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XXXIX.- "It is a most brilliant manoeuvre to make dispositions apparently bad, retaining to oneself the undoubted power of changing them into good ones, and doing this at the right moment. Nothing so greatly disconcerts the enemy, and is so likely to induce him to commit great faults; for while executing his combination for attacking one in a bad position, he suddenly finds himself badly placed in presence of a well-placed enemy; and if he do not change his dispositions, he is beaten ; and if he changes them in the presence of his adversary, he is beaten likewise."-Maréchal de Saxe.

XL.-"With an army inferior in number, inferior in Infantry, inferior in Cavalry, and inferior in Artillery, a general battle must be avoided. Numbers must be supplied by Rapidity of Marching; Artillery, by the Nature of the Manoeuvres; Cavalry, by the Choice of Positions."Napoleon Bonaparte.

XLI.-Pursue with the utmost vigour, rapidity, and audacity. Retreat before an enemy who has just struck a decisive blow, and knows how to follow it up by exploring this principle to the utmost, will doubtless change into disorderly flight, and end in the ruin of the army.

XLII.-A line of battle is cæteris paribus more or less good according as it is more or less difficult to attack it in the direction of its length.

XLIII. The siege artillery, different parks, baggage, &c., must not enter a defile till possession of the further extremity of the defile has been secured. These must be left in position outside, under a proper escort, till this has been done. It is clear that in case the enemy should oppose the passage of the defile at its further extremity, suddenly or otherwise, or should oppose the passage by occupying a position for that purpose in the defile itself, the embarrassment caused by the siege artillery, different parks, baggage, &c., if allowed to enter before the possession of the other extremity of the defile had been secured, might lead to very serious consequences.

XLIV. It is the duty of Cavalry to follow up a Victory, make prisoners, and hinder the defeated army from rallying.

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XLV.-Artillery being more necessary to Cavalry than to Infantry, since Infantry possesses its own powerful fire, whereas the fire of Cavalry is relatively inconsiderable, Cavalry must always have its Artillery with it, whether it attacks, remains in position, or retires.

XLVI.-" In war as in politics, the lost moment never returns. Fortune is a woman, and it is necessary to profit boldly by every opportunity."-Napoleon Bonaparte.

XLVII.-When a defile has to be passed within the circle of the enemy's activity, the troops halt and take position or halt only on the further side, till the whole army has passed.

XLVIII.-In forming the plan of a campaign, every plan that the enemy can form, or at least every one of the principal ones, of which there will always be a very restricted number, must be taken into consideration; and the plan, when formed, must, in addition to its purely offensive part, (which it must always have, since a passive defensive is inadmissible,) contain within itself the means of successfully opposing every one of those plans which it is considered the enemy may have proposed to himself, as well as every offensive project the enemy may form.

XLIX. When an army is experienced and warlike, that of the enemy newly levied, or from a long peace inexperienced in war, it is a maxim to endeavour by all possible means to force the enemy, as soon as possible, to a decisive general engagement. If, on the other hand, the case be reversed, one must fortify defiles, endeavour to bring about partial engagements on very favourable and, if possible, entrenched ground, make a liberal use of fieldworks, and, when a general engagement is determined on, take up a strong position, fortified as much as possible, and with the back well turned to good prepared lines of

retreat.

L.-Field-fortifications are always useful and never injurious when constructed in accordance with the correct principles of the science of Fortification.

LI.-Use the utmost rapidity, gain time, be in readiness at the earliest moment.

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LII.-"An army passes everywhere, and in all seasons, where two men can stand abreast."-Napoleon Bonaparte. LIII." It is a fact that when one is not in a desert, but in a peopled country, if the general is not wellinformed it is because he is ignorant of his trade."Napoleon Bonaparte.

LIV. When Death is despised and scorned he hides in the enemy's ranks.

List of several Maxims of War.

