MR. JUSTICE HAWKINS AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

THE clause of the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, which enacts that "No action shall be brought whereby to charge any person upon any agreement that is not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof," has met with a fair share of the judicial discussion which has been accorded to that statute generally, and the principles by which it is interpreted are now well known and defined. Those rules has been stated to be that "a contract which, according to its terms is primâ facie not to be performed within a year is not the less within the statute, because it is made defeasible by a contingency which may occur within that period, and, on the other hand a contract which primâ facie, and from its terms may be performed within a year, however improbable that it will be so, does not fall within the statute, and it is immaterial that the performance of it is by the natural course of events delayed for a much longer period." The above words are extracted from the judgment of Mr Justice Hawkins in the case of Davey v. Shannon (40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 628), and are fully supported by a long series of decisions and dicta. While entirely accepting therefore his Lordship's statement of the law, we cannot help differing from him in his application of it to the facts of the case in question. There the plaintiff in his statement of claim alleged that in the year 1866 the defendant entered into his employment as foreman for a term of three years upon the terms, amongst others, that if he should leave the plaintiffs' employment he should not engage in the service of anyone carrying on, or himself carrying on, the business of a tailor or outfitter within a certain distance of the plaintiffs' place of business. It was further stated that on the expiration of the three years the defendant continued in such employment upon the like terms except as to the period of employment until 1877. A breach of the above condition was then alleged, and damages and an injunction claimed. To this the defendant pleaded the above clause of the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, and the plaintiff demurred. The agreement sued upon, viz., the one established after the expiration of the three years, was therefore one the duration of which was coextensive with the defendant's life, and might be broken by him at any time. It could consequently only be completely performed by his dying without having broken it, and the question raised by the plea was therefore whether an engagement for life is to use Mr. Justice Hawkin's own words, "a contract which primâ facie and from its terms may be performed within a year." His Lordship held that it was not, and that therefore the Statute of Frauds applied, and that the demurrer was bad.

It will have been observed that by his Lordship's own definition the probability of the contract remaining in force beyond the period of a year from the making thereof is not material, and we cannot help thinking that the effect of his Lordship's decision is to raise a presumption of law as to the duration of human life, which has never been raised before, and which in other cases the law has expressly declined to raise. We are of opinion that a contract which "primâ facie and from its terms" is not to be performed within a year, can only be such a contract as, unless defeated by some contingency provided for, is incapable from its terms of arriving at its full completion and performance within the year, and that in this case inasmuch as the period of full completion had no reference to any space of time, but merely to the happening of an event which might occur at any time the contract did not fall within the category of those which by the rule of law as above stated come under the statute. The judg ment we are discussing will be found to contain a careful résumé of the decisions bearing upon the question which are cited in illustration of the legal propositions laid down, and are relied upon as supporting the conclusion arrived at. With one exception, however, we venture to think that they are consistent with and bear out the opposite conclusion, and in support of this opinion we propose shortly to consider the bearing of some of the most important of them.

The exception above alluded to is the case of Eley v. The Positive Life Assurance Company (L. Rep. 1 Ex. Div. 20). There the plaintiff sued for damages for the breach of an alleged contract whereby the defendants were stated to have agreed with the plaintiff that the plaintiff should be solicitor to the company and should transact all its legal business, and should not be removed from his office except for misconduct. The Court found that there was no such contract but went on to say that if there had been it would not have availed the plaintiff, unless it had been in writing. The case went up to the Exchequer Chamber where the decision was affirmed but only upon the former ground. This, therefore, is not a direct authority but is only an expression of opinion by the Court of Exchequer in an analogous case. Of the other cases mentioned in the judgment there is one other which at first sight might appear to support the conclusion that the present contract was within the statute. This is the Irish case of Farrington v. Donohoe (Ir. Rep. 1 C. L. 675). It was there held that a parol agreement to maintain a child known to be about five years old until she should be able "to do for herself" could not be sued upon. Although it might be determined within the year by the death of the child.

Here, however, it may be observed that the ultimate time fixed for the completion of the contract was the time when the child should be able "to do for herself," necessarily more than one year distant, while the death of the child was merely a collateral event which might sooner determine the agreement. In the present case the death of the defendant was the time primarily fixed for the completion of the contract, and in that fact there lies we conceive the clearest distinction between the cases. Moreover in the judgment in the same case, another Irish decision, Murphy ▼. O'Sullivan (11 Ir. Jur. N. S. 111) was referred to without dissent, in which it was directly decided by the Irish Court of Error that an agreement to maintain a young person during his life was not within the statute, which, if Irish cases be considered, is of course a decision directly establishing our view of the question. We do not wish to drag our readers through an enumeration of all the cases mentioned by Mr. Justice Hawkins they can be seen in the judgment itself. In all those in which writing was held necessary it will be found on examination that the period primarily appointed for performance though perhaps not definitely fixed was of a certainty more than a year distant, while in those in which a parol agreement has been held sufficient such period might have arrived within the year. Of the last of these classes of cases we will, however, in conclusion select the one which is perhaps most in point as showing that the present judgment ought to have been for the plaintiff. This is Fenton v. Emblers (3 Burr. 1278) a case more than 100 years old and frequently followed and relied upon. There the action was brought upon an agreement made upon good consideration between the plaintiff and one May whose representative the defendant was, whereby May promised by his last will and testament to give and bequeath to the plaintiff a legacy of £16 a year to be paid and payable to her yearly, and every year from the day of the decease of May for and during the term of her natural life. The first payment of the annuity was not to take place within a year from the date of the agreement because it would only be payable a year after May's death, but it was urged that the performance of the agreement would have been the making of the will in accordance with it, and that that might have been done within the year; and upon this ground it was held that the agreement was not within the statute. In the judgment of Mr. Justice Denison in this case the following words of Lord Chief Justice Holt were cited, "Where the agreement is to be performed upon a contingency and it does not appear within the agreement that it is to be performed after the year then a note in writing is not necessary," and to the same effect Mr. Justice Wilmot says, "the clause in the statute only extends to such promises, where, by the express appointment of the party, the thing is not to be performed within a year." This seems to us precisely to coincide with Mr. Justice Hawkins's definition of a contract not within the statute, viz., one which “primâ facie and from its terms may be performed within a year, and we cannot understand why the law should not be similarly applied. In the present case there could not from the nature of the agreement be an express appointment that the contract was not to be performed within a year, and it is certain that it might have been so performed. With great deference we cannot, therefore, think that it is properly held to be within the statute.

