another, excites a defire for whatever is fair and good, and engages even the paffions on the fide of the judgment. It fixes the ftrongest and most lasting impreffions upon the mind, fanctions the arguments of reafon, and gives life to the leffons of morality.

How tame and fpiritlefs are the precepts of wisdom, even when taught by a Socrates or a Plato, if compared with the more animated beauties of virtue, exemplified in the actions of an Ariftides, or a Phocion! To the former we only give the cold affent of the judgment; of the latter we express our admiration with rapture; they receive the prompteft tribute of our applaufe, they excite the fpirit of emulation, and we are eager to fhew by our conduct the influence which they have gained over our hearts.

But what is this homage, which is paid almost involuntarily to fuch great and illuftrious examples? It is undoubtedly the voice of nature, and the fuggeftion of reafon pure and uncorrupted by the bad practices of the world. It is the decifion of a correct judgment, and the proof of a genuine tafte for true greatness and folid glory. In order therefore to form a virtuous character, and to be diftinguished for the moft laudable actions, it is an object of the first concern to be ever attentive to this voice, and to conform to its wife and friendly admonitions.

While hiftory holds up to the view inftances of eminent virtues and fplendid actions, fhe calls not the student to a fervile imitation of her examples; for thus might he unintentionally be led to error and misconduct. No two men were ever precisely the fame in moral or intellectual qualities, or in fituations exactly fimilar; and therefore no one can with fafety conclude, that the fame conduct could in all refpects be prudent for him, which his predeceffor has followed. Expedients fpringing from our own minds are formed with more clearnefs, and executed with more fpirit, than those which are derived from the imitation of others. While the imitator is revolving the precedents of past times, and minutely examining them with reference to his own cafe, he may fuffer the favourable opportunity for action to escape him, and may be undone for ever;-or, fuppofing he fhould take any particular example for his guide, from a want of accurate difcrimination, he may betrayed into fome fatal error. The acute and the difcerning will not fail to combine originality of plan with the guidance of precedent; they will ' make every proper allowance for the various difpofitions and manners of the times; they will inftantly perceive where circumftances differ or agree; and will adopt only fo much of the example, as is applicable to the exigency of their own affairs.

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History rifes to the highest degree of importance, and attains the full dignity of its character,

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by fixing our attention upon the conduct of divine Providence in the moral government of the world. It is clear to every one, who takes the moft fuperficial view of the past, that great events have often been effected by trifling means; that the confequences of actions have been much more extensive, more fatal or calamitous, than were originally intended by the agents themselves; that the defigns of Providence have been brought about by the caprice of human tempers, or the violence of human paffions; and that craft, tyranny, and cruelty have rarely escaped their juft, though fometimes long delayed punishment. The refult of actions has been widely different from the end propofed by those who planned them; and great revolutions have been effected in direct oppofition to the projects of the perfons, who were the chief inftruments of them. Such extraordinary difcoveries draw us much nearer, and give us a much better infight into the operations of the Deity, than thofe occurrences, in which the caufes are more equal to the effects; as is the cafe with the common affairs of life. Thus hiftory becomes the handmaid of religion, and opens to us the moft wonderful profpects of the divine interpofition in the government of the world i.

Exclufive

I fubjoin the following remarkable inftance from Robertfon's Charles VIth, Book 10, C. 5. "It is a fingular circumstance, that the Reformation fhould be indebted for its full establishment in Germany, to the fame hand which had formerly brought it to the brink of destruction, and that both

Exclufive of the general ufes of hiftory, there is a particular application of it, which every one naturally makes to his own pursuits, his own age, and his own habits of thinking. The politician fearches the records of paft ages for the rife and fall of ftates, the measures which advanced their greatness, and the caufes which precipitated them into ruin. The foldier looks for military achievements, the conduct of generals, and the difcipline of armies. Caufe and effect engage the attention of the philofopher; and the man of fcience is interested by the defcription of the phenomena of nature. The antiquarian ftudies the ancient laws, cuftoms, and dreffes, and other peculiarities of nations. The man who is advanced in years, is gratified with remarking in the fame book those

events should be accomplished by the fame arts of diffimulation. The ends, however, which Maurice, the Elector of Saxony, had in view at thefe different junctures, feem to have been more attended to, than the means by which he attained them. It is no lefs worthy of obfervation, that the French King, a Monarch zealous for the Catholic Faith, should, at the very fame time when he was perfecuting his own protestant fubjects with all the fiercenefs of bigotry, employ his power in order to maintain and protect the Reformation in the Empire; and that the league for this purpose, which proved so fatal to the Romish Church, fhould be negociated and figned by a Roman Catholic Bishop. So wonderfully doth the wisdom of God fuperintend and regulate the caprice of human paffions, and render them fubfervient towards the accomplishment of his own purposes." In the preface to Sir W. Ralegh's History of the World, many fimilar examples are taken from the early part of the History of England.

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fentiments and actions, which he difregarded in his youth; and the habits of thinking, which he has formed at one particular period of life, induce him to fearch for different fources of entertainment and inftruction at another. Thus every perfon is influenced by his peculiar tafte: when he confults the volumes of hiftory, he difcovers fomething in them to fuit the complexion of his own mind; and, from a natural partiality to his own pursuits, may be inclined to think, that his favourite hiftorian wrote only for his use and entertainment.

Readers, however, of every age and defcription, may find in history ample materials for improving their judgment, by tracing the due connexion which fubfifts between caufes and effects. They ought not to be fatisfied with the recital of events alone, but endeavour to investigate the circumftances which combined either to produce, to haften, or to retard them; as well as the manner of their operation, and the degree of their influence.

In whatever abftrufeness the science of politics may be fuppofed to be involved, it is probable, that the motives which lead to the performance of many remarkable actions do not lie very deep in the human mind. The actions themselves may indeed dazzle by their fplendoúr, or furprize by their novelty; but ftill they might probably be the refult of no greater reach of capacity, than that which is exerted in the management of common concerns.

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