Myrick's Probate (Cal.), 237. The fact of voting is accepted as evidence, though it is not conclusive evidence, of domicil. Hayes v. Hayes, 74 Ill. 312; East Livermore v. Farmington, 74 Me. 154; Fisk v. Railroad, 53 Barb. 472; Mandeville v. Huston, 15 La. An. 281. Payment of taxes is evidence of domicil. Chase v. Chase (N. H.), 29 Atl. 553; Hood v. Judkins, 61 Mich. 575; 28 N. W. 689; Meserve v. Folsom, 62 Vt. 504; 20 Atl. 926; Bowman v. Boyd (Nev.), 30 Pac. 823. So is the execution of one's will in accordance with the laws of a particular place. Dupuy v. Wurtz, 53 N. Y. 556; Dupuy v. Seymour, 64 Barb. 156; Tucker v. Field, 5 Redf. (N. Y.) 139. The "ownership of real "estate" in a place, "not coupled with residence therein, is of no value with "reference to domicil or residence." Price v. Price, 156 Pa. St. 617; 27 Atl. 291; Dupuy v. Wurtz, supra; Barton v. Irasburgh, 33 Vt. 159; Heirs v. Peebles, 1 Tex. 673; Butler v. Hoffer, 1 Wash. C. C. 499. As to the ownership of real estate, coupled with other circumstances, especially as affecting the question of the retention of domicil, see Jacobs, Law of Domicil, ss. 417-419. A mere declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States is insufficient to prove an intention to adopt as a domicil the place, city, or State in which such declaration is made. Bremme's Estate, 13 Pa. Co. Ct. 177 ; 2 Pa. Dist. 455. That a person attended a particular church is admissible as tending to show his domicil. Fulham v. Howe, 62 Vt. 386; 20 Atl. 101. The residence of the wife is primâ facie evidence of the husband's domicil. Brewer v. Linnaeus, 36 Me. 428.

23. (Rule 16.) DECLARATIONS. - As evidence of domicil, acts are more important than words. Firth v. Firth, 50 N. J. Eq. 137. Nevertheless, a person's declarations are admissible to show the character of his residence. Kemna v. Brockhaus, 10 Biss. C. C. 128; Kilburn v. Bennett, 3 Met. 199; Hulett v. Hulett, 37 Vt. 581; Verret v. Bonvillain, 33 La. An. 1304; Ex parte Blumer, 27 Tex. 734; Gundlin v. Hamburg-American Packet Co. 6 Misc. 620; 26 N. Y. Supp. 73. The operation of this rule is qualified in many jurisdictions by the common-law rule excluding declarations of a party in his own behalf on the ground of interest, unless they accompany the act in question and serve to explain it as part of the res gesta; and this qualification has given rise, sometimes even in the same jurisdiction, to much conflict of authority. Viles v. Waltham, 157 Mass. 542; Brookfield v. Warren, 128 Mass. 287; Wright v. Boston, 126 Mass. 161; Chase v. Chase (N. H.), 29 Atl. 553; Ayers v. Weeks, 65 N. H. 248; 18 Atl. 1108; State v. Palmer, 65 N. H. 9; 17 Atl. 977; Fulham v. Howe, 62 Vt. 386; Bangor v. Brewer, 47 Me. 97; Burgess v. Clark, 3 Ind. 250; Griffin v. Wall, 32 Ala. 149; Mitchell v. United States, 21 Wall. 350; Beason v. State, 34 Miss. 602; 1 Wharton on Ev. s. 258 et seq. As to declarations or statements in wills, see Dupuy v. Wurtz, 53 N. Y. 556; Dupuy v. Seymour, 64 Barb. 156; Mackenzie v. Mackenzie, 3 Misc. 200, 23 N. Y. Supp. 270; Matter of Stover, 4 Redf. (N. Y.) 82; Gable v. Ways (Md.), 17 Atl. 565; Harberger's Will, 13 Phila. 368. By the Civil Code of Louisiana (Art. 42) the intention of a person to make his principal establishment in another parish than that in which he is domiciled, and thus to change his domicil to such other parish, is proved by a written declaration of his intention before the recorders of the parishes from which and to which he shall intend to remove; but, in case this declaration is not made, his intention must be inferred from circumstances (Art. 43).

