organism is a machine of limited capacity. It cannot expend excess effort without a period of recuperation.

This phenomenon may be inevitable, to but it does not for that reason constitute a less serious danger for the nations whose wealth and labor power have been most seriously diminished. Industrial production and agricultural production alike have been absorbed entirely in creating the means of warfare. Their permanent capital has been disastrously depreciated. They no longer possess reserves, and it is only by intensified production that they can supply objects of necessary consumption for the people and compensate for the loss of their best workers on the field of battle. Unless these nations are able to restore their productive capacity to the normal level, they will be condemned to privation and high prices for an indefinite period. They will be handicapped, moreover, in the international market, because they will have no excess of products to employ in reducing their inflated currency and their enormous

public debts abroad, and to meet the increased taxes which must inevitably be levied. Their immediate embarrassment is increased by the fact that during the first steps of political and economic recovery they will have great difficulty in obtaining the food and raw materials indispensable for their sustenance and their industry. So we have verified anew let me say in passing the law that nations are interdependent- a law doubly impressed upon us during the late hostilities. But let us ask the question whether this growing disinclination to work is not something more than a transient wave of idleness caused by the exhaustion of the war. May it not be due to a transformation in the mental attitude to labor which we have hitherto overlooked, and which the stress of our present situation has suddenly brought into evidence - just as we may be unconscious for years of some latent physical weakness until a shock or a chill or an accident suddenly produces serious symptoms? Is this not, in other words, an evidence of moral and economic disease that presents to our sociologists and economists a problem rendered more complex and delicate by the fact that it manifests itself simultaneously with the imperious demands of labor for shorter hours and higher wages? Undoubtedly, the excessive rise in prices due to the war has precipitated the demand of the working proletariat for higher wages. Parliament, in the meantime, has hastily adopted, under

duress, a law reducing the working day to eight hours. But it is perfectly clear that if the increase of wages and the shorter hours of labor cause a decline of production, not only will the working people fail to derive any advantage from the change, but they will pay relatively more in proportion even to their higher wages for everything they buy, and the general welfare of society at large will be seriously affected.

The General Federation of Labor evidently realizes this danger, for in its 'minimum programme' it has summarized the demands of the working people in the following formula: 'Maximum production in minimum time for maximum wages.' Let us observe that this formula is precise only in appearance, for 'maximum wages' remains undefined and varies according to the idea of the person who uses it. However, ambiguous though the formula may be, it contains a vital truththat is, reducing the hours of labor and raising wages must be accompanied by an increase, or at least by no falling off, in production.

This makes it important to inquire whether we have any data already upon this point. Now, we do have such evidence from a source that cannot be questioned by the working people. It is the testimony of the Russian Bolshevist newspapers, given by the leaders of Bolshevism, and consequently cannot be criticized as favorable to the bourgeoisie or capitalists to use the language of our French revolutionaries. Bolshevism is nothing less, in fact, than a practical application of Marx's theories. It has inaugurated a dictatorship of the proletariat, nationalized industry, and placed production under the control of the working people. Here we have all the conditions for a decisive test. What are the results? Let us give them in the words of the men who made the experiments.

The Marxian, Bazaroff, writing in Novaia Zhizn of the 30th of March, 1918:

'From the first, it was quite evident that to put the workingmen in actual control would lead to the ruin of industry and would rapidly convert the proletariat into a labor reserve fund for capitalism instead of a mobilized army of workers.'

The term 'labor reserve fund' is somewhat obscure, but the statement is sufficiently explicit that labor control resulted in ruining industry.

Isvestia, the official organ of the Bolshevist Government, confirms this statement in its issue of May 4, 1918:

'It' (labor control) 'is simply total lack of comprehension of the conditions fundamentally necessary for industrial production the absolute annihilation of the latter.'

Larin, the former People's Commissioner for Labor, after having admitted that 'the experiment did not succeed' concludes an article in the Twelfth Bulletin of the Consumers' Union with these words:

'We have got to abandon resolutely all idea of transferring the management of factories to the working people employed in them, for this measure results in merely substituting a new group of employers for a single employer.'

The same official asserted on the first of April, 1919, in the Control Commission:

'We have introduced in Russia unexampled license among the working people.'

This license and lack of discipline have resulted from shortening the hours of labor, increasing wages, and diminishing production. The decline in the latter is estimated at from sixty to seventy per cent. What happened .in factories and in the railway administration is particularly significant.

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The expenses of the railways have risen from one and one half billion rubles to eleven billions, while the income from the roads has fallen to one fifth its former total. Compared with 1915, the decline in revenues was twenty per cent in 1916, seventy per cent in 1917, and eighty per cent at the end of 1919.

