her late ally. She encouraged the most eloquent of the French emigrants, to rouze the military pride of the king of Prussia, who, from his connexions with England, had been exposed to the discredit of returning from the expeditions of Reichenbach and Riga, without adding to the renown of the Prussian armies.

Frederic William, naturally brave and benevolent, and feeling for the sufferings of the King, princes, and nobles of France, embraced with joy, an opportunity of acquiring great glory to himself, while at the head of his troops, he should restore the French monarchy. The new Emperor, equally generous, and disposed to military glory, was induced not to consult the ministers and friends who had possessed his father's confidence, but yielded to the influence of the Russian party; which had so many partizans at the court of Vienna.

The human mind forms resolutions, not from a complication of different considerations, but under the influence of one predominating passion. The motives which actuated the great northern powers on this occasion, and at this time, were probably no other than what have been just described. Yet, we may easily imagine other motives which might have occurred, and might have dictated the same conduct on the part of all the parties. The Empress might be well pleased to Occupy and weaken the power of Austria and Prussia, while she still kept an eye on Turkey and Poland, and extending her influence over Germany and Europe. The emperor might, without the imputation of very inordinate ambition, be in

clined to embrace an opportunity of recovering the territories that had been wrested by Louis XIV. and Louis XV. from his hereditary dominions, as well as from the empire on the left side of the Rhine; and the King of Prussia, besides that he might be inclined to embrace an opportunity of cementing a reconciliation with the Empress, or at least deem it imprudent to oppose her will, seconded by the Emperor, and all this at a juncture when he could not reckon on the support of France in a contest with his riva!, had an interest in the existence of a power that had formed so long a defence to the states of the empire against the encroachments of Austria. At a meeting at Mayence, the Emperor and the King of Prussia had a conference for the purpose of restoring the French monarchy. The combined troops were placed under the command of the Duke of Brunswick, esteemed, from his past services, as one of the first generals in the world, and justly considered in Germany as one of the most just and enlightened of her sovereigns. The Duke had been considered by the Emperor Leopold, as the most proper person, in every respect, to direct the force of this defensive confederacy. Anintercourse had been opened between them confidentially on this subject; and the Duke was fully apprised, and approved of the enterprize of Leopold. This was the circumstance that led him eventually to the command of the combined armies. He was, in fact, involved in the enterprize, without possessing the real power of either controlling or guiding it to the objects of which he had approved, and which his own

wisdom would have suggested*. This circumstance is a key to the subsequent issue of the campaign; and will account for several events that have been hitherto involved in mystery.

The Duke of Brunswick was naturally an advocate for any co-operation between the courts of Vienna and Berlin that tended to secure the rights and integrity of the German empire; in equal danger from the violence of the French revolution, and the policy by which Russia had constantly succeeded in inflaming the states of the empire against each other. He accordingly accepted with pleasure of a command that was originally signed for him by Leopold; and which the new Emperor and the King of Prussia were destined to confirm. From a delicacy towards those sovereigns, he was unassuming in their presence. In proportion as one of them was as yet inexperienced, and the other diffident of his own talents, the veteran and profound Generalissimo was attentive to their orders; so that in fact, he gave but few of his own; and these more in the detail than the suggestion of measures. Hence it was, that a proclamation, above noticed, evidently in a tone opposite to what the Duke of Brunswick would have dictated, was given in his name.

This work, the cause of much evil, was both suggested and composed by an individual, who, without office, obtained an influence which (where there was no permanent command) was equal to authority. It lay naturally with the princes of France to suggest the kind of manifesto which, from their knowledge, might have the most powerful effect, in intimidating the revolutionists in France, and encouraging the loyalists. The disposition of princes and statesmen, to encourage the intemperance of violent partizans, rather than to listen to prudent advice, and to depend for justification and acceptance on the conciliatory voice of moderation, is an error as fatal as it is commont..

An unfortunate effect also flowed from another deviation from the line of conduct that would have been pursued by the Duke of Brunswick. The husband of the Arch-Duchess Christina, aunt of the young Emperor, commanded the Austrian troops in Flanders. Had the army under the Duke of Brunswick marched into France directly, through that country, his command must have been for a time suspended. Hence, we have understood, originated the march into Champaign, and the eventual failure of the siege of Lisle, by the

Prince of Saxe Teschen; which, with other events in the field, of this year, we are about to relate.

