fusing inspection, what penalty will be incurred by such refusal ? 32. Refer to the Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, and state the limit of time within which an action may be brought under the provisions of that Act. 33. Appearance in London to a writ issued out of a district registry-To whom must notice of appearance be given? And what are the consequences of omitting to give such notice? 34. In what cases must husband and wife be joined as plaintiffs in an action. 35. Action for recovery of land-Can any and what causes of action be joined therewith without leave? QUESTIONS ON THE LAW OF REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY AND THE PRACTICE OF CONVEYANCING. 36. In what forms may a mortgage of leaseholds be effected? Which is the form usually preferred in practice, and for what reason? 37. A vendor, pending completion of a contract for sale of real estate, goes to Australia, having given a power of attorney to his solicitor to complete the matter and execute the deed of conveyance; What course should the purchaser's solicitor require to be adopted on completion? 38. Is there any and what difference between a tenancy from year to year, commencing 24th June 1879," and "a tenancy for one year from 24th June 1879, and so on from year to year?' 39. A tenant of a farm for a term of years makes encroachments during his tenancy on adjoining waste ground. At the expiration of his tenancy who will be entitled to the benefit of such encroachments ? 40. What is compensation for use and occupation? When does it arise? Can the landlord distrain for it? 41. Is any and what particular form of attestation requisite for the due execution of a will? Give the wording of the form in general use. 42. Will a general devise to trustees of all a testator's real estate whatsoever and wheresoever, over which he has a power of disposition, upon trusts declared by the will, pass estates of which he was seised as trustee or mortgagee? Give the reason for your answer. 43. A testator bequeaths a legacy to his nephew, a minor, with a direction to his executors to pay it to him on his attaining twenty-one. The nephew survives the testator but dies before attaining twenty one. Who is entitled to the legacy Give the reason for your answer. 44. Has a purchaser of enfranchised copyhold, in the absence of any stipulation on the subject in the contract, the right to inquire into the title of the lord who granted the enfranchisement? and does the fact that the enfranchisement carried out under the Copyhold Acts affect any such right? was 45. State shortly what are the powers given to trustees by Lord Cranworth's Act of 1860. 46. Are there any and what circumstances under which the marriage of a testator does not revoke his will? 47. If personal estate be settled on a woman for life, for her separate use, without power of anticipation; can she under any and what circumstances alienate her life interest? 48. Has a solicitor any and what lien on the title deeds of an estate deposited in his hands by a client who holds a mortgage on the estate? 49. Since what time have debts been made assignable by deed, and by what statute was the change effected? How were debts formerly recoverable at law by an assignee? 50. What are specialty debts, and by what statute were they deprived of their priority in administration over simple contract debts? Have they now any and what advantage over simple contract debts? THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF BANKRUPTCY. 51. State briefly the principal provisions of the Act which are applicable to traders only. 52. What powers may the Chief Judge, or the judge of a local court, delegate to a registrar? What matters may be heard and disposed of in chambers? 53. How does the Act define a secured creditor ? Is an execution creditor, on whose behalf the sheriff, acting under a writ of fi. fa. has seized, but not sold, the debtor's goods before the debtor has committed an act of bankruptcy, a secured creditor? 54. What are the provisions of the Act as to fraudulent preference? Why is it difficult to make out a case of such preference? 55. State the doctrine of relation. What are the exceptions to it? 56. What are the limitations of the rights of the trustee over the bankrupt's estate in the following officer in the army or navy, or is engaged in the civil service, or has a pension from the Treasury? 57. Case A.-A. puts his name on a bill or note for the accommodation of B., and B. becomes bankrupt. On what condition may A. prove against B.'s estate? Case B.-A. and B. put their names on such paper for the accommodation of each other, and A. becomes bankrupt. On what condition may B. prove against A.'s estate? Case C.-A. and B. put their names on such paper for the accommodation of each other, and both become bankrupt. What right of proof has either estate against the other estate? Suggest reasons for the rule in each case. 58. What are the provisions of the Act and of the General Rules of 1870 respectively as to the disclaimer of leaseholds by the trustee? What is the effect of the disclaimer as regards tenants' fixtures? 59. What are the rights of a creditor who has not proved before the declaration of any dividend or dividends? What is the remedy if the trustee refuses to pay any dividend? What becomes of unclaimed dividends, and when? 60. State more fully the rule that joint and sepaeach other. What are the exceptions to the rule? rate creditors cannot prove in competition with CRIMINAL LAW AND PRACTICE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE. 61. Is there any penalty, and, if so, what, for riding or driving furiously any horse or carriage in towns? And is there any limit as to time within which proceedings must be taken? And before what tribunal should such proceedings be taken? 