I-In war it is frequently the height of good policy to
make one effort more, though such course appear desperate.
A general who fears to engage most thoroughly lest he
should have his troops so broken that he will be unable to
effect a retreat from the field, had better not fight at all,
and retreat at once in the best possible order. "Media via
est tutissima," is not a maxim of war, but the direct con-
trary of a maxim of war. "Media via non est tutissima,'
is a maxim of war; for in war a middle indecisive course
is in general certain defeat. Let us hear Napoleon on this
subject:-

"The Glory and Honour of his Country's Arms ought
to be the first and highest consideration with a general
who engages in battle. The safety and preservation of the
army is only secondary. But it is also in that same
Audacity and Obstinacy which the Honour and Glory of
his Country's Arms demand, that the safety and preserva-
tion of the army is found. In a retreat, besides the
Honour of his Country's Arms, he will often lose more
men than in two battles-a reason never to despair while
brave men remain around the standards. And by this
Victory is obtained and merited."

II. The officer in command of an army, or of any portion of an army, when in the circle of the enemy's activity, ought frequently to say to himself, "What should I do if the enemy appears in front? what if on the right? what if on the left?"

III-In war, it is a maxim of wisdom and prudence to

esteem an enemy one knows at his value, and one not known at above his value.

IV.-" A rapid march augments the courage of an army, and increases the probabilities of victory."-Napoleon.

V." In Germany and Flanders, the number of the Cavalry ought to be one-fourth of the number of the Infantry; in Spain, one-sixth; on the Alps and Pyrenees, one-twentieth."-Napoleon.

These, then, are the respective proportions in which Napoleon says Cavalry and Infantry ought to enter armies destined respectively to act in Germany, Flanders, Spain, the Alps and the Pyrenees. If, then, France be considered as a mean between Germany and Flanders on the one hand and Spain on the other, in respect of the natural configuration of the soil-an approximate fact which actual observation indicates to be the case, as well as the geographical position of France intermediate between those countries—the Cavalry in an army destined to act in France should be one-fifth of the Infantry. In the Russian Army the Cavalry is more numerous than in any other relatively to the Infantry, an arrangement indicated by the physical configuration and state of the country; and for an army destined to act in Russia, the Cavalry ought to be about one-third the number of the Infantry.

VI.-An officer is never truly and properly seconded, supported, and obeyed by his inferiors, unless he is known to be perfectly inflexible.

VII." That general, however able in all other respects, who is unable to obtain the affections of, and excite enthusiasm of some kind or other among his soldiers, is only an ignorant officer."-Napoleon.

VIII. There are five things which should never be separated from a soldier: his arms, his cartridges, his knapsack, his provisions for at least four days, and his pioneer's tool.

IX. A soldier should be encouraged by all possible means to remain a soldier. This is to be done by manifesting respect and esteem for old soldiers, and by augmenting the pay as the duration of the soldier's service

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X.-Infantry ought to be ranged in line on two full ranks only, because it is not possible to fire effectively in a deeper order than this, and because it is certain that the fire of the third rank is very imperfect in itself, and injurious to the fire of the other two. To the two full ranks must however be added a third rank, not full, containing about one-sixth the number of those in either of the full ranks, the men being distributed at equal intervals, one behind every sixth man.

XI.-A council of war never fights. A general commanding an army in chief ought never to hold a council of war unless he has previously determined not to fight, and wants to saddle a few others as well as himself with the responsibility of the course he had previously determined on. By discussing, debating, and holding councils of war, the worst and most pusillanimous course is almost always taken; and this is a certainty proved by the experience of all ages. For a general commanding an army privately to ask, consider, and profit by the views, experience, and advice of any officer in whose opinion he places confidence, is one thing, and most desirable,-to hold a council of war another, and seems little desirable, except in the case mentioned.

XII.-In war, nothing has been done while aught remains to do.

XIII.-In war, indecision is a cancer.

XIV.-In war, nothing is more necessary than to strike the iron when it is hot.

XV.-In war, a good Dodge, Trick, or Artifice is never
to be despised.

Before proceeding to any explanation of the preceding
principles and maxims, which may appear necessary, and
to their illustration and exemplification from Military
History, two subjects will be discussed, because, in illus-
trating and exemplifying the principles and maxims, they
can at the same time be illustrated and exemplified,
And these two subjects are-