From The Spectator, 81 March.
THE FENIANS IN CANADA.

have to traverse is out of the question. The Fenians would be plundering for their support in a week, and would be accounted for by the farmers without expense to Canada. THE Fenian menaces against Canada The commissariat even of ten thousand would be important in one case, and one men is a serious affair, one which cannot be case only, if they were secretly favoured by provided for by all the subscriptions all the the Government of the United States. Of Pats and Biddies in the Union could afford. themselves the Fenians can do nothing, Imagine that number, however, across the except, it may be, produce a riot in Mon- frontier, and what are they to do? Stocktreal. People who talk of their "levies," ade themselves, says General Sweeny, after and "revenue," and "fleet," as if they were the fashion of New Zealand and the Far serious things, are simply blinding themselves West, and die in brave defence, while their by their own use of big words. Even on countrymen and the disbanded soldiers of their own statement of their own resources the North flock in masses to their aid.

the Fenians are powerless to upset any "Securely entrenched in Upper Canada," Government whatever, much less one like they are to do wonderful things. Well, that of Canada, which can dispose of twenty Irishmen die bravely, no doubt, particularly or thirty thousand very good troops, and when fighting on the British side, but in has behind it one of the great empires of this case something beyond bravery seems the world. It is quite possible, as the Feni- to be required. Dinner, for example, is an leaders say, that there are 300,000 per- essential to courage, and whence are the sons in America who have some sort of heroic ten thousand to get the needful connection with the Society, for Irishmen, bread, bacon, and potheen? They cannot like all imaginative races, have a love of get them in Canada without dispersing into conspiracy in their blood; and in America knots of undisciplined stragglers, whom the it is very pleasant and even beneficial to farmers, threatened in their homesteads, belong to a large organization, or brother- would shoot down one by one. They canhood, or "historic society," which can car- not carry them on their march without carts, ry arms without being ridiculous and offer and draught animals, and drivers, and arto local leaders a considerable vote. Even rangements which no power but that of a the President may think that, should the regular government ever succeeds in getdispute between himself and the Republi- ting together. They would be starved out cans ever come to blows, a Fenian "army," in a week, and in a fortnight ready to surwhich would also be a democratic and render to the first body of regular troops strongly pro-slavery army, might be a very useful nucleus for his party. Fernando Wood clearly thinks that, and so does the Board of Aldermen of New York, which, mainly supported by the Irish emigration, has just declared war by resolution on the Government of Great Britain. It is also possible that of these 300,000 men 30,000, or 10 per cent., may be men with sufficient recklessness, ignorance, and faith in their leaders' secret assurances of favour at Washington to organize, and drill, and even, on opportunity offering, to commence a march. But supposing all that to be true, and a grand strategical plan to be formed and published for British benefit, what is there actually to be done? The thirty thousand volunteers may exist, but they must be got together, and when together they must be fed, and when fed they must be provided with artillery, and not one of these things can be done without the consent of the United States. A mere order from the President would close all the lines of railway leading northward, and marching over distances such as the Fenian army would

which made its appearance in front of their stockades. We may, and many among us do, exaggerate the proposition that war is now a science, but it is quite certain that the organization of an army, so that it can be fed twice a day without plunder, is an art, and one which requires certain conditions. Either the army must be able to communicate with certain depôts previously filled, or it must have the sympathy of a tolerably dense population, both of them conditions totally wanting to the Fenians. On the other hand, the Canadian Government has 6,500 regular troops sure to be well provided, 20,000 volunteers, with no commissariat difficulties, and otherwise quite as good as Fenians, and the ultimate aid of about 600,000 grown men, all resolute not to endure marauding under political pretences. These considerations must be as clear to the Fenian leaders as to any outsiders, indeed much clearer, for they know, and we do not, how much of all their tall talking is baseless. If they are, no Fenian lives will be wasted in any inroad at all, while if they are not, the failure of the at

THE FENIANS IN CANADA.

