recosannual provincial meeting, the council aftertims meet to determine whether it is a reasonable pri e' NDER the old common law practice the responsibility in regard to searching for appearance to a writ of summons rested entirely with the solicitor's clerk making the search. The Judicature Acts brought with them a system by which, after the search was made, a certificate of non-appearance on a printed form, signed by a clerk in the appearance office, was issued to the person searching (in cases of no appearance), !such search being made by the clerk in the office, and not by the solicitor's clerk. There was this exception in the case of the Queen's Bench Division, that there the search was made by the solicitor's clerk. The new practice having continued up to the present time, we understand that it has at length been determined to fall back on the Chancery practice as regards searching for appearance, which practice has never been altered, and which consists in keeping a book called a cause book, recording under separate columns the various steps in each action. A great improvement is thus accomplished, and much time will be saved in searching for appearance in common law actions, while, on the other hand, the risk which existed of overlooking an appearance, under the old practice, will now be entirely removed. If the common law masters would exchange views with the Chancery clerks of records and writs more often than they do, the adoption of useful Chancery practice in common law proceedings would be more frequently resorted to than at present. IN another column we report an application to the Common Pleas Division against a solicitor in connection with the obtaining through a solicitor's clerk of a copy of counsel's opinion dealing with the merits of the case of the opposite party in an action. It is impossible to take exception to the observations of the learned judge who mulcted the offending solicitor in the whole of the costs of the application to the court. But what of the solicitor's clerk who surreptitiously obtained the document in question? THE Liverpool Mercury, of June 24, 1879, contained the following: Mr. CAUTION MEAWAY SOLICITOBicitor, Is NOT RESPONSIBLE for any instructions received otherwise than by himself, at his only office, top floor Grecian-chambers, 57, Dale-street, Liverpool. but even in such cases the fitness of the applicant should be shown beyond a doubt, and certificates of qualification signed by distinguished members of the Profession carry weight. We regret exceedingly that a member of the solicitors' profession, in the person of Mr. John Sandilands Ward, should have so transgressed the rules of professional propriety as to have involved himself in incarceration at the hands of the Commons House of Parliament, he having been guilty of a breach of the privileges of that House in connection with the business of a client, named Grissell, who has also been condemned to a like punishment upon a like charge. The dignity of Parliament, and the integrity of its members having been duly asserted by resolutions of the House of Commons, we trust that a distinction will be drawn between the conduct of Mr. Ward, who may be described as a comparatively young solicitor (having been admitted in 1870), and that of his client, the former having at once submitted himself to the call of the Speaker, and to the judgment of Parliament; and without attempting to defend Mr. Ward, it is certainly rather hard upon him that it should be alleged against him, as an aggravation of his offence, that the document he read by way of defence was not sufficiently modest, and that he read it with unbecoming composure. It cannot be expected of a professional man in Mr. Ward's position that he should have approached the bar of the House of Commons with fear and trembling. He has been already severely punished for the offence which has been proved against him, and we cannot say under the circumstances that we consider that the council of the Law Society is upon to take any action in the matter, for the punishment has already been both summary called and severe. continue to invite country solicitors by their circulars to so employ them, they must at all events be prepared to do without the patronage of London solicitors in the proper business of law stationers. The council have done well in calling attention to this matter, but the remedy in the main rests with country solicitors themselves. If they prefer the law stationer to their qualified London agent the evil will grow, and will in the end recoil upon the heads of those who encourage the practice, because in time connection will spring up between London and provincial law stationers, the latter undertaking similar work. As we have said, in some matters we are of opinion that London law stationers infringe the provisions of the Solicitors Acts, and of the Stamp Act of 1870. And then there is the 32nd section of the Solicitors Act 1843, the provisions of which appear to have been lost sight of by the council; that section provides penalties for any solicitor who permits his name to be anyway made use of" in any court of law or equity, upon the account or for the benefit of any unqualified person, or who does any other act enabling such a person to act in any respect as a solicitor. The force and effect of this section is, we fancy, not sufficiently appreciated. At the annual meeting, a resolution was adopted, declaring that the rights of solicitors as advocates before courts of quarter sessions ought to be defined by the Legislature. The question has frequently been referred to in former reports of the council of the society, and we have no doubt that the resolution referred to will receive due attention at the hands of the council. The mover of the reso lution called attention to some observations made on a recent occasion by Mr. Cole, Q.C., as Recorder of Devonport, wherein he objected to solicitors as advocates appearing before him. The observations of Mr. Serjeant Cox, Recorder of Portsmouth, were also referred to, and Mr. Ford referred to letters he had received from country solicitors, especially to one from Mr. the different practice in the different parts of H. K. Hebb, of Lincoln, who pointed out Lincolnshire, solicitors having audience in that During the discussion the practice in Ireland part called Holland, and that called Kesteven. was also referred to. Solicitors might very well have the right to so practise, whilst in important cases counsel would no doubt continue to be employed by solicitors. The suggestion of the forth a good deal of discussion, and a variety of council to do away with the admission-fee called opinions were expressed, some members going the length of suggesting that the pecuniary interests of some members of the society in the association the dignity of membership of the society would be lowered by the operation of the proposed change. by a majority, so that the payment of an admisThe proposal of the council was, however, adopted rely that the council will be careful not to elect as sion fee has already ceased to be a condition of membership, and members of the society of course members of the society men unfitted for such a privi lege. We hope the offending person or persons will be London law stationers with the duties of London would be prejudicially affected; and others that discovered by the advertiser. AN application was made on Monday last to Lord Coleridge at Westminster, asking that a solicitor, whose name had been removed from the roll should be reinstated. The application was refused on the ground that, if acceded to, removal of names from the roll would amount merely to a suspension. We cannot adopt this view. To be suspended from practice for a fixed period cannot be regarded as a punishment as severe as that of having one's name struck off the roll, even though at a future date the name is restored to the roll. In applications of this kind there should be a preliminary investigation by the council of the Law Society, to be followed by a report from that body for the information of the court when the appli cation is made. A GOOD deal of doubt exists in the minds of many