66

state, have no resource but to fall back on | etc., have not only their special nerves as the position that they, as it were, see this reflected in speculo Trinitatis" that is to say, that in some way incomprehensible to us, it is made known to them by God.

So far our argument has been that mental action, in our ordinary life, always implies concomitant changes in the material substance of the brain, but as this conclusion, once admitted, opens up a large class of questions of deep interest, it is hardly fair to broach the subject without giving these some consideration, though in regard to many of the points, we are not yet in a position to make very definite state

ments.

channels of excitation, but also certain parts of the brain necessarily involved in their play. There is, therefore, an a priori probability that to the mental functions also certain parts of the brain are specially assigned. Assiduous attempts have been made to determine this point, in the way both of direct experimentation in the lower animals, and of observation of the peculiarities of disposition and character of individuals, in connection with the varied configuration of the brain, as inferred from the external form of the skull the latter being the basis of the popular system of phrenology. But little light, however, has been thrown on the subject by either of these methods.

The latest experiments, those of Dr. Ferrier-though their value is still disputed-go to extend to the greater part of the brain proper, what had previously been generally admitted as to the lower masses of nervous matter within the skull, namely, that it also is the seat of peculiar

There are two aspects in which we may regard the views opened up to us by an admission of the dependence of the play of thought on the action of the brain. We have first the scientific question, whether we can follow up the general assertion of the part which the brain, as a whole, takes in mental work, by assigning proper organs in its complex structure to the sev-reactions whereby impressions made on eral faculties of the mind, or at least by its substance excite corresponding exterindicating what functions may be per- nal movements, only with this difference, formed by the different parts of the brain that the molecular changes in the cerebral in developing the phenomena of thought convolutions are attended with that state and feeling. This question is the more of distinct consciousness which is known important as the answer to it cannot but as sensations. That is to say, the brain modify in some degree our whole system is not so much the organ of thought of mental philosophy, even if it does not proper as of the excitement of the sensarevolutionize it so far as does the popular tions which provide the material of thought, system which goes under the name of and of the consecutive production of the phrenology. But the moral question bodily actions which accompany and proopened up will naturally have more in- mote thought, and avail for its utterance terest to the readers of this review, as it or manifestation. The posterior lobes of brings under consideration what bearing the brain and its extreme frontal portion, the doctrine of cerebral action in thought whose excitation Dr. Ferrier found was has on our freedom of will and powers of not followed by movements, are comparaself-control, our ideas on all which points tively small in the lower animals, even in must necessarily hinge very much on the those of advanced development, such as view taken of the true relation of mind the cat, dog, and monkey, but they attain and body. We will, therefore, touch as much larger dimensions in man, and are, briefly on the physiological aspect of the in fact, what give the peculiar human char question as is consistent with such a state-acter to his head. The convolutions of ment of the case as will make intelligible any reference to its leading features involved in our subsequent remarks.

In favor of the idea that the different mental powers have each appropriate parts of the cerebral mass as their special organs, may be adduced the analogy of the several physiological actions of various parts of the lower division of the nervous system, now more or less definitively ascertained. For instance, it is now admitted that the movements of the chest in respiration, of the heart in the propulsion of the blood, of the eyes in vision,

the frontal region are regarded by Dr. Ferrier as organs for the inhibition or control of the responsive movements referred to, his idea being that for thought and reflection it is necessary that the sensations should not be allowed to discharge themselves at once, as it were, in external expression. If this view be admitted in regard to the non-excitable region in front, it would seem reasonable to extend it to the posterior lobes also, which Dr. Ferrier is inclined, though with some dubiety, to

The Functions of the Brain, p. 282.

regard rather as the organ through which our appetites and internal sensations make themselves felt.* It is with some diffidence that we venture to differ from such an authority, yet we cannot but think that Dr. Ferrier's opinion of the function of the posterior lobes is open to the same objection as the view of the phrenologists presently to be noticed.