62. If A. steals a dog, before what statutory tribunal is such offence triable, and to what punishment is A. liable? 63. If any person wilfully or wantonly disturbs any inhabitant of any town by pulling or ringing any door bell, or knocking at any door, is such person guilty of any offence? And if so, before what tribunal is such offence triable, and within what time, and to what punishment (if any) is such person liable? 77. A. married in England, and lived here with his wife for some years. He then left her, and went to America, where he contracted a bigamous marriage with a lady, by whom he had a child. State, shortly, the evidence which the English wife must adduce to obtain a divorce. 78. In a suit for a judicial separation on account of the wife's cruelty, what condition does the court impose upon the husband in the event of its decreeing a separation? 79. What effect has a decree of judicial separation upon the status of a wife, and upon such property as may subsequently be acquired by, or come to, her? 80. What preliminary steps must be taken by a person desirous of prosecuting a suit in formá pauperis? LAW STUDENTS' DEBATING SOCIETY. AT the meeting of this society on the 17th inst., Mr. T. B. Napier in the chair, the question for the debate was: "A railway company received a tank of creosote for carriage. During the transit the creosote escapes without any negligence on the part of the company and flows by natural underground channels to a river, where it damages a fishery. Has the owner of the fishery any being Fletcher v. Rylands (L. Rep. 3 H. of L. remedy against the company?" The cases cited 330); Nichol v. Marsland (L. Rep. 10 Ex. 255); Vaughan v. The Taff Vale Railway Company (29 L. J. 247, Ex). Mr. C. S. Eady, LL.D., opened the discussion in the negative. After the debate the chairman summed up, and on the question being put to the meeting, it was decided in the negative. UNITED LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY. THIS Society held its annual dinner on Wednes day, at the Pall Mall Restaurant. The dinner committee (Messrs. Moyle and Quicke) had been fortunate enough to secure Mr. Sergeant Parry for the chair, and he was supported by Mr. Montague Cookson, Q.C., the hon. standing counsel, and other gentlemen. About thirty-five were present. After the usual loyal toasts, Mr. Pickersgill pro64. If a person employed by or under the Post-posed "The Legal Profession." To this toast Mr. office steals a post letter. does such offence amount Cookson, Q.C. responded on behalf of the Bar, to a felony or misdemeanour? And where is such and Mr. Dowson for the other branch of the Pro offence triable? in part or all, does the Central Criminal Court Act give jurisdiction? and quote the reign, year, and chapter of the Central Criminal Court Act. 65. Over what city or cities, county or counties, 66. Is the crime of forgery by statute a felony or misdemeanour? And where is the offence triable, whether committed in the country or in London? 67. If A. unlawfully assaults and beats B., what summary remedy has B., and how can he enforce it, and under what statute ? 68. Define misdemeanour, and quote some of the principal misdemeanours. 69. Is slander recognizable before magistrates, and, if so, under what circumstances? 70. Has any accused person a right to call any, and, if any, what, witnesses in his defence before a magistrate? And what is the magistrate's duty if the accused person desires to call any such witnesses? THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THe Probate and DIVORCE DIVISION OF THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. 71. What is the usual course taken with regard to the administration of the estate of a bastard, who dies intestate, and without wife or child? administration differs from the title by will. 72. State in what respect and why the title by 73. B. died, having made a will of which he appointed his wife (with others) executrix. She proved the will, and survived the other executors. She then married again, and during her second coverture made a will under a power, and appointed her then husband sole executor thereof. Upon her death letters of administration, with her will annexed, were granted to her second husband, who survived her, and was the sole person entitled to the personal estate, over which she had no disposing power. Will the second husband, by virtue of such administration, sufficiently represent the testator B., part of whose estate is unadministered? or must administration be taken to B.'s estate? Give a reason for your answer. 74. In what case can probate of a will be obtained from a district registry? and what effect has such a probate? 75. A testator erased in a will, with a knife, the amount of a legacy of £200, and in his own handwriting substituted £100 for it. He also wrote under the attestation clause an explanatory memorandum of what he had done, but such memorandum was not duly attested. Explain why the alteration could not take effect. 