24. (Rule 17.) RESIDENCE AS EVIDENCE OF DOMICIL. — That residence in a place is evidence of domicil there, see Anderson v. Watt, 138 U. S. 694;

Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400; Shelton v. Tiffin, 6 How. 163; The Venus, 8 Cranch, 253; Abington v. North Bridgewater, 23 Pick. 170; Hart v. Lindsey, 17 N. H. 235; Ryall v. Kennedy, 40 N. Y. Super. Ct. 347; Hindman's Appeal, 85 Pa. St. 466; Carey's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 201; State v. Frest, 4 Harr. (Del.) 558; Quinby v. Duncan, 4 Harr. (Del.) 383; Johnston v. Turner, 29 Ark. 280 ; Ex parte Blumer, 27 Tex. 734; Mills v. Alexander, 21 Tex. 154; In re Toner, 39 Ala. 454; Horne v. Horne, 9 Ired. 99; Graveley v. Graveley, 25 So. Car. 1; Olsen's Will, 63 Iowa, 145; Keith v. Stetter, 25 Kan. 100; Dow v. Gould, 31 Cal. 629; Hairston v. Hairston, 27 Miss. 704; Alter v. Waddill, 20 La. An. 246; Cadwallader v. Howell, 3 Harr. (N. J.) 138. But no particular length of residence is required to gain a domicil. Guier v. O’Danel, 1 Binney, 349 note; Carey's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 201; The Venus, 8 Cranch, 253; Cooper v. Galbraith, 3 Wash. C. C. 546; Johnson v. Twenty-one Bales, 2 Paine, 601; Kemna v. Brockhaus, 10 Biss. C. C. 128; Stockton v. Staples, 66 Me. 197; Parsons v. Bangor, 61 Me. 457; Swaney v. Hutchins, 13 Neb. 266; Russell v. Randolph, 11 Tex. 460; Horne v. Horne, 9 Ired. 99; Verret v. Bonvillain, 33 La. An. 1304; Johnston v. Turner, 29 Ark. 280; Hart v. Horn, 4 Kan. 232; Hairston v. Hairston, 27 Miss. 704; Hulett v. Hulett, 37 Vt. 581. Yet length of residence, unexplained, may be evidence of the animus manendi. Dupuy v. Wurtz, 53 N. Y. 556; Williamson v. Parisien, 1 Johns. Ch. 389; Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400; The Ann Green, 1 Gall. 274; White v. Brown, 1 Wall. Jr. 217; Hood's Estate, 21 Pa. St. 106; Hulett v. Hulett, 37 Vt. 581.

25. (Rule 18.) RESIDENCE, OR NON-RESIDENCE, NOT NECESSARILY EVIDENCE OF THE EXISTENCE OR NON-EXISTENCE OF DOMICIL IN A PARTICU

LAR PLACE. - As has been seen (supra, 1, Rule 1), it is essential to domicil that there should be an intention to remain permanently, or at least indefinitely, in the place where one resides. As to how far the fact of residence or non-residence is or is not evidence of domicil, see generally the cases cited supra, under 24 (Rule 17). See, also, Fain v. Crawford, 91 Ga. 30; 16 S. E. 106.

With respect to residence as affecting domicil, the controlling question is that of intent, not motive. Thus, if a person gives up his residence in one State and removes to another State with the intention of making the latter his permanent home, he acquires a domicil in the latter, though his motive was to prevent the defendant (a corporation) from removing a suit, which he intended to bring against it, to the United States Courts. Chicago & Northwestern R'y Co. v. Ohle, 117 U. S. 123. See, also, Young v. Pollak, 85 Ala. 439; 5 So. 279.