agents. IN our last issue we reported the proceedings at the recent annual general meeting of the members of the Chief Law Society. The attendance of members on the occasion was not as large as usual, and several members of the council were conspicuous by their absence from the meeting. The proceedings lasted altogether about two hours and a half. The election of officers was of a purely formal character there being no opposition in any case. The subjects which appeared to attract most attention were: The ancient rules of the Inns of Court relating to the call of solicitors to the bar; the proposals of the council in to regard public notaries; and the interference by On the first question a very general opinion appeared to prevail that greater facilities should be given to solicitors for being called to stated that the council had at length prepared a the bar, and indeed the president of the society ferred in our last issue. In regard to Notaries Public Bill upon the subject, and to which Bill we rethe chief speakers against the proposal of the council were, the solicitor of the society of Public Notaries of London, and Mr. Sydney Gedge M.A.; and upon the amendment to omit so much of the report of the council as related to this subject being put to the meeting, it was supported by a number of members, but was declared by the president to be lost. It is only fair to point out that the action of the council in this matter is due to an important resolution passed at the last annual provincial meeting of the members of the society; and, as regards the recommendations of the council, we believe that the burden of investigating the whole question fell mainly upon the shoulders of Mr. Grinham Keen, a member of the council. The recommendations appear to us to be such as may in the main be fairly adopted. There ought certainly to be an examination, and there is no reason whatever why the Archbishop of Canterbury should be burdened with the duty, either by himself or his officers, of appointing public notaries. It is a common occurrence for country solicitors in large general practice to be appointed public notaries without any service under articles and without passing any examination. The probability is that only a comparatively few solicitors, say 500 or 600, will take advantage of the proposal of the council, if sanctioned by the Legislature. That opposition should come from the Society of Public Notaries in London is natural enough, and we have already referred to their grounds of opposition. We incline to the opinion that every notary should be a solicitor. Indeed, a large majority are so already, and there is some force in the suggestion of Mr. Keen, that the existing public notaries who are not solicitors should, upon condition, be admitted to practise as such. No doubt the proposal of the council will be resisted by the Society of Public Notaries, but we trust the Society of Solicitors will not leave matters as they are. As to the conduct of London law stationers, in openly inviting country solicitors to employ them to undertake London agency work, there appeared to be but one opinion at the annual meeting, and if London law stationers COMMON PLEAS DIVISION. Monday, July 21. (Sittings in Banco, for the three Divisions, before Lord COLERIDGE, C.J. and DENMAN, J.) Lord COLERIDGE gave notice that in all pro bability the court would sit in banco next Wednes day week. Re A SOLICITOR. THIS gentleman had been struck off the rolls in 1873 for some irregularity in the matter of £310 received by him for a Mr. Bird. Morgan Lloyd applied that he might be rein. stated. Lord COLERIDGE, observing that he professed, if anything, to be less lenient than his predecessor in the construction of such conduct by solicitors, and that, if such an application were permitted, striking off the rolls would amount merely to a suspension, and so the graver punishment, in effect, be equalised with the less severe, refused the reinstatement. The materials were too meagre on which it was sought to be obtained. Re A SOLICITOR. Herschell, Q.C. showed cause against a rule calling on a solicitor to answer certain charges of misconduct as follows: An action was pending connected with some houses in the city-a case of landlord against tenant for rent. Proceedings in ejectment were taken in the High Court, and while they were yet pending, the client for whom this solicitor acted produced a document, which the solicitor read. It proved to be an opinion by an eminent pleader, advising the defendant on his case, which the client in question had got by a bribe from a clerk of the defendant's solicitor. This was the misconduct charged. Herschell (Horne Payne with him) urged on his behalf that when he read it he did not know what it was, that it contained no new information, that he gained no knowledge thereby affecting the result, and that as soon as he could he got rid of the client who had so behaved. Sir Henry James, Q.C. (with him F. Hollams), on the part of the Incorporated Law Society, desired not to press harshly on the individual, nor to do more than assert the honour of the Profession. Whether the purloined opinion disclosed anything of advantage to the party for whom he acted or not was immaterial; it was a breach of duty as between professional men, the punishment for which he willingly left in the hands of the court. The COURT remarked that it was their province to maintain the honour of solicitors, who, conducting in secret by the leave of the court multifarious matters, could only be controlled, as regards their less respectable members, by severe rules. This solicitor should at least have warned his honourable opponent that he had a traitor in his camp. It was almost their opinion that the purloined opinion should have been sent back. Such a course seemed obviously fair. The solicitor conducting litigation for a client owed a duty of good faith to his client, but none the less of honour to his opponent; and the fact that the document improperly retained, even if it were the fact that it was innocently received and read, was of no advantage to the party, did not affect the moral complexion of the affair. They would not, however, suspend in this instance (though they besitated some time as to whether that was not their duty) on account of the high character hitherto borne by the inculpated person, but they discharged the bill only on the terms that he pay all the costs of the application, to be taxed as between attorney and client. REPORTS OF SALES. Thursday, July 17. By Messrs. FAREBROTHER, LYE, and PALMER, at the Mart. Drury-lane-No. 23, Macklin-street, freehold-sold for £3650. Company Limited-sold for £615. Twenty shares of £25 each, paid up, in the Auction Mart By Messrs. GLASIER and SONS, at the Mart. Lewisham-Nos. 3 to 9, Keith-terrace, term 50 years-sold £1200. Nos. 1 and 2, Marischal-road, term 50 years-sold for £450. A plot of land, term 82 years-sold for £900. Nos. 4 and 5, Cumberland-terrace, term 78 years-sold for £615. Nos. 45, 47, 49, and 50, Lordship-road, term 78 years-sold for £2900. support of such application shall be filed at the Petty Bag Office, and a copy thereof shall at the same time be left with the clerk of the Petty Bag, to be delivered by him to the Registrar of Solicitors, and the order for such taking out or renewal, shall (if made) be drawn up on reading such affidavits, and an affidavit of such copies having been left and notices given. Upon an application to dispense with the required notice of intention to take out or renew a certificate, a summons must be served on the Registrar of Solicitors calling on him to show cause within ten days' notice why such taking out or renewal of certificate should not be allowed; and if no cause be shown to the satisfaction of the Master of the Rolls, he may make an order for allowing such certificate to be issued. INNER TEMPLE SCHOLARSHIPS. SCHOLARSHIPS of 100 guineas each have been adjudged by the Inner Temple as follows:-In Common Law, Mr. Francis Ambrose Keating, B.A., late Scholar of St. John's College, Oxford; in the Law of Real and Personal Property, Mr. George Cave, B.A., Scholar of St. John's College, Oxford; in Equity, Mr. A. Williams. EXAMINATIONS AT THE INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY, U.K. JUNE 1879.