without warrant, oral or written, from a judicial officer are enumerated under ARREST. For the present purpose it is enough to say that at common law imprisonment by any person may be justified

(1) In the case of felony, if a felony has been actually committed, and there is reasonable and probable cause for believing the person arrested to be the felon;

(2) In the case of misdemeanor, where a real and not a merely technical breach of the public peace is being committed, or there is reasonable ground to fear its renewal, and the arrest is immediate (1 Stephen, Hist. Cr. Law, 193-200; Addison, Torts, 8th ed., 173; Bowditch v. Balchin, 1851, 5 Ex. Rep. 378; Baynes v. Brewster, 1842, 2 Q. B. 375; 57 R. R. 707; Timothy v. Simpson, 1835, 1 C. M. & R. 757; 40 R. R. 722; approved in Price v. Seeley, 1843, 10 Cl. & F. 28; 8 E. R. 651). A constable is in a better position than a private person, since imprisonment by a constable can be justified at common law where he has reasonable cause to suspect that a felony has been committed, and that the person arrested committed it, and he need not prove that a felony had in fact been committed.

The burden of proof that the executive officer or private person had reasonable and probable grounds for his belief at the time of the arrest, rests upon the defence. Under the present practice it is for the jury to find the truth as to any facts in controversy, and for the judge to say whether the facts constituted a reasonable ground for the arrest (Lister v. Perryman, 1870, L. R. 4 H. L. 521). This rule has been subject of much controversy and criticism, and will be further discussed under MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

It is not necessary to enable the person imprisoned to sue for false imprisonment that the imprisonment or any consequent legal proceedings should have terminated. The prisoner, if his arrest is illegal, is entitled to regain his liberty by application for a writ of HABEAS CORPUS. The old remedy by writ de homine replegiando has fallen into disuse. Where the imprisonment was in intended execution of a statute, any action in respect of it appears to be subject to the provisions of the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict. c. 61, which have superseded the old rules as to NOTICE OF ACTION and pleading the GENERAL ISSUE.

2. Wrongful imprisonment is an indictable misdemeanor at common law, whether it is or is not coupled with assault or battery. It is punishable by fine and (or) imprisonment without hard labour, at the discretion of the Court. The offence is triable at Quarter Sessions. In an indictment for the offence it is usual to charge also an assault and battery (see Archbold., Cr. Pl., 23rd ed., 891). Prosecutions for false. imprisonment are unusual, unless there have been circumstances of oppression, extortion, or other special aggravation.

Imprisonment on a British ship under the orders or at the request of a foreign Government, and outside its territory, is a misdemeanor against English law (R. v Lesley, 1859, 29 L. J. M. C. 97).

There is said to be a common-law misdemeanor described as kidnapping (R. v. Grey, 1682, 9 How. St. Tr. 127; 3 Russell, Crimes, 6th ed., 269), but its incidents do not differ from those of wrongful imprisonment, except that it is said to involve taking the prisoner out of the realm. It is a misdemeanor under sec. 11 of the Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Chas. II. c. 2), knowingly to frame, contrive, write, seal, or countersign any warrant for the commitment, detainer, or transportation of any.

subject resident in England, Wales, or Berwick, as a prisoner to Scotland, Ireland, the Channel Islands, or any place beyond the seas, or so to commit, detain, or transport any person. The punishment is to suffer the penalties of pramunire, i.e. forfeiture of lands, tenements, goods, and chattels (not affected by the Forfeitures Act, 1870), and imprisonment for life, and to be put outside the King's protection (see Stephen, Dig. Crim. Law, 6th ed., p. 89). This enactment is directed against kidnapping (Designy's Case, 1682, 2 Raym. (Sir T.) 474), and against transportation for misdemeanors, or without trial and conviction (see Hallam, Const. Hist., vol. iii. p. 13), and did not affect transportation under conditional pardon, as practised in the seventeenth century (see Act, ss. 12, 13), nor the reconveyance to other parts of the empire of fugitives from the justice of these parts (s. 16); and, as regards convicted prisoners, it has been to some extent overridden by the Transportation and Penal Servitude Acts. (See EXTRADITION; FUGITIVE OFFENDER; PENAL SERVITUDE; and 6 Law Quarterly Review, 1890, p. 388). The kidnapping of Pacific Islanders is punishable under the Pacific Islanders' Protection Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 19), and 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 51); and see SLAVE TRADE.

