days' notice to the opposing creditor and his attorney, and by advertisement in The Times, was ordered to be given. On the 17th June, 1851, his application under the 28th section was enlarged generally, and on the 16th July the application under the 28th section was further enlarged generally. In May last the insolvent was arrested and committed to prison at the suit of Sims Reeves, who had obtained a judgment against him for services rendered. He then applied to the Chief Commissioner and obtained permission to file a petition under the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, and in his schedule he inserted not only his new debts, but the old debt of Russell, who had, prior to his petition under the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, successfully opposed an application by the insolvent for a protecting order under the 28th section of 7 & 8 Vict. c. 96. The insolvent to-day came up for his hearing, being opposed by

Sargood, for Russell, upon the ground that it was an application to get rid of an adverse judgment under the ·Protection Acts, and supported by

Cooke, who contended that leave having been given to file the new petition, he was bound to insert the old debts in the schedule.

Mr. Commissioner Law intimated that the two cases were distinct, and he would not touch the present schedule until his old debts (in respect of which an adverse judgment was now pending) were struck out. He would deal separately with the other matter under the 1 & 2 Vict. that was now before him.

The learned Commissioner said, I cannot adjudicate in this matter, so long as the insolvent by his counsel, insists upon retaining the creditors of a prior insolvency in the list of those against whom he is seeking the assistance of the court. It is urged, that he is bound to make the list a true list of all persons to whom there are unpaid debts; and that, therefore, it must include the creditors of prior insolvencies. This is a mistake. It is not even necessary, in noticing such prior insolvencies, to encumber the schedule with the names of creditors who belonged to them, and who are to be found in our past records. The scheduled list is to be a list of those who are parties to the insolvent's present suit in this court. Those former creditors are not parties to this suit. They have no concern in it. The rights and duties between them and the insolvent are not to be adjusted nor meddled with under this insolvency. He sought his advantages against them in a former suit; he seeks none in this. They took his property under a prior insolvency; and have no interest in any which may ever come to be administered under this. It would be absurd that their debts should swell the amount for which he is to execute the warrant of attorney. On the other hand, if, hereafter, he should be wrongfully sued by such parties, he must insist on the protection which he earned by his former insolvency. This court, or any other court would be imposed upon, if, by the insertion of their names in the list now before me, it should be led to protect his rights, as if acquired under this insolvency. The law is sufficiently perplexed by the new protection system, without introducing further confusion by blending one insolvency with another. I have before insisted, that creditors under one, cannot, for the same debt, be creditors under another. This was where a protection insolvency came after a prison insolvency. Here the protection insolvency preceded, and we are now on a petition under 1 & 2 Vict. The notion that the law requires the insertion of "all creditors," in the largest possible sense of the term, is essentially the same notion that would introduce the creditors of a former insolvency as helping to compose the 3007. owing by a trader, when he comes for protection. I say, as before, that the notion is perverse. If the universality of the term "all creditors," is to embarrass us, let it embarrass us always throughout the act. It must then control us as to the opposition at a hearing,

