radicalism has dashed itself to pieces. Its mad agitation reached such lengths as to disgust its own supporters. The faith of those, who in all the disorders of the year that lies behind us never lost hope that the sound common sense of German labor would finally revolt from the fallacies and follies of these radical leaders, has been justified. Many signs indicate that the influence of radicalism upon the German working people, after rising rapidly for a time, is now decidedly on the wane. The latest by-elections in Germany show a great falling off in radical votes. We are told that the subscription lists of some of the leading radical Socialist newspapers are by no means as large as formerly. Most important of all, the workingmen show a growing disinclination to obey the strike orders of the radical leaders. The general strike which the latter tried to start in Berlin recently, in connection with the machinists' strike, proved a complete fiasco. The working people are satiated with that sort of thing. They have finally learned that constant strikes injure not only the community as a whole, but also the participants. On the other hand, we are receiving from every part of Germany encouraging reports of an increase in industry and labor efficiency. Germany is already at work again

to be sure not yet up to its old mark, but making progress. Dislike of steady labor is one of the consequences of the war that still lingers. I would not have my readers think that we are going full steam ahead by any means, nor would I convey the impression that danger of a Communist Revolution has entirely disappeared, although it is greatly lessened.

One of the most effective pieces of propaganda against Bolshevism is the report of the trial of the assassins of

the Munich hostages. The German working people shudder with abhorrence at the beastly brutality there exhibited by the Soviet leaders. The Communist party itself, although not large numerically, is divided into factions which fight each other quite as bitterly as they fight the bourgeoisie and the Majority Socialists. In spite of all that, we are not yet perfectly insured against a Communist revolt in Germany. Spartacanism survives, and there is reason to fear that the privations of the coming winter, that hunger and cold, may give it new life. That will be our critical season. A Socialist minister wisely said a few days ago that if the new government survived the winter, its safety was assured. After that, trouble may flare up here and there, but Noske and his national guard can master it.

But while the dangers threatening the young German republic from the left are lessening, those that threaten from the right are growing. There is no mistaking the fact that for some time a reactionary wave has surged through Germany. For a time after the complete collapse of the old régime the Conservatives and Pan-Germans disappeared completely from public view. The elections to the National Assembly were a crushing defeat for them. However, even that defeat did not dishearten them. They have re-. organized and are now conducting an active agitation.

Let no one suppose that these Conservatives and Pan-Germans have learned any lessons from their country's frightful disaster. No, indeed. They are just what they were before, and they talk the same language that they did in the days of the Kaiser. Their political conceptions are of enviable simplicity. Germany's defeat was due entirely to the Socialists. The latter started a revolution that de

moralized the army and brought about the Peace of Versailles- a disgraceful peace, which only a Socialist government would sign.

You may be astounded that there are still men who hold these views after the experiences which the nation has gone through. The Peace of Versailles and the revolution are obviously the result of German defeat -a defeat not due to the Social-Democrats, but to the military leaders who, in the summer of 1918, with a poorly fed and war-wearied army, ventured a great offensive against an enemy front strengthened by fresh American forces; to army leaders who did not know how to estimate the strength and effectiveness of the enemy tanks, and who refused to believe that Foch had a reserve army to break out suddenly from its forest lair upon the German flank. The persons responsible for German defeat are the military leaders, who ventured to inaugurate an unlimited submarine campaign, thinking to destroy England in three months- the men who made this foolhardy move in defiance of the cabinet and against the warnings of the German Ambassador in Washington. Responsibility for German defeat is shared by everyone in this country who supported a policy of fighting to the bitter end and defeated every peace effort of the government and the Reichstag. They are the men who blocked the intended mediation of President Wilson, who demanded annexations in a war where Germany was opposed to practically all the rest of the civilized world, and who were so so completely blind to actual facts that they pursued these unattainable ends after the strength of the army and the courage of the nation were exhausted. The men who did these things were our military leaders and our Pan-Germans and Conservatives. Upon them rests responsibility

for our defeat and not upon the shoulders of the Social-Democrats and the bourgeois parties. That is the truth.