-FINAL EXAMINATION. AT the examination of candidates for admission on the Roll of Solicitors of the Supreme Court, the examination committee recommended the following gentlemen, under the age of twenty-six, as being entitled to honorary distinction: 1. Charles Elton Longmore, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Gepp and Sons, of Chelmsford; and Mr. Thomas Joseph Sworder, of Hert ford. 6. Thomas Rothwell Haslam, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Ramwell, Pennington, and Bradshaw, of Bolton. 7. Charles Lovett Grundy, who served his Nos. 1 to 8, and 10 to 12, Bouverie-road, term 78 years-sold clerkship to Messrs. Cowdell, Grundy, and Browne, of London. for £4030. THE elementary works selected for the intermediate examination of persons under articles of clerkship for the year 1879, and which examination is held under the authority of the Solicitors Act 1877, are: Smith on Contracts, 6th edition, 1874; Williams on the Principles of the Law of Real Property, 11th or 12th edition; Williams on the Principles of the Law of Personal Property, 10th edition; Haynes' Outlines of Equity, 3rd or 4th edition. THE regulations as to re-admission on the roll of solicitors, and as to taking out and renewal of ananal certificates, issued on the 2nd Nov. 1875, are still in force, and provide in effect that if any solicitor of the Supreme Court, after having at any time taken out a stamped certificate, shall, for the space of a whole year from and after the expiration thereof, have neglected to renew the same for the following year, or has failed to obtain such a certificate within twelve months from the date of his admission on the Roll, the registrar shall not afterwards grant a certificate to such solicitor, except under an order of the Master of the Rolls, and for the purpose of obtaining such an order the applicant shall, six weeks before the application is intended to be made, give notice thereof as in the case of an original admission, and the affidavits in 8. Thomas Ledbrooke Grimes, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Greenway and Campbell, of Warwick; and Messrs. Robinson, Preston, and Stow, of London. The council of the Incorporated Law Society have accordingly awarded the following prizes of books: To Mr. Longmore, the prize of the Honourable each. The examiners have also certified that the following candidates, under the age of twenty-six, whose names are placed in alphabetical order, passed examinations which entitle them to commendation : Frederick Broadbridge, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Barrell, Rodway, and Barrell, of Liverpool. William Henry Clough, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Terry and Robinson, of Bradford; and Messrs. H. B. Clarke and Son, of London. James William Loader Cooper, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Bailey and White, of Winchester; and Messrs. Pickett and Mytton, of London. William Hastings Fowler, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Moody, Turnbull, and Graham, of Scarborough; and Messrs. Layton and Jaques, of London. James Hargreave, B.A., who served his clerkship to Messrs. Johnson, Barclay, and Johnson, of Birmingham; and Messrs. Burton, Yeates, and Hart, of London. mingham; and Messrs. Crowder, Anstie, an Vizard, of London. The council have accordingly awarded them certificates of merit. The number of candidates examined was 289; of these, 220 passed, and sixty-nine were postponed. BIRMINGHAM LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETYAT the 649th meeting of the society held on Tuesday evening, 8th July, in the Law Library, Bennett's Hill, H. Parish, Esq. in the chair. After the transaction of special business a debate took place upon the following moot point: 66 Has a chairman of a public meeting a legal right to order the ejection of persons who wilfully and persistently obstruct the proceedings, with a view to prevent the carrying out of the objects for which such meeting was called?" The following were the principal cases referred to: Howell v. Jackson (6 C. & P. 723); Wooding v. Oxley (9 C. & P. 1); Clifford v. Brandon (2 Camp. Nisi Prius, 358); Lucas v. Mason (L. Rep. 10 Ex. 251; 44 L. J. 145, Ex.). The speakers were Messrs. Rogers and Vince on the affirmative, and Messrs. Davis, Edwards, and O'Connor on the negative. At the close of the discussion the chairman summed up, and on the question being put, it was found that the votes were equal. The question was decided in the negative by the chairman's casting vote. UNITED LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY. AT a meeting at Clement's Inn Hall, Strand, on Wednesday, the 16th inst., Sir Patrick Colthe Plays attributed to Shakspere." A discussion quhoun, Q.C., read a paper on "The Authorship of Messrs. Kains Jackson, Collyer, Dr. Tyler, and ensued, opened by Mr. E. H. Pickersgill, in which others took part A vote of thanks to Sir Patrick Colquhoun was carried unanimously. 66 On Monday, the 21st inst., at the Law Institution, Mr. W. C. Owen opened the following moot: 'A., being in debt to B. and C., conveys all his property to B., who undertakes to satisfy the debt owing from A. to C. A. shortly afterwards dies. Has C. any means of enforcing payment from B.?" (Tweddle v. Atkinson, 1 B. & S. 393; Pollock on Contracts, 2nd edit., p. 196, &c.) It was decided by a majority of four that at common law there was no remedy; but that, the established, equity would have granted relief. relationship of trustee and cestui que trust being On Wednesday last, at Clement's Inn Hall, Mr. S. Ward moved "That the Contagious Diseases Act should be repealed." An animated discussion ensued, Mr. Ward being supported by Messrs. Ashton, Cross, Spence, Payne, Banks (Secretary to the National Association), and Rev. and being opposed by Messrs. Skipper, Rundle, Levey, and Pitt Corbett. Mr. Owen also spoke. The motion was carried by a majority of one. On Wednesday next the subject for discussion is as follows: "That the degrees of kinship within which marriages should be prohibited should be based upon physical, and not upon religious grounds.' To be opened by Mr. W. Slater. Students' Queries. ARTICLES OF CLERKSHIP-FURTHER ARTICLES.-Can an articled clerk, before expiration of his articles, obtain a release from them, his principal being willing, and enter into fresh articles for the remainder of his term with a London solicitor, the London solicitor not being the principal's (who practises in the country) agent? [Certainly; the articles can be cancelled by mutual consent, and further articles could then be entered into. See sect. 13 of Solicitors Act 1843.-ED. STUD.'s DFPT.] ARTICLES OF CLERKSHIP.-Please inform me whether I can be articled to a managing clerk who is a solicitor and takes out a practising certificate? T. S. [No. See sect. 4 of the Solicitors Act 1843.-Ed. STUD.'S DEPг.] ADMISSION DURING VACATION.-(1) On what day can I earliest be admitted. I am over twenty-one, have passed my final examination, and my articles expire on. 4th Sept. 1879? (2) Can I be admitted on Sept. 5, or must I wait until sittings? (3) When is the list of prizetakers and honours men at the final examination June 17 and 18, 1879, announced? (4) Where can I see it ? F. J. T. and C. (2) You need not Shortly; in our [(1) On or after 5th Sept. next. wait till Michaelmas sittings. (3) columns.-ED. STUD.'S DEPT.] READING FOR THE INTERMEDITE EXAMINATION.-In looking up some past numbers of the LAW TIMES I find in the issue of 5th April last that "B." would like to correspond with an articled clerk who intends preFrancis Quekett Louch, who served his clerk-senting himself for intermediate in Jan. 1880. I intend ship to Mr. John Louch, of Langport; Mr. Henry doing so, and shall be glad to adopt his plan of correBurke Godwin, of Newbury; and Messrs. Gregory, spondence, or to mutually assist any other student who Rowcliffe, Rowcliffe, and Rawle, of London. is going up for that examination. M. (York.) Alfred Parkinson, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Dibb, Raley, and Clegg, of Barnsley; and Messrs. Torr, Janeways, Torr, and Gribble, of London. Samuel Royle Shaw, jun., who served his clerkship to Messrs. Saunders and Bradbury, of Bir INTERMEDIATE EXAMINATION.