Final Hearing.-Where a defendant gave a cognovit not to be enforced" until after the final hearing of a Chancery suit instituted by the defendant against the plaintiff, and the final decree or order to be pronounced thereon," it was held that the words "final hearing" and "final decree" were not applicable to a decree which was being appealed from (Jones v. Reynolds, 1834, 1 Ad. & E. 384).

Final Judgment.-See JUDGMENT.

Final Order.-See ORDERS.

Final Port.-The words "final port of destination or of discharge" in a marine commercial contract mean the port where the ship is intended to and does discharge the bulk of her cargo; and the last port of discharge is not the port where the ship may have been originally destined to discharge any part of her cargo but the place where she does actually discharge the whole of it (Preston v. Greenwood, 1784, 4 Dougl. 28 and 33; Moffat v. Ward, ibid. 29). The words "last port of discharge" in such a contract mean "the last practicable friendly port of discharge" (Bayley, J., Brown v. Vigne, 1810, 12 East, 283, where the ship was bound on a voyage to the Plate, and the last port, Buenos Ayres, was in the hands of the enemy, so that Monte Video became the last port of discharge). But in another case where a ship was intended to go to Canton, but the Chinese War broke out, and the English stormed Canton, and the ship was lost at Hong Kong, it was held that she was covered by the policy, for Canton was still accessible and available as the final port of discharge, though ships went there at their own risk (Oliverson v. Brightman, 1846, 8 Q. B. 781; 70 R. R. 642; Arnould, Marine Insurance, 7th ed., 1901, ss. 466, 467). A "final port may, however, not be the last port of discharge in a marine policy (Crocker v. Sturge, 1897, 1 Q. B. 330; 2 C. C. 43; and see Spalding v. Crocker, 1897, 2 C. C. 189, and Arnould, 500-503); and for the end of a voyage for the purposes of a seaman's contract of service, see The Scarsdale, 1906, P. 103; 74 L. J. P. 135.

Final Process.-Another term for execution on a judgment or decree. The phrase is contrasted with "original process" (q.v.), which signifies the step taken to compel the defendant to appear in the action, and with "mesne process" (q.v.), which is process issued during the pendency of the suit.

Final Sailing.-These words, in a charter-party, bill of lading or policy of marine insurance, mean "getting clear of a port for the purpose of proceeding on a voyage" (Lindley, L.J., Price v. Livingstone, 1882, 9 Q. B. D. 679-682). In a charter-party they are generally found in connection with the payment of freight, e.g. "an advance of one-third freight within eight days from final sailing of the vessel from her last port in the United Kingdom" (ibid.); and in policies of insurance in connection with the beginning or continuance of the risk, e.g. "warranted to depart on or before a particular day" (Moir v. Roy. Ex. A. C., 1815, 3 M. & S. 461, 16 R. R. 330, 613). The port of which the vessel is to be clear means the port understood in its "ordinary commercial sense," or "that which shippers of goods, charterers of vessels, and shipowners mean by a port," though that may not be identical with the area of the