Among persons in respect of whom the question of residence requires exceptional or somewhat special consideration, we may note the following classes: (1) Prisoners. The transportation of a person to a place other than that of his residence, for the purpose of temporary imprisonment, does not change his domicil. Baltimore v. Chester, 53 Vt. 315, and cases therein cited; Barton v. Barton, 74 Ga. 761; Hardy v. De Leon, 5 Tex. 211; Young v. Pollak, 85 Ala. 439; 5 So. 279.

(2) Convicts. A person confined as a convict, for a term of years, does not acquire a domicil in the place of his confinement. Topsham v. Lewiston, 74 Me. 237, criticising Reading v. Westport, 19 Conn. 561, and Washington v. Kent, 38 Conn. 249, and citing with approval Grant v. Dalliber, 11 Conn. 234, 238; Barton v. Barton, 74 Ga. 761.

(3) Fugitives and Refugees. — The fact that a person leaves a place as a fugitive from justice, intending never to return, does not destroy his domicil there. Cobb v. Rice, 130 Mass. 231, cited with approval in Ayers v. Weeks, 65 N. H. 248. But if a person in such a predicament goes to a new place with the intention to remain permanently or indefinitely, he acquires a domicil there. Young v. Pollak, 85 Ala. 439; 5 So. 279; Cobb v. Rice, 130 Mass. 231. The Constitution of New York provides that no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of his presence or absence at any almshouse or other asylum at public expense, nor while confined in any public prison. People v. Cady, 143 N. Y. 100; 20 N. Y. Supp. 474; 37 N. E. 673.

(4) Paupers.

As to pauper settlement or domicil, see People v. Cady, 143 N. Y. 100; 20 N. Y. Supp. 474; 37 N. E. 673; Baltimore v. Chester, 53 Vt. 315; Freeport v. Board of Supervisors, 41 Ill. 495; Covode v. Foster, 4 Brewst. 414; Amherst v. Hollis, 9 N. H. 107; Washington v. Kent, 38 Conn. 249; Topsham v. Lewiston, 74 Conn. 236. An inmate of a veteran's home, who intends to remain as long as he lives, though he took up his abode there because of indigence, acquires a residence for voting purposes. Stewart v. Keyser (Cal.), 39 Pac. 19.

(5) Lunatics. As to the domicil of insane persons the decisions are conflicting. It has been held that a domicil acquired by a person when sane cannot, after he has become insane, be changed by his guardian. Pittsfield v. Detroit, 53 Me. 442. Contra, Holyoke v. Haskins, 5 Pick. 20; Anderson v. Anderson, 42 Vt. 350; Hill v. Horton, 4 Den. (N. Y.) 88. A person under guardianship as an insane, or as a weak-minded, person may, however, have sufficient mental capacity to acquire a domicil for himself and thus to change his domicil. Talbot v. Chamberlain, 149 Mass. 57; 20 N. E. 305; Mowry v. Latham, 17 R. I. 480; Culver's Appeal, 48 Conn. 165. And insanity does not prevent continuous residence from establishing a pauper settlement where the residence began before the insanity. Topsham v. Lewiston, 74 Me. 236, and cases therein cited. (6) Invalids. — A change of residence for purposes of health does not generally effect a change of domicil. Fidelity Trust &c. Co. v. Preston, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 461; 28 S. W. 658; Still v. Woodville, 38 Miss. 646; Ex parte Blumer, 27 Tex. 734; Dupuy v. Wurtz, 53 N. Y. 556; Hegeman v. Fox, 31 Barb. 475; Isham v. Gibbons, 1 Bradf. 69; Kellogg v. City of Oshkosh, 14 Wis. 625.

(7) Officials.

