BARKER v. BURGESS. Master and servant. It is not a sufficient reason for dismissing a domestic servant without notice that she had, during the service, been married without the master's knowledge and consent. The plaintiff, a journeyman baker, sought to recover, in right of his wife, from the defendant, landlord of the Globe public-house, Great Titchfield-street, Marylebone, the sum of 30s. On the 5th of February last, plaintiff's wife, who was then single, entered the service of defendant, at the yearly wages of 181., which she received up to the 5th ult. On the 15th of the same month, she asked leave for two days' absence, which was granted; but she unexpectedly returned on the following evening, and in answer to her mistress as to how she had enjoyed herself, she replied "Very well, for she had got married." Mrs. Burgess exclaimed, “Got married! Oh, you wicked sinner, how could you do such a thing; pack up your clothes and go immediately." The plaintiff asked for her wages due, 15s., and boxes, both of which were refused; defendant said he should detain them till she paid him 158. for the loss of her services for the fortnight, which she was compelled to do in order to obtain possession of her property. His HONOUR did not see any reason why the plaintiff's wife should be deprived of her wages and money exacted from her because she had got married, and gave judgment for the amount claimed, with costs. BLOOMSBURY. Uncertificated attorneys. It having been intimated to Mr. Wright, the chief clerk of this court, that a number of persons were in the habit of practising in the court without being certificated, that gentleman apprized Mr. Heath of the circumstance, who at once directed an order to be issued to the effect, that no attorney's costs would be allowed upon taxation, unless his certificate of this year was produced. It appears that several practitioners have acted as advocates in this court, whose names are not upon the rolls; and one has had the chief practice in this court, without having taken out his certificate for the last three years. The attorneys who have paid the tax feel the above rule to be anything but stringent, as it does not prevent the defaulters practising. In connexion with this court, it may be as well to observe that the chief clerk, following the excellent example of The Daily News, now publishes a list of plaints over 5., and which are given gratuitously to members of the profession. CLERKENWELL. (Before Mr. Serjeant JONES.) STEVENS v. NELSON. Alleged fraudulent sale-Caveat emptor. Where scrip shares had been placed by defendant in plaintiff's hands, who bought them, supposing them to be shares in a different company: Held, that the rule of caveat emptor applied. This was an action to recover the sum of 197. 10s. paid by the plaintiff, who is a stock-broker, for some scrip shares which at the time of the purchase he supposed to be those of the Great Yarmouth Railway, but which he afterwards discovered to be shares in a project known as the Waveney Valley line, and which were not worth twopence. The plaintiff, on ascertaining that he was deceived, wrote to the defendant, returning the shares, and requested him to refund the cash. Defendant, in reply, stated that he was not in a position to pay back the money, and sent back the shares. The defendant's solicitor urged that it was a bona fide sale, and that it was the case of the biter bit, the shares in the Great Yarmouth line being worth at least 35 per cent.more than the amount paid. His HONOUR was of opinion that there had been no deception practised, the defendant having, before he received the money, placed in the plaintiff's hands that which he professed to sell; the plaintiff had therefore an opportunity of examining the scrip, and, from his occupation ought to have known the value of the article he purchased. Judgment for the defendant. HOLMES v. Moss. Practice-Costs-Action on a judgment. Where an action is brought in this court upon a judgment, in a Superior Court, this court will not allow costs to the plaintiff. The defendant in this case is an attorney. Hutchinson, of 51, Lincoln's Inn Fields, stated that the action was brought to recover the sum of 61. 98. 7d., balance of 1267. 58. 7d. In June, 1848, the plaintiff obtained judgment against the defendant, and issued execution, but upon the defendant executing a warrant of attorney undertaking to liquidate the debt and cost and interest, by instalments of 11. per week, he was released by the There was a balance of 5s. 7d. due upon the debt and costs, which, together with 67. 48. interest, at the rate of 4 per cent., which the defendant had admitted and promised to pay, was the sum now sought to be recovered. sheriff. His HONOUR gave judgment for the plaintiff, but refused costs on the ground that the action was brought upon a judgment obtained in one of the Superior Courts,-a practice which, in his Honour's opinion, ought not to be countenanced. The interest, moreover, was charged upon the costs as well as upon the debt, and the calculation was one of very great nicety, seeing that the debt was reduced upon the payment of each instalment. Hutchinson said the plaintiff could not avail himself of the judgment of the court above, as the sheriff could not calculate the amount due for interest; the plaintiff had therefore no other remedy than that of prosecuting his claim in the County Court. His Honour would observe that, independent of the interest, 58. 