Which

that the things they were continually to give and receive information about, might be the easier and quicker understood. That this is so, and that men in framing different complex ideas, and giving them names, have been much governed by the end of speech in general, (which is a very short and expedite way of conveying their thoughts one to another,) is evident in the names which in several arts have been found out, and applied to several complex ideas of modified actions belonging to their several trades, for dispatch sake, in their direction or discourses about them. ideas are not generally framed in the minds of men not conversant about these operations. And thence the words that stand for them, by the greatest part of men of the same language are not understood: v. g., colshire, drilling, filtration, cohobation, are words standing for certain complex ideas, which being seldom in the minds of any but those few whose particular employments do at every turn suggest them to their thoughts, those names of them are not generally understood but by smiths and chymists; who having framed the complex ideas which these words stand for, and having given names to them, or received them from others, upon hearing of these names in communication, readily conceive those ideas in their minds; as by cohobation, all the simple ideas of distilling, and the pouring the liquor distilled from anything back upon the remaining matter, and distilling it again. Thus we see that there are great varieties of simple ideas, as of tastes and smells, which have no names; and of modes many more; which either not having been generally enough observed, or else not being of any great use to be taken notice of in the affairs and converse of men, they have not had names given to them, and so pass not for species. This we shall have occasion hereafter to consider more at large, when we come to speak of words.

CHAPTER XIX.

OF THE MODES OF THINKING.

1. Sensation, Remembrance, Contemplation, &c.-WHEN the mind turns its view inwards upon itself, and contemplates its own actions, thinking is the first that occurs. In it the mind observes a great variety of modifications, and from

thence receives distinct ideas. Thus the perception which actually accompanies, and is annexed to any impression on the body, made by an external object, being distinct from all other modifications of thinking, furnishes the mind with a distinct idea, which we call sensation; which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any idea into the understanding by the senses. * The same idea, when it again recurs without the operation of the like object on the external sensory, is remembrance; if it be sought after by the mind, and with pain and endeavour found, and brought again in view, it is recollection; if it be held there long under attentive consideration, it is contemplation. When ideas float in our mind, without any reflection or regard of the understanding, it is that which the French call reverie:† our language has scarce a name for it. When the ideas that offer themselves (for, as I have observed in another place, whilst we are awake, there will always be a train of ideas succeeding one another in our minds) are taken notice of, and, as it were, registered in the memory, it is attention. When the mind with great earnestness, and of choice, fixes its view on any idea, con siders it on all sides, and will not be called off by the ordinary solicitation of other ideas, it is that we call intention or study. Sleep, without dreaming, is rest from all these; and dreaming itself is the having of ideas (whilst the outward senses are stopped, so that they receive not outward objects with their usual quickness) in the mind, not suggested by any external objects or known occasions, nor under any choice or conduct of the understanding at all. And whether that which we call ecstasy be not dreaming with the eyes open, I leave to be examined.

2. These are some few instances of those various modes of thinking, which the mind may observe in itself, and so have

* Compare Hobbes on Human Nature, chap. ii. § 2 et seq., and chap. iii. § 16.-ED.

Lavaux well describes this states of mind:- "Situation de l'âme qui s'abandonne doucement, et se livre enfin tout entière à ses pensées, à ses imaginations, à ses reflexions." Rousseau, who thoroughly understood the import of the word, says—“Livrés à cette douce contempla tion, nous nous laissions entraîner à nos rêveries." And Madame de Sevigné, the Lady Montague of France, observes in one of her letters"J'ai quelquefois des rêveries dans ces bois, d'une telle noirceur, que j'en reviens plus changée que d'un acces de fièvre.”—ED.

as distinct ideas of, as it hath of white and red, a square or a circle. I do not pretend to enumerate them all, nor to treat at large of this set of ideas, which are got from reflection: that would be to make a volume. It suffices to my present purpose to have shown here, by some few examples, of what sort these ideas are, and how the mind comes by them; especially since I shall have occasion hereafter to treat more at large of reasoning, judging, volition, and knowledge, which are some of the most considerable operations of the mind, and modes of thinking.

3. The various Attention of the Mind in thinking.—But perhaps it may not be an unpardonable digression, nor wholly impertinent to our present design, if we reflect here upon the different state of the mind in thinking, which those instances of attention, reverie, and dreaming, &c., before mentioned, naturally enough suggest. That there are ideas, some or other, always present in the mind of a waking man, every one's experience convinces him, though the mind employs itself about them with several degrees of attention. Sometimes the mind fixes itself with so much earnestness on the contemplation of some objects, that it turns their ideas on all sides, marks their relations and circumstances, and views every part so nicely and with such intention, that it shuts out all other thoughts, and takes no notice of the ordinary impressions made then on the senses, which at another season would produce very sensible perceptions: at other times it barely observes the train of ideas that succeed in the understanding, without directing and pursuing any of them: and at other times it lets them pass almost quite unregarded, as faint shadows that make no impression.

