CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE CONDUCTORS OF THE PHRENOLOGICAL JOURNAL AND SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, BART.

The Conductors of the Phrenological Journal present compli. ments to Sir William Hamilton, and beg leave to inform him, that, at a meeting called expressly for the purpose of considering and deciding on a request, stated in his note to Mr Combe, of date 12th instant, regarding his making, in that Journal, a reply to, or commentary on, the correspondence between him and Dr Spurzheim and Mr Combe, they came to the resolution of granting it, on condition of Sir William's paying the expense necessarily to be incurred in printing, if inserted in the forthcoming Number. They require this on the ground of that Number being already full, and such reply or commentary constituting extra matter. But should Sir William prefer, they are willing, at their own cost, to give what he may think necessary in the succeeding Number. They make these offers solely be cause of the peculiar circumstances of the case, and with the understanding, that the permission will be deemed by Sir William, as it is by them, a concession and departure from the principles of conduct usually adopted and recognized in literary journals.

Edinburgh, 15th April, 1828. Sir William Hamilton, Bart., 8c. &c.

SIR WILLIAM Hamilton presents compliments to the Conductors of the Phrenological Journal, and begs leave to observe, that they completely reverse the purport of his note to Mr Combe, in saying that it was “regarding his (Sir W.'s) making “ in that Journal a reply to, or commentary on, the correspond“ence between him and Dr Spurzheim and Mr Combe.' He stated then, as distinctly as he does now, that he only requested to be allowed to accompany with a reply the criticism or review of that correspondence on the part of the Phrenologists, which, he was informed by Mr Combe, was to appear along with the letters in the ensuing number of the Journal. If the correspondence were to be printed, as he thinks it ought, without observation or comment by either party, in that case Sir W. would never have dreamt of writing any remarks, or, where he could prevent it, of allowing any remarks to be written on what he regards as a closed pleading; far less would he have been so absurd as to request their insertion in the Phrenological Journal. Sir W. is ready to pay whatever expense the publication of a rejoinder to the new pleading by Mr Combe's friend may occasion. This will not be written by himself. At the same time, he cannot view, and would not choose to accept, the insertion of that reply as a favour. In so far as the Phrenological Journal professes to give a full and impartial report of the evidence for and against the doctrine, it affords Sir W. a title (and, in the circumstances of the case, the strongest title,) to put its professions to the test ; but it is only in as much as it thus incurs a general obligation, that he would presume to prefer a request to its conductors.

16, Great King Street, 15th April, 1828.

The Conductors of the Phrenological Journal return compli. ments to Sir William Hamilton, and beg leave to inform him, that, in their letter of 15th April, they acceded to Sir William's request regarding his making in that Journal a reply to a commentary on the correspondence between him and Dr Spurzheim and Mr.Combe; and, if they expressed themselves differently, it was unintentionally, and the difference must have arisen from an error in transcribing their minute, in using “or” for “a" before the word "commentary," Having acceded to Sir William's request, they consider it unnecessary to discuss whether Sir William is entitled to their compliance as a matter of right, or bound to accept of it as a favour. They add also, that, owing to the press of other matter, they are obliged to postpone the commentary till their next Number, in which they will insert Sir William's reply.

Edinburgh, 21st April, 1828.

PHRENOLOGICAL JOURNAL.

No XVIII.

ARTICLE I.

PHRENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ELOQUENCE.

(Read to the Phrenological Society by Mr Simpson.)

PRINCIPAL Campbell, in his work on the Philosophy of Rhetoric, which has long been and still is a standard guide, defines eloquence in its greatest latitude," that art or talent

by which discourse is adapted to its end;" and quotes Quintilian," dicere secundum virtutem orationis ;-Scientia "bene dicendi." Dr Campbell admits that his definition is much more comprehensive than the common acceptation of the term eloquence, but, nevertheless, adopts it for two reasons; 1st, It is best adapted to the subject of his essays (scarcely a test of the absolute correctness of a definition); and, 2dly, It corresponds with Cicero's notion of a perfect orator, "qui dicendo, animos audientium et docet, et delectat, et per"movet." It is plain that Cicero does not warrant Dr Campbell's very extensive definition; for many a discourse is perfectly adapted to its end which neither instructs, nor delights, nor strongly moves. Cicero, however, calls that an eloquent discourse which, at one and the same time, does all the three; and, as will appear in the sequel, the Roman is more phrenological in his definition than the Scottish rhetorician.