407

tempt is assured beforehand by the leaders' | would regard a successful inroad of Fenians
folly and want of brain.
as an inexpiable insult, as an offence from
But the Americans may be secretly fos- people to people which rendered friendship,
tering the movement? Of course they in this generation at least, a demoralizing
may, and then the Fenians are only formid- humiliation. To join in the Union might
able as part of the strength of the United be advantageous, to be conquered by it en-
States. They are not more formidable than durable, but to be annexed by gangs of
any other section of the American popula- armed Irish labourers, moved solely by
tion, not half so formidable, if persistency hatred of England - the Canadians will
counts for anything, as an equal number of sooner retreat into the wilderness. Nothing
New Englanders. But there are at least but this feeling could have brought those
three reasons why the American Govern- volunteer farmers so sharply up to the front.
ment will not foster the movement, except It is not worth while to be ruined rather
for certain domestic purposes, to which it may than exchange Ottawa for Washington, but
readily be applied. One is the dislike enter- it is worth while to die rather than be ruled
tained by all born Americans, and especial-
ly American yeomen, i. e., three-fourths of
the population, to all Irishmen, and to
Fenians as Irishmen distilled. It is diffi-
cult to express the degree of this dislike,
which pervades all classes, from men like
Emerson, who declared that there "was
a great deal of guano in the Irishman's des-
tiny," i. e., that his main use was to die
and so fertilize the soil, to the Yankee
boss," who deliberately calculates that an
Irishman costs little more wages than a
negro, and is rather more convenient to
feed. Those, however, who happen to have
any knowledge of the kind of feeling en-
tertained in Yorkshire towards the Irish
colonies settled there may form some inade-
quate idea of American sentiment a sen-
timent intensified almost beyond reason by
the scenes enacted during the riots of 1865
in New York. The second reason is that
the American Government knows perfectly
well that a war with Great Britain will be
a maritime war, in which Irishmen, who can
do anything in the world except make sail-
ors, will be of no possible use, and will
therefore, unless attacked, begin by organ-
izing naval preparations, not by tempting a
valuable class of labourers to fling away
life in imbecile raids upon a wilderness.
Great Governments sometimes conspire, but
free Governments know perfectly well that
conspiracy is merely a hindrance, a worry
such as a theatrical cloak would be to a
champion of the ring. And lastly, Ameri-
can statesmen, one and all, are penetrated
with the desire to secure Canada, if at all,
by the consent of the Canadians. They
want Canada, it may be, but they do not
want three millions of hostile white people
within their northern border- do not want
a new, and brave, and well armed popula-
tion to keep down. They know perfectly
well that Canadians, though they might en-
dure conquest by the mighty Republic,

for five minutes by triumphant Teague. American statesmen know this feeling perfectly well, and though they may not object to gentle pressure such as the abolition of the Reciprocity Treaty, or to keep up a panic which checks prosperity and suggests the security the Union would confer, they will not break for ever with the Canadians. It is not of course convenient for a President who is founding a new party to quarrel with his extreme right wing, the ultra-democrats to whom the Irishmen belong, sooner than he can help, or to weaken his allies in a city like New York, or to affront the devotees of State rights by a needless exertion of Federal power. But the moment the menaces become real the Government will act, and those who think the Fenians can resist its action simply know nothing of the United States. The old "Know-Nothing" party, the only party in the Union which ever developed itself spontaneously without leader or organization, want nothing but such a chance. Only let there be a cry for a day that the Irish are disloyal, and in every State of the Union the suffrage will be confined to men born within its limits, and the Irish power, such as it is, extinguished for ever. The Irish will run no such risk, and the Fenian movement in America as well as Europe will, we believe, end in nothing but a slight increase to the unhappiness of a race as gifted and as unfortunate as any which history records-a people which by some wonderful perversity of circumstances is at home less stained by crime than any existing nation, yet is believed in America as well as in England to be hopelessly turbulent and unruly, which has won every battle it ever fought except its battles of independence, and has succeeded in every kind of effort except that of making a happy and contented home.