THE WIFE'S EQUITY TO A SETTLEMENT. In a recent article we propounded the question, how far the old equitable plea of purchase for valuable consideration, which used to be pleaded in bar of a bill in Chancery, and had practically much the same operation as a demurrer, was likely to be affected by the union of the equity courts with the courts of common law. We saw that the principle upon which that plea rested for its efficacy was the refusal of the equity courts to exert their extraordinary jurisdiction over and above the law, as against a defendant who had done nothing to make himself a proper object for the interference of the court. The defendant stood on his legal rights; and the court refused to interfere as against him, because it could not interfere without depriving him of his legal rights, which he had done nothing to forfeit. But we saw at the same time that, when the circumstances were such that the interference, or rather the action, of the court did not imply any deprivation of the legal rights of the defendant, but only resulted in giving his legal rights to the plaintiff, the court no longer refused to interfere, or rather to act, in the matter; and under such circumstances the plea of purchase for valuable consideration was not admissible. This class of cases is one among several other classes, all depending for their principle upon the same view of the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, as being an extraordinary jurisdiction over and above the law. In the case of the purchaser for valuable consideration without notice, the court refused to aid his adversary against him, upon the ground that the adversary had shown no claim to anything over and above what the law would give him. There were other cases in which the court did not absolutely refuse to interfere, but made a bargain with the suitor as the price of its interference. In these cases the plaintiff and the defendant were both entitled in equity to something over and above what the law would give them, but the court refused to enforce the plaintiff's equity against the defendant, except upon condition that he would voluntarily allow the equitable

claim of the defendant against him. And in these cases, as in the former ones, the court did not pretend to restrain the plaintiff from getting whatever the law would give him; it only refused to give him something more unless he would do something in return for the concession. For example, if a man laid out money in improving land of which he erroneously supposed himself to be the owner, he might afterwards be ejected by the true owner; nor had he any claim in equity to compensation for the money laid out in improvements, unless the true owner had perpetrated a practical fraud by wilfully concealing his better title while the money was being laid out. That is to say, equity did not interfere to prevent the true owner from exerting his legal rights to the full; his conduct in so doing was regarded as harsh rather than inequitable. But let it be supposed that the true owner had only an equitable title, which he could not make effectual without the aid of the Court of Chancery over and above the law; here the court took advantage of the fact that he was obliged to ask for its aid, and refused to aid him except upon condition that he would make fair compensation.

A more extensive and important class of cases illustrating the same general principle is comprised under the title of a wife's equity to a settlement. By the common law, which still remains unaltered as regards property belonging to the wife at the time of the marriage, a husband immediately on his marriage became entitled absolutely to all his wife's chattels in possession, and to the rents and profits of her real estate during the marriage; he also became entitled to all her choses in action, provided he reduced them into possession during the marriage; and he also became entitled to all her chattels real, with full power to alien them; though, if he died without having reduced into possession the choses in action or aliened the chattels real, leaving the wife him surviving, they would respectively revert to the wife by survivorship. With this legal right equity did not interfere. The husband was left free (with one remarkable exception to be presently noticed) to take all that the law would give him. But if he found himself obliged to resort to equity in order to eke out his legal title, the Court of Chancery took advantage of his need, and refused to aid him in recovering the wife's property except upon condition that he would make some settlement which would secure to the wife a fair share of the benefit. These cases differ from those last mentioned in this, that what may be called the antagonistic equity, which the court insisted upon as the price at which it would give effect to the plaintiff's equity, did not reside in the defendant but in a third person, namely, the plaintiff's wife. Technically she might be a stranger to the equity against the defendant; but the court took notice of the fact that the plaintiff's title was derived to him through his marriage. And the wife's equity was generally good, not only against the husband, but also against his assignees whether voluntary or involuntary. That this was the origin, and that this gives the true theory, of the wife's right in equity to a settlement, cannot be doubted. The principle is illustrated with peculiar clearness by the cases of Sturgis v. Champneys (5 My. & Cr. 97) and Gleaves v. Paine (1 De G. J. & Sm. 87). In the former case (which was decided by Lord Cottenham in 1839, reversing the decision of Sir L. Shadwell) a Bill was filed by the provisional assignee of an insolvent husband, to perfect his title at law to a life estate in real property, to which the husband was entitled in right of his wife and the assignee was entitled as representing the husband. He was obliged to have recourse to equity, because the legal estate was outstanding in mortgagees. Doubts were raised as to the validity of the wife's claim, upon the ground that the court had never before made a provision for a wife out of such an interest as the wife in that case had, and that it was not established that the wife's equity extended to the rents of real estate. But it is plain that this objection is really an objection against the principle itself-if the principle itself be admitted, the objection becomes nihil ad rem; and this was Lord Cottenham's opinion. “If," he said, “the authorities support Lady Champneys' equity as a condition which this court imposes as the price of the assistance which the assignee asks of the court, the nature of the estate of the wife in the subject-matter in contest does not seem to be important." That part of the principle which gives effect to the wife's claim, is here summed up neatly in a very few words.

The other part of the principle, that, namely, which leaves the husband or his assignee free to get whatever the law would give him, is well illustrated by the other case above mentioned Gleaves v. Paine; a case which has sometimes been oddly thought to be somehow out of accord with Sturgis v. Champneys, whereas in truth each of them well serves to explain and complement the other. In Gleaves v. Paine, before Lord Westbury in 1863, the case was as follows: Husband and wife, being seised of lands as tenants in fee simple in right of the wife, joined in mortgaging the lands for a sum admitted to be greater than the value of the husband's estate by curtesy or for joint lives of himself and wife; the proviso was for reconveyance to the wife on redemption by the husband; the husband having become bankrupt, the wife filed a bill against his assignees and the mortgagee, claiming a right to redeem, and to prove against the bankrupt's estate for the amount, and to have the lands (without prejudice to the mortgage) settled on herself. As the mortgage debt exceeded

any possible interest of the husband in the lands, his assignees of course refused to redeem, and the wife, as Lord Westbury observed, got what she wanted at a vast expense, while by a little better management she might have got it cheaply. But he left no doubt about the principle which he considered applic able to cases in which a claimant could make good his title at law to the wife's property without coming to equity for assistance. He declared himself not disposed to extend the decision in Sturgis v. Champneys any further than it actually went; and said that it would extend the rule very much to recognise the doctrine that a wife might come to the court asking for a settlement of real estate belonging to the husband (i.e. the husband's interest in right of his wife in his wife's lands) as against the husband's assignee, which the assignee could render available without resorting to this court. Against this we have nothing to object, except that it was not very correct to describe the supposed doctrine as an extension of Sturgis v. Champneys. It is true that the doctrine is not to be found in Sturgis v. Champneys; but this is not enough to make it an extension of Sturgis v. Champneys; for it might be described as an extension of Spencer's case upon the same ground.

As to the exceptions to the rule, that the husband's assignees are bound by the wife's equity no less than the husband himself, it is now pretty well settled that a purchaser from the husband for valuable consideration of a life estate to which the wife is equitably entitled may have the help of equity to perfect his title without giving up any part of his purchase to the wife, provided that at the time when the purchase was made the husband was properly maintaining the wife. But we are more concerned to notice the exception, to which reference has been made above, to the rule that the Court of Chancery did not interfere with those legal rights which the husband could enforce without having recourse to equity to perfect his title; because this exception throws a remarkable light upon another branch of the subject to be presently mentioned. This exception comprises those cases in which the husband sued in the Ecclesiastical Court for a legacy or a share of personalty under an intestacy due to his wife; when the Court of Chancery would restrain by injunction his suit in the Ecclesiastical Court until he had agreed to make a reasonable provision for the wife.