7d. was due upon the debt and costs of the original action. His HONOUR repeated his opinion that it was not a case in which he felt justified in allowing costs. HARVEY v. GODDARD. Evidence-Cost-book-Mining. Quære, can the cost-book of a mine be received in evidence without a stamp. This was an action to recover the sum of 351. balance of 50%. for the purchase of twenty-five shares in the Wheal Providence Mining Company. The plaintiff produced a book, in which was desposited the transfer of the shares. Wakeling objected to the document being read, on the ground that it was inadmissible, being an agreement without a stamp. In answer to Parry, the plaintiff said the shares had been transferred in the ordinary way, and that the practice which had been pursued by the Wheal Providence Company was the invariable mode adopted in Devon and Cornwall; no transfers were ever stamped. Wakeling still contended that the document could not be received in evidence, not being an entry in the book, but an agreement pasted therein. Parry submitted that under the Joint Stock Registration Act, transfers of this description were exempt from the payment of the stamp. He regretted, from the circumstances of his having been instructed only that morning while in court, that he had not an opportunity of referring to the act, nor was he prepared to furnish the court with any authority. His HONOUR regretted that, in this respect the court was not in a position to assist the learned counsel. Parry would take the liberty of suggesting, now that these courts were every day becoming more and more important, that it would materially assist counsel, who were frequently called upon at very short notice to appear in cases in which questions of great legal importance were involved, if the Treasury were to furnish each court with a respectable library. He thought that if gentlemen in the position of His Honour, Mr. Serjeant Storks, Treasury to that effect, it could hardly fail to meet with prompt and other learned judges, were to make a representation to the attention. His HONOUR seemed to despair of such a display of liberality from that quarter. The Treasury are eager to grasp all the money, but will part with none. Parry was unable to proceed with the case in consequence of the absence of the attesting witness to Mr. Goddard's signature. The learned counsel asked His Honour if he might be allowed to call the defendant. His HONOUR-Not when there is an attesting witness. I will adjourn the case for the attendance of the witness, or you may take a nonsuit; but in either case the plaintiff must pay the costs of the day. An adjournment was then agreed to. CUMBERLAND. Penrith, June 22, 1849. (Before T. HASTINGS INGHAM, Esq.) SHEPHERD V. LANCASTER AND CARLISLE RAILWAY COMPANY. Liabilities of carriers. A carrier is liable only for the safe custody of goods entrusted to him up to the period of their delivery to the consignee. Therefore, where a cask of treacle was sent to a grocer, and he requested the carrier's servant to place it in the cellar, and in doing so the cask broke and the contents were spilled: Held, that this being no part of the duty of the carrier, and the delivery being previously complete, he was not responsible for the loss so occasioned. Bleaymire for plaintiff. for defendant. This was an action against the company to recover the value of a portion of a hogshead of treacle, which it was alleged had been lost and injured by the negligent conduct of the company's servants. It appeared in evidence that the hogshead in question had been delivered at Liverpool to the London and North Western Company, to be conveyed to Penrith, The defendants would take the hogshead into their possession at Lancaster, and convey it to Penrith. At Penrith it was taken by a person with whom they contract for the delivery of all goods at that place. On the arrival of the hogshead at the plaintiff's shop-door, and before it was staged at the usual place for goods of this description, the plaintiff's shopman requested the carriers to assist to let it down into the cellar and produced a rope to be used for that purpose; in pursuance of this request, the carriers were engaged in placing the hogshead in a proper position for being let down into the cellar, it over-balanced and fell down the cellar entrance and burst, and a portion of the contents was lost. On behalf of the company it was proved they had duly given notice that they would not undertake or be responsible for the delivery of goods into cellars or warehouses, and Mr contended 1st, that the company were not liable for the acts of any party with whom they might contract for the delivery of goods; 2ndly, that there was no contract with the defendants for the carriage of the goods in question, but that the contract was with the London and North Western Copmpany; and, 3rdly, that the delivery was completed so far as the company were concerned, before the accident happened. His HONOUR, in giving judgment, said, the first point raised by the defendants had been settled in a recent case where the London and North Western Company were held liable for