We can readily understand why the Pan-Germans and Conservatives should feel it incumbent upon them to evade acknowledging this responsibility and try to impose it upon their political opponents. Those are the usual tactics of politics. But what we cannot understand is that this distorted interpretation of the events should begin to take root among the German people. However, that is apparently the case. There are many evidences that a Pan-German and a Conservative agitation, which, of course, is employing its old standby of attacking the Jews, is winning ground. Just how much ground it is difficult to say. We shall not know until the coming spring. However, present indications are that the reactionary parties will not be the small minority in the coming Assembly that they are to-day. However, it is unlikely that they will constitute a majority either in the next Reichstag or in any subsequent one. We may count upon the common sense of the German people to prevent that.

In any case, the drift toward Conservatism is the most significant fact in the political life of Germany just at present. It appears to be due less to approval of the Pan-German and Conservative programme than to dissatisfaction with the achievements of the past year. Radicalism seems to have played the same hand in the German revolution that it has in all previous revolutions, and assisted reaction. These radicals have been demanding the socialization of industry and the organization of Soviets. They have been instigating strike after strike; they have been threatening the security of private property and income;

they have been disturbing the public peace, until at last a longing for law and order, for peace and quiet, has seized upon the mass of the population. One of the most important tasks of the government and of the parties now in power, is to prevent this dissatisfaction from turning against the republic itself. The ruling parties, including the Majority Socialists, have been statesmenlike enough to repudiate the extreme demands of radicalism, but they have made many concessions which circumstances forced upon them. The bourgeoisie also knew that it must make sacrifices, and that after such a war as we had fought, it was impossible to return to the old conditions. However, there is a limit to the sacrifices that the bourgeoisie will voluntarily make under any conditions. No government can exceed that limit without resistance. It often seems as though our new government was inclined to fall into the same error as the old government in respect to usurping undue authority. If taxes are made so high that a man derives practically no income from his property or his labor; if the shop committees are given such power that the employer is deprived of practically all, say in the administration of his business, the result quite possibly will be to drive so many into the reactionary camp that they will overthrow our free institutions.

So, the young German republic is pursuing a treacherous path between dangers on the left and dangers on the right. The dangers on the left, as we have said, seem to be diminishing. The dangers on the right are not to be despised, but with care, they also may be avoided. The situation of the present German government recalls that of the Directorate after the storms of the French revolution. That body likewise had to repel attacks from both radicals and royalists. This his

torical parallel is, to be sure, not very encouraging for the young German republic, for we know that Napoleon succeeded the Directorate. However, there seems little likelihood that a Napoleon will rise in modern Germany. The generals that it has at present are hardly up to Napoleon's stature, and are not likely to intimidate the administration. If the republic can keep alive but a few years and prove its capacity to survive the present crisis, its future is assured. The men at the head of the government are not statesmen of over-towering genius, but they are honest and well-intentioned. The administration frequently does things that savor of dilletantism and unworldliness. It will have to learn its trade. But there is no reason why the German bourgeoisie, and German working people should not eventually qualify to hold power as long as the Prussian Junkers did that is for several centuries.

The difficulties are not insurmountable. The question upon which the survival of the republic really hinges is one inherited from the old régime. The debts of the German nation on April 1, 1920, will amount to two hundred and four billion marks. Will it be possible to carry this gigantic debt burden, and will political existence be possible so long as that burden exists?

A second point-in a few weeks Germany's enemies will ratify the Peace Treaty. A treaty will then go into effect which imposes upon Germany conditions most of which can never be fulfilled. No one can tell now what will happen if the Treaty of Ver sailles actually comes into force and Germany's former enemies demand that it be carried out. That would bring the German republic face to face with difficulties in comparison with which its previous trials have been but child's play.

[La Revue Baltique, December 15, 1919] ESTHONIA THROUGH FRENCH EYES

BY M. TERQUEM

I HAVE just spent a considerable period in Esthonia and I bring back very vivid impressions of the country. I have seen a government in operation that was only a few months old. I have dealt directly with cabinet officials with regard to very difficult questions. They handled these matters with a sobriety, a sense of justice, and a respect for democratic principles that would be commendable in a country where republican institutions had always existed. They were not intoxicated with power; they did not waste time with unnecessary formalities; there were no stately guards outside their ante-chambers. No, these high officials were simple, honest, hard-working burghers, who looked upon their office not as a mere title of distinction, but as a command to hard labor.