For other forms of imprisonment, see ABDUCTION.

[Authorities.-2 Co. Inst. 482, 589; Viner, Abr., "Imprisonment; " Com. Dig., tit. "Imprisonment;" Hawk., P. C., bk. i. c. 60; Addison on Torts, 8th ed., 146; Pollock on Torts, 7th ed.; Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 3rd ed.; Bigelow on Torts, Engl. ed., 130; Stephen on Malicious Prosecution; Archbold, Cr. Pl., 23rd ed., 891; Russell on Crimes, 6th ed., vol. iii. 269, 309.]

False Judgment.-1. At common law the mode of challenging judgments given in the common-law County Court or a Court. baron or other Courts not of record was by writ of false judgment. Originally the writ was returnable in the Court of the immediate feudal superior of a baron in whose Court the false judgment had been given. By the Statute of Marlborough, 52 Hen. III. c. 3, exclusive cognisance was given to the King's Courts, and the writ became returnable in the Common Bench. The proceedings in the lower Courts were certified by the suitors, subject to a mode of trying errors assigned on their certificate, which is prescribed by 1 Edw. III. st. 1, c. 4. The whole process is now obsolete, but is dealt with fully in Vin. Abr., tit. "False Judgment" (see CERTIORARI).

2. False judgments in Courts of Record, even a Court of Piepowder, were challenged by writ of error, now abolished as to civil proceedings, and as to inferior civil Courts superseded by appeal to the King's Bench Division (Darlow v. Shuttleworth, [1902] 1 K. B. 721), unless another mode is given by statute (see ERROR, WRIT OF; APPEAL; CERTIORARI).

False Latin.-Indictments were drawn in Latin in England. till 4 Geo. II. c. 26, and in Wales till 6 Geo. II. c. 14, s. 5. If the words used were insensible in Latin and not known in English law as a term of art, the indictment could be quashed (Long's Case, 1603, 5 Co. Rep. 121). The only relic of this obsolete practice is the (virtually but not formally repealed) provision in the Treason Act, 1695, 7 & 8 Will. III. c. 3, s. 9), that an indictment is not to be quashed for miswriting, misspelling, or false or improper Latin, unless excepted to before evidence is given.

False Measures.-See WEIGHTS AND MEASURES.

False Personation.-See PERSONATION.

False Pretences.-The common-law remedies for wrongs effected by fraud are (1) by indictment for a common-law CHEAT; (2) by action for deceit (see FRAUD). The definition of cheating at common law having been found insufficient (see CHEAT), the statutory offence of obtaining money by false pretences was created partially and tentatively by 33 Hen. VIII. c. 1, and substantially in its present form in 1756 (30 Geo. II. c. 24). It is now constituted by secs. 88-90 of the Larceny Act, 1861 (see Archbold, Cr. Pl., 23rd ed., 593). The reason for creating the offence was that the offence of larceny did not cover cases where a man was induced by fraud to part with the property as well as the possession of a chattel (Archbold, Cr. Pl., 23rd ed., 455).

1. It is a misdemeanor (a) to obtain from any person by any false pretence, with intent to defraud, any property the subject of larceny, ie. any chattel, money, or valuable security, but not a dog (R. v. Robinson, 1858, Bell C. C. 34) (s. 88); (b) by any false pretence to cause or procure, with intent to defraud, the payment of any money, or the delivery of any chattel or valuable security, to any person for the use or benefit of the person making the false pretence, or of any other person (s. 89). Persons are punishable as for obtaining property by false pretences who win to themselves or others money or any valuable thing by any fraud or unlawful device or ill-practice in playing at any game, or in betting on the players, or on the event of any game, sport, or pastime (8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 171; and see R. v. Hudson, 1860, 29 L. J. M. C. 145).