the value of a parcel which had been lost by Chaplin and Horne, the contractors for the delivery of the company's goods in London. On the 2nd point, I am of opinion that there was an acceptance of the goods by the defendants from the London and North Western Company, implying a contract; and, at all events, constituting them bailees for hire, and as such, responsible for any wrongful acts of their servants. On the third and main point, however, I think the defendants are entitled to a verdict: it is admitted by the plaintiff that he did not consider it to be the duty of the defendants to deposit the hogshead in his cellar, and that the carriers would have sufficiently discharged their duty, if they had securely deposited it at his shop door. Now, undoubtedly, so soon as goods have arrived at their proper destination, and are there deposited, and no further duty remains to be done by the carrier, his responsibility as such ceases, and in all cases of this sort the material consideration is, whether the owner of the goods has taken any possession of them, or has terminated the custody of the carrier by any act or direction which does not flow from the duty of the carrier. In the case before the court it is proved that when the carrier arrived with the goods, and was about to deposit them in the usual way, he was requested by the plaintiff's shopman to deal with them in a manner quite beyond his duty; he proceeds to act according to that request, and from that moment I am of opinion the transit of the goods was ended, and any more complete delivery was waived by the plaintiff, and he became himself constructively in possession of the goods; and that the acts which followed, and during the performance of which the loss occurred, were purely gratuitous and beyond the duty of the carrier; and if so, it falls within the settled principle of law that when a bailee, on request, undertakes to perform a gratuitous act from which the bailor is alone to receive benefit, there the bailee is only liable for gross negligence. In this case, the loss arose, as appears, from an accident; or, at all events, no evidence has been adduced to show that there was negligence; there will, therefore, be a verdict for the defendants. The com pany did not ask for costs. LANCASHIRE. Bolton, January 17, 1851. (Before W. A. HULTON, Esq.) SMITH V. FRANCE. Right of way. This was an action of trespass brought by the plaintiff against the defendant, both of whom are residents at Rumworth, near Bolton. It appeared that the plaintiff was the tenant of Henry Tempest, Esq., the owner of considerable property in Rumworth, and elsewhere in that neighbourhood, and had leased to the corporation of Bolton, the right to make reservoirs, conduits, &c., and to collect the water arising from the springs on the sands there; the corporation making compensation to certain mill-owners and others requiring water power, whose supplies had been materially affected. The land occupied by the plaintiff was in the shape of a lodge or dingle, through which a foot-path leading from hamlet to hamlet passed, and the same had been used as a public foot-path from time immemorial. It was admitted, arguendo, that the path had been used as a highway, and had by prescriptive right become common to the public. The corporation of Bolton had, under the powers of a local act of Parliament, intersected and made impassable the said highway by a lodge or reservoir which they had constructed for the purpose of supplying the owners of mills with water, in lieu of the streams which had been taken and diverted for the supply of the inhabitants of their borough, and by the 5th section of their act, the only words enabling them to enter on lands were expressed as lands and other places, in Rumworth. Gaskell, with him Richardson, contended on the authority of the King v. Tippett (3 Barn. & Adol. 193), that the prescriptive right of the public to this highway could not be destroyed by an act of Parliament, otherwise than by express words, and that the words above quoted were totally inadequate for such purpose. Winder, for the plaintiff, proved the defendant had, on the day alleged in the plaint, passed along the edge of the reservoir to a certain extent, and had also needlessly left it at an earlier period than he ought to have done, to regain the highway, and contended that the defendant had no right there at all, the act of Parliament having destroyed the highway, and clearly the defendant had no right to trespass on the land, merely at caprice his to regain the highway in question. Considerable interest was taken in the matter, and His Honour's judgment was looked for with anxiety by the vicar and churchwardens of Dean near Bolton, the highway being the only one leading from Chew Moor and other places to the church at the former place. His HONOUR now delivered judgment. The facts proved before me in this case are, that the plaintiff was in the occupation of certain closes of land adjoining to an ancient public highway in the parish of Deane, and that such highway has recently been intersected, and to a certain extent rendered impassable by a reservoir which has been formed under the authority of an act of Parliament. The act complained of was committed under the following circumstances. The defendant