this

and in the adjudication made on the merits of that opposition. The result will be, that a man who suffered for two years on account of fraud in his first insolvency, will be liable to two years more for the same fraud under his second insolvency; and the same again, if he should ever incur a third; the period in each case running from the date of the then present petition. This monstrous consequence must be maintained by those whose whole argument has hitherto been, "a debt is a debt," and "a creditor is a creditor." The only peculiarity in this case of Henry Smith is, that the former insolvency has not yet arrived at a protecting order, the case being under adjournment sine die. This does not release the case from the principle which has been laid down, namely, that the rights of the parties are to be adjusted only under the insolvency to which they belong. The prior insolvency concerned all creditors who were so at the time when it was petitioned for. This insolvency concerns those who became creditors since that time. No incidents of either insolvency can set aside this essential distinction. Nothing can give the new creditors a right to share with those of the prior list. In the summer of year, a creditor on the prior insolvency arrested this party; and he was soon after detained at the suit of a new creditor, for he had contracted debts since his former petition. It is this last detainer which alone qualifies him to file the present petition; and I am ready to deal with the merits of it. But in so doing I will not touch the merits of the former case. On those merits I will hear neither party. I listen to the objection of him who says that he is not to be brought before the court again by reason of this new proceeding. This attempt is perhaps made in the notion that I may require the creditor who before substantiated his case, to prove the same matter of opposition again under this new petition, and in the hope that he may be tired out and fail to do it. This, indeed, must be the object; for if he should come and make his proof, no advantage would accrue to the insolvent; the adjudication would be unfavourable to him. There might, however, be this absurd incident: that if this court should issue its warrant to discharge after two years under the present insolvency, the Queen's Bench, or other committing court, would have to issue its warrant to discharge from the same detainer at the end of one year, under the first insolvency. It has been said that, as the former case still stands adjourned sine die, I may adjudicate in the present petition between the insolvent and the prior creditors, as we do where a case is adjourned sine die in bankruptcy. The cases are very different. In that case there is no new failure or insolvency; and, therefore, no offence to the principle of keeping distinct an earlier and a later insolvency. If a man is already before the Court of Bankruptcy, where his liberty can be dealt with, as well as his property, we do not think it right to anticipate the decision of that court by entertaining his petition for liberty, which alone we can deal with while the bankruptcy stands. But, when that court has refused to give any judgment at all, by adjourning the examination sine die, we often hear and adjudicate on the merits; and for this reason, that a man is not to be imprisoned for life. Whatever be the fitness of this practice, any question upon it wants analogy to the question in this case. There the question would concern a conflict of administrations in regard of one and the same insolvency; one property to be surrendered; one list of creditors. It would not concern two successive failures, the latter showing new property and new creditors. Moreover, the ground which indicates our proceeding in the petition of one who is adjourned sine die as a bankrupt, does not exist in a case which has been adjourned sine die under the Protection Law. man is not left to be imprisoned for life. As to any existing detainer, it cannot last more than a year; at the end of that time, the court which committed must dis

A

charge. As to the liability to arrest by the others, this too is not perpetual, although the term sine die must be employed. By the provisions of the Protection Statutes, this court is not to pronounce a judicial sentence, saying when a man shall have his liberty, or why it is delayed. Where there has been misconduct, we are simply to abstain from judgment. We are required, however, notwithstanding that misconduct, to entertain the question again, having a discretion, by hearings from time to time, to decide when the continuing risk of imprisonment may be relieved. If a commissioner here, on a case fully heard, should pronounce on the ground of past misconduct, that, notwithstanding imprisonment, it shall remain adjourned for ever, and that he will never listen to an application under the 28th section, the danger of perpetual imprisonment would then arise. But the remedy would be, not in filing a fresh petition under the other statute, and claiming to merge one insolvency in another. It would be in an application for mandamus. So long as the schedule before me is framed to blend the two insolvencies of this party as it does now, I cannot swear him to the truth of it, nor proceed to adjudication.

The learned Commissioner made the following indorsement on the schedule" On hearing the insolvent by his counsel, who claims an adjudication in respect of the creditors under the former insolvency, as well as in respect of new creditors. This I refuse to give." Adjourned generally.

The insolvent went back to prison. NOTE. This decision is in accordance with that of Re James Wood, by the Chief Commissioner and Mr. Commissioner Harris, 2 C. C. Chron. 321, 14 L. T. 2.

COUNTY COURTS.

BERKSHIRE.
Reading.

(Before J. B. PARRY, Esq.)

PARKER v. Great WESTERN RAILWAY.

Carriers-Railways.

A railway company is liable for damage done to goods by delay in the delivery beyond the time announced.

And this, although a notice is posted at the stations to the effect that the company will not hold itself responsible for any delay. The plaintiff in the case was Mr. Parker, general carrier, &c.; defendants were the Great Western Railway Company.

Mr. Parker said that the action was brought to recover the sum of 61. 6s., and that there was a large number of cases depending upon its decision. The plaintiff's case was that on the 3rd of September, and on the 19th of September, he despatched a quantity of meat by the trains which should reach London at two o'clock, whereas the train on each occasion was five and six hours late, causing the meat to spoil, and arriving too late for the market. No doubt the defendants would rest their defence mainly on a notice given, and which he would admit. That notice ran thus: they will not, under any circumstances, be liable for goods should any claim arise from delay, detention, or any other cause." He contended that the notice was an illegal one; that meat was paid for at a higher rate than thirty-five other articles, and that circumstance should be a reason in favour of its safe delivery. He concluded by saying that the company should be liable if they did not use due diligence in the arrival of the train.

That

Isaac Machin was the first witness called, who proved that on the 3rd of September he received several hampers of meat for butchers in London to sell in the Newgate-market, which he delivered at the company's offices by five o'clock in the evening, being in good time for the train. On the 11th of September he also packed off several hampers of meat in good time for the train which should arrive in London at two o'clock in the morning.