In consenting to interfere in these cases, the court seems to have taken up the ground, that in these matters it had a concurrent jurisdiction with the Ecclesiastical Court, and that, as the wife could enforce her equity in Chancery but not in the Ecclesiastical Court, Chancery would compel the husband to come to the court where the wife would have a fair chance of enforc ing her rights. But, however we may explain the exception, it still remains an exception which cannot be brought within the terms of the principle above laid down; for that principle would warrant the Court of Chancery only in refusing to the suitor its extraordinary jurisdiction over and above the law, whereas in the cases now contemplated it not only refused to exercise in his favour its ordinary jurisdiction, but even prohibited him from enforcing that ordinary jurisdiction elsewhere. In this respect its practice differed, as we have seen, from its practice with respect to the analogous class of cases having regard to the claims of purchasers for valuable consideration without notice. In the latter class of cases the court not only did not prohibit the adverse suitor from proceeding in another court, but itself consented to exercise its ordinary jurisdiction in his favour.

This exception throws a remarkable light upon the celebrated case of Lady Elibank v. Montolieu (5 Ves. 737; 1 Wh. & Tu. L. C. 461.) That case is commonly regarded as having established the right of the wife herself to take proceedings to give effect to her equitable claim, instead of waiting until her husband or his assignee found himself obliged to have recourse to the assistance of Chancery. That inference has indeed been drawn from the case; but when we point out that in that case the subject-matter in contest was the share of personalty to which the wife as next of kin was entitled under an intestacy-a kind of case in which the court assumed a much greater latitude of interference than in others-it may be doubted whether the inference ought not in strictness of reasoning to be confined to cases in which the Court of Chancery would have granted an injunction to restrain proceedings in the Ecclesiastical Court. In Eedes v. Eedes (11 Šim. 569) Sir L. Shadwell said, he took it to be "perfectly settled law" that where a wife was entitled to a chose in action consisting of a principal sum, and not only of income, she might file a bill against her husband and the trustee for a settlement. But anyone who reads the cases there cited and relied upon in argument at the bar (which, by the way, do not include Lady Elibank v. Montolieu) will perhaps be of opinion that the law, far from being perfectly settled, was rather in a state of uncertainty and confusion.

We have put together the foregoing remarks by way of propounding the question, what effect the recent consolidation of the courts of equity with the courts of law will have upon this peculiar piece of equity. It may safely be said that this question is more intricate, if not more difficult, than the analogous question with regard to the equitable claims of purchasers for valuable consideration without notice; and we commend it accordingly to the serious consideration of the reader.

contended that, as he had settled the claim of a third party for the payment of which the defendant had become surety, the bill of sale having been given to the defendant to protect him in his suretyship,' therefore the defendant had no authority to enforce his rights under the bill of sale. The defendant's counsel took the objection that this point was not raised in the pleadings, nor was it so raised. On the other side it was objected that the defendant's pleadings were also defective, as issue had not been taken on the plaintiff's reply. Upon this the learned judge said he must decline to amend the pleadings on either side, and added: "People think they can put down what they like in their pleadings, and leave it to the judge to frame their pleadings for them. I must say I decline the task.' The parties then agreed to a reference of the action and all matters in difference upon terms. The probability is, that in this case the learned counsel engaged discovered that the pleadings had not been settled by counsel, as the ordinary rules of pleading had not been complied with. As far as it can safely be done we advocate the practice of solicitors settling their own pleadings; but country solicitors are hardly wise in doing so without the assistance of their London agents, who are usually the best judges of whether it is necessary that pleadings should be settled by counsel. Unfortunately, there is a growing tendency on the part of counsel to encourage technicality in pleadings such as existed under the Common Law Procedure Acts. The aim of the pleader should be to make pleadings as simple as possible, and in the case under notice we can not help thinking that the learned judge might well have amended the defendant's pleadings if not those of the plaintiff also, for counsel on either side appear to have clearly understood the claims and intentions of the litigants. The non-joinder of issue was clearly an oversight, and the objection in reference to it purely a technical one. The great purpose of pleadings (which in many cases might be altogether dispensed with) is to point out the distinct nature of the issues between the parties.

A CURIOUS question of practice is brought to our notice in regard to the time allowed to a defendant to reply to a plaintiff's defence to the defendant's counter-claim. It is contended by some lawyers that in such a case, the defendant's reply to the plaintiff's defence to a counter-claim is in the nature of a rejoinder to the plaintiff's reply, and that therefore the defendant has only four days to deliver such pleading, and that leave of a judge is necessary to deliver it, under Order XXIV., rule 2. Others contend that the answer of a defendant to the plaintiff's defence to his (the defendant's) counter-claim, is a reply pure and simple, and that therefore the defendant has three weeks, under rule 1 of the same order, after the plaintiff's defence to counter-claim, within which o deliver such reply. The case before us arose thus: A plaintiff brought an action stating that it would be tried at a certain assize town, for which assizes he considered he would be just in time. If the defendant was entitled only to four days, he would have been in time, assuming that the plaintiff gave notice of trial with his reply, such reply containing his defence to the defendant's counter-claim; but if to three weeks, that would have thrown the plaintiff over the long vacation. The point has not been decided at Judges' Chambers, as far as we know.

A gratifying and somewhat novel proceeding took place at Portsmouth last week. A local solicitor (Mr. Henry Ford) having been appointed clerk of the peace of the borough in question, was presented by the professional men of the town with a wig, gown, and bands, and the learned recorder of the borough, upon the new clerk of the peace appearing in court as such for the first time, offered him congratulations, and expressed a hope that the new costume in which Mr. Ford appeared would last long, and that the clerk of the peace would long live to wear it. There was perhaps a touch of satire in this observation of the learned recorder; and it is certainly a fact that, whilst some few solicitors who are clerks of the peace do don the costume which is in common use by members of the Bar, yet there are a large number of solicitors who as clerks of the peace wear only the gown and bands. It may be remembered that the new clerk of the peace at Portsmouth is the solicitor who, in 1876, urged before the recorder that the right of solicitors to act as advocates at quarter sessions ought to be recognised. Courts of quarter sessions are among those tribunals, in which one may expect that outward form and show will contribute to securing that respect for the court, on the part of those attending before it, which is absolutely necessary to the due administration of justice, and we have no doubt that, while the solicitors at Portsmouth have been anxious to mark their esteem and regard for the new clerk of the peace, they also considered that, though the late clerk of the peace wore only the gown and

bands, his successor would do well to wear the wig also, for the reason suggested. It must be taken for granted that, as the adoption of the head-dress involved a slight departure from general usage, it was not resorted to without the sanction of the learned recorder.

ORDER XXVII., r. 2, provides that a plaintiff may without leave amend his statement of claim once at any time before the expiration of the time limited for reply, namely, three weeks from the delivery of the defence. Under the old procedure an amendment of a declaration in a common law action, could only have been made by an order of a judge. The new practice has already given rise to inequitable results in some cases, for the practice at chambers is to allow amendments under the rule referred to, although the same may constitute a fresh action; as for instance, where a firm sue a man, and the defendant sets up a counter-claim against the plaintiff firm, the plaintiffs are permitted to amend by substituting one of their firm only as plaintiff, thus shutting out the defendant's counter-claim, and the defendant would, in such a case, be put to needless costs in regard to his counter-claim, electing perhaps, after such an amendment, to settle the action brought by the particular partner. It strikes us that the rules of the Supreme Court ought to have provided that in a case like this, where the amendment really constitutes a fresh action, the leave of a judge to so amend should be necessary, and it would be only fair in such a case that the defendant should have his costs up to the amendment, as there would often be double fees to counsel for settling pleadings, &c., or at all events the defendant ought to have the costs of his first defence where the plaintiff's amendments occasion an altogether different defence. A plaintiff ought not to be allowed to occasion needless costs to his opponent through his (the plaintiff's) own errors, the making of which has been discovered from the contents of the defendant's statement of defence, or counterclaim.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.-COMMON
PLEAS DIVISION.
Thursday, July 30.
(Sittings in Banco, for the three divisions, before
DENMAN, J. and POLLOCK, B.)

