in a way they ought not to do, we should be entitled to a Receiver. What is the harm that would be done? My learned friend says that the Society would be annihilated; they have no funds, I admit;-but why should not those funds be received, pending the litigation, by a person who will not spend improperly the monies of the Society? They say in their Answer, which they have read, that they will continue so to do. Why should not, pending the suit, the money be safe? They say they have a right to go on spending it. My learned friend, Mr. Knight, felt he could not support that; and said, if your lordships say we ought not to be guilty of this expenditure, we will not, that shows we have a right to make the motion. I know the value of such a concession on his part, that the Corporation have done what they are not entitled to do; and I have a right, upon that concession, in that statement, to have the money paid into Court; it is a concession that the parties, in his view of the case, are entitled to it. But they have been doing much more:-the money they have been expending, for what they call public purposes,-money they are not authorised to expend, and at least we are entitled to have that money paid into Court; it is no answer to be told that the whole case has been gone into upon motion. It is true that the whole case has been elaborately gone into; but that is no answer to us. It is said we have come to feel the pulse of the Court, and have not come in time. The answer, first of all, was excepted to; it was amended in November 1834, and this motion was made in the April following-that was the long delay; by stating, in their first Answer, an expenditure greater than their receipt, 18,000. more than their receipts; it was necessary to except; the Answer was corrected; the correction took place in November 1834, and this motion was made in April 1835. Mr. WOOD.-That was the Answer to the amended bill. Sir WILLIAM FOLLETT.-I apprehend there was no delay; the parties were attempting to compromise, and failed; it is true it is not till recently I have had the honour to address your Lordships; but notice was given in April 1835. They proceeded by filing their bill, my learned friend says, as soon as the Corporation was altered in its character. No; it was as soon as they chose to assume other powers than those entrusted to them. When they assume those powers which they take upon themselves to do, formed as they are, not by the members of the twelve Companies but out of the Corporation generally, when they are assuming the powers claimed to-day, we were bound to take proceedings; the bill was filed, and the Answer put in; an amended bill was filed, and upon this motion they now come to-day, still insisting their right, and saying they have a right to dispose of our funds at their discretion; they do not admit our right, and they will persist in doing it, according to the tenor of their Answer, during the whole progress of this suit, unless you prevent them. upon Then how do we stand? Have we made out no case to call upon your lordships to say, that the money shall not be expended during the suit? Have we not satisfied you we have that right? There would be something in it if we had any means of recovering against these parties if they expend it improperly; but one of their great arguments is, that they have no money; and if we have made a case to entitle us to this relief, you will interfere to prevent this expenditure. I do not understand that my learned friends have made out any answer to this, according to the practice of this Court; the practice of the Court is, if we have made out a breach of trust like this, you would grant a Receiver. Is the case stated by Mr. Wood at all like this, where a person had an actual beneficial interest? Is it like these parties denying their character of trustees, and insisting upon their right to spend the money of their cestuisque trust? I have examined my learned friend's arguments, and can find none directed against this motion, except the one that would fall back upon this question, that they were not trustees for this purpose. I understand it appears since the filing of the bill, in their Answer, that they have expended 8957. 13s. 1d. for tavern expenses, and 9531. 5s. in gratuities to the members; that appears since the filing of the bill in their Answer. Are they not going on doing it, and what reason is there to suppose they are not doing it after their Answer? Mr. Justice BOSANQUET. Do you know what time that comprises? Mr. LLOYD. From the filing of the bill to September 1834. Mr. LLOYD.-The bill was filed in July. Sir WILLIAM FOLLETT.-This is from the filing of the bill that they have expended this sum. Then are they going on doing this?—No doubt they are. How are we to be repaid? We cannot be unless your lordships interfere by this motion. But I say further, they are going on exercising their discretion, applying this money to public purposes. What public purposes?