Henry Munday, foreman to Mr. Parker, at the Paddington station, proved that on the days in question the trains were respectively five and six hours late, thereby causing the meat to be materially damaged.

Slocombe, on behalf of the company, called the two guards of the

respective trains to prove that every diligence was exercised to get the trains at Paddington at the proper time; but owing to the immense weight they had to convey, it was impossible to arrive at proper time.

the

six hours late, and that by that delay any goods were injured, the His HONOUR said he was of opinion that if a train was five or company were liable. It was no argument in their favour to say that the train was so heavy that it could not proceed quickly. Putting a greater quantity of luggage in the carriages than could be conveyed, was tantamount to putting clogs on the wheels to prevent the carriages travelling at their usual speed.

Slocombe said that if the goods had not been attached to the train at the various stations they must have been left behind. His HONOUR said that in that case they must have more trains or else reduce their traffic, He should give a verdict for the plaintiff for the amount sought.

hundreds more of a similar nature.

Mr. Parker intimated that this case was only the forerunner of

CLERKENWELL COUNTY COURT.
(Before Mr. Serjeant JONES.)
POPHAM V. Greenwood.
Contempt-False subpœna.

The court will inflict a heavy fine, with order for immediate payment, upon a person who had imposed a forged subpæna upon an ignorant witness.

This was an action brought by Mr. William Home Popham, of Tunbridge-place, and Skinner-street, New-road, St. Pancras, one of the surgeons employed by the parish of St. Pancras, against Mr. William Greenwood, the landlord of the Northumberland Arms, Bagnigge-wells-road, to recover the sum of 197. 10s., for medical attendance, &c.

Crouch, barrister, appeared for the plaintiff.
Wakeling, sen., for the defendant.

Crouch, in opening the case, said that Mr. Popham was known as one of the doctors of the parish; the defendant was a highly respectable licensed victualler, and the proprietor of an old-established public-house, and many other houses, in St. Pancras, some of which were occupied by poor persons. In October, 1850, the plaintiff received letters from Mr. Greenwood, requiring his medical aid for four persons, two of whom were his tenants. In consequence of these letters Mr. Popham attended the parties, and he now sought to recover the amount due for his services to them.

Mr. Popham was sworn, and gave evidence in support of the learned counsel's statement, who put the letters into his hand, and asked whether they were Mr. Greenwood's handwriting? - Mr. Popham believed they were, but could not say positively.

who swore that he believed the letters were in the handwriting of Crouch then called Mr. M'Gahey, late vestry clerk of St. Pancras, Mr. Greenwood.

Cross-examined by Mr. Wakeling: He had received letters from Mr. Greenwood when he was vestry clerk of St. Pancras, with reference to the roads. He knew there were more Greenwoods than one in the Bagnigge-wells-road, and they were housekeepers. Did not know which of them wrote the letters. Only thought they were written by Mr. Greenwood, the defendant. Never saw any of them write.

Crouch then called a relieving officer of St. Pancras, who swore that he believed the letters to be in the handwriting of Mr. Greenwood. He never saw Mr. Greewood write.

Wakeling.-Pray what brought you here? Witness. I was asked to come; I was served with a subpoena (producing a paper from his pocket.)

Wakeling asked to see it; and on perusing it said, "Why this is a copy subpoena purporting to be issued from the Crown-office, bearing the test of the Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Queen's Bench." Who gave you this?

Witness. It was left at my house, and I thought I was obliged to attend.

Wakeling.-Look at it. Do you know whose writing it is?After considerable hesitation he said it was like Mr. M'Gahey's handwriting.

The JUDGE.-Mr. M'Gahey must know his own handwriting. He is in court. Let him stand up.

Mr. M'Gahey then entered the witness-box, and the paper was handed to him.

JUDGE. Do you know anything of that paper?

Mr. M'Gahev.-I would rather not answer that question.
JUDGE.-
you decline answering it?

Mr. M'Gahey.—I would rather not answer.
JUDGE. Did you write it?

Mr. M'Gahey. I must decline answering.
JUDGE-I ask you again, do you know that paper, and I require
you to say whether you know anything of that paper or not?
Mr. M'Gahey. I must decline answering.
JUDGE-I ask you again, did you write it?

Mr. M'Gahey.-I would rather not answer.

JUDGE-Then I must fine you under the act of Parliament. You are fined 107., under the act 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, and I order you to pay forth with.