was passing along the old highway, and left it a considerable distance from the point where the reservoir intersects the highway. He crossed the plaintiff's field to the nearest corner of the reservoir; walked in a line parallel and near to the embankment of the reservoir; and left it at the other corner for the purpose of regaining the highway and proceeding to his destination. I consider that in doing so he committed a trespass, and therefore that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict. But as there are some special circumstances in the case, and as the action has probably been brought to obtain my opinion on the right of the public on the one hand, and of the occupier of the estate on the other, I think it proper to state my reasons for the conclusion I have arrived at. It was argued for the plaintiff that, by the construction of the reservoir under the act of Parliament, the right of the public to pass along the highway was virtually extinguished. I am of opinion that such is not the case. I find nothing in the act under which the reservoir was formed to that effect, and I consider that the prescriptive right of the public to pass along the highway was not taken away by that statute. This being so, and the ancient line of highway having been rendered impassable by the reservoir, the public have a right to pass over the adjoining land for the purpose of avoiding the obstruction and regaining the highway. This is clear law, established by a number of cases, stated by Mr. Justice Blackstone in his Com mentaries, and pointedly laid down by Lord Mansfield in Taylor v. Whitehead, Dougl. 720, where, after 'stating the law relating to private ways, his lordship continued:-" Highways are governed by a different principle. They are for the public service, and if the usual track is impassable, it is for the general good that people should be allowed to pass in another line." But this right must be exercised within reasonable limits, and as in this case the defendant did not pursue the ancient line so far as he reasonably might have done, but left it at a greater distance from the obstruction than there was occasion for him to do, I consider that in so doing he committed a trespass. Had he left the old highway and passed through the field as near as he reasonably could to the reservoir and embankment, I think he would only have done that which the law allowed him to do. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to a verdict, but under all the circumstances the damages will be nominal. NORTHAMPTONSHIRE. Northampton, December 11, 1850. (Before J. W. WING, Esq.) Damages 6d. Set-off-Jurisdiction-Debt above 501.-Set-off above 50l.—Costs, Where an action was brought for a balance of a sum above 50%.. the particulars showing an account of 2471., with admission of a set-off and payments reducing it to 341. 168. To which defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations, and also a set-off to a larger amount than the whole demand. Held, that the court had not jurisdidiction, the subject-matter in dispute exceeding 501. Held, also, that in a case in which the court has not jurisdiction, it has not authority to give costs to the defendant. This was an action for 347. 168., balance of a claim of 2821. 58., for goods sold and delivered. The particulars of the plaintiff's demand contained the items of a claim for the last-mentioned amount; the items of a cash account and set-off, admitted to be due to defendant, amounting to 2471. 9s. The defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations, and a set-off. The particulars of the set-off annexed contained items of payment and for goods (differing from the items set out in plaintiff's account,) amounting to 3871. 15s. 6d. (far exceeding plaintiff's claim.) Tennant for the plaintiff. Becke for the defendant. His HONOUR called on the defendant to state whether he admitted the debt. Becke stated that he denied the debt, as disclosed in plaintiff's particulars, but he objected to the jurisdiction of the court. By the plaintiff's particulars a balance of 347. 16s. was claimed, and plaintiff gave credit for goods alleged to be delivered by defendant amounting to 291. 10s., which with the above balance showed a debt of 641. 68., exclusive of payment. This brought the case within the rule laid down in Woodham v. Newnham and Beswick v. Capper. Tennant stated that he should be prepared to prove a settled account. His HONOUR.-Then you must prove that, in the first instance. Tennant called plaintiff, who swore that some weeks ago defendant told him that he knew he owed plaintiff between 341. and 351., and he might get it if he could. Becke. This is no evidence of an account stated. To give the court jurisdiction there must be an account proved to be stated with reference to the subject-matter of the action. Again, to support a count in a declaration for an account stated, there must be such an admission as would imply a promise to pay the amount. His HONOUR.