port for fiscal purposes (Jessel, M.R., Price v. Livingstone, above, p. 681; Lord Esher, Sailing Ship Garston Co. v. Hickie, 1885, 15 Q. B. D. 580, 588; quoted by Lord Halsbury, Hunter v. Northern M. I. C., 1888, 13 App. Cas. 717 and 723). This is exemplified by three decisions all turning on the question of whether a ship had "finally sailed" from the port of Cardiff. In the first the ship was in what was then called the Bute Ship Canal, and had got her clearances, and was quite ready for sea, but it was held that she had not sailed from the port, the artificial channel being within the port (Roelandts v. Harrison, 1854, 23 L. J. Ex. 169); in the second, the ship, after being loaded at Penarth Dock, was towed by a tug seven or eight miles, which brought her three miles into the Bristol Channel, and it was held that she had" finally sailed," though she was still within the limits of the port of Cardiff for fiscal purposes, and was driven ashore within the limits of the port in its commercial sense (Price v. Livingstone, above); in the third, where by charter-party freight was to be paid "two-thirds in cash ten days after the final sailing of the vessel from her last port in Great Britain," and the ship loaded at Cardiff for Bombay, and after clearing and proceeding down the artificial channel leading from the Bute Docks to the river Taff, collided with another vessel at a place three hundred yards beyond the junction of the channel and the river and had to return, it was held that she had not "finally sailed," for the "port" extended beyond the artificial channel (Sailing Ship Garston Co. v. Hickie, above). The word "sailing" in a marine commercial contract is satisfied by the ship breaking ground on the voyage, or beginning her voyage in a state of complete readiness, though she does not leave the port; but if her equipment is incomplete, and the voyage is not bona fide begun, it is not a "sailing" (Thompson v. Gillespy, 1855, 24 L. J. Q. B. 340; Hudson v. Bilton, 1856, 26 L. J. Q. B. 27; Lang v. Anderdon, 1824, 3 Barn. & Cress. 495, 27 R. R. 412; Lea I. C. v. Blogg, 1898, 2 Q. B. 398 and 3 C. C. 1, 218; Carver, Carriage by Sea, 4th ed. (1905), 220, 567). A vessel has been held not to have been "despatched from Australia" when she sailed from Moreton Bay, but the crew, after going a short distance, mutinied and insisted on her going to Sydney (Sharp v. Gibbs, 1857, 1 H. & N. 801; and see Van Baggen v. Baines, 1854, 23 L. J. Ex. 213, "sailing from and leaving" a port).

Finder of Property.-See DETINUE, Vol. IV., at p. 546.

Fine.-In Crown cases, as in the law of real property, the term fine (finis litis) was originally applied to a sum paid by the defendant to put an end to the litigation, which was termed making a fine with the King. It is distinct from AMERCEMENT (q.v.) (Griesley's Case, 1588, 8 Co. Rep. 38), being an amount settled by a sort of bargain between the defendant and the justices, by which the defendant might avoid or put an end to his imprisonment, or to his prosecution; and, in fact, the practice of making fines appears to have been adopted by the King's justices in aid of the Exchequer, and in order to avoid the necessity of having the amount of amercement settled by a jury as required by Magna Carta (see 1 Pollock and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, 515). Fines seem at times to have been made in felony cases; but they are usually confined to misdemeanors. Fines were in early times also described as a ransom (see 1 Hen. v. c. 3; 4 Black. Com. 380), and are always carefully distinguished from FORFEITURE (q.v.).

The sense in which fine is now most commonly understood is a pecuniary penalty or pecuniary forfeiture or pecuniary compensation payable under a conviction or order of a Court in a criminal or quasicriminal case (see 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, s. 49). The order is usually if not invariably to pay the fine to His Majesty. On the abolition in 1870 of forfeitures on conviction for treason and felony (see ATTAINDER), care was taken to declare that forfeiture did not include any fine or penalty imposed on any convict by virtue of his sentence (33 & 34 Vict. c. 23, s. 5). A fine is never imposed on a conviction of treason or felony except under the provisions of a statute authorising such imposition. A fine may be imposed for any misdemeanor to any amount which the Court thinks fit, subject, however, to any specific limit imposed by a particular statute, and to the Bill of Rights (1 Will. & Mary, c. 2) and Magna Carta (25 Edw. I. c. 14), which prohibit "excessive" fines and amercements. The power to fine at discretion is given with respect to one felony only (manslaughter, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 5). But it is given with respect to all the indictable misdemeanors punishable under the Criminal Law Consolidation Acts of 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 117; c. 97, s. 73; c. 98, s. 51; c. 99, s. 38; c. 100, s. 71), and power is given to order imprisonment in default of payment.