Mr. M'Galey.-I was not aware your Honour could fine me 10%.; will your Honour allow me to reconsider whether I should answer the question?

JUDGE.-No; I cannot allow the time of the court to be wasted any longer. I have asked you a great many times to answer the question, and you refused to do so. I will impound this document, in order that Mr. Wakeling may have an opportunity of moving the Court of Queen's Bench for an attachment against the parties next

term.

After further investigation, to show that the plaintiff attended the parties as paupers,

His HONOUR said he could not see how they could clear up the case. A note was put in, which was no more than what any person of influence in the parish would write for a person without the means of assistance. Mr. Greenwood appeared to be of some influence in the parish, and he wrote to the parish doctor of the district, as he should have done, to assist the sick poor. These courts were for the purpose of administering justice to the poor. A forgery and concoction of an instrument takes place, supposed to issue under the hands of the Lord Chief Justice of England. Whether he is vestry-clerk or not, it is clear that that instrument came from his (M-Gahey's) hands; and when poor persons were brought here, frightened to come under feigned process threatening them with a penalty of 100., I think, when such a case comes before a court of justice, I should not be doing my duty if I did not inflict a heavy penalty, and I should hold myself unworthy of sitting here if I did not carry it out to its fullest extent, and I hope Mr. Wakeling will carry it out too. Wakeling applied for costs, which his Honour granted.

DERBYSHIRE.

Bakewell, October 16, 1851.

(Before J. T. CANTRELL, Esq.)

CRITCHLOW v. GLOVER.

Money paid.

Where the servant of a carrier paid the amount of carriage of a parcel to his employers on account of the person to whom it was addressed, who was unable to pay it to him at the time of delivery: Held, that he could not recover it from such person without an express promise to repay the same.

Plaintiff sued for 78. 10d. the amount paid by him for defendant four years ago, for the carriage by coach of a hamper of fish or game for defendant, delivered near Bakewell, but which defendant promised to pay at a future time, but neglected doing so.

Plaintiff was a servant under the coach proprietors, and on showing this 7s. 10d. in his accounts they refused to pay plaintiff the amount, alleging he should not have trusted defendant, but retained possession of the articles, &c. Plaintiff, therefore, now

sought to recover the amount from defendant. Defendant contended he did not owe Critchlow the amount, and produced a letter from Greaves one of the coach proprietors, showing plaintiff not to be in their employ.

His HONOUR said he must nonsuit the plaintiff as he could not sue for the amount paid by him for the defendant, unless he had previously had defendant's authority to pay the amount to the coach proprietors for him, the defendant being the person to whom the parcel was addressed. Plaintiff nonsuited.

Wirksworth, October 15, 1851.
(Before J. T. CANTRELL, Esq.)
SANDILAND, Clerk, v. Walters.
Distress.

An overcharge made for impounding cattle can be recovered back by action in the County Court.

Plaintiff sued defendant in tort for recovery of 4s. for an overcharge made by defendant (as common pounder at Wensley, Derbyshire) from plaintiff for impounding several cows which were found

trespassing on plaintiff's neighbour's land, and for which the defendant had received 4s. before liberating such cattle from the common pound.

Plaintiff contended that the charge was unreasonable.

Defendant on the other hand asserted that he charged 1s. per head, being the proper amount according to custom in that part of the county, and according to his instructions at the time of his appointment.

His HONOUR informed defendant that "custom" would not answer his purpose on that occasion, and under so old a statute as 1 & 2 Phil. & M. c. 12, s. 2, which still remained as law, any person making such charges as he had done in his situation, was liable to a penalty of 51. for receiving or taking more than 4d. for one distress, no matter whether there were 100 head of cattle, or only one at the time; he could not charge 4d. per head, but only that amount for the whole distress, and made an order for repayment of 3s. 8d. and costs to plaintiff.

Insolvent-Liabi'ity in respect of debts omitted from schedule. An insolvent after obtaining his final order is liable for any debt omitted from the schedule.

Quare, where a debt is not entered in the schedule at exactly the proper amount, can the court amend after final order under the 78 Vict. c. 96, s. 30?

The plaintiffs were brewers at Southsea, and defendant a retailer there. In December last, defendant obtained his final order, and in his schedule had entered the plaintiffs as creditors for 107. only instead of 201. 68., the actual amount due at the date of the petition, and the plaintiffs now sued for 107. 6s. the difference between the

amount as entered in the schedule and the actual amount of thedebt. It was alleged that plaintiffs were present at the hearing and opposed.