Re A SOLICITOR.

Muir showed cause against a rule calling on the solicitor in question to answer and explain his conduct.

A female client had intrusted him with £400 to invest for her on mortgage of leaseholds at 5 per cent," he undertaking "to pay 5 per cent. till invested." This was in June 1870. No interest having been received since last year, the lady inquired after her securities, and was greeted with the information that her confidential adviser had not invested her money, and was unable to pay either capital or interest. His explanation was twofold. He had been ill; he had mixed up her money with

his own.

The COURT, on being informed of the engagement of the solicitor to pay forthwith a portion out of a taxed bill about to be paid him, allowed the case to stand over, with liberty for either side to apply to a judge in the vacation.

LEEDS ASSIZES.-NISI PRIUS COURT.
Monday, July 28.
(Before BRAMWELL, L.J.)
PROVISIONAL ENTRY OF CAUSES.

ON taking his seat, his LORDSHIP asked if the provisional entry of causes had proved beneficial. Wills said, so far as he could see, the arrangement had been most beneficial.

Cave had pleasure in concurring in the remarks of his friend Mr. Wills. The arrangement had been of great advantage to the bar, as it enabled them to know what cases were to be taken first. The thanks of the Bar were due to Mr. Marshall.

His LORDSHIP said he suggested the idea, but Mr. Marshall, Registrar of the Leeds County Court, had had the trouble of carrying the arrangement out-the gratuitous trouble, because it was no gain to him. He could not but think it was an unmixed boon. Before the provisional entries there was no knowing which cases were coming on first, and every defendant had to be ready with his witnesses on the first day of the assizes.

Cave said he had a case in point. He was in a case were there sixty-nine witnesses, some of whom came from Scotland, and all of whom, under the old arrangement, would have had to be present on the first day of the assizes, at enormous expense.

His LORDSHIP said he was told that some gentlemen at Wakefield or Sheffield complained that the arrangement gave an advantage to the Leeds solicitors; because Leeds solicitors were on the spot, and solicitors at Wakefield or Sheffield had to come a few miles, and were not allowed their

costs for provisional entries. A boy could be sent over at the cost of a few shillings, or he should think Mr. Marshall would receive the entries by post if they were properly stamped. If the arrangement were not successful, it must not be repeated.

The leaders of the Bar concurred in the opinion that the arrangement had been successful, and Mr. Waddy said he was instructed by a Huddersfield solicitor to say that it had been an advantage to the Profession at Huddersfield.

His LORDSHIP, on seeing the cause list afterwards, said: Of the twenty-one causes entered that day, only two were from Leeds, the others being from Huddersfield, Wakefield, and those places which were supposed to complain. There were people who objected to anything, however convenient it might be, and there would have to be a struggle to keep the arrangement up.

Wills. I hope we shall be strong enough to keep it up.

The subject then dropped.

HEIRS AT LAW AND NEXT OF KIN. WILLIAMS (Daniel), Pwllhobi, Llanbadarnfawr, Cardigan, a retired bookseller. Next of kin to come in by Nov. 2, at the chambers of V.C. M. Nov. 12, at the said chambers, at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims.

APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT-STOCK WINDING-UP ACTS. ANGLO-BELGIAN BANK LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Sept. 15, their names and addresses, and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their soli citors (if any), to L. C. Alexander, 121, Pall Mall, Midd e sex, the official liquidator of the said company. Nov. at the chambers of V.C. B., at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. SOUTH KENSINGTON DAIRY COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Sept. 1, their names and addresses, and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to H. S. Foster, S. Copthall-buildings, Throgmorton-street, London, the official liquidator of the said company. Oct. 29, at the chambers of the M. R., at eleven o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims STAR ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED-Petition for winding-up to be heard Aug. 2, before the M.R. ALEXANDRA HOTEL COMPANY, BRADFORD, LIMITED.-Peti tion for winding-up to be heard Aug. 2, before the M.R. CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. LAST DAY OF PROOF.

BAMFIELD (Robt. H.), St. Ives, Cornwall, solicitor. Aug. 22; W. Burrows, solicitor, 60, Gracechurch-street, London. Oct. 29; M.R., at eleven o'clock.

BARTRUM (Jos. K.), Cairn's Villa, Weston, and of Northumberland-buildings, Bath, solicitor. Aug. 22; F. Fos solicitor, 3. Abchurch-lane, London. Oct. 29; M.R., at eleven o'clock. BOWKER (Eliza A.), 84, Berwick-street, Oxford-street, Middlesex, widow. Oct. 1; Crosse and Co., solicitors, Lancaster-place, Strand, Middlesex. Nov. 24; V.C. H., at one o'clock. CAREY (Jos.), 49, Pall Mall, Middlesex, gentleman. Sept. 30: H. Kimber, 79, Lombard-street, London. Oct. ; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock.

DALZELL (Jas.), Wallingford, Berks, gentleman. Sept. 1; J. Maude, solicitor, 29, Lincoln's-inn-fields, Middlesex. Oct. 28; M. R., at eleven o'clock.

ELLIOTT (Jno.), West Brandon, Durham, farmer. Aug. 31; G. Maw, jun., solicitor, Bishops Auckland, Durham. Nov. 3; V.Č. B., at twelve o'clock.

EYRE (Thos.), 66, Finboro'-road, West Brompton, Middle sex. Sept. 15; Wing and Du Cane, solicitors, 1, Gray' inn-square, Middlesex. Nov. 21; V.C. H., at one o'clock. ELLIOTT (Isaac). Maryport, Cumberland, chemist and druggist and stockbroker. Sept. 10; Tyson and Hobson, solicitors, Maryport. Nov. 27; V.C. H., at one o'clock. GEORGE (Jane), Shirley, Milbrook, Southampton, spinster, Sept. 15; M. Webb, solicitor, Barbican-chambers. Barbican, London. Oct. 31; M. R., at twelve o'clock. HAIGH (Thos.), Bradford, bank manager. Sept. 11: Jas. N. Dickons, solicitor, Bradford. Oct. 31; M.R., at twelve o'clock.

(Hannah), 20, Holland Villas - road, Kensington, Middlesex, widow. Aug. 12; Jno. H. Brewer, solicitor, Carlisle. Oct. 27; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock.. HIRST (Wm. O. L.), Wakefield. York, retail clothier. Sept. 1; D. F. E. Sykes, solicitor, Huddersfield. Oct. 31; M.B,

at twelve o'clock.