-I was articled 19th Oct. 1877 for five years. When have I to present myself for the above examination, and when for the final? T. A. [(1) Your earliest time is April 1880 if the examination that month takes place after 19th; otherwise in June 1880. (2) Earliest time in June 1882.-ED. You do not say for what period you are bound under articles.-ED. STUD.'S DEPT,] wise to read them. [Probably all four volumes. Certainly study the work.-ED. STUD.'S DEPT.] EMPLOYMENT DURING ARTICLES.-Would reading for a law decree at Oxford vitiate service under articles if the time can be spared therefor? [As we understand your question- certainly it would.-ED. STUD.'S DEPT.] M. PRECEDENTS.-Can any of your readers kindly tell me of a really good book of modern Precedents in Con veyancing for use in a solicitor's office? ARTICLED CLERK. REAL PROPERTY AND to NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. WILL-ANNUITY-INVESTMENTS TO PRODUCE INTERMEDIATE 1881.-If Stephen's Commentaries are selected for the intermediate examinations in 1881 will-DEFICIENCY OF INCOME-IF TO BE MADE UP candidates be examined in the whole of the four OUT OF CORPUS.-A testator empowered his volumes? I have the work. Do you think it will be trustees, at such times as they should think ARTICLED CLERK. proper, to sell his real and personal estate, and directed them to invest the proceeds, and set apart a sufficient portion of such investments as will produce the annuity of £1200, which I bequeath to my wife for her life, payable quarterly," such annuity to be reduced to £150 in case of his wife's second marriage. "And as to the entire residue of my said trust estate, and also to that part thereof set apart in favour of my said wife, after her death, and as to such part thereof as shall be no longer required to be set apart in consequence of her second marriage," in trust for his children. The testator's estate proved insufficient to produce the annuity of £1200. Held (reversing the decision of Hall, V.C.), that the widow was NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. entitled to have the deficiency raised out of the SALVAGE-PILOTAGE.-A person, whether a corpus of the trust estate: (Gee v. Mahood, 40 pilot or not, who takes charge of a vessel in dis-L. T. Rep. N. S. 663. Ct. of App.) tress, with the consent of her master, is entitled ADMINISTRATION-JURISDICTION-DOMICIL to salvage reward, in the absence of an express-SCOTCH ASSETS.-Where the Probate Division contract to the contrary. Semble, it is immaterial of the High Court of Justice had granted a general whether, under such circumstances as would entitle probate of the will of a testator domiciled in a person to salvage reward in any case, the person Scotland, the Chancery Division made the ordiclaiming salvage does or does not hold himself out nary administration decree, without limiting the rightly or wrongly as being a pilot, so long as he decree for administration to the assets in England, performs the service. The Frederick (1 W. Rob. and notwithstanding the opposition of a majority 16) approved: (The Anders Knape, 40 L. T. Rep. of the executors: (Re Maxwell, 40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 684. Adm. Ct.) N. S. 669. Ct. of App.) MARITIME LAW. had jurisdiction to hear and determine the ease against S. notwithstanding he was brought before them on an illegal warrant, and there was no written information: (Reg. v. Hughes, 40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 685. Cr. Cas. Res.) COMPANY LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. VOLUNTARY WINDING-UP-DISSOLUTION OF COMPANY.-When a company has been voluntarily wound-up under the 142nd section of the Companies Act 1862, and has been dissolved under the 143rd section of the Act, the court has no jurisdiction to make a compulsory winding-up order, unless the dissolution can be impeached on the Decision of Jessel, M.R. ground of fraud. affirmed. Re Pinto Silver Mining Company (33 L. T. Rep. N. S. 336; L. Rep. 8 Ch. Div. 273) explained and followed: (Re London, &c. Insurance Company, 40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 666. Ct. of App.) BANKRUPTCY LAW. DIGEST OF BANKRUTCY DECISIONS IN 1878. (Continued from page 213.) ORDER AND DISPOSITION. A., a partner in a firm of distillers, mortgaged his estate and interest in the distillery, and in the partnership and goodwill of the business, to B.: but the property mortgaged remained in the occupation of the firm until the bankruptcy of A. The mortgage deed, so far as it included the fixtures, was not registered under the Bill of Sale Act 1854. Held that the interest of A. in the partnership was a close in action other than a debt within the exception in sect. 15, sub-sect 5 of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, and that the property comprised in the mortgage deed, was therefore not in the order and disposition of A. at the time of the bankruptcy: What notice of Clerk of the Peace. (Ex parte Fletcher; Re Bainbridge, 38 L. T. Rep. appeal to be given. N. S. 230.) MAGISTRATES' LAW. SESSIONS. G.R.H.Somerset, Esq., Q.C. the expenses of matters over which they had no POOR RATE OBJECTION TO VALUATION LIST NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. INCLOSURE ACT - PRIVATE RIGHT OF WAY -EFFECT OF ALLOTMENT.-The General Inclosure Act (8 & 9 Vict. c. 118) enacts (sect. 68) that all private or occupation ways over, through, and upon the lands to be inclosed which shall not be set out" by the valuer as provided by the section shall be for ever stopped up and extinguished." The appellant purchased lands, together with all ways, &c.," from H. At the time of the purchase an inclosure of the waste of the manor in which the lands sold were situated was in contemplation, and H. expressly reserved to himself the allotments to which he would be entitled under the award in respect of the lands so sold. He afterwards sold the allotments to the respondents. The occupiers of the lands sold to the appellant had for forty years, and down to the time of the award under the Inclosure Act, enjoyed a private right of way over the part of the waste comprised in the respondents' allotment, but the award did not set out any way over that allotment. Held (affirming the judgment of the court below), that the effect of the award was to extinguish the right of way previously enjoyed by the occupiers of the appellant's land: (Turner v. Crush, 40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 661. H. of L.) REFORMATORY LIABILITY ΤΟ PROVIDE CLOTHING-PRISON AUTHORITIES.-T. M., a invenile offender, was sentenced by the stipendiary magistrate of L. to a short term of imprisonment, and a further period of five years in a reformatory school. Previously to his entering the school the Prison Commissioners of England had provided the said T. M. with clothing proper and suitable for such school. Under the Prison Act of 1865 the mayor, aldermen, and burgesses of L. were the prison authorities for the prison of the borough of L., and under the Reformatory PERJURY-PETTY SESSIONS-JURISDICTION and Industrial Schools Act of 1866 they still are OF JUSTICES-ILLEGAL ARREST-WANT OF the authorities for the reformatory and industrial INFORMATION IN WRITING OR ON OATH.schools of the borough. By the Prison Act of H., a police constable, obtained an illegal warrant 1877 the borough prison of L. was transferred from against S. for assaulting him and obstructing him the old prison authorities and vested in one of Her in the discharge of his duty. H. arrested S. Majesty's principal Secretaries of State. The thereon, and took him before the magistrates in question was whether the providing of clothing petty sessions, who convicted and sentenced S. for juveniles sentenced to a period of years in a to six months' imprisonment with hard labour. reformatory or industrial school after a term of No objection was taken by S. to the proceedings, imprisonment was a prison or reformatory school and he called a witness to show he