2. It is a misdemeanor, fraudulently, and by any false pretence, and with intent to injure or defraud any other person, to cause or induce any other person (1) to execute, make, accept, indorse, or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security; or (2) to write, impress, or affix his name, or the name of any other person, or of any company, firm, or copartnership, or the seal of any body corporate, company, or society, upon any paper or parchment, in order that it may be afterwards converted into, or dealt with as, a valuable security (s. 90). This offence was created in consequence of the decision in R. v. Danger, 1856, 26 L. J. M. C. 185.

3. It is also a misdemeanor to receive any property obtained by means of the offences above stated, with knowledge that it was obtained by such offences (s. 95).

The punishment for offences 1 and 2 is penal servitude from three to five years, or imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for not over two years, with or without fine (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, ss. 88, 90; 54 & 55 Vict. c. 69, s. 1); and the punishment for offence 3 is penal servitude from three to fourteen years, or imprisonment and (or) fine as in cases 1 and 2 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 95; 54 & 55 Vict. c. 69, s. 1). The Court may in the alternative require the offender to enter into his own recognisances, with or without sureties, to keep the peace or be of good behaviour, or both; or in default of finding sureties, imprison him without hard labour for not over one year (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 117).

Where the offence is a first offence the Court may deal with the offender under the First Offenders Act, 1887, 50 & 51 Vict. c. 25. See FIRST OFFENDERS. Where the offence is committed after a previous

conviction for the same offence or for felony, the Court may, in addition to any other lawful sentence, put the offender under police supervision for not over seven years after the expiration of his sentence (34 & 35 Vict. c. 112, ss. 8, 20).

4. Under the Debtors Act, 1869, 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62, s. 13, it is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment with or without hard labour for any period not exceeding twelve months, for any person (whether a bankrupt or not) to obtain credit under false pretences or by means of any other fraud, in incurring a debt or any other liability (R. v. Rowlands, 1882, 8 Q. B. D. 530; R. v. Peters, 1886, 16 Q. B. D. 636; R. v. Wyatt, 1904, 1 K. B. 88; and see FRAUDULENT DEBTORS.

5. Persons who conspire, incite, or attempt to commit, or who aid or abet, counsel or procure the commission of any of the above-named offences, are liable to indictment. See ABETTOR; ATTEMPT; CON

SPIRACY.

6. There are numerous statutory offences of a fraudulent character which closely correspond to false pretences. See Official Index to Statutes (ed. 1907), tit. "Fraud;" Russell on Crimes, 6th ed., vol. ii. p. 553; and ACCOUNTS, FALSIFICATION OF; FORGERY.

7. As to procuring illicit carnal intercourse by false pretences, see RAPE.

A very considerable amount of case-law exists as to the scope and effect of the provisions of secs. 88-90 of the Larceny Act, 1861, which is collected in Archbold, Cr. Pl., 23rd ed., 593-619; and Russell on Crimes, 6th ed., vol. ii. It may be thus briefly summarised. A pretence to be within the statute must be a false representation by words, writing (R. v. Cooper, 1876, 2 Q. B. D. 510; R. v. King, [1897] 1 Q. B. 214), or conduct (R. v. Barnard, 1837, 7 Car. & P. 784), that some fact exists or has existed; a promise as to future conduct not intended to be kept is not by itself a false pretence (Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1899, 62 & 63 Vict. c. 22, s. 3); nor is mere commendation or appreciation of wares for sale, i.e. puffing (R. v. Ardley, 1870, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 301; R. v. Foster, 1876, 2 Q. B. D. 301). Thus, giving a cheque known to be worthless for the price of goods is obtaining the goods by false pretences. But in the case of the use of a cheque or bank note, to prove that the pretence is false it is necessary to show that the accused knew the cheque or note to be absolutely valueless, or had no reason to believe that it would be honoured on presentation (R. v. Hazelton, 1874, L. R. 2 C. C. R. 134; R. v. Ollis, [1900] 1 Q. B. 758). The cases, of which the most extreme is R. v. Gordon, 1888, 23 Q. B. D. 354, draw almost invisibly fine distinctions between false promises and false statements. the practice to convict persons for obtaining food by false pretences who dine at a restaurant and do not pay, but this practice was difficult to justify. Such cases are now dealt with under sec. 13 (1) of the Debtors Act, 1869 (R. v. Jones, [1898] 1 Q. B. 119).