HURST (Harriet), Chester-terrace, Regent's Park, Middle
sex, and St. Paul's, Stamford, spinster. Oct. 1; E. W.
Crosse, solicitor, 7, Lancaster-place, Strand, Middlesex,
Nov. 4; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock.
HOLLIDAY (Ephraim), Drighlington, near Birstal, York,
colliery proprietor. Oct. 1; Jno. Battye, solicitor, Birstal,
near Leeds. Nov. 5; V.C. B., at twelve o'clock.
JENSEN (Geo.), Kingston-upon-Hull, shipbroker. Aug. 31
Thos. Priestman, solicitor, Hull. Oct. 28; V.C. M., at
twelve o'clock.

KITCHEN (Thos.), 35, Phoenix-street, St. Pancras, Middlese
lamp manufacturer and mineral oil merchant. Aug.
J. H. Lydall, solicitor, 12, Southampton-buildings, Char
cery-lane, Middlesex. Oct. 28; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock.
LANGE (Carl), Quay Side, and St. Mary's Mount, Jesmond,
Newcastle upon-Tyne, merchant ad colliery owner.
Sept. 3: Chas. Jas. Garbutt, solicitor, Newcastle-upon-
Tyne. Nov. 3; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock.
MICKLETHWAIT (Rev. Jno. N.), Taverham Hall, Norfolk.
Aug. 81; J. M. Robberds, solicitor, Norwich, Oct. 9:
V.C. M., at twelve o'clock.

POTTS (Isaac). Spinners' Arms inn, Milbourne-street,
Carlisle, innkeeper. Sept. 3; J. Bendle, solicitor, L
Hodgson's-court, Carlisle. Oct. se; M. R., at eleven
o'clock.

SYMMONS (Alexander), 8, Catherine-street, Strand, Middle sex, musician. Sept. 1; R. Brale, solicitor, 8, Serjeants' inn, Fleet-street, London. Oct. 27; V.C. B., at twelve o'clock. SMITH (Samuel), Keighley, York, wool comb maker and grocer. Aug. 13; H. Fluker, solicitor, 3, Serjeants'-inn. Chancery-lane, London. Oct. 28; V.C. B., at twelve o'clock. WOODHEAD (Jos.), Gomersal, York, woolstapler. Aug. 19; W. Flower, solicitor, 1, Great Winchester-street, London. Oct. 28; V.C. B., at twelve o'clock.

CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. Last day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent. ADRIAN (Julius), Giessen, and of Wiesbaden, both in Ger many, gentleman. Sept. 30; Fielder and Summer, soli citors, 3, Godliman-street. Doctors' Commons, London. ATTWATER (Chas.), Fern Lea, St. John's road, Brixton. Surrey, Esq. Sept. 1; Hine and Co., solicitors, 4, Collegehill, London.

ASQUITH (Wm.), Blenheim-square, Leeds, gentleman.
Sept. 6; Bulmer and Son, solicitors, 73, Albion-street,
Leeds.

BOWATER (Thos.), 4, Hanover-street. Hanover-square,
Middlesex, tailor. Sept. 15; W. T. Elliott, solicitor, 5,
Verulam-buildings, Gray's-inn, Middlesex.
BRIDGEMAN (Henry O.), formerly of Woodlands-villa, Isle-
worth, Middlesex, and Little Queen-street, Westminster,
late of Lynton Lodge, Vanbrugh Park, Blackheath, Kent,
civil engineer. Aug. 18; Tamplin and Co., solicitors, 159,
Fenchurch-street, London.

Boys (Wm.), 23, Leighton-road, Kentish Town, Middlesex. Aug. 30: Brooks, Jenkins, and Co., solicitors, 7, Godlimanstreet, Doctors' Commons, London.

BROWNING (Juanna), Chosen Cottage, Hucelecote, Glouces ter, widow. Aug. 16; Wiltons and Riddiford, solicitors, Gloucester.

BOWERING (Fredk.), 85. Camberwell New-road, Surrey, and of Bowering's buildings, Roupell - street, Blackfriars, Surrey, newsagent. Sept. 15; R. Greening, solicitor, 46, Fenchurch-street, London.

BURTON (Robert), 26, George-street, Kingston-upon-Hull, ale and porter merchant and music hall proprietor. Aug. 50; Lowe and Co., solicitors, 19, Parliament-street, Hull. BROWNE (Hannah), 24, Hans-place, Chelsea, Middlesex, widow. Sept. 1; Evans and Co., solicitors, 2, Gray's-innsquare, London.

BrSH (Alfred G. A.), Farthinghoe. Northampton, Esq.
Sept. 10; Smythe and Brettell, solicitors, 2, Staple-inn,
Middlesex.

BEVAN (Edward), 2. Somerset-place, Canynges-road,
Clifton, Bristol, gentleman. Sept. 29; Sweet and Bur-
roughs, solicitors, 24, Bridge-street, Bristol.
BURLEY (Wm. R.), Oakland House, Stoneygate, Leicester,
Esq. Sept. 1; Miles, Bouskell, and Place, solicitors,
Leicester.

BROWN (Edmund), St. Andrew, 70, George-street, Portman-
square, Middlesex, licensed victualler. Aug. 31; Deane,
Chubb, and Co., solicitors, 14, South-street, Gray's-inn,
Middlesex.

BRIGGS (Sarah J.), Hazel House Farm, Aldboro', York, spinster. Sept. 1; Hirst and Capes, solicitors, Boroughbridge

BALLIN (Samuel), 16, Union-street, St. Peter and St. Paul, Bath. farrier. Sept. 29; J. A. Timmins, solicitor, 4, Henrietta-street, Bath.

BELL Elizabeth), Dartford, Kent, spinster. Sept. 1; C.R. Gibson, solicitor, Dartford.

BEAUMONT (Thos. M.), M.D., Knaresborough. Sept. 1; S. C. F. and C. A. Powell, solicitors, Castleyard, Knaresborough.

BOUGHEN (Jas.), Ashill, Norfolk, carpenter. Sept. 8; M. S. Emerson, solicitor. 6, Rampant Horse-street, Norwich. BAYLEY (Wm. B. M.), Green-street, Park-lane, Middlesex, Esq. Sept. 1; Trollope and Winckworth, solicitors, 31, Abingdon-street, Westminster.

BOLEY (Jno.), Rooksbridge, East Brent, Somerset, innkeeper. Aug. 8; G. and R. Poole, solicitors, Bridgwater. BRIGHT (Robt.), late of Bewley Farm, Chardstock, Dorset, afterwards of Laurel Cottage, Dalwood, Devon, yeoman. Sept. 1; Canning and Kyrke, solicitors, Chard, Somerset. BALL (Edwd. M. C.), Glen Elms. Northam, near Bideford, North Devon, Esq. Aug. 15; Rye and Eyre, solicitors, 16, Golden-square, Middlesex.

CLAYTON (Haley W.), Newport House, Barton-on-Humber, Lincoln, and Kingston-upon-Hull, coal merchant. Sept. 6: Levett and Champney, solicitors, 6, Parliament-street, Hall.

CAMPBELL (Capt. the Hon. Ronald G. E.), 34, Onslowgardens, South Kensington, Middlesex. Aug. 25; Farrer, Ouvry, and Co., solicitors, 66, Linc. ln's-inn-fields, Middlesex.