Another official organ of the Bolsheviki, Novy Pout, states in its second number that the factories of Oboukof and Nevsky had not been able to repair locomotives because they had to stop work in order to weed out the mechanics who were moderate Socialists hostile to Bolshevism, and that the cost of production had risen in the proportion of thirteen to one. A great unemployment crisis ensued and sixty per cent of the people working in the nationalized enterprises around Petrograd struck. The Marxian, Soukomlin, stated at a meeting of the General Federation of Labor on the eleventh of January, 1919:

"The state has become the employer, but the government is resorting to measures of control to which the working people have always been hostile. It has abolished the eight-hour day and reëstablished piece work.'

Lenin, himself, asserted before the second Pan-Russian Congress of Professional Unions that the political economy of Marxian Bolshevism had failed. The Poutiloff factories turned out but five locomotives during the first five months of 1918, as compared ing with a normal production of thirtyeight. The Nevsky works completed but eight as compared with fifty. The two shops delivered but thirty-eight locomotives in the course of the year, as compared with the former output of two hundred and ninety-seven. The number of workers employed on a locomotive had increased from between seventeen and twenty to be

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tween one hundred and thirty-one and one hundred and fifty-eight, and the cost of a locomotive had risen from forty-eight thousand rubles to eight hundred thousand rubles. The average repair items had increased from ten thousand rubles to one hundred thousand rubles. The famous Marxian, Bernstein, drew the following conclusion from this experience in his address before the Socialist Congress in Berne: 'Bolshevism leads directly to the decadence of mankind.'

To say the least, these results constitute practically a demonstration of the problem which we are considering. In complete control of the administration of industry and labor, the Russian Bolsheviki have reduced working hours and increased salaries with the result that prices have risen to unheard of heights and production has fallen to an unprecedented minimum. General expenses are nearly ten times what they were before and the price of manufactures has risen in proportion. The balance is idleness and misery. This is confirmed by the Bolshevist paper, Derevensky Kommunist (Village Communist), in number sixty-three.

'In place of working eight hours, resting eight hours, and devoting eight hours to pleasure and instruction, the workingmen loaf eight hours, sleep eight hours, and play cards the rest of the time. Cards and loafing are the principal occupations.'

So we see, that in Bolshevist Russia at least, the celebrated eight-hour formula no longer applies.

But is this increasing dislike of work not evident elsewhere than in Bolshevist Russia, as a sentiment accompanying the reduction of the hours of labor and the increase of salaries? An equally typical answer is furnished by the coal miners of the United Kingdom:

'In 1887 an English miner hewed annually two hundred and ninety

nine tons of coal for a wage of two hundred and sixty dollars. The mining cost per ton was slightly over ninety cents. In 1888 the average miner hewed but two hundred and fortyeight tons, his salary had risen to four hundred and fifty-five dollars. Consequently, the labor cost per ton was about one dollar and eighty-three

cents.

In 1914, the annual output per miner fell to two hundred and fortythree tons, and his pay raised to four hundred and ninety-five dollars, so the labor cost per ton had increased to two dollars and three cents.

By 1918 the miner's annual output was only two hundred and twentyfour tons, while his yearly pay had risen to one thousand one hundred and eighty-two dollars, so the labor cost per ton reached five dollars and twentyeight cents.

A representative of the Labor party in Parliament, Mr. Hartshorn, estimates that this year production will fall to one hundred and ninety-three tons, and that the labor cost per ton will reach six dollars, or seven times what it was twenty years ago, and three times what it was before the war. Working hours have fallen from twelve to ten and then to eight, and it is now proposed to reduce them to seven and possibly six.

The British Government has organized a Commission of Inquiry to investigate and stop waste. The manager of one of the big war works testified before this Commission that not a single one of the seven thousand workers employed in building airplanes did an honest day's work for the money he received.

We must recognize that the same conditions exist in France. Instead of trying to apply the formula of the General Federation of Labor, ‘maximum production in minimum time for

maximum wages,' the workers of the whole world are adopting the policy of 'maximum wages for minimum time and minimum production.' We say this without any hostility whatever toward the working proletariat. It is merely an economic phenomenon to be noted and studied in order to understand its meaning.

One can easily understand, in view of these conditions, that the solicitude of our merchants and manufacturers as to the result of the eight-hour day and the accompanying rise of wages is not without some foundation. Looked at from this angle, increasing distaste for work, though it may be explained for the moment by the 'wave of laziness' that has followed the overexertion of the war, is in reality due to more fundamental social causes likely to produce serious effects. For the growing deficit in production inevitably will produce universal want and social retrogression. What are its causes? The progress of invention has certainly increased the comforts of life and contributed in that respect to human happiness, but it has also increased our demands and sharpened our appetite for pleasure. At the same time, mechanical progress has inspired us with a desire to do things with the least possible effort. That is the primary cause for the increasing dislike of work. It has not affected equally rural labor, probably because the product of the soil is measured by the amount of toil that is devoted to its cultivation.

Operative labor, on the other hand, ordinarily receives a fixed remuneration in the form of wages. This deprives the worker of personal interest in his output. Employees demand, furthermore, that wages shall be equal, since the needs of the workers are equal. They prefer to increase their incomes by exerting pressure