A person does not lose his domicil by absence in the service of the government. In re Town of Highlands, 22 N. Y. Supp. 137; State v. Grizzard, 89 N. C. 115; Dennis v. State, 17 Fla. 389; Commonwealth v. Jones, 12 Pa. St. 365, 371. Yet he may, just as other persons, change his domicil. Mooar v. Harvey, 128 Mass. 219; Commonwealth v. Kelleher, 115 Mass. 103; Darragh v. Bird, 3 Oregon, 229; Wood v. Fitzgerald, 3 Oregon, 568. The Maryland statute (Act of 1890, ch. 573, s. 14), which requires all persons leaving the State to reside abroad to make a certain declaration in order to retain their domicil, applies to officials in the service of the United States. Sterling v. Horner, 74 Md. 573; Lancaster v. Herbert, 74 Md. 334; Southerland v. Norris, 74 Md. 326.

(8) Ambassadors. — That domicil is not changed by residence abroad as a diplomatic representative, see observation of the court in Crawford v. Wilson, 4 Barb. 504; and of Gibson, C. J., in Commonwealth v. Jones, 12 Pa. St. 365, 371. Wharton, Conf. of L. s. 49, places this rule on the ground that the "house of an ambassador, or minister 'extraordinary, is regarded as a part of the territory which he "represents." Though this fiction, which is carefully to be distinguished from the personal extra-territoriality of the minister, has gained currency in consequence of the fondness of writers for metaphorical expressions, it has little foundation in law. See article on Asylum in Legations, etc., Political Science Quarterly, vol. vii., pp. 397-405. But it is clear that the foreign residence of a diplomatic agent in itself affords no evidence of an intention permanently to reside abroad.

(9) Consuls. — As in the case of diplomatic agents, the residence of a person abroad in a consular capacity in itself affords no evidence of a change of domicil. Wooldridge v. Wilkins, 4 How. (Miss.) 360, 366. (10) Persons in the Military or Naval Service. While mere enlistment and service abroad by such persons do not show a change of domicil (Brewer v. Linnaeus, 36 Me. 428; Knowlton v. Knowlton, 39 N. E. 595), yet such persons may change their domicil in the ordinary way. Mooar v. Harvey, 128 Mass. 219; Remey v. Board of Equalization, 80 Iowa, 470; 45 N. W. 899; Ames v. Duryea, 6 Lansing, 155.

(11) Sailors. Though sailors may in the ordinary way change their domicil, mere absence on duty, however prolonged, has no such effect. Guier v. O'Daniel, 1 Binney, 349 note; Thorndike v. City of Boston, 1 Met. 242, 246; Hallet v. Bassett, 100 Mass. 167; Stockton v. Staples, 66 Me. 197; In re Bye, 2 Daly (N. Y.), 525. Nor can a sailor's wife change his domicil in his absence, and against his will, by removing his effects and children to another place. Porterfield v. Augusta, 67 Me. 556.

Cerro

(12) Servants.—The domicil of the servant is that of the master. Moreland v. Davidson, 71 Pa. St. 371. But not necessarily so. Gordo County v. Hancock County, 58 Iowa, 114. See Wharton, Conf. of L. s 47.

(13) Apprentices.

The domicil of the apprentice is that of the master. Maddox v. The State, 32 Ind. 14.

(14) Ecclesiastics. In the United States the domicil

not necessarily within his charge or diocese.

of a clergyman is

The domicil of an

itinerant clergyman is the place of his last permanent residence. Allgood v. Williams, 92 Ala. 551; 8 So. 722.

(15) Students. -A person does not gain a domicil by residing in a place

merely as a student. Opinion of the Judges, 5 Met. 587; Granby v. Amherst, 7 Mass. 1; Fry's Election Case, 71 Pa. St. 302; Lower Oxford Contested Election, 11 Phila. 641; Sanders v. Getchell, 76 Me. 158; Hart v. Lindsey, 17 N. H. 235; Kelley v. Garrett, 67 Ala. 304; Matter of Rice, 7 Daly, 22; White v. Howard, 52 Barb. 294; Vanderpoel v. O'Hanlon, 53 Iowa, 246; 36 Am. Rep. 216. If, however, there is a permanent abode, which may be shown by engaging

;

in business, by establishing a home, or by other circumstances, a domicil is acquired. Matter of Ward, 19 Abbott (New Cas.), 187; 20 N. Y. Supp. 606 ; Dale v. Irwin, 78 Ill. 170; Sanders v. Getchell, supra; Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488; Lower Oxford Contested Election, supra.