From The Economist, 7th April.

THE DANGEROUS CRISIS IN GERMANY.

The real points at issue remain, however, what they were before. The Prussian Premier, and in the main the King, are deter

ONE of the many difficulties of this Ger-mined that they will have the Danish

man dispute, perhaps the one which most embarrasses outsiders, is the absence of a pivot. Usually nations when seriously opposed select some one point, often very insignificant, as the centre of argument, and their determination and power can be tested by the way in which they approach or recede from that central trifle. In the revolutionary war the point was the opening of the Scheldt. Nobody cared particularly about the Schellt, but everybody understood that if France" opened" it she meant war, and if not that she was still within diplomatic range. In the Crimean war the pivot was first the keys of the Holy Sepulchre, then the entry into Moldo-Wallachia, and then the Protectorate of Greek Christians, and as Russian demands on these points were advanced or modified the world understood the obstinacy or the vacillation of the different Cabinets engaged. In this German struggle there is uniortunately for outsiders no such pivot. There was one, the legal meaning of condominium, that is in simpler English the question whether the King of Prussia had by the convention of Gastein surrendered his share of legislative power in Holstein, or only of administrative power. The King held that he had only given up the latter, and acted on his views by issuing a decree applicable to both Duchies, visiting advocacy of the claims put forward by the Duke of Augustenburg with penal servitude. The Kaiser held that both had been surrendered, and acted on his views by refusing to surrender Dr. May, convicted par contumace of insulting Prussia. The struggle seemed likely to range round this point, but it has been abandoned, and the pivot now forming seems to be this. Shall the matter be left to the Diet or not? Austria saying yes, but Prussia affirming that the Confederate system is only manageable when the two great Powers are in harmony, demanding a reform which will imply absorption, and treating each State of Germany as a separate sovereignty. The selection of this arena for the diplomatic struggle would make it endless, but that the Government of Berlin, while writing long despatches about it, acts also as a great Power, treats armaments in Austria as menaces, and in the latest despatch published informs the outside Powers that in face of such threats she may not be able to avoid the appearance of aggression.

Duchies as a compensation to the Prussian people for depriving them of their constitutional liberties. Upon this point we conceive their minds are made up, and they will not in any event recede. They will pay Austria cash for her share, or suggest other schemes of compensation, but the Duchies they will have, though it should cost a war. But if the last alternative is accepted, they think the opportunity a good one for settling the German question once for all by absorbing Germany North of the Maine, or at least establishing, as Count von Bismark is reported to have said, a free trade in States. From this design they may be induced to recede, as, for example, by French resistance, but the temptation is very great. The design, to begin with, paralyses the minor States. The majority of persons in North Germany are not willing to see Prussia aggrandised, if they are not includ ed in Prussia, because they know that they will, under those circumstances, have all the disadvantages of independence without its reality. But if Prussia intends to unify North Germany, then they are willing, because they will then be citizens of a very mighty State of their own blood and language, which they hope very soon to convert into a free and constitutional, though carefully armed monarchy. They will not support their Princes in resisting that revolution, and the Princes are therefore paralysed, for the marked peculiarity of these States is, that while their Courts are despotic in small things, they are in great things completely under the control of opinion. Moreover, to do the statesmen of Prussia justice, they really wish, according to their lights, to make Germany great, and see very clearly that if North Germany can be united without suffering severe enough to create intestine hatreds, the new monarchy will be very great indeed, quite equal to France, and able, by protecting Sweden and Denmark, to make of the Baltic a German instead of a Russian lake. Naturally the Austrian Governinent does not approve this design. Its head is heir of a house which for generations has given Emperors to Germany, and he cannot forget the immense prize which always seems at once so near and so distant. Austrian statesmen, moreover, though not wholly sharing that sentiment still perceive that the Hereditary States are the basis of Austrian power, and fear if Prussia be