was not guilty. expense, and whether the Prison Commissioners, H. was afterwards indicted for perjury committed or the mayor, aldermen, and burgesses of L., as by him at the hearing of the case at petty sessions, the authorities having the management of the and convicted by the jury, subject to the opinion reformatory schools, were liable for the expense of of this court as to the jurisdiction of the justices such clothing. Held. that the Prison Commis. | in petty sessions, because there was no written sioners were liable, and that the mayor, aldermen, information nor oath to support the warrant. and burgesses of L. should not be burdened with Held (Kelly, C.B. dissentiente), that the justices Per the Chief Judge: Partners are possessed per my et per tout, and each of them is lawfully in possession of the whole of the assets, but not exclusively, not solely in possession. It is said that every partner may deal as he will with the partnership property, and as to collecting the partnership assets, there is no authorities for such a proposi tion. Everything a partner does, is done on the presumption that he is the lawfully constituted agent of his co-partner, that is, on the presump tion that they are both owners. Neither is more the owner than the other; neither is sole owner. They are both entitled to do all lawful things until the conclusion of the partnership. If either partner does anything, he does for himself and the other. He takes no action except it is done under the partnership. The sheriff may seize the share of a partnership, but he cannot seize the tables or the chairs in their entirety, because the other partner is entitled to half of them-to half of what is seized as well as of what is not seized. The interest which a partner takes in a partnership is not a right to the chattels, not any order and disposition of them otherwise than under the partnership contract, and certainly not with the consent of the true owner: (Ib.) B. and S. were partners. They filed a petition for liquidation by arrangement, and plaintiff was appointed trustee. B. had separate liabilities, and separate assets consisting of furniture. Plaintiff, by direction of B.'s separate creditors, allowed the furniture to remain in B.'s house. The joint creditors of B. and S. made an order of discharge. B. assigned the furniture, and other furniture acquired after the discharge to defendant's without plaintiff's knowledge, and shortly afterwards filed a second liquidation petition, B. then claimed the furniture. The trustee under the second liquidation disclaimed all interest. Held, affirming the decision of Lush, J., that, the trustee under the second liqui dation having disclaimed, the order and disposition clauses would not affect plaintiff's claim: (Meggy v. The Imperial Discount Company, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 309.) The custom of hiring pianos on the three years' hire-purchase system is well established, and therefore a piano remaining upon the premises of a liquidating debtor at the time of the appointment of a receiver, but which had been obtained by the debtor under an agreement for hire, by which upon punctual payment of £15 a year for three years by monthly instalments, the hirer would become, at the end of the three years, the owner of the instrument, the three years not having elapsed, as not within the doctrine of reputed ownership: (Ex parte Hattersley; Re Blanchard, 38 L. T. Rep. Ñ. S. 619.) A. drew two bills of exchange upon B. and C., indorsed upon the security of cement in A.'s possession, and stored in A.'s warehouse. A. packed the cement in barrels, which he set apart in his own warehouse, and marked them with the initial letters of B.'s name, to whom also the invoice was sent as on a purchase made by him. A.'s bankers discounted the bills, and A. received the proceeds. A. soon after filed a petition of liquidation, at which time the cement remained in his warehouse, set apart and marked as before stated. One bill became due before and one after the filing of A.'s liquidation petition, and both were paid by C., who claimed the cement as being held by A. as a trustee for him. Held, by the Chief Judge, that A. did not hold the cement as a trustee within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, and that the cement passed to A.'s trustee as being in A.'s order and disposition at the time of the bankruptcy with the consent of C., the true owner: (Ez parte Cohen, 38 L. T. Rep. A policy of life assurance is a thing in action within the meaning of the exception to the reputed ownership clause of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, sect. 15, sub-sect. 5. The second mortgagee of a policy of life assurance gave no notice of his mortgage to the first mortgagee or to the insurance company, till after the mortgagor had filed a liquidation petition, and a trustee had been appointed under it. Held, that the policy being a thing in action, and as such excepted from the reputed ownership clause of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, the second mortgagee was entitled to the policy subject to the rights of the first mortgagor: Ex parte Ibbotson; Re Moore, 39 L. T. Rep. N. S. 884.) N. S. 1.) Per James, L.J.: It is clear beyond all argument that a policy of life assurance is a thing in action, and is, therefore, within the exception contained in the 5th sub-section. (Ib.) PARTNERS AND PARTNERSHIP. P.. having dissolved a former partnership with H. and C., continued the business alone under the style of P., Son and Co., his own name alone being placed over the shop front. He employed his son to assist him in the management of the business, and authorised him to sign cheques and to order goods in the name of the firm, his intention being to take his son into partnership if the business prospered, but no partnership was in fact entered into between the father and the son. Ultimately P. and his son were jointly adjudicated bankrupts as ostensible partners. Of fifty-seven creditors who proved in the bankruptcy, two deposed that the son had been held out to them as a partner by the father, and eight others deposed that they always believed the son to be a partner. Held, that there had been a sufficient holding out of the zon as a partner to convert the assets of the business, which were originally the separate estate of the father, into joint estate of him and his son so far as creditors were concerned. Held also, that the doctrine of reputed ownership applied, and that the assets were distributable among the creditors of the firm as being in the apparent possession and reputed ownership of the firm with the consent of the true owner: (Ex parte Hayman; Re Pulsford, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 238.) ministration of the testator's estate, under which section of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, upon a pora receiver had been appointed, and he by order of tion of the bankrupts' premises for a years' rent, the court had taken possession of the property of which distress was further completed on the 4th the firm, and was carrying on the partnership March. A sale was effected of the goods so seized business. Held upon appeal, discharging the which realised the net sum of £88 5s. Upon these order of the County Court, that an order in bank- facts it is contended by the counsel for the trustee ruptcy restraining the administration suit, was an that the case falls within the principle of the improper exercise of the power of the court, inas- decisions, that where there has been a withdrawal much as the matters in dispute could be better from its distress by the landlord there having been considered in the administration suit in Chancery sufficient goods to satisfy his claim for rent, the than in the Court of Bankruptcy: (Ex parte Charl-power to distrain a second time for the same rent ton, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 295). PENDING PROCEEDINGS. The creditors of a liquidating debtor accepted a composition payable by instalments, and secured by the joint and several promissory notes of the debtor and a surety. The debtor and his surety being unable to pay the