CLEMENTS (Mary), Chesnut House, Gladstone-road, St. Peter's, Broadstairs, Kent, spinster. Aug. 28; Blake and Heseltine, solicitors, 4, Serjeants'-inn, Fleet-street, London.

Cocks (Robt), Ipswich, confectioner. Sept. 1; S. Westhorp, solicitor. 32, Museum-street. Ipswich.

CATHRE, otherwise CATHRO (Adelaide M.), 4, Aberdeenplace, Maida-hill, Middlesex. widow. Sept. 15; Paine and Co, solicitors, 47, Gresham House, Old Broad-street, London

COTTERELL (Chas. J.), 6, Gordon-square, Middlesex, gentleman, Aug. 20; J. T. J. Collins, solicitor, 4, Furnival'sinn, London.

CARTER (Jno.), Holbeach, Lincoln, brewer. Sept. 11; Jno. P. Hurton, solicitor, Holbeach.

COPP (Jas.), 57, Park-road. St. John's, Hampstead, Middlesex, builder. Sept. 12; Crowther and Walker, solicitors, 1, Raymond-buildings, Gray's-inn, London.. CHESTER (Sophia E.), Ashtead, Surrey, widow. Sept. 1; Lucas and Co., solicitors, 14, Hart-street, Bloomsburysquare, Middlesex.

CHAMPNESS (Rev. Thos. P. A.), Badsworth Rectory, York. Aug. 30; Fairfoot and Webb, solicitors, 13, Clement's-inn, London.

CATOR (Wm. T.), late of Old Hall, Woodbastwick, Norfolk, formerly of South Walsham, Norfolk, Esq. Aug. 30; Radcliffe and Co., solicitors, 20, Craven-street, Charing. cross, London.

CARTER (Thos. D.), formerly of 6a, and late of 67, Vincentaquare, and of Horseferry-road, Westminster, and of Eastcheap. London, builder. Aug. 22; Wilkins and Co., solicitors, 10. St. Swithin's-lane, London.

DAVIES (Elisha), Hatton, near Hounslow, Middlesex, farmer. Aug. 18; Wilde and Co., solicitors, 21, Collegehill, Lordon.

DEACON (Ernest), Pontypool, Mons.. civil and mining engineer. Aug. 21; Edmd. B. Edwards and Son, solicitors, Town-hall, Pontypoo.

DAY (Peter), Warwick, gentleman, formerly a solicitor. Sept. 30: A. Day, solicitor, Upper Surrey-street, Norwich DONALDSON (Sarah A.), 1, Peel-street. Bishopwearmouth, Sunderland, wilow. Aug. 18; E. Huntly, solicitor, 61, Fawcett-street, Sunderland.

EARLE (Ralph A.), 27, Park-street, Grosvenor-square, Middlesex, Esq. Aug. 20; Richards and Co., solicitors, 29, Lincoln's-inn fields, Middlesex.

FOWLER (Wm.), Stanley Villa, St. Germain's-road, Forest Hill, Kent, gentleman. Sept. 15; J. Curtis, solicitor, 12, Old Jewry chambers, Old Jewry, London.

FARMER (Thos.), Stockton-on-Tees, gentleman. Sept. 16; Newley, Richmond, and Watson, solicitors, Stockton-onTees.

FELL (Henry W.), Ulverston, Lancaster, gentleman. Sept. 30; S. H. Jackson, solicitor 49, Market-street, Elverston. PINNIS (Jeremiah), Swingfield, Kent, yeoman. Aug. 9; E. and W. Knocker, solicitors, Dover. FRANKLIN (Lewis A.), 24, Lancaster-road. Belsize Park, Middlesex, and 8 and 13, Cross street. Finsbury, Middlesex, merchant. B. Davis, solicitor, 6, Cork-street, Bur. ington-gardens, Middlesex.

FOGATY (Thos.), 2. Rose villas, Berkeley-rd, Horfield, Gloucester, wharfinger. Sept. 5; E. E. Salmon, solicitor, 50, Broad street, Bristol.

GREAVES (Jas.). Openshaw, Lancaster, boiler maker. Aug. 30; J. and J. Hibbert, solicitors, Clarendon-place, Hyde. GILL (Jas.), 9, Westfield-park, Redland, Bristol, gentleman, Ang. 31; A. E. Ward, solicitor 7, Broad-street, Oxford. HUGHES (Henry). 59, Fenchurch-street, London, and 52, Bow-road, Middlesex, optician and nautical instrument maker. Sept. 29; Wm. Greenwood, Heathfield, Willes. den, Middlesex.

HIGGINSON (Chas.), Hoole, near Chester, farmer. Aug. 19;
Bridgman, Weaver, and Jones, solicitors, Westminster-
buildings, Chester.
HALE (Harriet), The Fishery, Mapledurham near Reading,
Berks, widow. Aug. 19; Morley and Co., solicitors, 89,
Chancery-lane, Middlesex.

HICKSON (Amelia A.), formerly of Longdown, Marchwood,
Hants, late of Belmont House, Kenn-road, Clevedon,
Somerset, spinster. Sept. 1; O'Donoghue and Anson,
solicitors, 2, St. Augustine's-parade, Bristol.
HOMAN (Susanna), Lansdowne-terrace, Stoney Stanton-
road, Coventry, spinster. Aug. 28; Twist and Sons,
solicitors, 16, Hertford-street, Coventry.
HAWDON (Wm. W.), Wackerfield, Ingleton, Durham, gentle-
man. Sept. 30; Jno. Nixon, solicitor, Barnard Castle.
HOLTHAM (Richd. W.), Gloucester, auctioneer. Sept. 5;
Bretherton and Son, solicitors, Gloucester.

HUDSON (Jno. R.), 2, Stuart-terrace, Derby, and the Inner
Temple, London, gentleman. Sept. 30; Taylor and Co.,
solicitors, St. Mary's-gate, Derby.
HOLLAND (Thos.), Ockfield Cottage. Witley, Surrey, gentle-
man. Sept. 1; Albery and Lucas, solicitors, Midhurst.
HILL (Jane A. A.), 46. Avenue Malakoff, Paris, widow.
Sept 29; Davies and Hunter, solicitors, Abchurch House,
Sherborne-lane, London.

HOUSEMAN (Edwd. C.), Winteringham House, Knares borough, surgeon. Sept. 1; 8. C. F. and C. A. Powell, solicitors, Castle-yard, Knaresborough.

HAWKINS (Jno.), Park House, Park-road, Edgbaston, gentleman. Sept. 1; G. E. Hawkins, solicitor, 11, Cherrystreet, Birmingham.

HALL (Jno. W.), 76, High-street, Islington. Middlesex, working cvtler. Sept. 9; J. Ford, 57, Poole's-park,

Holloway, Middlesex.

HUGHES (Chas. H.), Quay-street, Carmarthen, Esq., solici tor. Sept. 1; Geo. Thomas and Browne, solicitors, Carmarthen.

IDLE (Amelia), Shopwyke, Oving, Sussex, widow. Sept. 1; Dixon and Co., solicitors, 10, Bedford-row, Middlesex. JONES (Wm.), 17, South-street, Manchester-square, Middlesex, pawnbroker. Aug. 20; W. Justice, solicitor, 6, Bernard-street, Russell-square, London.