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comes an Empire, those States may gravi- ful enemy in Italy, an
tate towards her, and Austria thus be flung
completely to the Eastward, be in fact re-
duced to Hungary, with certain dependen-
cies clinging to her skirts. Austria, there-
fore ready to fight rather than be ordered
out of Holstein, is prepared to fight rather
than see the sovereignty of Germany trans-
ferred to Prussia, and has therefore armed,
not we think to coerce Prussia, but to pre-
vent her from either seizing Holstein, or re-
forming the Confederation her own way.
Prussia affecting alarm, or it may be feel-
ing it, for nations have traditions, and
the superiority of Austria is in all German
States traditional, has armed also, and it
now rests with her to take the next step.
War or peace depends upon her absolutely.
Austria certainly will not attack, and if
Prussia does nothing, the situation will sim-
ply last until some entirely new event al-
ters the complexion of affairs.

enemy whose mere existence adds without cost 200,000 men to the Prussian army. That army, again, is in high spirits and complete organisation, possessed in particular of an artillery which Austria cannot rival, but may, if this opportunity is lost, rival in a few years. The Government is also for the hour a dictatorship in the hands of a very strong dictator, a circumstance convenient for war. It has a reserve treasure of considerable amount, and it has the means of securing, if not the alliance, at least the neutrality of France. All these are circumstances which point strongly to war, while there are two others which seem very greatly opposed to peace. If Prussia withdraws, the King is face to face again with a disappointed people and a disappointed army, a position no Sovereign claiming absolutism can approve, while Berlin loses altogether her control over the minor CabiThe question for Europe, therefore, is nets. They are always hostile, and the which line the Cabinet of Berlin will now moment it is known that Prussia is not preadopt? Will the King- for this is the pared to fight, even for unity, the feeling truth stripped of diplomatic verbiage-among the people which restrains the lesrisk a great war for a great Empire, or will ser Courts will disappear. They are not he fear so very great an enterprise? The anxious about the Duchies, but about Gerspeculation is one upon which no publicist man unity. The balance of evidence therenot inconceivably rash will give a final opinion, for he cannot know the three essential but unknown quantities in the game, -the personal wish of King Frederick William, the policy of the Czar Alexander, and the determination of the Emperor Napoleon. Each may intervene at the last moment with decisive effect. All he is justified in saying is that the balance of We have taken little account in this probabilities inclines towards war for these statement of the despatches exchanged bereasons. Prussia is governed by a man of tween Berlin and Vienna repudiating the very unusual firmness and audacity, whose idea of attack, for they are very meaningheart is set on making her an Empire, who less. Nations in modern times never do has contemplated this war as ultimately attack, they only defend themselves by an inevitable, and who, if he shrinks at the aggressive movement. It is a great point eleventh hour, is a beaten statesman. We always with statesmen to enlist the national look to it as certain that Count von Bis- sentiment of honour by saying the country mark will not recede, and the King will be is threatened, for the masses do not undermost disinclined to face an angry people, stand policy, and do quite understand deprived alike of his prestige, of his expect- national independence. Even if she deed territory, and of his great Premier. cides on war Prussia will probably not atMoreover, he is quite as resolved as his tack. She will only do some act in HolsMinister to establish Prussian ascendancy tein which she will assert to be legal, and some day or other, and the opportunity which Austria must resist, the resistance seems to be very favourable. Austria is raising in the Prussian mind the idea that decidedly weaker than she has been for the country is being deprived of the reward years, weaker by far than she will be as of Duppel. Or she will, as a measure of soon as her free-trade policy has restored necessary precaution, occupy Saxony, and her revenue, weaker by far than she will so compel Austria without direct attack be when Hungary has been conciliated and either to resign her position as protector Venetia surrendered. She has no friend- of the smaller States or to declare war, the ship with France, and she has a very dead-onus of which will not appear to the Prusly, and as it may prove, a very power- I sian people to rest upon Berlin.

fore is that this lull will not last, that Austria cannot give way, and Prussia will not; and that, therefore eliminating the unknown quantities, they will come to blows. But then those unknown quantities may at any moment become known, and so alter the whole aspect of a problem which unfortunately concerns Europe very gravely.