composition, the debtor obtained leave to summon a general meeting to vary the terms of the composition, but proceeded in all respects as if a fresh first meeting was being convened. At the new meeting resolutions were duly passed accepting a smaller composition; but the Registrar refused to register the resolution, and the debtor was subsequently adjudicated bankrupt. The debtor's solicitor applied to the court for payment of his costs incurred under the ceedings to vary the composition. Held, that the Registrar having refused to register the resolutions, and no appeal having been brought from his order, there were no proceedings pending within the meaning of the rule: (Ee parte Hooper, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 366). (To be continued.) WAKEFIELD COUNTY COURT. pro (Before Mr. Serjt. TINDAL ATKINSON, Judge.) Bankruptcy Right of distraining by landlord has gone, and further that the agreement of the 28th Jan., by which the remaining portion of the money unpaid, the subject of the distress, was to be added to the principal sum to be secured by a new mortgage extending the time for payment from ten to sixteen years, that from that moment the amount which had been distrained for ceased to have the character of rent, and that the directors had lost the power of distraining for it. It is whether this proposition is maintainable upon the facts stated that the decision in this case must turn. With regard to the right of the landlord to distrain a second time after having withdrawn from the first distress, the law is clear and distinct. If a tenant upon whose goods a distress has been made does anything equivalent to saying "Forbear to distrain and postpone for my accommodation your distress to some other time," in such a case the landlord may distrain a second time. In Lear v. Edmonds (Barnwell & Adolphus, 157) it was said, "that if the goods, the subject of the distress have been relinquished at the request of the party, it would not operate as a bar; there must, no doubt, be a lawful ground for relinquishing the first distress and taking a second, but in all the cases in which the landlord withdraws at the request of the tenant and for his accommodation the landlord is not debarred from distraining a second time." In the present case it is not disputed that the distress made upon the goods on the 6th Jan. was not carried out by sale at the request of the bankrupts, and was withdrawn upon their promise to pay £100, partly performed by the payment of £25, the then arrangement being conditional upon HIS HONOUR, who had reserved his judgment, a final one being completed, which should be consaid:-This case comes before me by way of clusive and binding upon both parties. There motion, in which William Pease, the trustee of the can, I think, be little doubt as to what was the estate of the bankrupt Duckells and Furness, intention of the parties at the meeting of the 28th applies for an order to compel the Leeds Estate Jan. On the side of the directors it was that the and Building Society to file an account of the character of the debt as rent should not be sale of the bankrupts' goods, chattels and effects changed, and the distress should not be considered, under a distress made by the society for two years' abandoned until the £25 agreed to be paid on the rent, and also to direct them to pay to the said 11th Feb. and the remaining £25 on the 1st trustee the proceeds of such sale, together with March had been carried out, and that with regard the costs of the distress, and the cost of the to the other matters they were to be emvarious applications to the court in this matter. bodied in a new mortgage deed which owing The facts, so far as they are necessary to be stated to the bankruptcy was never completed; and for the decision of the court in this case, are, that I believe that such also was the intention the society in Nov. 1876, advanced to the and understanding of the terms by the debtors bankrupts a sum of £1050, made up of principal themselves. There was a total failure on the part and interest secured by a mortgage of the of the latter to carry out their part of the agreeborrower's premises and land. This amount was ment. The sending the post-dated cheque in lieu made repayable by yearly instalments of £105. of making the promised payment on the 11th The deed was in the ordinary form, and contained Feb. was in itself a substantial breach of the the usual allotment clause by which as between agreement of the 28th Jan., and I am of opinion the parties a tenancy from year to year was that on the filing of the petition in this court on instalments, the last of which became due on created. The debtors having failed to pay two the 26th Feb. the agreement came to an end by the bankrupts being unable to perform its terms. the 30th of Nov. 1878, the society distrained In the absence of the second mortgage deed all for two years' rent. On the distress being was in parol, and the performance of a covenant put in force the debtors made cannot be waived by parol at common law. Rent representation to the secretary of the society of which arises out of a covenant is a specialty debt, of the partnership if the distress was persisted ment, by a deed, or some contract of as high or the ruinous effect it would have upon the credit and can only be discharged in the absence of payin, and upon the promise of an immediate pay- higher nature. West v. Blakeway (2 Manning & the distress was provisionally withdrawn until ment of £25, and a subsequent payment of £75, Grainger, 729) is an authority to show that in the final terms of agreement as to the payment of the seal of the party, and the contract into which he case of a covenant the whole matter is under the remaining amount had been come to a written has entered can only be discharged by an instrument consent in the meantime having been given for of the same nature as that by which the contract the possession to be continued without sale for was created. There is nothing arising out of the twenty-one days. Pursuant to this arrangement, facts of this case which operates, in my opinion, on the 28th Jan. an interview took place at the in the nature of an estoppel so as to prevent the society's offices in Leeds between Furness and the second distress from being operative. The direcdirectors, at which terms of settlement for the tors, as landlords, had not wantonly," in the withdrawal of the distress were discussed at language of Bagge v. Mawby (8 Exch. 641), length, and it was then agreed that upon the pay- abandoned the distress without sufficient excuse ment of £25 on the 11th Feb., and a further pay for so doing, and thus made the second distress ment of £25 on the 1st March, the distress should unlawful, but had been induced to withdraw it at be withdrawn, and that the terms contained in the the instance and for the accommodation of their following minutes entered in the society's books tenants, whose failure to perform the conditions should be embodied in a new mortgage deed, the upon which it was provisionally withdrawn has minute being as follows: "Furness appeared prevented their landlords from realising the before the directors, and after considerable fruits of their first distress. In substance discussion it was agreed that he was to pay this case is nothing more than the landlords not A., B., and C. were in partnership together, £50 in a month, to pay it in with the carrying the first distress into effect upon a carrying on business under the style or firm of £25 already paid, making £75. The remaining promise of payment within a limited time which T.,C., and Co., and were also individually trustees arrears unpaid to be extended to the term of six-promise has not been performed. Lee v. Cooke of the will of T. C. deceased, a former partner in teen years, £25 to be paid on the 11th Feb. and (3 Hurlstone & Norman) decides that, where misthe firm. The firm having presented a liquidation £25 on the 1st March following 29th Jan. 1879. conduct exists on the part of a tenant, a petition, under which resolutions were passed for a The debtors failed to make the payment of £25 on second distress is lawful. I am of opinion