76. What is necessary to perfect the chain of executorship through a feme executrix ? fession. evening, "Success to the Society:" he alluded to The Chairman then proposed the toast of the the various objects for which the society existed, to the hard work it was doing among law students and young practitioners, and expressed his conviction that such a society, bringing together as it did both barristers and solicitors, Bar students and articled clerks, must necessarily be of great assistance to the Profession. Mr. Swinfen Eady proposed, and Mr. Shirley responded to the "Officers of the Society," after which Mr. Quicke, in a short speech, drew attention to the country societies in union with this society, coupling with the toast the late secretary of the Bolton Law Students' Society. Mr. Haslam of the B.L.S.S. responded, and expressed his belief that his society, which had been called by the LAW TIMES a model law students' society, considered it a great boon to be in union with such a society as this. Mr. Moyle then proposed the last toast on the list, The Chairman,' alluding, amid continuous cheers, to the fact that from the year 1864. when the society was founded, to the present time, the chairman had taken a deep and sincere interest in the welfare of the society. Personally he (the speaker) had received substantial assistance from Mr. Serjeant Parry in forming the law library. The society had that night ample proof of the learned Serjeant's kindly feeling to them, and he begged them to drink the toast with full musical honours. After the applause attending the musical honours had somewhat subsided, Mr. Serjt. Parry rose to respond. Having thanked those present for the warmth with which they had received the toast, he said that the interest he took in the society was then as great as it had ever been, and the he hoped to see it enjoy, in years to come, prosperity that had attended it in the past. (Applause.) announced till July 1880. (3) What books are most MAGISTRATES' LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. BASTARDY-MARRIED WOMAN LIVING WITH treasurers. An order having been made to wind- sect. 57 of the Poor Law Act (4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76), TURNPIKE TOLLHOUSE USED AS A DWELLINGHOUSE-ENCROACHMENT.-A tollhouse had been used for the residence of a man employed to keep the road in repair ever since the tolls had ceased to be collected there, twelve years ago. The HER HUSBAND-JURISDICTION OF JUSTICES. adjoining landowner applied for a mandamus to -A single woman, after being delivered of a bas- compel the road trustees to pull down the house, tard child, got married, and, whilst living with under 4 Gee. 4, c. 95, s. 57, in order that he might her husband, applied for an affiliation summons purchase the site, under 3 Geo. 4, c. 126, s. 89. against the putative father. Held, upon a case Held, that the house, being situated within forstated by justices, that the 3rd section of the bidden distance from the centre of the road for a Bastardy Laws Amendment Act 1872 does not dwelling-house (under 3 Geo. 4, c. 126, s. 118), it apply to such a case, and that the justices rightly was, under the circumstances, no longer required refused to make an order: (Stacey v. Lintell, 40 for the purposes of the road; and that the appliL. T. Rep. N. S. 553. Q. B.) cant was entitled to this remedy: (R. v. Greenlaw FRIENDLY SOCIETY-CORPORATE BODY CAN-Turnpike Trustees, 40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 555. Q. B.) NOT BE OFFICER OF.-Semble, that a corporate body cannot legally be appointed an officer of a friendly society. The committee of management of a friendly society which had power, in certain events, to elect officers of the society, on the happening of one of such events, passed a resolution that a bank which had been registered as an unlimited company under the Companies Acts of 1862 and 1867 should be appointed treasurers of the society. The manager of the bank accepted the office on behalf of the bank, and certain moneys belonging to the society were paid to the bank as BOROUGH ......... When holden. Saturday, June 28...... HIGHWAY-LOCOMOTIVE-TO BE IN CHARGE OF THREE PERSONS.-A steam locomotive, while in motion on a highway, is to be in charge of three persons, one of whom, by 41 & 42 Vict. c. 77, s. 29, shall precede the locomotive on foot, and "shall in case of need assist horses and carriages drawn by horses passing the same.' Held, that the fact that the man preceding the engine was leading a horse and cart of his own was not sufficient to support a conviction for a breach of the above provision: (Davis v. Browne, 40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 557. C. P.) H. B. Poland, Esq. 8 days 7 days G. E. Dering, Esq. BASTARDY-APPLICATION OF A MARRIED THE decision of the Queen's Bench Division of Thomas Lewis. R. S. Hawkins. affiliation against one Charles Lintell, charging But a difficulty may still arise upon the subject; for, although the decided cases show that the words single woman may include a woman separated from her husband, there is no very obvious definition of what legally amounts to a woman living separate from her husband. As yet, there has been no case under the Act where an order of affiliation has been made where the husband and wife, though in fact not living together, have been living within access to each other. In the first case referred to upon the subject (Rex v. Luffe, 8 East, 193), the facts there were these: The husband of the woman had been beyond seas, and she did not see him or have access to him from the 9th April 1804 until the 29th June 1806; on the 13th of the following month of July she was delivered of a child. Evidence having been given of these facts, and also that one Luffe was the father of such child, the justices made an order on such father, notwithstanding that it was urged that, being the child of a married woman, the justices had no jurisdiction to make the order, and that the non-access of the husband was not proved during the whole of the wife's pregnancy. The Court of King's Bench overruled these