these constitute just that part of the brain which a more accurate acquaintance with the conformation of the organ in the lower animals shows to be deficient in them, and present characteristically in our own species. If this part then has any connection with such propensities, its office must be not to develop but to controltheir play, as Dr. Carpenter remarks in The aim of this school, in their exposi- his criticism of the system.* These and tion of brain action, is much more ambi- such like discrepancies between the dicta tious than that of any physiologist. They of phrenological writers and the results claim to set forth a complete philosophy of later investigations into the functions of mind, associating all its endowments of the brain have led not a few physiolo with the masses of brain substance_on gists of note, who once entertained such whose operation they are dependent. But views, subsequently to give them up. On it must be admitted that their conclusions the other hand, it must be allowed that meet with no general favor from physiolo- Dr. Ferrier's observations give some supgists. Various causes have probably con- port to the phrenologists in locating the tributed to bring on the disfavor with reflective faculties in the frontal region.† which the system is now regarded in scientific circles. A good deal may be due to the extent to which it has been made by some of its professors to pander to a wretched empiricism and to the shallow conceits of many who have come forward as its advocates, but the main cause of the collapse seems to be that the conclusions of its best writers are largely vitiated by the crudity of their ideas on the subject of the philosophy of mind. As Todd and Bowman, remark, "many of the so-called faculties of the phrenologists are but phases of other and larger powers of the mind, and the psychologist must determine what are and what are not fundamental faculties of the mind, before the physiologist can venture to assign to each its local habitation." †

The only conclusions positively warranted as yet in regard to the functions of particular parts of the brain seem to be their ministration to the reception and elaboration of sensory impressions, and the manifestation of mental states by appropriate bodily actions. The instrumentality of the brain in proper thought, or in memory, can as yet be predicated only of the convoluted surface of the hemispheres at large, and is based on the general facts mentioned before such as the increase of mental power concomitantly with the larger development of brain substance, the loss of consciousness and memory from injury to that organ or interruption of its functions, and the waste of nerve tissue proportionate to the amount of mental work performed.

To this we must add that the exponents For the dependence of memory on the of the system in the present day are by no integrity of the material substance of the means up to our actual knowledge of the brain there is abundant evidence, though structure and functions of the brain itself, but little success has yet attended the having rested too exclusively on the efforts either of physiologists or physiexamination merely of the skull, its exter-cians to connect it with particular parts of nal case. Allowing that the discrepancies the cerebral mass. The probability in have been exaggerated between this and the cerebral surface immediately underlying it, it is clear that the form of the skull gives no clue to the proportional development of the parts situated more internally, some of which belong to the same sheet of convoluted nervous matter. The want, too, of sufficient knowledge of the comparative anatomy of the brain has led them at least into one serious error sufficient of itself to upset their conclusions. We refer to their localizing the animal propensities in the posterior lobes, for

fact must be admitted to be wholly against the existence of any local centre for memory, and in favor of its depending on the residuary traces of previous impressions of sensation and feeling, and of the motor efforts consequent thereon, in any part of the brain where these have occurred, and to whatever cause, objective or subjective, they were due.

Admitting, however, that mental phenomena, as they occur in our present state of existence, are associated with, and have their character determined by concomitant * British and Foreign Medical Review, October 1846. Functions of the Brain, p. 288.

changes in the substance of the brain, different views may still be taken of the nature of this association. On the one hand, we may regard our being as complex, consisting of a conscious and active principle intimately conjoined with the material organism, which it uses not only for the manifestation but probably also for the elaboration of its own processes- -the brain in the course of thought taking the part somewhat of the pen of the writer, or the instrument of the player. Mechanical though they be, these appliances furnish no small help in the process of composition itself and are something more than He shows that matter is essentially gifted the necessary media of its outward ex- with active properties, with powers of attracpression. Few, if any, of our most fluent tion and repulsion; even its impenetrability authors or speakers could carry on their involves repulsive forces. Indeed he is discontinuous current of argument, were it posed to adopt the theory of Boscovik, which not constantly associated with the con- makes matter nothing else than an aggregate comitant embodiment, as it were, of their of centres of force, of points of attraction and conceptions either by the pen or by the repulsion, one towards the other. The inorgans of voice; and we believe the pri-herent activity of matter being thus vindicated, vate history of some of the most celebrated composers shows a like dependence on the accompanying execution of their ideal efforts for the full perfection of their flights of harmony. As the bright idea once enunciated, or the happy musical combination once uttered, seems to afford a fixed basis for farther advance on the part of the composer, so we may fairly imagine that the result of one operation on the part of the active and conscious element of our nature, by being imprinted in the way of a memorial impression on the substance of the brain, acquires a fixity and permanence which enables it to serve as a secure basis in the further progress of thought.

of manifesting those other properties spoken of as spiritual or immaterial.