JONES (Sarah E., formerly of Derby, late of 42, Sutherland-gardens, Maida-vale, widow. Aug. 30; F. Parker, 2, Harcourt buildings, Temple, London.

JONES (Richd.), 26, Adelaide-square, Windsor, Berks, gentleman's servant. Aug. 26; E. Brown, 99, High-street, Marylebone, Middlesex.

JACKSON (Wm.), Hebden-bridge, Halifax, formerly a licensed victualler, at the time of his death out of business. Aug. 25; J. P. and J. Sutcliffe, solicitors, Hebden-bridge. KEARSLEY (Chas.), Ripon, York, brick and tile maker. Sept. 1; Brett and Craven, solicitors, Kennedy-street, Manchester.

KEENE (Mary), formerly of Baydon, Wilts, late of Wroughton, Wilts, widow. Sept. 15: Clarke and Co., solicitors, 14, Lincoln's-inn-fields, Middlesex.

KNIGHT (Richd.), 7, Westbourne-terrace north, Middlesex, gentleman. Sept. 18; J. J. Cridland, solicitor, Bedfordrow, Middlesex.

LEARMOUTH (Alexander), Brecon House, Madeira-road,
Ventnor, Isle of Wight, gentleman. Sept. 1; A. Jones,
solicitor, 3, Serjeants'-inn, Chancery-lane, London.
LANE Thos.), Colyton, Devon, gentleman. Aug. 30; E. H.
Wilton, solicitor, Colyton,

LARCOM (Right Hon. Major-Gen. Sir Thos. A.), Bart..
K.C.B., Heathfield, Fareham, Hants. Aug. 25; Radcliffe
and Co., solicitors, 20, Craven-street, Charing Cross,
Middlesex.

LAWSON (Adam), Osborne-road, The Brook, near Liverpool, fire-clay manufacturer. Aug. 25; E. Cotton, solicitor, 19, South John-street, Liverpool.

LAST (Jas.), Ipswich, superannuated police officer. Aug. 30;
J. Mills, solicitor, 13, Elm-street, Ipswich.
LITTLEHALES (Anne), Kingsgate-street, Winchester, widow.
Sept. 1; Bowker and Son, solicitors, 23, St. Peter's-street,
Winchester.

MOIR (Mary M.), 58. Dyke-road, Brighton. spinster. Aug. 15; Cooper and Williams, solicitors, 17, Middle-street, Brighton.

MURRAY (Garrett O'Moore), 100. Rue des Martyrs, Paris. Sept. 10: Dixon and Co., solicitors, 10, Bedford-row, Middlesex.

M KEONE (Henry R.), formerly of 5. Norfolk-terrace, Hammersmith, late of 84, Holland-road, Kensington, Middlesex, civil engineer. Aug. 30; Hopgood and Co., solicitors, 17A, Whitehall-place, London

MYERS (Nancy), Wiswell Shay, near Whalley, Lancaster, widow. Aug. 7; Chas. Hall and Son, solicitors, Accring ton.

MAY (Mary), Treville-street, Plymouth, rope manufacturer. Sept. 1; Stephens and Co., solicitors, 7, Athenæumterrace. Plymouth.

MILLS (Thos. C.), 23, Camden-cottages, Camden Town, Middlesex. gentleman. Aug. 28; Pattison and Co., solicitors, 11, Queen Victoria-st, London.

MATTHEWS (Jno), Yarcombe, Devon, yeoman. Sept. 1; Canning and Kyrke, solicitors, Chard, Somerset. MANSEL (Lieut. U. J. Robt.), Anglesey, Alverstoke, Southampton. Aug. 30; Rchd. R. Wilkson, solicitor, Gosport. MITCHELL (Wm.), Milner Gate, Luddenden Foot, Halifax, yeoman. Aug. 18; Robson and Suter, solicitors, 22, George-street, Halifax.

MITCHELL (Thos.), 1, Mont-le-Grand, Heavitree. near Exeter, Esq. Aug. 14; J. Jerman, solicitor, 5, Bampfyldestreet, Exeter.

MATTHEW (Peter), formerly of 17, Lower Berkeley-street, Portman-square, afterwards of 11, Welbeck street, Middlesex, late of St. Peter's, Mount Pleasant, Hastings, surgeon dentist. Aug. 16; Clarkson and Co., solicitors, 24, Carter-lane, Doctors' Commons, London. NEWTON (Thos.), Mansfield, Notts, maltster. Sept. 1; Jno. H. White, solicitor, Stockwell-gate. Mansfield." NEAME (Charlotte), 25, Orchard-street, St. Dunstan, near Canterbury, spinster. Sept. 3; Wightwick and Gardner, solicitors, 15, Bouverie-square, Folkestone. NIGHTINGALE (Thos. A.), 18, Tavistock-street, Bedfordsquare, and of Lincoln's-inn, Middlesex, barrister-at-law. Sept. 1; Anderson and Davies, solicitors, Ludlow. OXENHAM (Hugh), 33, York-terrace, Regent's Park, Middlesex, gentleman. Sept. 30; Hume and Co., solicitors, 10, Great James'-street, Bedford-row, Middlesex. OWENS (Mary), Frodsham-street, Chester, widow. Aug, 16: Hine-Haycock and Bridgman, solicitors, 4, College-hill, London.

PETITT (Jos. W.), 152, Great Portland street, Middlesex, tobacconist. Aug. 27; Hockley and Russell, solicitors, High-street, Guildford.

PATEY (Augusta R.), Brighton, widow. Aug. 30; H. S.
Davy, solicitor, Ringwood, Hants.
PHILLPOT (Mary), Hazelwood House, 6, Belgrave-terrace,
Belgrave-road, Torquay, widow. Aug. 12; Walls and Co.,
solicitors, 11, Queen Victoria-street, London.

PRICE (Jno.), Bromsgrove, Worcester, nail factor. Aug. 12;
Scott and Horton, solicitors, Bromsgrove..
PALMER (Anne), Gingerland, Bradnínch, Devon, widow.
Aug. 29; J. and W. B. Sparks and Blake, solicitors,
Crewkerne.

QUINN (Ellen), Reservoir street, Liverpool, widow. Aug. 17;
Nordon and Levy, solicitors, 7, Victoria-street, Liverpool.
RHIND (Sarah), Denchworth Lodge, Thornton Heath, near
Croydon, Surrey, widow. Aug. 16; G. J. Shew, solicitor,
8. Furnival's-inn, Holborn, London.
ROBERTS (Ellis), 47, Windsor-treet, Liverpool, retired pilot.
Aug. 20: Morris and Jones, solicitors, 13, Harrington-
street, Liverpool.

ROBINSON (Sarah), Longton, Stafford, widow. Aug. 18;
G. L. and C. F. Robinson, solicitors, 20, King-street,
Longton.

ROBINSON (Jno.), Westholme, Werneth, Oldham, cotton spinner. Sept. 1: Murray and Wrigley, solicitors, 11, Clegg-street, Oldham.

STEPHENSON (Harriett), 3, Ellington-terrace, Ramsgate, spinster. Sept. 1: Ware and Hawes, solicitors, 7, Great Winchester-street-buildings, London.