The "obtaining" by false pretences does not include detaining goods otherwise obtained, but means acquiring with intent to deprive the owner permanently and entirely of the goods, whether the goods are or are not acquired under a contract (R. v. Kilham, 1870, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 261). Consequently a loan of money can, but a loan of chattels cannot, be obtained by false pretences. It is not necessary that the property obtained should exist at the date of the false pretence if it is made or acquired and parted with in reliance on it (R. v. Martin, 1867, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 56).

It must be shown that the goods were parted with under belief in the pretences, however foolish such belief may be, and however easy it was for the person cheated to make inquiry as to the truth of the pretence (R. v. Mills, 1857, Dears. & B. C. C. 285). Where the property was not parted with from belief in the pretence, the pretender is indictable for the attempt to obtain the property (R. v. Hensler, 1870, 11 Cox C. C. 570), or may be convicted of the attempt on an indictment for the completed offence (R. v. Roebuck, 1856, 25 L. J. M. C. 101 (14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 9)).

The offence is committed in the case of a pretence transmitted by post from one county or country to another, both where the letter is posted and where it is received (R. v. Holmes, 1883, 12 Q. B. D. 23; and see R. v. Ellis, [1899] 1 Q. B. 230; R. v. Oliphant, [1905] 2 K. B. 67. As to the difference between local venue and territorial jurisdiction, see Companhia de Moçambique v. British South Africa Co., [1893] App. Cas. 602. The rules as to venue in larceny cases do not apply to false pretences (R. v. Stanbury, 1861, 31 L. J. M. C. 88; R. v. Leach, 1855, 25 L. J. M. C. 77).

The distinctions between false pretences, forgery, and larceny by a trick are in certain cases very fine. A person who deliberately utters a forged document falsely pretends its genuineness, and the difference between false pretences and larceny rests on the answer to the question whether the person cheated did or did not mean to part with the property, as well as with the possession of the article in question (R. v. Thompson, 1862, 32 L. J. M. C. 57; R. v. Cooke, 1871, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 295; R. v. Buckmaster, 1887, 20 Q. B. D. 182; R. v. Russett, [1892] 2 Q. B. 312; R. v. King, [1897] 1 Q. B. 214); and see LARCENY.

The difficulty created by the fineness of these distinctions is usually obviated by indicting for false pretences and relying on the rule under sec. 88 of the Larceny Act, 1861-that a person is not entitled to be acquitted of the misdemeanor if his offence amounted in law to larceny. This provision merely repeats with small variation the general rule under 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 12; but there is no mode of convicting for false pretences where the indictment is for larceny.

Procedure-Trial.-All the offences referred to under this head are indictable offences triable at Quarter Sessions even after a previous conviction (5 & 6 Vict. c. 38, s. 1). All the principal offences and conspiracies. are subject to the Vexatious Indictments Act, 1859, 22 & 23 Vict. c. 17; 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62, s. 18, but attempts to commit them are not (R. v. Burton, 1875, 13 Cox C. C. 71). A Court of summary jurisdiction may deal summarily with obtaining or attempting to obtain a chattel, money, or a valuable security, if the value of the thing in respect whereof the offence is said to have been committed or attempted does not in the opinion of the Court exceed 40s. (62 & 63 Vict. c. 22, s. 1).

Indictments for obtaining property by false pretences must set out with particularity, and falsify, the actual pretence used, and state the person to whom the pretence was made, and from whom the property was obtained (R. v. Sowerby, [1894] 2 Q. B. 173). If this is not done, the indictment can be quashed; but the defect will be treated as cured if not challenged before verdict (R. v. Goldsmith, 1873, L. R. 2 C. C. R. 74). As to the proper mode of averring a false pretence by advertisement to the public, see R. v. Silverlock, [1894] 2 Q. B. 766.

Where the charge is of obtaining money or bank notes it is sustained by proof of obtaining any piece of money or note, even if given for the