objections. In his judgment Lord Ellenborough, after referring to decided cases, said: "From all those authorities, I think this conclusion may be drawn: that circumstances which show a natural impossibility that the husband could be the father of the child of which the wife is delivered, whether arising from being under the age of puberty, or from his labouring under disability occasioned by natural infirmity, or from the length of time elapsed since his death, are grounds on which the illegitimacy of the child may be founded. And, therefore, if we may resort at all to such impediments arising from the natural causes adverted to, we may adopt other causes equally potent and conducive to show the absolute physical impossibility of the husband's being the father; I will not say the improbability of his being such; for, upon the ground of improbability, however strong, I should not venture to proceed. No person, however, can raise a question, whether a fortnight's access of the husband before the birth of a full-grown child can constitute in the course of nature the actual relation of father and child. But it is said that if we break through the rule insisted upon that the non-access of the husband must continue the whole period between the possible conception and delivery, we shall be driven to nice questions. That, however, is not so; for the general presumption will prevail except a case of plain natural impossibility is shown; and to establish such an exception as the present cannot do any harm, or produce any uncertainty in the law upon the subject. . . . With respect to the case where the parents have married so recently before the birth of the child that it could not have been begotten in wedlock, it stands on its own peculiar ground, the marriage of the parties is the criterion adopted by the law, in cases of ante-nuptial generation for ascertaining the actual parentage of the child. For this purpose it will not examine when the gestation began, looking only to the recognition of it by the husband in the subsequent act of marriage." The doctrine thus established has been recognised as sound in all subsequent decisions; and especially in the two recent ones of Reg. v. Collingwood (17 L. J. 168, M.C.; 12 Q. B. 681; and Ex parte Grimes, 22 L. J. 153, M.C.; 2 Ell. & Bl. 547), in each of which it appeared that access was impossible; and in Ex parte Grimes, where the husband had, at the time of conception, been under a sentence of transportation in Van Dieman's Land. In each one of these cases the nonaccess of the husband at the time of conception was undoubted; and when this is proved by evidence other than that of the wife, it establishes the illegitimacy of the child. Difficulties, how ever, often arise where, although the husband and wife have not cohabited, the husband has nevertheless not been far away from his wife; and this difficulty is greatly increased since the passing of the 41 Vict. c. 19, whereby by sect. 4, a magistrate is, under certain circumstances of an aggravated assault by a husband upon a wife, to order that a wife shall be no longer bound to cohabit with her husband. The rule of law laid down by Lord Ellenborough has been further expanded by subsequent judges; thus, in the Say and Sele Barony Case (1 H. of L. Cas. 507), it was held that the illegitimacy of a child born of a married woman is established beyond all dispute by evidence of her living in adultery at the time when the child was begotten, and of her husband then residing in another part of the kingdom, so as to make access impossible. Alderson, B., also, in Cope v. Cope (5 C. & P. 604), says: "If a husband have access, and others at the same time are carrying on a criminal intimacy with his wife, a child born under such circumstances is legitimate in the eye of the law; but if the husband and wife are living separate, and the wife is notoriously living in open adultery, although the husband have an opportunity of access, it would be monstrous to suppose that under these circumstances he would avail himself of such opportunity." In cases, therefore, which now not unfrequently arise, of an application by a married woman living apart from her husband, for an order of affiliation, the inquiry will be a somewhat nice one as to whether the husband had an opportunity of access to his wife at the time of conception, and whether, if he had, it is at all probable from the conduct of the parties that such access took place; always bearing in mind that the law presumes in the case of husband and wife the legitimacy of the issue until the contrary is proved to the conviction of the magistrate. With reference to the 41 Vict. c. 19, s. 4, it is to be observed that the words are merely permissive, namely, "that the wife shall be no longer bound to cohabit with her husband;" whether or not such an order is to be taken as prima facie evidence of non-access may be a matter of doubt. No decision has as yet been pronounced upon the point, and we are somewhat curious to ascertain the view of a Superior Court upon it. A. consigned goods to B. for sale on commission, and drew upon him four bills of exchange to cover the amount advanced by B. upon the goods, which bills B. accepted. B. paid one of the bills, but having asked A. to put him in funds to cover the amount, was informed that A. had filed a petition for liquidation. B. thereupon sold the goods, and paid the proceeds into his banking account, and soon after suspended payment. His creditors, including the billholders, accepted a composition of 7s. in the pound, which was duly paid. As trustees claimed the balance of the proceeds of sale, after paying the