Not that this materialistic, or "singlesubstance doctrine" -as Dr. Bain calls it is new in itself. It has been revived indeed with fresh energy in our own day, having received a new impulse from the prevalent views as to the so-called "corelation of forces," but even in last century it had a powerful advocate in Priestley. Of the line taken by this writer Dr. Bain gives us, in the work before us, a general summary, of which we have room to quote but a part:

But, on the other hand, we see that a very different view of the relations of mind and body is now put forward and claims to meet with a favorable reception from some of those who have the repute of Occupying the most "advanced" position as leaders of the public opinion of our day. This view, so far as we can understand the language of its exponents, involves the denial, or at least is opposed to the admission, of any distinctive spiritual element or principle in our nature. Admitting, as all must, who do not wilfully shut their eyes to what passes without us and to what passes within us, two classes of facts or phenomena - those made known to us by our external senses, and those of which we become aware by our inner consciousness - it would yet allow but one substance to which both classes of phenomena belong, a substance which we cail material when we have to do with its sensible properties, but which has also the capacity

why should it not be able to sustain the special activity of thought, seeing that sensation and perception have never been found but in an organized system of matter? It being a rigid canon of the Newtonian logic, not to multiply causes without necessity, we should adhere to a single substance, until it be shown, which at present it can not, that the properties of mind are incompatible with the properties of matter (p. 183).

The more recent movement in favor of materialism has arisen in Germany, principally among the professors of the natural sciences; but their views evidently find favor also with some men of mark in our own country, among whom we may fairly reckon the author before us, to judge from the way in which he states their case in the concluding chapter of his work:

Their handling of it turns partly on the accumulated proofs, physiological and other, of the dependence of mind on body, and partly upon the more recent doctrines as to matter and force, summed up in the grand generality known as the Co-relation, Conservaenables them to surpass Priestley in the cotion, or Persistence of Force. This principle gency of their arguments for the essential and inherent activity of matter; all known force being in fact embodied in matter. Their favorite text is, "No matter without force, and no force without matter." The notion of a quiescent, impassive block, called matter, coming under the influence of forces ab extra, or superimposed, is, they hold, less tenable

now than ever. Are not the motions of the matter? And besides the two great properties planets maintained by the inherent power of called Inertia and Gravity, every portion of matter has a certain temperature, consisting, it is believed, of intestine motions of the

The rapid sketch thus given seems to tell its own tale as to the future. The arguments for the two substances have, we believe, now entirely lost their validity; they are no longer compatible with ascertained science and clear thinking. The one substance with two sets of properties, two sides, the physical and the mental- — a double-faced unity-would appear to comply with all the exigencies of the case (p. 196).

The work done, as Mr. Lewes expresses it, when "viewed from the physical or objective side, is a neural [nervous] process; viewed from the psychical or subjective side, it is a sentient process."" In an earlier part of his work Dr. Bain, if not so explicit as at the conclusion, in telling us what theory he does adopt in regard to the connection of mind and body, is at least quite decided in repudiating the doctrine of the co-existence in our nature of two substances, a material and an immaterial, "which has prevailed from the time of Thomas Aquinas to the present day," but which "is now in course of being modified at the instance of modern physiology." The view "that the mind and the body react upon each other; that there is constant interference, a mutual influence between the two," is rejected on the grounds that we have no experience of mind apart from body, and that there is in company with all our mental processes an unbroken material succession (p. 130).

pro

and collocations of matter are continually evoking new forms, and presenting to us other powers before unknown to us. What right has any one then to deny the existence in matter of latent potentialities, which experience and reason combine to show are actually now there, and in all probability have been latent antecedently? *

Des Cartes too, as is well known, held animals to be merely sentient automata. But by the author before us and others of his school it is obviously meant to explain in the same way the whole range of the activities of the human mind also.

Now it is undoubtedly the opinion of many able physiologists, in regard at least to the human mind, that we have no satisfactory ground for concluding that cerebral action covers the whole domain of thought, and other conditions commonly referred to the soul; but even granting such a position to be tenable, and allowing that no rupture of nervous con

there may

be "

tinuity," as Dr. Bain puts it - how this interferes with the concomitant action of soul and body in the present state of our being, we entirely fail to see.

form

It is true that if thought, as thought, requires, in the present constitution of our nature, the association of corporeal action for its own activity, this activity must cease after the dissolution of our bodily fabric by death, unless in the divine econmy some substitute be provided for the bodily organization. But seeing that our main reasons, as believers, for holding the doctrine of the immortality of the soul are the intimations of it in God's revelation, Were this view of the nature of mental the proportion of faith requires us also to phenomena restricted to such as are char-hold that he will supply whatever is needacteristic of the lower animals, it goes in ful to carry out his designs in this respect, no respect beyond what is strongly main- however impossible it may be for us to tained by an author of very different any conception of his method of clivities, Professor Mivart. He anticipates doing so, save in so far as he has expressly revealed it to us. The faith that gained Abraham so high a blessing, was that when the sacrifice came to be offered, God would provide himself a lamb for a burntoffering; and if our own immortality has to be realized by a like act of faith, doubtless it will also meet with a like recompense of reward. In so far, he has, indeed, given us a revelation of his design towards us, in the doctrine of the resurrection of the body a doctrine harmonizing, at least to this extent, with the most advanced views of modern physiology, that it represents the united action both of soul and body, as necessary for the full perfection of man's powers, as well mental as corporeal.

the query

Is it conceivable that the arrangement of matter, in whatsoever conditions, should be the occasion of evoking from potentiality to act a power not only of living and reproducing, but of feeling and sensibly cognizing, of form ing associations of sensible images, of connecting therewith various emotions, a power capable of exhibiting the complex instincts of the ant, the fidelity of the dog, and the simulation of reason of the elephant?

