5 M. & G. 14; B. & Arn. 5; 13 L. J., C. P. 57; Coogan APPEAL. v. Luckett, (1846), B. & Arn. 716; 15 L. J., C. P.

159.

By Reg. Act, 1843, s. 66, "Every judgment or decision of the said Court shall be final and conclusive in the case upon the point of law adjudicated upon." This means final as regards the particular voter whose case is thus decided on; and even in a subsequent year, in the absence of any new facts; Sproule v. Buchanan, L. (1894) 51; but it will not prevent another voter from raising the question again with regard to his vote, although the circumstances of his case be similar. Roberts v. Percival, (1864), 18 C. B., N. S. 36; H. & P. 121; 34 L. J., C. P. 84. And in accordance with the principle that a Court, having a peculiar jurisdiction, from which there is no appeal, is not bound by its own decisions, the Court of C. P. had power to review its previous decisions. Webster v. Ashton-under-Lyne (Overseers of), Hadfield's case, (1873), L. R., 8 C. P. 306, 313; 2 Hop. & C. 89; 42 L. J., C. P. 146. See Kemp v. Wanklyn, (1894) 1 Q. B. 265, 267; per Ld. Coleridge, C. J.

Under the Judicature Act, 1881, however, "the juris- Appeal to diction of the High Court of Justice to decide questions leave. C. A. by of law, upon appeal or otherwise, under the " Reg. Acts, 44 & 45 V. 1843, 1865, and 1878, "or any of the said Acts, or any c. 68, s. 14. Act amending the same respectively, shall henceforth be final and conclusive, unless in any case it shall seem fit to the said High Court to give special leave to appeal therefrom to her Majesty's Court of Appeal, whose decision in such case shall be final and conclusive."

No appeal lay from the refusal of the High Court to grant leave to appeal. Kay v. Briggs, C. A., (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 343; 58 L. J., Q. B. D. 182; acc. Lane v. Esdaile, D. P., (1891) A. C. 210; S. C., sub nom. Payne v. Esdaile, (1891), 60 L. J., Ch. 644. But now by the Judicature Act, 1894, s. 1

66

'(5) In all cases where there is a right of appeal to the High Court from any Court or person, the appeal shall be

57 & 58 V.

c. 16.

APPEAL. heard and determined by a Divisional Court constituted as may be prescribed by rules of Court; and the determination thereof by the Divisional Court shall be final, unless leave to appeal is given by that Court or by the Court of Appeal. (6) An application for leave to appeal may be made ex parte or otherwise, as may be prescribed by Rules of Court."

On granting leave.

The Q. B. D. now, therefore, as in other cases where there is a right of appeal, follow their former decisions, giving leave to appeal if they consider the decision to be doubtful; Kemp v. Wanklyn, (1894) 1 Q. B. 265; F. & S. 360; 63 L. J., Q. B. D. 529; and the principle stated in Hadfield's case, supra, as to reviewing its own decisions, seems to apply to the Court of Appeal, as its decisions are now final.

With regard to leave to appeal being given by the High Court, Lord Esher, M. R., has made these valuable observations: "The jurisdiction which the judges of the Divisional Court have to give or to refuse leave to appeal from their own decisions is a very delicate one. Merely to say that they are satisfied that their decision is right is not, I venture to suggest, a sufficient reason for refusing leave to appeal, when the question involved is one of principle, and they have decided it for the first time. If that was carried to its legitimate conclusion, they ought to refuse leave to appeal in every case." Ex pte. Gilchrist, (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 521, 528; 55 L. J., Q. B. 578, 579. And similar principles will now apply to leave being granted by the C. A. to appeal.

It is, however, submitted that an order made by the High Court, or a judge thereof, under the Reg. Act, 1878, s. 37, ante, p. 340, to a R. B. to state a case, is not within the jurisdiction mentioned in the Judicature Act, 1881, s. 14, ante, p. 351, and that an appeal would therefore lie from such an order made, or from the refusal to make such an order, without leave granted, and in this way the opinion of the Court of Appeal might in some cases be indirectly obtained without leave to appeal.

TION OF REGISTER,

BURGESS

ROLL, AND

REGISTER.

If the judgment of the Court reverse the decision of CORRECthe R. B., notice of, such judgment or order of Court is to be forthwith given to the sheriff in counties, or returning officers in boroughs, having the custody of COUNTY the register, or town clerk having custody of the burgess roll. This notice, which is to be in writing under the hands of one of the Masters of the Supreme Court (z), must specify exactly every alteration or correction to be made in the register or burgess roll in pursuance of the judgment or order; and the sheriff, or returning officer, or town clerk, having custody of the burgess roll, is required to alter or correct the register or burgess roll accordingly, and sign his name against such alteration or correction, and hand over to his successor in office such notice with the register or burgess roll: Reg. Act, 1843, s. 67; Reg. Act, 1878, s. 35. This provision is extended to the burgess lists in municipal boroughs not parliamentary, and to the county electors' lists: Cy. El. Act, 1888, s. 4. In this case the notice must be given to the clerk of the county council: Id.; Local Gov. Act, 1888, ss. 3 (xii.), 83. So it would seem where the appeal relates to the list of parochial electors; see Local Gov. Act, 1894, ss. 43, 44.