His HONOUR said that if that was clear he should have held them concluded thereby, but as it was he felt bound to make an order for the amount proved to be due, 8l. 10s., but without costs.

SOUTHWARK COUNTY COURT.
September 29, 1851.

(Before GEORGE CLIVE, Esq.),

MATTHEWS v. DODWELL.
Liabilities of beer shop keepers, fc.

Held, that the liabilities of innkeepers towards their guests do not extend to the lodgers of beer shop keepers.

This was an action, by a weekly lodger, to recover from his landlord the value of property alleged to have been stolen from him while asleep.

The plaintiff, Thomas Matthews, was a mechanic, and the defenThe action was to recover 14-being the contents of a leathern dant, Mr. Dodwell, keeper of a beer-shop in the Cornwall-road. purse, 16s. 6d., and the value of a waistcoat and kerchief. The plaintiff had agreed to take a bed at 2s. per week, and he slept in the house thirteen weeks, when, upon Monday evening, July 21, a man unknown to him was allowed to sleep in another bed in the

same room.

When he awoke in the morning he found his leathern purse upon the top of his bed, but all the silver it contained, 16s. 6d. was gone. His waistcoat and kerchief had also disappeared. There were, altogether, three beds in the room he occupied, one of which was taken by another lodger. The stranger lodger, who occupied the third bed, had disappeared. The plaintiff complained that proper fastenings were not provided to the outer door, and that it was not locked. The thief had, therefore, every chance of escaping detection.

Teague, attorney, of Crown court, Cheapside, submitted that upon this state of things the defendant was liable in law. His-Honour might recollect a late case in which a landlord was found liable to pay a guest the value of a gold watch which he had laidupon his bed-room table upon retiring to rest and missed in the morning.

His HONOUR said he was aware of the liability of innkeepers, but did he know any case in which the same principles had beer applied to beer-shop-keepers?

Teague said he did not know of any case of that description, but submitted that the same principles should apply.

His HONOUR was understood to observe that he thought that in some late cases the principle of the liability of landlords for property lost or stolen from their guests had been carried to the utmost limits, and he certainly did not feel inclined to extend these principles to beer-shop keepers, unless compelled by some express decision upon the point.

The defendant said that the plaintiff had been drinking, and the man who had slept in the other bed had come to him and said that his sister had come up to see the Exhibition, and he had given up his bed to her for the night, and that was the reason he came to his house. He believed him to be a respectable man.

His HONOUR intimated that he did not know of any decision rendering beer-shop keepers liable if the property of their guests was lost or stolen, and would give the plaintiff's attorney time to produce a case upon the point, if he could.

Adjourned for that purpose.

To-day, Teague intimated that he could not find any cases in the books expressly authorizing the extension of the principles of law regulating the relations between an innkeeper and his guests to beer-shop keepers; but he could see no difference between them.

His HONOUR thought that, in the absence of any express decision, he was not justified in extending the liabilities of innkeepers and tavernkeepers to a new branch of trade. The plaintiff had his purse in his own pocket, and put it under his pillow. He had not given it into the custody of the landlord, and, therefore, it must be considered to have been in his own custody. He should, therefore, direct a verdict to be entered for the defendant.

Verdict for the defendant.

MAIN v. DOUBleday. Practice-Particulars.

The summons stated that defendant was summoned to answer to a "claim, the particulars of which are hereunto annexed." The particulars annexed consisted of a coachmaker's bill for repairs of a carriage. It appeared from the statement of plaintiff's attorney that the action was intended to be for damages done by defendant's servants to the plaintiff's carriage by negligent driving.

Held, that the summons and particulars were an insufficient statement of the cause of action.

This was an action on the case for damage done to the plaintiff's carriage by the defendant's servant, who drove against and injured the same. Before the jury were sworn,

Clarke, for the defendant, wished to inquire of the plaintiff's counsel (Dawson) what the action really was for, because the summons merely stated the defendant was summoned to answer the plaintiff " to a claim the particulars of which are hereunto annexed." Now the only particulars annexed was a copy of a coachmaker's bill made out by the coachmaker to the plaintiff. What did it all mean?

Dawson. It is an action on the case for having driven against the plaintiff's carriage and broken the same, and for damages in respect thereof.

Here his HONOUR asked for the summons and particulars of demand; and after looking at them attentively said, there is certainly nothing connected with the summons to inform the defendant what he is summoned here to answer, although I have no doubt he is perfectly well aware of the case.

