expansion at the expense of Dutch territories, expressed in a section of the Belgian press, all these factors have turned our sympathy into distrust and strained our relations almost to breaking point.

There are grievances of long standing, and grievances of which one never heard before. However that may be, they are not entirely one-sided. Holland has her grievances as well, a point too often overlooked.

We have an old saying, the reflection of a mind experienced in the school of life: 'Better have a good neighbor than a distant friend,' and acting upon that maxim our people are willing to make concessions on many points. But they will neither countenance the cession of territory nor sacrifice their independence of action as a sovereign Power. Our friends to-day may be our enemies to-morrow, and a military convention of any sort as seemingly proposed - is certainly in flagrant contradiction to the principles of the newborn League of Nations, principles which admit no neutrality and overrule all bonds of mutual help in the all-binding rule that a breach of the peace by any country shall be discountenanced by all the other Powers without exception.

From a practical point of view, and assuming that Germany were in a position to renew her aggressive policy in the distant future, a military convention between Holland and Belgium would mean that the historical 'cockpit of Europe' would be shifted to the North- a not altogether agreeable prospect for us, and acceptable only if supported by the League in its entirety, but never if a promised backing by the Belgian battalions were the only guaranty.

The defense of Dutch Limburg certainly is a difficult proposition, but the Belgian contention that a violation.

of that ill-defended region for another treacherous invasion of Belgium might prove fatal, can be accepted only on the assumption that the Dutch, to their utter dishonor, would not consider a breach of territory to constitute a casus belli, which, of course, is inconceivable. The Belgians, who would thus suspect us of connivance, might be well advised to pursue this point to a logical conclusion, which is that not only Limburg, but the whole frontier between their country and ours up to the Scheldt, offers means of access to German legions, and that — the possibility of connivance admitted strongly fortified Limburg might well have the result of leading to a wholly mistaken sense of security.

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Not a weak defense of Limburg, but the strong connection of Limburg to a country with traditions to uphold, is the best guaranty against the violation; and so it has proved to be in the last war. Assuming the League of Nations to be no more than an idealistic vision- and what other view do the Belgian imperialists entertain?- the safety of the Northern Meuse line rests with the whole of the Dutch Army, not with the Maastricht garrison alone.

So far as the question of the Scheldt is concerned, British statesmen, consulting their history books, will find ample reasons why, in the past, Great Britain has always resisted, and successfully resisted, the opening of the Scheldt to men-of-war. She never wanted a renewal of Napoleon's threat that Antwerp should be 'un pistolet chargé sur la gorge de l'Angleterre.'

This is, however, a problem which will solve itself, once the principles of the League of Nations are accepted. The next war will then know no neutrals, and access for men-of-war to any waterway cannot be refused. I do not see what good can come of stirring

A BUDAPEST journalist, who participated in the Soviet Government as a member of the Communist party, sends to Vorwärts the following communication:

During Karoly's régime Paul Keri, an intimate friend of the easily influenced premier, resided in Switzerland and flooded his country from that point with predictions of the coming world revolution. These reports, together with the increasing pressure of the Entente, turned Karoly's sympathy more and more toward Soviet Russia. The Social-Democratic party was quite unaware of this change. It might have seized the reins of government as early as February, and ought to have done so in view of the constantly recurring cabinet crises and the growing agitation against the government. But the Social-Democrats did not wish to take over the administration, because they feared that they would only disappoint the people in view of the critical situation the country was facing, and thus disparage the Socialist movement itself.

Suddenly the whole nation was shocked by the ultimatum of the Entente, presented by Colonel Vix, demanding the evacuation of extensive territories inhabitated solely by

Hungarians. To comply with this demand would cut off Budapest from essential sources of food supply. A few weeks previously the Bolshevist leaders had been imprisoned. This had increased the sympathy for them among the working people, who were suffering fearfully from unemployment and under-nourishment. The relief granted the unemployed by the government was 15 crowns a day, which hardly sufficed to buy a single meal. As a popular appeal the Communists demanded that the government pay discharged soldiers and war invalids in a lump sum 5400 crowns, equal to unemployment benefits for an entire year. This measure would have put a burden of about 40,000,000,000 crowns upon the Treasury. However, such trifles did not trouble the Communists. On the one hand Minister Piedl was roughly handled at his office by a mob advocating these demands, while on the other, capitalists were resisting bitterly a direct levy upon propertythe only measure that would restore public solvency.

The ultimatum of the Entente was followed by an outburst of Chauvinism. The Social-Democratic party faced the choice of either establishing a party dictatorship in opposition to

many of the working people, or of coöperating with the Communists. The metal workers threatened to withdraw from the party if a dictatorship were not proclaimed. This is the reason the Socialists united with the Radicals.