-I am of opinion that nothing has been proved to give me jurisdiction, and the plaintiff must be nonsuited. If the plaintiff had proved an account stated and a balance due, as appears on his particulars, the result would have been different; but where the accounts extend over many years, such a loose and qualified admission as that sworn to by plaintiff is worthless. If the plaintiff had proved his case with reference to the amount annexed to his claim, a difficulty would have arisen, to which, in the course of the case, I drew Mr. Becke's attention, and I believe with him the point has not yet been decided, and would give rise to much discussion. The defendant's set-off consists of items, differing greatly from those contained in plaintiff's particulars as constituting defendant's claim. The defendant claims upwards of 50% for goods sold and delivered; these items are not admitted by plaintiff, therefore I should be called upon, in deciding on this plea of set-off, to adjudicate upon a claim exceeding 501. My opinion (as at present advised) is that I should not have jurisdiction to decide this. The point need not be decided now, but it may, perhaps, save trouble if I were to state the course I should feel disposed to pursue in such a case. I should give judgment for plaintiff, but suspend my order as to execution and as to costs until the defendant had had an opportunity of bringing an action in one of the Superior Courts for the amount of his set-off. The costs in this court would depend upon the result of that action. Plaintiff nonsuited. Becke stated that he felt a difficulty as to applying for costs. It appeared to him that if the court had no jurisdiction to try the case, it had no jurisdiction to give costs, and yet he had seen reports of several cases where the judges of other County Courts had given costs to defendants where plaintiffs had been nonsuited in consequence of objections for want of jurisdiction. The contrary had always been the practice in this court. His HONOUR-I cannot see that I have any power to make an order for costs, if I have no jurisdiction to try the case. No order as to costs. NOTTINGHAMSHIRE December 5, 1850. (Before J. H. WILDMAN, Esq.) CRAFTS v. HAWKRIDGE. Jurisdiction-Trover-Conversion. Trover may be maintained in the County Courts. Where the holder of an article has received notice from a party alleging himself to be the owner not to part with it, and afterwards, upon demand made by another person refuses to do so, such refusal is not a conversion. This was an action brought to recover a picture, value 31. On the hearing the following facts were proved, viz.: That on or about the 26th December, 1849, plaintiff bought a picture from his brother-in-law Harriman; that he paid 77. for it, took it home, and hung it up in his own house. Plaintiff afterwards tried to resell the picture, but not succeeding, he asked Harriman to look out for a customer, and the plaintiff sent the picture from his house at Basford, to a public-house in Nottingham. Shortly afterwards, in consequence of a communication made to Harriman, he went to defendant and offered him the picture, telling him at the same time that it belonged to Mr. Richard Crofts, of Basford. This was about October, 1850, and defendant requested Harriman by bring him the picture to look at. Harriman immediately went to the public-house and asked the landlord to allow him to take the painting for the plaintiff's inspection, and it was taken to the defendant's office, who told Harriman to leave it, and the price if he bought it was to be 81. Crafts, the plaintiff, afterwards called on defendant either for the picture or the value of it, but defendant said he had received a notice from the assignees of Harriman, who became bankrupt in April, 1850, not to part with the painting, and therefore he could not purchase it. A demand was again made by plaintiff, upon defendant, for the picture, but he refused to give it up for the before-mentioned reason. The defendant at the hearing brought the picture into court, and stated that he was ready to do whatever the court ordered. The judge then said that, although a demand of the picture was proved by the plaintiff and a refusal by the defendant to deliver it, still as the defendant had produced the picture in court, he could not hold that there was a conversion by the defendant, and he ordered the plaintiff to be nonsuited. The defendant then took away the picture without paying for it, and still retained it. At the next court day, 11th January, 1851, Parsons for the plaintiff, moved to set aside the nonsuit or for a new trial, and argued that the defendant had converted the property the instant he refused to deliver it to the plaintiff, and that the notice by Harriman's assignees, to the defendant, not to part with it, was not a sufficient justification for the defendant to keep it, and cited Roscoe, 7th edition, page 546, where it is expressly laid down, that a refusal on the ground of claim of right by another is evidence of conversion. Also, the case of Wansborough v. Maton, 4 Adolphus & Ellis, 884; Alexander v. Southey, 5 Barnwell & Alderson, 237; and a case in point decided by Mr. Justice Gould, cited in Laclough v. Towle, 3 Espinasse, 115; also the case of Skinner v. Lambert, 15 L. T. 244, deciding that where cows had been placed with defendant to agist, and a third person ordered him not to give them up, and on their being demanded by the plaintiff the defendant mentioned his orders, and said he could not give them up, but made no claim of any lien upon them, it was evidence of a