At common law the remedy for recovery of a fine was not by distress but by writ of levari facias or imprisonment till the fine was paid or sureties for its payment were found. The levy of fines imposed by Courts of oyer and terminer, etc., is regulated by the Levy of Fines Acts, 1822 and 1823; and see ESTREATS.

The power to impose a fine appears to have been exercised by all Courts of the Common Law, even by Courts leet (In re Bishop, 1292, 5 Seld. Soc. Publ. 45; 20 St. Tri. 780; Godfrey's Case, 1615, 11 Co. Rep. 44).

Courts of Summary Jurisdiction.-The maximum amount of every fine or penalty which may be imposed by a Court of summary jurisdiction depends on the statute, Order in Council, regulation, or by-law which creates the offence, or upon sec. 4 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, which empowers a Court where the statute dealing with an offence punishable on summary conviction does not authorise a fine, to impose a fine not exceeding £25, if imprisonment appear not to be the appropriate remedy. The fine is leviable by DISTRESS. In default of distress, imprisonment may be imposed (11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 19; 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, ss. 4, 47).

The justices may mitigate the fines in case of a first offence (42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, ss. 4, 52; Murray v. Thompson, 1888, 22 Q. B. D. 142). But this power cannot be exercised

(1) In proceedings under Acts relating to the regular or auxiliary forces;

(2) As to fines inflicted under an Act carrying into effect a treaty with a foreign State (42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, s. 54);

(3) In revenue cases (Phillips v. Evans, [1896] 1 Q. B. 305).

The justices can also direct payment of a fine by instalments (42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, s. 7).

The mode of paying and accounting for fines levied under order of a Court of summary jurisdiction is in the main regulated by the Summary Jurisdiction Rules, 1886; and see Paley on Convictions, 8th ed., 346.

A fine, when made or imposed, becomes eo instanti a debt of record, and (with the alleged exception of an indictment for non-repair of a

highway) belongs to the Crown (R. v. Woolf, 1819, 2 Barn. & Ald. 609; 21 R. R. 412), unless otherwise appropriated by the statute authorising its imposition (see Bradlaugh v. Clarke, [1883] 8 A. C. 354). Except where otherwise provided by statute (e.g. as to justices, ante), the sole power to mitigate or remit a fine is in the Crown. A power of mitigating a fine was at one time exercised by the Court of King's Bench under a writ of Privy Seal issued for that purpose (2 Hawk. P. C., bk. ii. c. 25, s. 3); but the modern procedure appears to be by petition to the Treasury (R. v. Loveden, 1800, 8 T. R. 615, 618n. (d)), which has taken over the functions of the Court of Exchequer as to this subject (see EXCHEQUER Practice). In certain cases where no provision is made for payment of the costs of a prosecution, the Treasury will allow one-third of a fine to be paid to the prosecutor to reimburse his expenses.

By the Bill of Rights grants or promises of the fines or forfeitures of particular persons before conviction are declared illegal and void (1 Will. & Mary, st. 2, c. 2, and 3 Black. Com. 259). This prohibition did not affect the grants by charter of fines, etc., at Courts of oyer and terminer, etc., in favour of particular boroughs or liberties, which in early days were common (see R. v. Mayor, etc., of London, 1834, 1 C. M. & R. 1; re Nottingham Corporation, [1897] 2 Q. B. 502).

[Authorities.-Burn, Justice, 30th ed., " Fines, Forfeiture," etc.; Stone's Justice, 39th ed.; Paley, Summary Convictions, 8th ed., 1904; Douglas, Summary Jurisdiction Procedure, 9th ed., 1907.]