The intelligence brought from time to time to the French princes, from every city, strong-hold, and military corps in France, was of the most encouraging kind. The sentiments of the Duke of Brunswick on this and other heads, which had been discussed before the expedition broke ground, may be collected from an observation which he is said to have made to the confederate sovereigns and princes relative to their intelligence:-"If these reports be true, there will not be occasion for half the force to be assembled: but if they be false, and that a spirit is to be encountered in France directly opposite to what is described, the combined armies will not be sufficient for the undertaking." It is at the same time to be observed, that the Austrian government, weakened by the war against the Turks, instead of sending sixty thousand men into the low countries, according to the original plan, was unable to raise more than thirty thousand; which were reduced to half that number, by a detachment of fifteen thousand, under General Clairfait, to join the Prussian army before Longwy; which detachment was farther reduced by the necessary garrisons of Namur, Mons, and Tournay. These facts it seemed proper to introduce in this place, previously to a narrative of the campaign, to which they belong; as they serve to illustrate, in a very important degree, both its conduct on the part of the German commander-in-chief, and its termination.

The plan of the Duke of Brunswick, then, on the whole, appears

to have been as follows: To set out from Coblentz, with an army of Prussians, fifty thousand strong, and to march, by Treves and Luxembourg, to Longwy. After the reduction of this place, and also, if possible, Montmedy, to establish at both, magazines for the army; and from thence to continue the march, and to reduce Verdun. In support of these, as well as of subsequent operations, the court of Vienna engaged to bring into the field two armies: the one to act in the country between the Rhine and the Moselle, and to be of sufficient strength for the purpose of menacing at once Landau and SaarLouis, and carrying on the siege of Thionville; while the other, of much superior force, should be engaged in some important operations in the low countries; but whose positions should be as near to the army of the Meuse as possible. If the pleasing expectations that had been entertained of a general rising in France, and co-operation with the invading army should not be verified, it was the design of the Duke of Brunswick not to cross the Meuse; but, during the siege of Thionville, as soon as the Prussians should be masters of Verdun, to detach a considerable portion of his army for taking Sedan, Mezieres, and perhaps, with the aid of the Austrian armies in the low countries, of Givet. In possession of the banks of the Meuse from Verdun to Givet, his flanks covered by two Austrian armies, it would be in the power of the Duke to throw his troops into cantonments behind that river: from whence he would be able to observe the opposite positions of the enemy on the Sambre; and from ground so strong to

go

go on the ensuing year, to conquests almost certain.

The French King, in consequence of the preparations and movements of the Austrians and Prusssians, and with a view, it is reasonable to suppose, to his own peculiar situation, had established three armies, in order to cover and protect his country, and to be in readiness to act as emergencies might require, or existing circumstances direct. The first army that was assembled, and which was disposed on the northern frontier of France, was placed under the command of the Marischal de Rochambeau, an experienced officer, who had served in the French armies during the late American war; the second under the Marquis de la Fayette, who had also served under him in the American war; and the third under the command of a gallant veteran who had spent more than forty years in the service of France, the Marischal Luckner, on the Rhine. Of the three generals, only Luckner and la Fayette were attached to the revolution. The discipline of the French army had, for some time past, been much neglected; while, from the political principles introduced into France, insubordination of the troops had been daily increasing. The soldiers living in garrisons, the great towns of

France imbibed the ideas of the civil classes with whom they associated, and became connected with the inhabitants of the capitals and the different provinces throughout the country. The want of discipline, however, was compensated by an ardour in the cause of liberty and the revolution; and, on the whole, what were called the troops of the line, were as capable of being led on to action, with alacrity and with effect, as any troops in the world. But the greater part of the officers, especially those in the first stations, were enemies to the revolution, and disaffected to the present government; which they considered as an usurpation. This diversity of sentiments produced of course a division in the army. Some of the officers, avowing their disaffection, retired from the service; others remained, ready to improve circumstances that might arise for overthrowing the present order of affairs, and restoring the former. A mistrust of the officers, produced among the soldiers, and communicated to the whole nation, increased the general hatred against the nobles: insomuch that it was under deliberation, at one period, among the rulers of the revolution, whether the class of nobles should not be precluded from the rank of commissioned military officers.

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