conversion. Parsons then argued, that according to the decision of Mr. Wildman, Defendant did not appear in person, but sent his son. The plaintiff's solicitor said the amount due arose from debt and costs received by defendant in an action brought by plaintiff, and defendant, on being summoned, was ordered to pay by instalments, which he had wholly omitted to do. An offer was now made, and a complaint was also made of other proceedings having been taken in one of the Superior Courts, and there were many other cases against him. Plaintiff's attorney said that the only proceedings taken on the part of the plaintiff was a summons before one of the judges, calling on defendant to show whether he had any claim for costs so as to see whether he had any defence, but he had not tendered any; and, although there might be other cases, plaintiff was the only party who had been fortunate enough to serve defendant with a summons. Under these circumstances, a commitment was pressed. Defendant's son again begged for longer time. His HONOUR-This was just the case of all others in which the power of imprisonment ought to be enforced, and an order of commitment for one month would issue, with costs. SHOREDITCH. (Before Mr. Serjeant STORKS.) JONES v. WATSON. Friendly Society-Jurisdiction. The arbitrators of a burial society are not entitled to order the fund to be paid to the next of kin, instead of the widow, because they considered the latter to be an immoral character, and the money so paid may be recovered in this court. This was an action to recover the sum of 47. paid to the defendant 25 next-of-kin of a deceased member of an enrolled benefit society. The funeral expenses had been paid by the society, and an arbitration having taken place, it was decided, that the plaintiff, who is the widow of the deceased, was not entitled to the award, having lived in open adultery with another man. T. B. Hughes (counsel for the plaintiff) submitted that under the 23rd section of the 10 Geo. 4, c. 26, the plaintiff, as administratrix, had clearly a right of action against the defendant, who, notwithstanding the balance due from the society after payment of the funeral expenses had been awarded and paid over to her by the arbitrators behind the back of the plaintiff, had no legal claim whatsoever. His HONOUR said, that, looking at the act of Parliament under which the arbitrators had decided, he doubted very much the validity of the award. The question, however, was left open, unless the whole of the sum awarded had been appropriated to the funeral expenses. He could not help thinking that the award was a very singular one, and he adverted to it to show how careful the Legislature ought to be in placing such matters at the disposal of parties so totally unacquainted with the legal effects involved in matters which they were called upon to execute. The arbitrators gave the award to the next-of-kin. upon the ground that the wife had forfeited her claim in consequence of her having lived in adultery. They decided upon an ex parte statement, and had given away all the husband's money. Such a proceeding was most illegal, and to say the least of it, was most extraordinary. They had no more right to investigate the moral character of the wife, than they ad to inquire into her temper; nor had they any more right to condemn the wife as an adultress, then they had to try the moral character of the next-of-kin. It was clear that, under the 23rd section of the statute, which had been referred to, the society was indemnified; but he was of opinion, that the party to whom the award was paid was liable for the balance of such award. The whole of the money belonged to the widow; and that being so, she was entitled to the balance sought to be recovered. Judgment accordingly. January 18, 1851. TODD AND ANOTHER v. JILKES. Unfounded complaint against a Bailiff. In this case a summons was taken out against the defendant, by a person the name of Newman, who is secretary to a loan society in which the plaintiffs are shareholders. The summons was addressed to 9, Harris-place, Hackney Road, and the officer who had the serving of the process, finding there was no such place, returned the summons as not served. Upon the application of Newman, a re-issue was granted gratuitously, and the address was amended. On the fresh instruction paper the following remarks were appended:-"The public are not to be defrauded out of their fees.The former summons was an attempted robbery by the summoning officer." The high-bailiff said he had thought it proper to bring the matter before his Honour, the charge of the officer being of so serious a nature that it was impossible to allow it to pass unnoticed. His HONOUR, having read the remarks on the plaint note, observed, that it was most disgraceful to accuse an officer in such terms, and make so serious a charge against his character in such a manner. He would willingly go into the inquiry, and if it was proved to his satisfaction that there was any foundation for such a charge, he would take care that the accused should not have another opportunity of so conducting himself. His Honour, handing the paper to Newman, asked him, if the remarks were in his handwriting. He admitted they were, but said he had written them in the heat of passion. Acot (the officer against whom the charge was made), stated that the party for whom the summons was intended resided at No. 9, Harris's-place, White Bear Gardens, Kingsland-road, a totally different neighbourhood from that which he had in the first instance been directed to. His HONOUR observed, that the charge against the officer was as disgraceful, as it was unfounded, and advised the party who made it to be more guarded for the future. January 23, 1851. WINTER V. THE VINTNERS' COMPANY. Master and servant. Liability of masters for goods delivered by their servants. This was an action to recover the sum of 5l. 17s. 6d. the value of twelve gallons and a half of sherry, which had escaped from a cask in consequence of the alleged negligence and carelessness of the company's servants. Evidence was adduced of the cask being in a perfect state when it left the docks, and that there was no appearance of a leakage when it arrived at the plaintiff's cellar. Mr. Winter, jun., and another witness, deposed that the vintners were "in an advanced state of intoxication;" but the witnesses did not observe any accident or injury done to the cask during its removal by the men from the cart to the cellar. The leakage was not discovered until the sixth day, which was accounted for in consequence of being at the back of the cask. Norton submitted that there was presumptive evidence of the injury having arisen through the carelessness of the company's servants. His HONOUR-You must prove a gross and positive negligence. A leakage might arise from some imperfection in the mechanical structure of the cask, or from a variety of causes over which the company could have no control. The grand feature of the case appears to be that the vintners' men were drunk; but it must be shown, in addition to that, that the leakage was the result of their negligence. Some men in that state are particularly cautious, and act with a vigour that is truly marvellous. Drunkenness is to be abhorred, but I cannot overset justice on that account. It is not sufficient to prove the leakage alone, you must prove that there was gross negligence. Norton being unable to carry the case further, the plaintiff was nonsuited with costs. WESTMORLAND. Kirby Lonsdale, June 20, 1849. (Before T. HASTINGS INGHAM, Esq.) PRESTON V. COATES. Hounding of sheep. Pearson for plaintiff. Defendant made default. This was an action brought to recover 21. for damages sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the defendant hounding plaintiff's sheep on Ingleton Fell. It appeared that plaintiff and defendant were both farmers, having a right of common on the Fell, and that on the 25th of May the defendant was seen by three witnesses to hound plaintiff's sheep off a part of the common, and drive his own on. No defence was offered, and His HONOUR, in delivering judgment, observed, that similar cases were continually brought before him in an adjoining county. The practice seemed to be for farmers, on finding their neighbours' sheep on good pasturage, to hound them off, and drive their own upon the sound land. Such a practice was illegal, and by doing so, the party rendered himself liable to an action. In this case. the defendant had not appeared, and on the evidence adduced, there could be no doubt the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict for 21. TAYLFORTH V. PARRINGTON. Judgment-Costs. In an action on a judgment in Superior Court, plaintiff can only recover the amount inserted in the judgment, and is not entitled to costs of a fi. fa. issued but not executed. This was an action to recover 137. on a judgment from the Exchequer of Pleas. A considerable portion of the claim was for costs of fi. fa. issued but not executed. His HONOUR said he could not give the plaintiff a verdict for any sum beyond the amount set forth in the judgment. There would, therefore, be a verdict for the plaintiff for 91. 1s. 1d. -- Assault on a high bailiff. Thomas Bouskill, of Wray, near this place, yeoman, and Agnes Brown, of the same place, appeared at the court to answer the complaint of the High Bailiff, for having violently assaulted him whilst in the execution of his duty. Mr. John Tennant, the High Bailiff, deposed on oath that on the 4th day of June instant, he went to Wray to levy an execution, issued from this court against the goods of the defendant, Brown's, husband. The defendant Bouskill was the landlord. After gaining admission and seizing the goods, the defendant Bouskill came to the house; expressed his determination to prevent him levying, and violently assaulted him; the defendant Brown also struck him. Bouskill despatched a messenger for his two sons, and in conse quence of the excitement of the neighbours, he thought it prudent to retire and make the best of his way home. Pearson appeared for the defendants, and expressed their deep contrition for the assault; and pleaded in extenuation of Bouskill's guilt, that he considered the bailiff had no right to distrain until the rent was paid. Bouskill was a most respectable yeoman and much regretted the course he had pursued. His HONOUR said, that Bouskill's conduct was much more culpable than Brown's, and his position was anything but a defence for the assault; he ought in fact to be more severely punished on that account. As