composition, was subsequently adjudicated bank- the 11th Feb., but on the 22nd March they sent that the second distress was open to the rupt. Previously, however, to the adjudication, to the directors a post-dated cheque for £50 pay- directors in this case, on the ground that an administration action had been brought by able on the 7th March. On the 26th Feb. a peti- the withdrawal of the first distress was at beneficiaries under the will of T. C. deceased, tion in bankruptcy was filed in this court by the the debtors' request and for their accommodacharging A. B. and C., and also a firm of B. and debtors, and upon learning this, the directors on tion, and that the second distress, for the reasons Co., with breaches of trust and fraud in the ad- I the 1st March made a distraint under the 34th I have stated, was valid and good in law. The Per James, L.J.: It is said that this is a hardship upon the gentleman who was the creditor of the father, having sold his business to him for a sum of money due from P. alone, but I think that it is only one of those misfortunes which occur to persons who deal with others that afterwards become bankrupt, and become bankrupt having partners. The rule has been established that joint creditors take the joint estate and separate creditors take the separate estate, and we have only to consider what is joint and what is separate estate, and we must apply the rule independently of any supposed hardship which it may inflict in any particular case: (Ib.) Per Thesiger, L.J.: The doctrine of law relating to ostensible partnerships is founded upon the doctrine of estoppel, and, although the doctrine of estoppel might be perfectly good as between those who contract with the joint creditors and the joint creditors themselves, I do not see why, in the event of bankruptcy, that estoppel should apply to the separate creditors whose rights seem to me to stand very much in the same position as the rights of the joint creditors. On the one hand you have a separate creditor who had, before the bankruptcy, a right of action against his particular debtor, and a right of obtaining judgment in that action, and to seize property which was actually and in fact separate property: (Ib.) an earnest COWS, COUNTY COURTS. - ACCRINGTON COUNTY COURT. Friday, July 18. were not (Before W. A. HULTON, Esq., Judge. DEWHURST v. TATTERSALL. Trespass-Negligence-Evidence. Barlow (solicitor, Accrington) for plaintiff. Hodgson (solicitor, Burnley) for defendant. His HONOUR delivered the following judgment:-This was an action brought to recover damages for a trespass committed by a cow of the defendant's, under the following circumstances: The defendant is a farmer near Burnley, and on the 3rd of April last, he drove three cows from his farm to Accrington, and exposed them for sale in the market or fair there. The market or fair is held in the public street. The cows tethered or fastened in any manner; and the defendant, who was the only person in charge of them, was at the distance of ten yards from the when one of them, the cow in question, started off and ran away. The defendant did all in his power to stop it, but was unable to do so. The cow went through several streets, and entered the plaintiff's backyard, and from thence it forced its way into the plaintiff's house, where it did the damage complained of. It was objected by Mr. Hodgson, who appeared for the defendant, that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant, and he cited the case Hammack v. White (31 L. J. 129,C. P.), in support of his contention. I wished to examine the case, and I reserved my judgment. I have read the case, and I find that the facts differ widely There can be no doubt that the plaintiff, in these cases, is bound to give affirmative evidence of negligence to support the action; and in the case cited such evidence was not given. The defendant White was riding his horse at a walk in the public street, when the animal became restive, and rushed on to the pavement, where he knocked the party down. It was held, that as no evidence was given that there was any want of prudence in riding the horse in the street, or of skill in its management, the defendant was not liable. In this case, when the defendant exposed his cattle in the public street, I think it was his duty to keep an effective control over them; and it seems very clear that, at the time when the cow made its escape, the defendant was at such a distance from it as to exclude all idea of proper control. I agree, therefore, with Mr. Barlow's argument, and I think that the defendant was guilty of negligence. If the driver of a horse and cart leave them in a public street with no one to look after them, and the horse starts off, and does damage, there would, I conceive, be no from those before me. difficulty in saying that the driver had been guilty of negligence. I am of opinion that, in this case, the defendant was liable for the damage sustained by the plaintiff, and I assess that damage at the sum of £3 10s. Verdict accordingly. BIRMINGHAM COUNTY COURT. May 12 and July 4. (Before J. MOTTERAM, Esq., Q.C., Judge.) APOTHECARIES' COMPANY v. HARRISON. The Apothecaries' Society and the right of chemists to prescribe Medicines. THIS action was brought by the Master, Wardens, and Society of Apothecaries, London, against James Harrison, chemist and druggist, 73, Stafford-street, to recover a penalty of £20, on the ground that the defendant had prescribed and furnished medicine to a person, and acted thereby as an apothecary, without having obtained a certificate, as required by the Apothecaries Act (55 Geo. 3). Nathan (instructed by Reeves) appeared for the plaintiffs, and Herbert (instructed by Glaisher) for the defendant. The case was investigated before his Honour on the 2nd and 3rd July 1877, and was then adjourned pending a decision on a similar case in a superior court. The facts of the case were, briefly, that a young woman, named Julia Caddick, called at the defendant's shop on the 27th Nov. 1876, and asked defendant if he could make up something to relieve her of the weakness from which she was suffering. Defendant asked her what the weak ness arose from, and she told him that it was a weakness left on her after her confinement. Defendant, she said, felt her pulse, looked at her tongue, and asked her to describe what she felt; she described her symptoms, and then defendant made her up some medicine, and said it would do her good. She took a dose of it in the shop, and paid defendant a shilling for it. Mr. Suffield, surgeon, at the previous hearing stated that the woman's symptoms were those of anæmia, which was a dangerous complaint, if not properly treated, and frequently ending in death. A preparation of iron, which the defendant had given to the woman, was a proper medicine; he did not think a sufficiently deep diagnosis had been made. Nathan now asked his Honour to give judgment on the matter, stating that he believed there was practically no dispute as to what took place at Mr. Harrison's shop. His HONOUR read over his notes of the evidence given at the previous investigation, and expressed a wish to have the case reargued, and the way in which in the opinion of the parties it was thought the recent decision in the Exchequer Division of the High Court affected this case. Nathan thereupon addressed his Honour at considerable length upon the law of the case. He quoted Lotinga's case, 2 Moo. & R. 495, and referred to the words of Cresswell, J. in defining an apothecary as a person who professed to judge of diseases by the symptoms, and applied himself to cure the diseases by medicines; and asked his Honour to decide whether the defendant in this case had not acted in the manner indicated. Defendant felt the woman's pulse, looked at her tongue, and put such questions as he thought necessary for a diagnosis of the case, and selected a medicine which was a proper medicine, so far as it went, for the complaint. Referring to the recent judgment by Baron Pollock in the Shepperley case, he pointed out that, according to the 28th section of the Act, the business of a chemist was that of "preparing, compounding, dispensing, and vending of