From The Saturday Review, 7th April.

AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA.

ANOTHER Week has gone by, and it is still as difficult as it ever was to say whether there will be a war in Germany or not. Austria assures Prussia and the world that she has not the remotest intention of going to war. Nothing could be further from her wishes than a dreadful civil conflict between two German States. She is merely guarding against any attack on her, and will abide by the old plain rules of the Confederation, which forbid two German States from making war on each other, and enjoin that all differences shall be settled by the Bund. Nothing can seem fairer, and the language of Austria is as peaceful and proper as could be. How then does it happen that, in spite of such language, war is still thought to be so near? The answer is, that Prussia has announced that she will annex the Duchies, and that, if peace is to be preserved, Prussia must consent to yield. She will have matched herself with Austria, and have owned herself to be out-matched. That the status quo should be preserved will be held throughout Germany a victory for Austria, and Austria will have gained this victory on behalf of the Confederation as well as for herself. Hesse Darmstadt has plucked up courage enough to inform Prussia that any attempt on her part to annex the Duchies would be looked on in Germany as a hostile movement to the minor States. Prussia has, however, said she will do this; and, if she now retreats, she will have yielded to the fear of what Austria and the minor_ States can do to hurt her. Some of the Prussian papers are bold enough and sensible enough to say that it is much better to yield now than to rush, out of mere obstinacy and pride, into an unjustifiable and dangerous war. But then these papers make things pleasant to themselves and their party by drawing a distinction between the Prussian Government and the Prussian nation. The Prussian nation will not be in the least degree humiliated by yielding, for it had nothing to do with the rash declaration of an intention to annex the Duchies. The Prussian Government will be very much humiliated, and Count BISMARK especially will be openly discomforted and disgraced; but this will not hurt the feelings of the Prussian Liberals, and will, perhaps, give them more pleasure than pain. It is not, however, the Prussian nation, but the Prussian Government that will decide whether there is to be war or not; and any one who examines

the whole position of the Prussian Government must see that it has very strong motives for choosing war rather than show signs of weakness and hesitation. The leadership of Germany is a prize worth struggling for, and the firm belief of Count BISMARK is that the leadership of Germa ny is to be won by the exercise and display of force. Those Germans who think as the Duke of SAXE-COBURG thinks believe that North Germany is to be united by the spread of the same liberal principles throughout its whole area. To Count BISMARK this an idle dream. The true way of leading Germany, in his view, is to say plainly that Prussia intends to lead it, and will force those to obey who will not consent to be led. Evidently it is a complete breakdown of such a policy, if, on the very first occasion when Prussia ought to act, and to make her petty neighbours act with her, she turns meek and amiable and peaceloving because Austria threatens her, and the minor States are very glad to find that Austria dares to go so far.

The Prussian Government is said to be very much displeased at the replies it has received from the States which it invited to say whether, in case of war, they would make common cause with Prussia or not. Most of them have evaded the question, and have taken shelter under the article of the Federal Constitution which prohibits all contests between its members. This does not suit Prussia, and Prussia accordingly declares in return that_the_Federal Constitution must be altered. If a war is made, it will be made, as the KING has declared, for something more than Schleswig-Hol stein. It will be made for half, at least, of the small States of Germany. Every one knows this, and yet the most remarkable feature in the whole of this German business is that the minor States neither side with Prussia nor against her. It is not merely that they shrink from any active measures, for that is to be expected from Powers to whom all activity is alien and may possibly be ruinous. The utmost that Reuss and Lippe can wish for is to be let alone and forgotten for ever, as they probably would be if it were not for the odious compilers of geography books, who will mention them when no one else would think of being so unkind as to remind mankind of their existence. But these little States do not even show a decided wish as to their fate. They do not much sympathize with either Austria or Prussia. In Bavaria, a Southern and a Catholic State, the feeling of the Government is said to be Prussian;

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