this was the first case brought before him, he felt disposed to be lenient, and should fine Bouskill 17. and Brown 10s., but in future, if the officers of the court were assaulted in the execution of their duties, he should inflict the full penalty, 51. WHITECHAPEL. Inattention of the authorities to the health of the Judge, and all whom business compels to attend this court. In the Whitechapel County Court, on Tuesday, January 21st, in the midst of a heavy cause, the Baroness von Zandt v. Williams, the learned judge complained of the oppressive heat, and directed the officers to open the windows. Riley, the chief clerk, pointed out to His Honour the impracticability of carrying out his desire, inasmuch as there were no pullies, ventilators, or any means to admit a fresh current of air. Mr. Serjeant MANNING.-Then officers break the windows, for I am determined not to sacrifice my health to the miserable parsi mony of those who care no more for our constitutions than they do for their reputation. The order of His Honour was not instantly carried out, when with pardonable warmth, for the place was actually unbearable, the learned judge said he would adjourn the court, and not sit until some alteration was effected, for the lives of all who came into the place were endangered. There being at this time a great number of cases to dispose of, the attornies and suitors loudly declaimed at the delay by adjournment, Mr. Phillpotts, solicitor, of John-street, Bedford-row, observing that he had for some time felt a depression from the confined atmosphere, of an indescribable nature, and suggested some other apartment to hear the plaints. The Learned JUDGE said that no one could feel more than he did for the inconvenience which professional gentleman, suitors and witnesses, must experience by an adjournment and the only remedy he could direct for the intolerable evil, would be for him to hold his court in his private room, where the parties in one cause only could be present. His Honour accordingly adjourned to his own room, and thereby made a court of justice, which, but for the courteous invitation to the reporters to be present, would at once constitute a Star Chamber. It appears that the hot air flues are so constructed in this court, that when once heated there is no apparatus for damping or staying their blasts. The court has been suffered to fall into decay, and to get into Chancery, for although used by the Middlesex Magistrates almost as much as by the County Court authorities, it seems that no person is authorized to expend a farthing in affording actual necessaries for the health, convenience, or business of parties connected therewith. The audience called together in this court by no means improve the atmosphere, and it is to be desired that some measures be speedily taken to alleviate the evil, and spare the learned judge the carrying out of an arrangement justifiable but still condemnatory. YORKSHIRE. Doncaster, January 14, 1851. This court will not grant protection to an insolvent whose object it On cross-examination, the insolvent stated that his difficulties began about two months ago; that he was sued by three creditors in the County Court, which caused him to apply to the Insolvent Court; that he had offered a dividend of 7s. in the pound, but his creditors refused it; that he had paid his attorney 10.; the excepted articles amounted to 201; his book debts were 8l. 138. 84d.; he had paid into court, for the benefit of his creditors, 4l. 9s. 6d.; and the amount he owed was 597. 11s. 10дd. Smith. The court will not protect a person whose object it is to defeat County Court judgments. All the insolvency commissioners have decided that, whenever the purpose of the petition is to avoid a County Court judgment, they will withhold protection: (Cayton's case, 1 C. C. Chron. 144; Cooper's case, id. 144; Ball's case, id. 145; Keene's case, id. 185; Browne's case, id. 185; Rimlin's case, id. 186; Symon's case, I Cox & Macrae, 24; Dain's case, id. 25.) Moreover, the earliest debt in the schedule appears to have been contracted in the year 1845; the balance-sheet ought, therefore, to have gone back to that date, and given a full account from that period; whereas the account is only commenced with the year 1849. The court will investigate all the facts appearing upon the schedule, in order to see if the insolvent is a person entitled to the benefit of the Protection Statutes. In Finche's case (2 C. C. Chron. 176), Mr. Commissioner Law said, "that the court was not confined to any particular ground of opposition, but must form its judgment from all the circumstances of the case." The same doctrine was held by the Chief Commissioner in Watson's case (3 C. C. Chron. 36.) And in Dain's case (1 Cox & Macrae, 25), the same cemmissioner said that "every case must depend upon its own circumstances; an insolvent's position in life, his conduct, and every feature of his case should be fully known; and if he found that an insolvent wished to avail himself of the Protection Statutes for the purpose of not paying anything when he could pay something, he should not have the benefit of the act of Parliament." The facts of the present case showed that the insolvent was not a person entitled to indulgence. He owed only 50% or 60%.; he had |