Dawson.-Your Honour has power to amend under the new

rules.

Clarke. I doubt that. The power given to amend must be consistent with the act of Parliament. The new rules are for the purpose of amending and extending in accordance with the letter and spirit of the statute, but where the aid of the new rules was sought to repeal a provision of the act, it could not be strained into effect.

Dawson contended that the particulars were sufficient; the summons stated that the plaintiff had a claim against the defendant, and the annexed coachmaker's bill formed the particulars of that claim.

Clarke said if this proceeding were allowed a man might be summoned apparently for one kind of action, and when he appeared, would find it a totally different affair; here there was no contract for a coachmaker's bill, or for money paid to any coachmaker, or for goods sold or materials provided by the coachmaker, in fact, the defendant did not know the plaintiff's coachmaker from Adam, and was no party to any contract between them; even the commonest summons from a Police Court stated explicitly the grievance for

which the defendant was summoned to answer; it would have been just as easy for the plaintiff to have stated what the action was for, as to have written a copy of the coachmaker's bill.

His HONOUR then referred to the act of Parliament and the new rules, and said he certainly thought a line should be drawn somewhere, and although the forms of pleading had been in a great measure abolished in the County Court, yet he thought some reasonable form was still necessary. Here there was not the slightest intimation of what the action was for; but he would put it to the defendant's attorney, as the jury were there, and counsel appeared, and the witnesses in court, whether he would press his

decision.

Clarke.—Yes, your Honour, I must do so upon principle. If this was to pass, it would be said anything would be sufficient for the County Courts, and I have no wish to see the County Courts the only courts of justice in the kingdom where a man is not judicially informed by his summons of what he is called upon to answer. His HONOUR then said there must be an end of the case. Plaintiff nonsuited.

October 20, 1851.

SMITH AND ANOTHER (Trustees) v. Ross.
Rent of moorings on the river.

Held, that a society of watermen may recover rent from strangers (watermen) who use moorings attached to a public landing belonging to them.

This was a plaint by the stewards of the Mill Stairs Waterman's Society, as trustees, &c., to recover for the use of the bolts and mooring chains, &c.

Teague, who appeared for the plaintiffs, said that the plaint was brought to recover the sun of 48. 4d. from the defendant, for the use of moorings at Mill Stairs, Rotherhithe. So far back as 1771 there had been a deed of gift of these stairs by Sir Peter Thompson to certain watermen plying from the stairs, who had also purchased themselves into a club. The aldermen of the city had a right of the causeway leading down to the water's edge. They had formed making by-laws to regulate these associations, and by a by-law made in the year 1845, in the mayoralty of Alderman Gibbs, the Mill Stairs Society of Watermen were authorized to demand from non-members (watermen) using the stairs one penny per week for stowage. The defendant had been in the habit of using the bolts and mooring chains, and this action was brought to recover the sum he had mentioned, and was intended to settle a question which was much disputed on the river.

His HONOUR doubted whether they had a right of action. If the defendant did not pay the stewards of the club they must cut him adrift.

Teague reminded His Honour that the city by-laws authorized them to make this charge.

His HONOUR said that the by-laws were no authority to recover in law.

Teague said he understood Mr. Serjeant Manning, the judge of the Whitechapel County Court, had decided a similar claim, preferred by another waterman's society, in favour of the stewards.

After some further discussion, the case was adjourned, to afford His Honour an opportunity to consult Mr. Serjeant Manning. Upon that day the learned judge stated that he had not been able to see Mr. Serjeant Manning, but that he continued of the same opinion.

Teague said he could not see how the claim differed from the ordinary case of rent, and for that there were two remedies, distress and action at law, of which the landlord had his election. The court seemed to think that neither of these remedies applied to their case, and if not, what remedy had they. It was clear that stranger watermen had no right to come on their freehold without permission. His Honour said that they had a right when a boat was made fast to cut it adrift; but suppose they did and damage accrued, to whom was that damage to be charged? clearly not to the owner of the boat, and he doubted whether they would be exonerated upo the ground that they were asserting a right. Suppose a boat sent adrift, as suggested, run against another boat with parties in it and upset it, would they not be answerable for the loss of life?

His HONOUR said he felt all the difficulties of the case, and would not hastily decide.

The judge then consulted in his private room with a barrister who was present, and shortly returned and intimated that as that gentleman was against him in opinion, he should again adjourn the case till the 20th October, and in the meantime see Mr. Serjeant Manning, who was reported to have had a similar case.