26. (Rule 19.) DOMICIL OF CORPORATIONS. The domicil of a corporation is entirely distinct from the personal domicil of its shareholders or officers; so that, if its property, its sole place of business, and its general office be in one place, its domicil is there also, though its trustees and shareholders reside, and the trustees often hold meetings, in different places. Perry v. Round Lake Camp-meeting Association, 22 Hun, 293. A corporation created under the laws of a particular State has its domicil in that State, and cannot change it by doing business in another State. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 520; Balto. & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Koontz, 14 Otto, 5; Douglass v. P. Ins. Co. 138 N. Y. 209; 33 N. E. 938; Boston Investment Co. v. Boston, 158 Mass. 461. See Pelton v. Northern Transportation Co. 37 Ohio St. 450; Baltimore v. Pass. Ry. Co. 57 Md. 31. A company, when chartered in several States successively, becomes a citizen of each of such States. Memphis &c. R. R. v. Alabama, 107 U. S. 581; Railroad v. Barnhill, 91 Tenn. 395, and cases cited. And a foreign corporation, when it obtains the privilege of doing business, and establishes a permanent general agency, in a State, is, as to the business there transacted, to be considered as domiciled there, so as to be subject to the same obligations and liabilities as a domestic corporation. Martine v. Int. Life Ins. Co. 53 N. Y. 339; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Best, 23 Ohio St. 105. In the first of the two cases last cited (Martine v. Int. Life Ins. Co.), the defendant, which was an English corporation, was held, under the circumstances, to have possessed, as to the business which the New York agency transacted, a belligerent domicil, so that it could not plead the non-payment of premiums during the Civil War by a Confederate policy-holder.

27. TAXATION.-Tangible movables are generally taxable at the place where they are actually situated. Pullman's Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18; Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622; Lumber Co. v. Loraine, 22 Fed. Rep. 54; State v. Dalrymple, 70 Md. 294; 17 Atl. 82; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Twombly, 29 Fed. Rep. 658; Burlington Lumber Co. v Willitts, 118 Ill. 559; People v. Smith, 88 N. Y. 576; Taylor v. Love, 43 N. J. L. 142; Maurer v. Cliff, 94 Mich. 194; 53 N. W. 1055; Colbert v. Leake County Supervisors, 60 Miss. 142; State v. Howard County Court, 69 Mo. 454; Standard Oil Co. v. Combs, 96 Ind. 179; 49 Am. Rep. 156; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Board of Assessors, 55 Fed. Rep. 206; National Dredging Co. v. State (Ala.), 12 So. 720. See Com. v. Gaines, 80 Ky. 489; Hardesty v. Fleming, 57 Tex. 395; Vogt v. Ayer, 104 Ill. 583; Hood v. Judkins, 61 Mich. 575; 28 N. W. 689. See, as to property tangible and intangible, held by trustee, Anthony v. Caswell, 15 R. I. 159; 1 Atl. 290; People v. Coleman, 119 N. Y. 137; 23 N. E. 488; In re Lines' Estate, 155 Pa. St. 378; 26 Atl. 728; 32 W. N. C. 376; Appeal Tax Court v. Gill, 50 Md. 377; Trustees v. City Council (Ga.), 17 S. E. 61; by guardian, Louisville v. Sherley, 80 Ky. 71. Property merely in transit is not subject to taxation. Coe v. Errol, 62 N. H. 303; Robinson v. Longley, 18 Nev. 71.

Personalty cannot be taxed at a place where it has neither an actual nor a