The Entente made no further demands. Three weeks later General Smuts arrived in Budapest and negotiated with Bela Kun. At first the situation seemed hopeful, since both patriotic sentiment and proletarian interests were united in opposing the surrender of purely Hungarian territory to foreign imperialists.

Bela Kun, who is now about forty years old, was originally a bourgeois journalist, but he has always been a Socialist at heart. He had served as a party secretary for the SocialDemocrats, and as director of a hospital fund. During the war he was captured by the Russians, and after the Bolshevist victory in that country he organized the first Hungarian Red Guard, which fought the counterrevolutionary Czecho-Slovaks. Among the war prisoners who were Kun's companions in Russia were Tibor Samuely, Bela Szanto, and Karl Bantus, all of whom later became members of the Communist government. Subsequently, during his sojourn in Russia, Bela Kun directed a school for Hungarian agitators in Moscow, and organized the Hungarian Communist party there. After the armistice Lenin sent him to Hungary. He brought several million rubles with him. A Russian Bolshevist intelligence committee was stationed in Budapest and Vienna under the guise of a Red Cross delegation. The members were later arrested and handed over to the Entente. They are still interned in the vicinity of Salonica.

Before long nearly everybody in Hungary was disgusted with the

Soviet administration, and if Budapest had not been attacked by counterrevolutionary warships on the Danube, the government would have fallen from its own unpopularity and the moderate Social-Democrats would have assumed control. In fact the Bolshevist dictators faced an impossible situation. The nation expected a miracle from them, and they were helpless. Factories had no raw materials or coal, but they had to continue paying wages. The only establishment that remained in full operation was the munition works at Esepel. Illicit trading was more general than ever; for legitimate merchants had been put out of business by the socialization of shops, and agencies to take their place had not been created. A new class of capitalists arose, composed of shady speculators of every kind, and of Soviet officials from the frontier. The latter did a tremendous business. A new bureaucracy was created, consisting largely of ignorant loafers from the proletariat and the lower bourgeoisie, much more corrupt and incompetent than the old one. than the old one. All these things compromised Socialism itself. Increasingly radical measures were adopted, and at last a true dictatorship was established. This resulted in constant conflicts between the Soviet government and the mass of the working people, who had been trained in Social-Democratic doctrines.

So far as the factories worked at all, they were managed by their former superintendents. Shop committees were authorized merely to approve measures but not to initiate them. The efficiency of the workers continued to decline in spite of all the exhortations addressed to them. Finally, it was necessary to introduce piece-work, and the adoption of the Taylor system was seriously considered. Large landed

Is it a joke, a tragedy, or a catchpenny political play? To most Englishmen the thought of America dry, New York and its other large cities barren wastes, where the only relief for thirst is ice cream, soda, or ‘near' beer - and it was a disillusioned negro who remarked on first acquaintance: 'It looks like beer, it tastes like beer, but it ain't got no authority when it goes down'- seems impossible. The land of the cocktail, where rye and bourbon whiskey competed with iced water as the national drink, and its genius had sent forth the mint julep to spread its civilizing mission over the face of the earth; the America of Bret Harte and O. Henry and the Western mining camps of the cinema, where cowboys drank unlimited quantities of raw spirits and 'bad men' indulged in indiscriminate gunplay - America dry was unbelievable. It was either a sorry joke, or it was too serious to be true.

Let me remove all doubts as to the sincerity of prohibition. America is dry, and it will remain dry for many years to come. The enactment of prohibition in America is one of the most interesting experiments the world has seen; what the effects will be time alone will tell. I shall not hazard prediction; I simply confine myself to facts.

To begin with, America has banished drink not by legislation, but by an amendment to the Constitution, and I believe I am correct in saying it is the first time in history any nation has written the prohibition of the manufacture, sale, or importation of liquor

into its Constitution. That in itself is a remarkable thing, and it disposes of the question whether prohibition is simply a political trick to be nullified with the next swing of the political pendulum. In America it is easy to make laws, and with equal facility they may be repealed, but it is a much more difficult and complicated process to amend the Constitution; and once an amendment has been adopted it is equally difficult and complicated to take it out of the Constitution.

To amend the Constitution the proposed amendment must first be adopted by two thirds of each House of Congress, and then submitted to the separate states, where it must be voted upon by both Houses constituting the Legislature of the state, and only when three fourths of the whole number of the states have ratified does it become an integral part of the Constitution. Therefore, an amendment to the Constitution must command overwhelming popular support; the whole country is given the opportunity to pass it upon its merits, first through its representatives in Congress, and then through its local representatives, the members of the state legislature; and the small and sparsely settled state has the same weight as the largest and most thickly populated, as the vote of every Legislature for or against counts the same.

The Constitution provides the machinery for its amendment, in the manner I have described, but makes no provision for the nullification of any part of the Constitution, as in the case