4. Hence it is probable that Thinking is the Action, not the Essence of the Soul.-This difference of intention and remission of the mind in thinking, with a great variety of degrees between earnest study and very near minding nothing at all, every one, I think, has experimented in himself. Trace it a

little further, and you find the mind in sleep retired as it were from the senses, and out of the reach of those motions made on the organs of sense, which at other times produce very vivid and sensible ideas. I need not, for this, instance in those who sleep out whole stormy nights, without hearing the thunder, or seeing the lightning, or feeling the shaking

of the house, which are sensible enough to those who are waking; but in this retirement of the mind from the senses, it often retains a yet more loose and incoherent manner of thinking which we call dreaming;* and, last of all, sound

* On this subject Blumenbach, in his Physiology, has some observations which the reader may not be displeased to find here, more espe cially as they appear to have been partly suggested by the words of Locke:-"Dreams are a sporting, as it were, of the imagination, in which it recals the ideas of objects formerly perceived, especially of objects of sight, and appears to employ and interest itself with them. It has been disputed whether dreams are natural during health. Some believe that sleep never occurs without them, although they may escape our memory. Others conceive them the consequence only of derangement in some of the abdominal viscera. Very healthy adults have asserted that they never dreamed. Dreams are generally confused and irregular, but occasionally discover extraordinary marks of reason. The power of corporeal stimulants is very great in producing dreams; v. c., of the semen in producing lascivious trains of ideas, of excessive repletion in causing frightful appearances. There is an instance on record of a man, in whom any kind of dreams could be induced, if his friends, by gently addressing him, afforded the subject matter. This, however, appears to be a preternatural state, between sleeping and waking; as does also the truly diseased case of sleepwalkers, and the very different, though morbid affection of somnambulists, seized with what is termed magnetic ecstasis. Locke and others have regarded all dreams as a species of this mixed state. § 326. The causes of sleepwalking have been attempted to be given by Alexander Ross, celebrated in Hudibras, where we find mention of

"An ancient sage philosopher,

That had read Alexander Ross over;" which is more, we dare say, than can be predicated of many sage philosophers of the present age. However this may be, our renowned reasoner writes as follows:-"Horatius and others record divers examples of sleepwalkers, who do strange things in their sleep; but this is also the work of nature; for I find that they are most subject to this infirmity, whose animal spirits are most active, subtil, and fiery, and whose imagination is strong; so that, by the strength of their fantasie, and agility of their spirits, the muscles are moved, though the will doth not then concur to this motion, nor reason make any opposition, which it would do if it were naked, and not suffer them to undergo such danger." (Hid. Secrets of Man's Body discovered, Book III. chap. ii. p. 76.) Lord Bacon has a short, but curious passage, on the immediate causes of dreams, pleasant or prophetic: "There be some perfumes prescribed by the writers of natural magic, which procure pleasant dreams; and some others, as they say, that procure prophetical dreams, as the seeds of flax, flea-wort, &c. (Nat. Hist. Cent. X. § 933.) Compare with the above the notions of Aristotle, as they are found in his three brief treatises on Sleep, Dreams, and Prophetic Visions, Op. t. vii. pp. 129-158. -ED.

sleep closes the scene quite, and puts an end to all appearances. This, I think almost every one has experience of in himself, and his own observation without difficulty leads him thus far. That which I would further conclude from hence is, that since the mind can sensibly put on, at several times, several degrees of thinking, and be sometimes, even in a waking man, so remiss, as to have thoughts dim and obscure to that degree, that they are very little removed from none at all; and at last, in the dark retirements of sound sleep, loses the sight perfectly of all ideas whatsoever: since, I say, this is evidently so in matter of fact and constant experience, I ask whether it be not probable, that thinking is the action and not the essence of the soul? since the operations of agents will easily admit of intention and remission; but the essences of things are not conceived capable of any such variation. But this by the by.

CHAPTER XX.

OF MODES OF PLEASURE AND PAIN.

1. Pleasure and Pain, simple Ideas.—AMONGST the simple ideas which we receive both from sensation and reflection, pain and pleasure are two very considerable ones. For, as in the body there is sensation barely in itself, or accompanied with pain or pleasure; so the thought or perception of the mind is simply so, or else accompanied also with pleasure or pain, delight or trouble, call it how you please. These, like other simple ideas, cannot be described, nor their names defined; the way of knowing them is, as of the simple ideas of the senses, only by experience. For, to define them by the presence of good or evil, is no otherwise to make them known to us, than by making us reflect on what we feel in ourselves, upon the several and various operations of good and evil upon our minds, as they are differently applied to or considered by us.

2. Good and Evil, what.-Things, then, are good or evil, only in reference to pleasure or pain. That we call good, which is apt to cause or increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us; or else to procure or preserve us the possession of any other good or absence of any evil. And, on the contrary, we