RYLANCE (Wm.), Whitefield, Pilkington, within Prestwickcum-Oldham, and of Cross-lane, Salford, paint and varnish manufacturer. Aug. 18; Boote and Edgar, solicitors, Crown-buildings, 18 and 20, Booth-street, Manchester. SLADE (Elias), Broadwin sor, Dorset, carpenter. Aug. 1 Robt. Leigh, solicitor, Beaminster, Dorset. SANDERSON (Geo. G.), formerly of Park Gate, near Rother. ham, York, late of Thorne, York, manager of ironworks. Sept. 16; Geo. Evans, solicitor, Rotherham. SCHOLES (Thos. S.), Milverton, Warwick, Esq. Sept. 20; Field and Sons, solicitors, Leamington. SLATER (Jas.), Newton, Dalton, Lancaster, farmer. Sept. 80; W. Butler and Son, solicitors, Dalton-in-Furness. STREETEN (Francis T.), 8, Dr. Johnson's-buildings, Temple,. London, and 14, Park-road, Haverstock Hill, Middlesex, barrister-at-law, Recorder of Worcester. Sept 23; F. Rolt, solicitor, 6, St. Paul's-churchyard. London: SHORT (Rev. Thos.), Solihull, Warwick. Sept. 1; Edw. O. Smith, solicitor, Solihull.

SPEAR (Jas.), 3, Hammersmith-terrace, Hammersmith, gentleman. Sept. 1; G. S. Warmington, solicitor, 1, Gresham-buildings, London.

SIMPSON (Thos. B.), Rutland-lodge, Effra-road, Brixton, Surrey, Esq. Sept. 1; Simpson and Palmer, solicitors, 9, Three Crown-square, Southwark.

SWAYNE (Wm.), Stoke-road, Guildford, Surrey, builder. Oct. 1; C. H. Craig, solicitor, 133, High-street, Guildford. SANDFORD (Geo. M. W.), 33, Hertford-street, Park-lane, Middlesex. Sept. 20; Norton and Co., solicitors, 6, Victoria-street, Westminster.

SIDEBOTTOM (Agnes), Etherow House, Hollingworth, Mottram in Long dendale, Chester, near Hadfield, Derby, widow. Sept. 12; Stevenson, Lycett, and Co., solicitors,. 1, Chancery-place, Booth-street, Manchester. SUDBURY (Jas.), Halstead, Essex, builder. Sept. 1; Sewell and Jaman, solicitors. Halstead.

SCOTT (Jno. E.), Union-street, Ryde, Isle of Wight, auctioneer. Aug. 11; Jno. W. Fardell, solicitor, Cambrian House Offices, Ryde, Isle of Wight. TARRANT (Jos.), Hartley Wintney, Hants, yeoman. Aug. 5; Lamb and Brooks, solicitors, Odiham, Hants. THOMSON (Wm.), M.D., formerly of Charlotte-street, Fitzroy-square, Middlesex, afterwards of Chudleigh, Devon, late of Northen hay-street, Exeter. Sept. 2; W. M. Flegg, solicitor, 11, Hill's-place, Oxford-street,. Middlesex. THOMPSON (Robt. F.), formerly of Barnard Castle, Durham, station master, late of Cleatham, Durham, railway goods agent. Sept. 30; John Nixon, solicitor, Barnard Castle. THOMPSON (Mary Ann), Shirley-street, Solihull, Warwick, widow. Sept. 1; Beale and Co., solicitors, 30, Waterloostreet, Birmingham.

TOPHAM (Jas.), Sussex Lodge, Loughborough-road, Brixton, Surrey, Esq. Aug. 22; Campbell and Co., solicitors, 17,. Warwick-street, Regent-street, Middlesex.

URMSTON (Elizabeth J.), Sillwood Lodge, Tunbridge Wells,. Kent, spinster. Aug. 16; A. T. Hewitt, solicitor, 32, Nicholas-lane, London.

WOLLASTON (Fredk.), Shenton Hall, Leicester, Esq. Oct. 31;.
Pilgrim and Preston, solicitors. Hinckley, Leicester.
WILSON (Maria), West Green Cottage, Wakefield - road,
Totterham, Middlesex, widow. Sept. 23; G. Ashley and
Tee, solicitors, 7, Frederick's-place, Old Jewry, London.
WILLIAMS (Jno. G.), New London House, Amlwch, Anglesey,
draper. July 31; D. Roberts, solicitor, 205, High-street,
Bangor.

WINTERBOTHAM (Thos.), formerly of the Virgina Plant,
Great Dover-street. Surrey, victualler, late of Orchard
House, Perry-hill, Catford-bridge. Lewisham, Kent, gen-
tleman. Sept. 1; H. J. and T. Child, solicitors, Paul's
Bakehouse-court, Doctor's Commons, London.
WRIGHT, otherwise STANLEY (Frances), 88, Guilford-street,
Russell-square, Middlesex. Aug. 30; A. Hicks and
Arnold, solicitors, 28, Wellington-street, Strand, Middle--
WALKER (Jno), Thorncliffe, Lillington, near Leamington
Priors, Warwick, Esq. Sept. 20; Field and Sons, solici-
tors, Leamington

sex.

WEBSTER (Mary Ann), 136, Beresford-street, Newington, Surrey, widow. Aug. 20; W. Bohm, solicitor, 23, Old Jewry, London.

WATERS (Mary), Oswaldkirk, York, widow. Aug. 25; T. L. Smith, solicitor, 74, Petergate, York.

YOUNG (Henry), Gillygate, York, plasterer. Sept. 2; Wm. Wilkinson, solicitor, St. Helen's-square, York.

REPORTS OF SALES.

Wednesday, July 23.

By Messrs. BAXTER, PAYNE, and LEPPER, at the Mart. Chislehurst, Loggs-hill-A plot of freehold land, containing 1 acre-sold for £550.

By Messrs. HARDS, VAUGHAN, and JENKINSON, at the Mart. Kent, Upton-Three freehold cottages-sold for £560. Bexley-heath-Freehold building land, 10 acres-sold for £3900; fruit plantation adjoining, 2a. 1r. Op., freeholdsold for £720.

Thursday, July 24.

By Messrs. HARMAN and MATTHEWS, at the Mart. Penge-Nos. 13 to 27 (odd Nos.), Arpley-road, term 86 years -sold for £1010. Brixton-No. 1 Poplar-walk-road, term 95 years-sold for £305.

Lower Clapton-Nos. 14, 16, 18, and 20, Glenarm-road-sold. including mortgage, for £1650.

By Messrs. C. C. and T. MOORE, at the Mart. Whitechapel, No. 65, Mansell-street, freehold-sold for £3050. Mile-end-Nos. 1 and 2, Coynant-cottages and Coynant-villa, freehold-sold for £1410.

Nos. 157 and 159, Skidmore-street, term 33 years-sold for £135.

By Messrs. DEBENHAM, TEWSON, and FARMER, at the Mart. Hyde-park-No. 92, Westbourne-terrace, with stabling, term 57 years-sold for £5000.

Spitalfields-Commercial-street, a plot of freehold landsold for £2000.

City of London-Nos. 21 and 22, Duke-street, freehold-sold for £2150.

Upper Mitcham-Two cottages, and a plot of land, freehold -sold for £160.

Freehold ground rent of £4 per annum-sold for £85.