He then goes on to say: To such objectors I would reply, How can you show that your conception of matter as it exists is adequate?... New combinations

Lessons from Nature, p. 239.

* Problems of Life, vol. ii., p. 459.

All, therefore, that can be said on this | in such a way as to overlook the difference, subject from the natural point of view is but this is not to account for it. If the that the tenet of the consciousness of the limit of our philosophy or power of expla disembodied spirit cannot be established nation be as Dr. Bain would seem to from the conclusions of science, but, if put it to generalize or discern agreeadopted as an article of faith, must stand ment among facts remotely placed, it may on evidence derived from the proper be quite true that, though the phenomena source of faith. of mind and body "have very little in

The other materialistic ground of objec- common-though they participate only tion, if solid, is more fundamental. It amounts to this, that, as we have no direct experience of mind apart from body-as "we are not allowed to perceive a mind acting apart from its material companion," we have therefore absolutely no knowledge of its existence.

in the most general attributes, namely, quantity, co-existence, and succession, and even as regards these, their participation is limited"—yet they have this one point of agreement, that they are both subject to our cognition while we are still in the body; but if the admission of this self-evident proposition is to be the furthest limit of our philosophy, it certainly does not carry us much above the level of the simplest child of nature, and hardly bears out the author's eulogy of the result, that

Matter [as Professor Ferrier makes the materialist say] is already in the field as an acknowledged entity-this both parties admit. Mind, considered as an independent entity, is not so unmistakably in the field. Therefore, as entities are not to be multiplied without necessity, we are not entitled to postulate a new cause, so long as it is possible to account there is nothing further to be done; nothing for the phenomena by a cause already in ex-further to be desired. Nor have we here any istence which possibility has never yet been disproved.*

This is the stock argument with all materialists, but it seems, not the less, to involve a double fallacy: firstly, in that it assumes sensible demonstration as the only source of knowledge; and, secondly, in an abuse of the Newtonian canon, not to multiply causes without necessity. There may be some reason in maintaining that we are not entitled to postulate a new cause, so long as it is possible to account for the phenomena by a cause already in existence; but some positive evidence is surely first called for in favor of such possibility it does not meet the case to say that it has not been disproved. The difficulty of proving a negation is so proverbial, that in such a matter it may be put out of the question.

reason to be dissatisfied with the position, or to complain of baulked satisfaction, or of being on a lower platform than we might possibly Occupy. Our intelligence is fully honored, fully implemented by the possession of a principle as wide in its sweep as the phenomenon itself (p. 122).

May we, then, have no aspirations after that which is beyond our full vision - no apprehension of truths which defy full comprehension? Must we not only acquiesce in the limited nature of our powers, but absolutely hug the chains which trammel us?

Such a philosophy would repudiate all consideration of efficient causes, as lying beyond the bounds of human knowledge, and therefore beyond the province of legitimate inquiry — a position which is compatible, perhaps, with the prosecution of physiIt is not merely that the phenomena of cal, but hardly with that of mental science. thought are different from those of a phys-In matter, as matter, we look only for pheical nature, in the sense that the phenomena of chemical action differ from those of mechanics, or of vital growth, though much more widely; but that the kind of difference is such that it revolts our understanding to ascribe them to an essence of a like nature. "Materialism annihilates itself," as Feuchtersleben remarks, "when it subtilizes so far as to exalt body into mind, and this is the only way to make it think and will." †

Of course it is possible to regard nature

Institutes of Metaphysics, p. 229. † Medical Psychology, p. 17.

nomena, we do not look for an efficient cause. For the mere purposes of physical science it is needless to go at all into the question of an efficient cause, the object of such science being simply to learn the established relations of succession and resemblance among phenomena. It may even be expedient at times to limit our investigation to this, confining ourselves for a particular purpose to a particular field of thought, and excluding what lies beyond; for the same subject may be viewed in different aspects, and, for the purpose of obtaining a clear view of one of these aspects, it may be best for the time to exclude others.