medicines and drugs." Mr. Nathan argued that dispensing meant weighing out or apportioning of ingredients according to quantities given, and it had nothing to do with the selection of the ingredients for the complaint he had himself diagnosed. For a chemist to select and prescribe medicines, he contended, was to take upon himself the duty of an apothecary. There was nothing which a regular practitioner did that the defendant did not do in this case, except that he did it in his own shop instead of at the bedside of the patient. Herbert, in reply, pointed out in the first place, that there were certain duties which the apothecary had to perform in preparing and dispensing medicines which the chemist also had to perform, and a chemist must not be convicted for doing an act which an apothecary might do. He contended that chemists and druggists, under the words 'dispensing" and vending," had a certain amount of discretion. His HONOUR said he thought it would not be denied that a chemist had to exercise discretion. If a person asked for a dose of medicine the chemist had to exercise discretion as to the quantity to be supplied according to the person to whom it was to be given, and might he thought make inquiries for that purpose. Herbert said his friend admitted that a chemist must exercise discretion in mixing a dose, and he Honour to say how far that discretion might be was prepared to accept that, and he asked his exercised. In Shepperley's case it was shown that the chemist examined a patient, and the judge left it to the jury to say whether the discretion used was proper. In this case he asked his Honour to say that the defendant simply exercised such discretion as belonged to him, and which was only ancillary to the dispensing and vending of the drugs. To prescribe was to discover or diagnose a disease, and to adapt a remedy for it. The difference between what his client did and such a told him what was the matter with her, and asked course was that the patient went into his shop and for medicine for weakness. Then came the question as to what was the proper dose of medicine to give her, and how could defendant better ascertain that than by feeling her pulse? He urged that the defendant in doing this was simply exercising discretion as to the dose of medicine which he should give. It was difficult to say how far such discretion might be exercised. His HONOUR asked, if a chemist and druggist might do what the defendant had done, what part of an apothecary's business he might not do? Herbert.-He cannot visit, sir. His HONOUR.-I am not sure that an apothecary can do that as a right and prescribe? There are cases in which it is said he cannot recover, except on a contract, for visits and medicines. Herbert said a chemist could not visit at the house of a patient, nor charge for advice in any way, without trespassing upon the duties of an apothecary. An apothecary might examine and discover what were the diseases of his patients, and then determine what were remedies; but a chemist might not do that. He the proper might take the statement of any person coming to him and saying what disease he had, and he might dispense medicine to him, and for that purpose he might exercise discretion as to the dose by examining the pulse. Further than that he had no right to go. After further discussion his Honour stated that he should defer his judgment until a day of which he would give notice to the respective parties. July 4.-His HONOUR delivered judgment as follows:-This is an action brought by the plaintiffs against the defendant to recover the sum of £20 by way of penalty under the 20th section of the 55 Geo. 3, c. 194, for practising as an apothe cary without having first obtained the necessary certificate. It was heard before me as far back as the 2nd July 1877, and was adjourned in conse quence of the pending of an appeal to the High Court of Justice against the decision of the County Court judge at Nottingham in a case similar to the present, and under the same Act of Parlia ment. That appeal has now been disposed of, and I am sorry not to be able to derive the assistance from it I anticipated. So far as concerns the question of what is meant by "acting as an apothecary" within the meaning of the Act, or the still more important question whether, in virtue of usage prior to the Act in 1815, the right contended for of the chemists to act as apothe caries in the treatment of simple ailments and the administration of simple remedies for their relief, the law is left in very much the same state of doubt as it was before. The facts of the case are shortly these. The defendant is a chemist and druggist, carrying on business at Birmingham, and a young woman named Julia Caddick, being unwell, was advised to go to the defendant's shop for medicine. In her evidence she states that she went to the defendant's shop on the 27th Nov. 1876, and saw the defendant, and asked him if he could make up some medicine to relieve her from a weakness she was suffering from. she told him it was a weakness left on her from her last confinement, and that her womb came down. She says further "that the defendant felt her purse, looked at her tongue and asked her to describe her feeling, when she told him she suffered much from pains in the back." After this, according to her evidence, the defendant gave her a bottle of medicine, which he said would do her good, and told her to take it according to the instructions on the bottle. She says She says " "she gave the defendant one shilling for the medicine, and took some of it at once in the shop." A bottle half full of medicine was produced in court at the trial by the witness, and she stated that it was the same that she obtained from the defendant at his shop on the 27th Nov. The witness was cross-examined at length, but her evi dence was not shaken in any respect. The above is all the evidence on the part of the plaintiffs, I consider necessary to state at length, except that of the medical man, Dr. Suffield, who in his examination stated "that he had heard the evi dence given by the woman, and from her descrip tion of her suffering, and from what she stated she had told the defendant, he should imagine he was suffering from anæmia, which was a constitu tional complaint of a dangerous character, fre quently leading to death if the patient was not the nature described, Dr. Suffield observed that properly treated." In diagnosing a complaint of one would have to go a little deeper into particu lars than seems to have been done in this case by the defendant. On cross-examination Dr. Suf field said "he did not think feeling the pulse was a sufficient diagnosis of the disease." Upon being requested by defendant's counsel, he examined the medicine in the bottle, and said "he thought it was a preparation of iron, and would be a proper medicine for the case.' In opposition to this defendant was himself called as a witness, and the material parts of his evidence were to the effect "that he remembered Julia Caddick (visiting his shop in November in the afternoon. She came and asked him to supply her with a bottle of strengthening medicine for a weakness after lying in." He denies that he examined her at all, and states that it was not not necessary. He says "he did not feel her pulse, and she did not tell him anything about the womb coming down." He admitted, however, that he did ask her if the weakness had anything to do with her confinement, stating that he did so because he saw she had been recently confined, and had a baby in her arms which she said was hers. The witness then stated, "I said to her, Do you mean general weakness of the consti added, "I mixed her up some stuff which I put tution? when she said, Yes." The witness then into a bottle and put a label upon it." The label admitted was "his label." on the bottle which had been produced the witness He said that the mixture in the bottle was not what the woman had from his shop, that he would swear. This, with the exception of an aged chemist called by the after, was the whole of the evidence on the one defendant, to whose evidence he should refer hereside and the other so far as the real question to be |