Fines.-Fines of lands were a very ancient method of transferring land, effected by a process that was in form the compromise of an action. They are said by Lord Coke to have existed before the time of the Conquest; and though this is probably too early a date to fix for their origin, there is no doubt that they are of very great antiquity, and are already so treated by Glanvill and Bracton. "A fine may be described to be an amicable composition or agreement of a suit, either actual or fictitious, by leave of the king or his justices, whereby the lands in question became or were acknowledged to be the right of one of the parties" (2 Black. Com. 349). The suit need not be a fictitious one, but the fact that by such a suit so good and unimpeachable a title could be given to lands led to the practice of instituting the suit for the sake of the transfer it served to effect; hence the origin and frequency of the collusive actions. The person who was formally the plaintiff, and practically the intending purchaser, was called the demandant, the defendant or vendor was called the deforceant; later on the terms conusee and conusor were used by lawyers to designate the demandant and deforceant respectively, these having reference to the recognition of the right of the one party by the other. The action was commenced by a writ demanding the lands; the deforceant then appeared, and thereupon, in consideration of a sum (practically the purchase money) paid by the demandant, acknowledged the latter's right to the lands in question, the action being compromised on these terms by leave of the Court. The fictitious cause of action was a covenant by the deforceant to convey to the demandant the lands forming the subject-matter of the action. The leave of the Court was granted, as a matter of course, upon payment of the requisite fee, called the post fine, later the King's silver. The next step was the concord, or terms of compromise-in modern parlance, the order by consent was then drawn up -setting out the acknowledgment of the demandant's rights by the deforceant. The concord must

have been thus acknowledged in person, either in Court or before a judge or commissioners, and the proceedings, so far as a valid and effectual transfer of the property was concerned, were at an end. The official of the Court then drew up a short abstract of the writ and the concord, and from this abstract (called The Note) was drawn the Foot, called also the Chirograph, of the Fine. Indentures of this chirograph were made and delivered to the parties. These were the title-deeds of the property, and set out the whole transaction and parcels at length. It is the chirograph, therefore, which is the evidence of the owner's title, and the document which should be abstracted in any abstract of title to property of which the root of title is a fine. The process above described is called levying a fine. The fines thus levied are divided into four classes, according to the operative words used in the concord, viz. :

"(1) 'Sur conusance de droit come ceo que il ad de son done,' commonly called 'a fine come ceo.' This is the most frequent, and by it the conusor acknowledges that the conusee already has the lands by a former gift of the conusor.

(2) 'Sur conusance de droit tantum.' This transfers only such right as the conusor has, and was most frequently used where the feesimple in possession was not given.

'(3) Sur concessit,' granting the estate de novo, without acknowledging any previous right.

"(4) 'Sur done grant et render,' being a combination of (1) and (3) above, is a species of double fine, and used in order to create particular limitations of estate." (2), (3), and (4) were "executory fines.'

This part of the subject cannot here be treated at greater length, and for a more detailed explanation of the above divisions the reader should refer to Shep. Touchstone, and also 2 Black Com. 349 et seq. The fine, by virtue of the common law, took effect by estoppel, and bound the parties thereto and their privies. But a far more extensive operation and effect was given to fines levied with proclamations, by virtue of certain statutes. It is this latter class of fines that are of the greater importance, and with which alone we shall deal in the rest of this article. Fines of this class may be divided into four main heads, for the purposes of dealing with their nature and effect, viz. :

(1) A fine by way of bar of non-claim.

(2) A fine by way of barring an entail.
(3) A fine by a married woman.

(4) A fine enuring to uses.

(1) A fine levied with proclamations barred, by virtue of the common law, not only parties and their privies, but also all strangers who did not claim within a year and a day. The common-law doctrine, though abolished by 34 Edw. III. c. 16, was restored in full force by 1 Rich. III. c. 7, and 4 Hen. VII. c. 24. The latter statute, however, extended the time for claiming to five years after proclamations made. To persons under disabilities (infants, femes covert, persons absent beyond the sea, etc.) a further period was given of five years after such disability had ceased. The proclamations required by the statute were sixteen, four times a term for four successive terms; these were subsequently reduced to one-fourth of the number respectively by 31 Eliz. c. 2. As to claiming by entry, it was provided by 4 Anne, c. 16, that an action must be brought within one year, and the claimant establish his right, otherwise such entry was to be of no effect.