The messengers in the public buildings were little barefoot boys-for shoes and stockings are unattainably dear. Nothing is left of the horde of gorgeous loafers, smoking cigarettes and drinking tea, that characterized the old Russian administration. Everybody works hard. The office hours are short but intensely busy, after the English or American fashion. All these bureau chiefs and division heads men and women, for there are many of the latter seem interested solely in putting into effect a practical and economical scheme of administration. Common sense compensates for their inexperience. Many of these gentlemen have other occupations besides their official duties. A professor of my acquaintance works from 11 A.M. to 3 P.M. in a govern

ment office, and gives his courses in the University at other times.

The nation has substituted a constabulary system for professional police. These men are ordinary citizens with a white arm band. They carry a gun slung over their shoulders by a piece of cord, because leather is too scarce and too dear to be employed. They patrol their beats and perform their duties strictly but without harshness. You see unemployed workingmen, poorly clad and barefoot, mingling with well-to-do citizens on the street. street. But it is perfectly safe any time of the night in the remotest of the interminable suburbs of Reval. You can go about with no other risk than that of being stopped by a constable, who will ask for your pass if you are out after midnight. Unless you have your pass you will be promptly put in jail. There is no trifling with regulations.

Vigor and decision characterize the Esthonian Government. A cabinet composed of revolutionary Socialists takes just as rigorous measures against its political friends, if they try to start trouble, as against the Baltic Barons.

It is a national characteristic of the Esthonians to be very obstinate about having their way. They are energetic in doing what they have resolved upon, but very cautious in embarking upon a project. They are level-headed and logical. Their national character is exactly opposite that of the Russians, which is so engaging, but at bottom so feeble. They, therefore, form a nation consciously distinct so much so that you are astounded that it should have been able to maintain itself intact under two centuries of Russian domination. As soon as circumstances permitted, it has resumed its ancient character. But it has acquired from the Russians some charming qualities. The people are good

companions, simple, amiable, hospitable so much so that a Frenchman feels almost ashamed of his own family reserve. They have the same ingenuousness, sincerity of mind, and democratic manner that most Russians possess.

This little country was devastated by the war; it passed through a crisis of Bolshevism; and finally it was overrun and occupied by the Teutons. But it has quickly recovered and is already making such headway against its difficulties as to awaken involuntary admiration.

Nobody denies the reality of Esthonian national sentiment. Russians of pure blood, who have resided in Esthonia since before the war, witness the revival of this sentiment with considerable surprise. But they frankly recognize its reality and regard it with sympathy. Russian refugees fleeing from the Bolsheviki are perhaps a little less just and sympathetic toward the Esthonians. But it is a universal experience that refugees are so embittered by their sufferings that they are unjust even to the country that gives them shelter. Those refugees who are now making the acquaintance of the Esthonians for the first time sometimes express indignation at the intensely national spirit of the latter. However, the country has only one inexorable enemy - that that is the Baltic Barons, who owned two thirds of the soil before the recent expropriation, and who were the stanch supporters and friends of the German invaders whom the common people abhorred.

The Baltic Barons are trying to ingratiate themselves with some of the allied missions so as to deceive them as to the real situation and prevent their becoming intimate with the Esthonian people. In this land of simple habits, the Baltic Barons are the only

men in a position to extend that oldfashioned manorial hospitality which is so seducing to a stranger. They play the country gentleman to perfection, and one can easily imagine the impressions of Esthonia and the Esthonians with which some innocent investigators leave the country, after having been passed from one German manor house to another, where they associated only with the Esthonians' hereditary enemies.

The campaign against the Baltic Barons is popular with the Russian refugees, but they have grievances of their own.

With that innocent zeal which is easily explained in a people who have controlled their own affairs but a few months and who are eager to assert their national character, the government has obliterated all German or Russian street names and signs. That is very inconvenient for people who cannot read Esthonian. However, the Esthonians have not gone as far as the Finns in this respect. You can talk Russian and anyone will listen. You can even use Russian in the government offices.

The Esthonians have no aggressive hostility to Russia. They are a nation of pacifists. They bear Russia no resentment and do not speak ill of the country. They merely want to be left alone. Their patriotism bears no observable trace of hatred of their former masters, to whom they are still bound by innumerable business, social, and family ties, and by many similar tastes. In this respect the Esthonians are very different indeed from the Finns, who are bitterly anti-Russian, or from the formerly subject nationalities of the old Austro-Hungarian monarchy, whose patriotism is measured by the intensity of their hatred of their neighbors and their desire for perpetual vengeance.