It is not necessary in these cases to apply to the Court for any formal order for the correction of the register; when the decision of the Court is given, the Master will give the notice directed by the statute as a matter of course. Whitmore v. Bedford, (1843), 5 M. & G. 9; 13 L. J., C. P. 55; S. C., nom. Peele v. Hinton, B. & Arn. 14 (a).

By the Reg. Act, 1843, s. 68, the copy of the order of Copy of Court, purporting to be signed by one of the Masters order, eviof the Supreme Court (z), is declared to be sufficient

(2) Usually the Master at the Crown Office. See p. 341, n. (i). (a) In Gadsby v. Warburton, (1844), B. & Arn. 281; 14 L. J., C. P. 41, the order of the Court was drawn up in the following form:"Upon hearing, &c., it is ordered that the decision of the revising barrister be reversed, and that the following name be expunged from the register of voters for the said southern division of the county of L- 'S. W., of N., near Hyde, Cheshire."" See also the form of order in Druitt v. Gossling, (1888), 58 L. J., Q. B. 112, n.

dence.

TION OF

REGISTER,

CORREC- evidence in all cases, without proof of the Master's handwriting, and "shall have the like force and effect BURGESS as any entry made in any list or register of voters, under this or the" R. P. Act, 1832.

ROLL, AND
COUNTY
REGISTER.

of R. B.'s

mistake.

Where the R. B. has made a mistake, and has Correction struck out a voter's name from the borough list, intending to strike it out of the county list, the Queen's Bench Division has no power to order the mistake to be corrected. Ex pte. Allen, (1859), 6 C. B., N. S. 334; K. & G. 258; 28 L. J., C. P. 256. Such a mistake could formerly be remedied on a scrutiny by allowing the vote; Oldham, (1869), 1 O'M & H. 156, (Ogden's case); but since the Ballot Act, 1872 (35 & 36 V. c. 33), s. 7, ante, p. 190, this could not be done.

The names of certain burgesses were entered on wrong ward lists, which were revised by the R. B. without the mistake having been pointed out. The town clerk made up the ward rolls in accordance with the lists. The mistake was not found out till October 30th. A mandamus to the town clerk to remove the names to the right ward roll was refused because he had performed his duty. R. v. Eastbourne, Town Clerk of, Ex pte. May, Times, Dec. 22, 1891, Q. B. D. The Court suggested that possibly a mandamus might lie to the R. B. to correct the ward lists. Sed quære, for the burgess could have seen that his name was not published in the proper ward list, and should have sent in a claim, which would have come before the R. B. in due course at the proper time.

APPENDIX I.

STATUTES (a).

8 Hen. 6, c. 7. [1429.]

What sort of Men shall be Choosers and who shall be chosen Knights of the Parliament (b).

Item, whereas, (2) our lord the king, . . . hath Ante, p. 1. provided, ordained, and established, . . . that the knights of the shires to be chosen within the same realm of England, to come to the parliaments of our lord the king hereafter to be holden, shall be chosen in every county of the realm of England by people dwelling and resident in the same counties (c), whereof every one of Ante, them shall have free land or tenement to the value of P. 66. forty shillings by the year, at the least, above all charges The quali[repealed by 35 & 36 V. c. 33]. Provided always the electhat he which cannot expend forty shillings by the year tors. as afore is said shall in nowise be chooser of the knights Ante, for the parliament [remainder of the section repealed by 35 36 V. c. 33].

10 Hen. 6, c. 2. [1432.]

Certain things required in him who shall be a Chooser of the Knights of Parliament.

fication of

P. 54

P. 41.

[This Act remedied a slight want of precision in the language of the 8 H. 6, c. 7, supra, and provided that Ante, each chooser should have a freehold of the requisite value] "within the same county where any such chooser will meddle of any such election."

(a) These statutes follow the text of the revised statutes, 2nd edition, 1888-96. In the statutes subsequent to those at present issued in this edition (i.e., 35 & 36 V. et seq.), the plan has been continued of substituting the short titles of statutes given by 59 & 60 V. c. 14 for those previously printed in the text of the statutes. The marginal notes, not forming part of the statute (see Claydon v. Green, (1868), L. R. 3 C. P. 511; 37 L. J., C. P. 226, 232), have been amended, where accuracy or perspicuity required an alteration to be made.

(b) See 35 & 36 V. c. 98 (Ireland). (c) Repealed by 14 G. 3, c. 58.