—I do not know; they may be of the same description as the public purposes relating to the borough of Coleraine; and will my learned friends say, in their Answer, that that was done before the Society was reformed, when the Society consisted of members of the twelve Companies? It is a most extraordinary argument that, because a person is a member of one of the twelve Companies of London, that the Irish Society are to be allowed to distribute this fund in the payment of election expenses, which those members may choose to think was right for aught I know these were public purposes of the same description. I apprehend they have no right to exercise their discretion, and spend money in contested elections, which they call a public purpose, opening the borough of Coleraine. They have no power over these funds in any way, except that in which the Companies participate; and upon this ground also I submit we are entitled to this motion. I think I may say it is impossible for your lordships to decide that we have not made out a case showing they are trustees. by their Answer; and they are making expenditure inconsistent with their duty. If this goes on, we have no means of getting the money back; and I submit to your lordships, according to the practice of this Court, we are entitled to the prayer of the motion. They deny it LORD CHANCELLOR.-We will give judgment in this case. in the course of next week. 4 G [Adjourned. Saturday, 27th February, 1836. JUDGMENT. LORD CHANCELLOR.-In this case the plaintiffs, who are the Skinners' Company, and who, according to their own representation, constitute one out of twelve, (as they call them,) "the twelve great Companies," but, in fact, one out of forty to fifty Companies who appear to have been the original adventurers in the settlement in the North of Ireland, apply to the Court, that the defendants, who are the Irish Society, may be ordered to pay into Court the sum of 47197., appearing by the Answer of the defendants to be in their hands, that the money, when so paid in, may be laid out, and that a Receiver may be appointed of the rents and profits of the estates, in the pleadings mentioned to be in the possession of the defendants, the Irish Society, and that the Irish Society may be restrained by the injunction of the Court from getting in the profits, or any part thereof. If it had not been for the great magnitude of the question this suit raises, not only affecting all the Companies in London, but affecting the Irish Society, and affecting a large district in the North of Ireland, for whose benefit a considerable expenditure has for two centuries been in the habit of being made out of the funds in question, I should not have thought it necessary to take any time to consider the judgment in this case. It has been said that the object of this motion was to obtain, if possible, the opinion of the Court upon the points contained in the pleadings, and which constitute the subject of the suit: if that is the object, I certainly shall, to the best of my endeavours, disappoint that object, for I think it is a course extremely inconvenient to encourage; and though it has been sometimes done in this Court, I think it is a course which by diverting the ordinary proceedings of this Court, is attended with great inconvenience and injustice to one party, to the benefit of another. It may be very convenient for the plaintiff to feel his way, to ascertain what is the feeling of the Court, and no doubt many applications of this description have been made for that purpose, and that purpose only. I consider that the Court is bound not to go out of its way to give the plaintiff the opportunity of obtaining, previous to the hearing, the opinion of the Court upon the subject-matter of the suit, which is certainly a great benefit to the plaintiff, to the prejudice of the defendant, and that the Court is bound to express its opinion only so far as is necessary to show the grounds on which it disposes of any interlocutory application. I consider that it is the duty of the Court to confine itself to the point upon which it decides, and not to go into the merits of the case. I shall therefore abstain, as far as possible, from giving any opinion as to the very important questions raised in this suit, the question being neither more nor less than this-Whether upon the settlement in the North of Ireland, under which the towns of Londonderry and Coleraine were established, and a large district given up by the Crown to the City of London, or to the Irish Society, or to the twelve Companies, the settlement of that property constituted the Irish Society simply ordinary trustees for the benefit of the twelve Companies, of which the Skinners' Company constitutes one; or, whether it was not accompanied with certain public purposes, and certain public trusts, independently of the private benefit of those twelve Companies? It is quite sufficient for my purpose, for the purpose of the present motion, to state that this is the question raised upon the pleadings, and that it is a question which, at all events, on the part of the plaintiffs, cannot be treated as a question free of very considerable doubt on their part. It is impossible to look at either of the two charters without |