Dr Blair adopts substantially Campbell's extensive deVOL. V.-No XVIII.

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finition. “ To be eloquent is to speak to the purpose ;" and “ eloquence is the art of speaking in such a manner as “ to attain the end for which we speak.” This elegant rhetorician, however, soon limits his definition, which, he says, “ comprehends all the different kinds of eloquence, whether “ calculated to instruct, to persuade, or to please. But as the “ most important subject of discourse is action, the power of “ eloquence chiefly appears when it is employed to influence “ conduct and persuade to action. As it is principally with re« ference to this end that it becomes the object of art, eloquence

may, under this view of it, be defined, the art of persuasion.”

Eloquence, etymologically interpreted, is speaking out ; in other words, raising the voice to harangue a multitude ; and this its original characteristic has, by the figure of speech senecdochè, continued to give it a name, whatever de gree of “ image, sentiment, and thought," beyond what belongs to common discourse, from the howling appeal of the savage, through all the stages of reasoning and rhetoric, up to the impassioned yet clear and logical speech of the orator of civilization, is therein comprehended. But the name elo quence has been yet farther extended; it has been borrowed to distinguish a mode of composition and expression where there is neither haranguing nor speaking out; namely, that effusion of imagery and sentiment with which the poet exalts and enriches even his prose, and to which no orator ever reaches who is not a poet. “ Song," says one of the masters, « is but the eloquence of truth ;" truth to nature, in the widest, the most eloquent sense of that high term.

But the question recurs, What is eloquence in itself—it matters not whether written or spoken, said or sung, -as distinguished from all other kinds of discourse, each kind presumed fitted to its own end? The grand advantage possessed by a phrenological over every other test of the soundness of a theory on any point of anthropology, consists in its instant appeal to the primitive faculties of the human mind, to which faculties the whole of nature bears a definite and easily-observed relation. It is for want of such a guide that the theories, even of the most venerated leaders of the old

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school, vanish in vague generalities. When Campbell says that eloquence is either 6 instructive, imaginative, pathetic, “or vehement;" tending “ to enlighten the understanding, “ please the imagination, move the passions, or influence “ the will;" when Blair writes, that eloquence “ either

instructs, pleases, or persuades,” which is a translation of Cicero's “ docet et delectat et permovet," but with the disjunction instead of the conjunction, the reader who thinks phrenologically is left quite unsatisfied. He derives no definite idea from Campbell's enumeration; and on the strength of the phrenological fact, that every faculty of the, mind is pleased in its own exercise, he is forced to reject Blair's distinction between teaching and pleasing as necessarily different things; for they are often most closely connected. Cicero avoids this error by using the conjunction ; but even Cicero's view is indefinite. The Phrenologist inquires, What is it to be instructed, to be pleased, or to be persuaded ? It is to have certain of our primitive faculties in a certain way affected or excited; and a great step will be gained when, dismissing such generalities as instruction, pleasure, and persuasion, we can say definitely, that eloquence is speech which is ultimately addressed to and excites certain of our primitive faculties in a certain way.

The faculties being all comprehended in the two classes of the intellect and the feelings, eloquence must be addressed to faculties in both or either of these classes.

There seems no difficulty in now seeing our way. No one who has listen, ed to true eloquence, or seen its effect on others, can for a moment doubt that it rouses feeling'; and that speech which falls short of this effect is not eloquence, whatever may be its distinctive character and merits. But speech which does

. fall short of exciting any of the feelings must, nevertheless, of necessity put into greater or less activity the intellect of the hearer ; in other words, furnish him with ideas, or add to his knowledge, and there stop. A prelection on the facts and phenomena of an inductive science, however it may de