composition of 7s., in order to pay the billholders who had proved A.'s estate for the remaining 13s. Held that as A.'s trustee was not so entitled, since if it was held otherwise, there would be a double proof against B.'s estate in respect of the same debt: (Ex parte Murrell v. Crisfield, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 363.) EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENTS. EXECUTION AND EXECUTION CREDITOR. debtor under a fi. fa., and advertised them for sale. Execution creditors issued a writ to recover an The sheriff took possession under an execution of the goods of a trader. The execution was levied in respect of a sum of £44 14s. 5d. The trader then became bankrupt, and his trustee obtained an injunction restraining the sheriff from dealing with the goods, which injunction was from time to time continued for a period of about a month in all, at the end of which time the injunction ceased, the sheriff went out of possession, and the goods were sold. The £44 148. 5d. was increased by means of the month's possession money to a sum exceeding £50. Held, that the execution was an execution in respect of a judgment for a sum exceeding £50 within the meaning of sect. 87, and that the trustee was entitled to the proceeds of the sale: (Ex parte Lythgow; Re Fenton, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 886.) The defendants were the execution creditors of one T. K., an insolvent debtor, who, by a deed made between himself and trustees, and also those of his creditors who should execute the deed, assigned to the said trustees all his book debts and other property in trust to carry on the business of the said T. K., and to realise his estate as the trustees might deem expedient, and to apportion the proceeds according to an equal pound rate to all creditors parties to the deed. If any creditor declined to accept a dividend, then such dividend was to be handed over to the debtor. The deed also contained a stipulation that the creditors-parties thereto of the third part-should severally, in proportion to their claims, covenant with the trustees to hold them harmless, and indemnified from all personal risks they might sustain by reason of the proceedings under the deed. Held, that the defendants were entitled to the goods, as the deed not only tended to defeat and delay creditors by imposing extraordinary and unreasonable terms upon them, but also contained a resulting trust in favour of the debtor: (Spencer v. Slater, 39 L. T. Rep. N. S. 424.) A shipbuilder D. being indebted to the plaintiffs in a large sum as security made an equitable assignment to them, dated Aug. 21, 1875, of all his right and interest in a steamship built for but not delivered to the Turkish Government, and retained by D. as having a lieu on the vessel for its price. D. also agreed to execute any further assurance of the ship to the plaintiffs which they might require. This assignment was not registered under the Bills of Sale Act 1854, nor was the ship registered as a British ship under sect. 19 of the Merchant Shipping Act. By an agreement dated 24th June 1876, D. agreed to sell to plaintiffs certain machinery fixtures and loose tools upon his business premises at a valuation, but this agreement was never signed by the parties thereto. On the 18th July 1876, the sheriff, under an execution issued upon a judgment obtained against D. by a creditor, took possession of the machinery, fixtures, and tools, and also of the steamship. On Aug. 22 the plaintiffs, the sheriff's officer being still in possession under an authority from D., took formal possession of part of the articles comprised in the agreement of June 24, 1876. Defendant having obtained judgment ogainst D., a writ of fi. fa. was issued; and on Sept. 13 a levy on the machinery, fixtures, tools, &c., was made under the writ. On an interpleader issue to try plaintiff's right to the steamship, and to the machinery, &c., as against the defendant, it was held (affirming the decision of Pollock, B., that plaintiffs had a good title to the ship, and to the machinery, &c., as against the defendant, because (1) the transfer of the ship by D. to the plaintiffs, being within the exceptions in sect. 7 of the Bills of Sale Act 1854, was effectual without registration, and the ship was not a British ship so as to require registration under sect. 19 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854. (2) The possession taken by the plaintiffs on Aug. 22 of the machinery, &c., constituted a sufficient actual acceptance and receipt to take the agree ment of May 21 out of sect. 17 of the statute of frauds and the sale by D. to the plaintiffs of the machinery, &c., was valid, notwithstanding they were in the custody of the sheriff when the plaintiffs took possession: (The Union Bank of London v. Lenanton, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 698.) FRAUDULENT PREFERENCE. The directors of a company being liable as con. tributaries for the amount unpaid on their shares, and also as guarantors in respect of a guarantee to a bank, a creditor of the company, and no calls having been made, it was resolved at a directors' meeting, at which those three directors were present, that "in order to reduce the balance due to the bank, it is recommended that the directors do pay up the amount of their shares." At the date of this resolution the company was insolvent. The three directors paid to, and took a receipt from, a person calling himself the pro-secretary of the company, the secretary having refused to receive them, sums equal in amount to the amount due on their shares, which sums the pro-secretary paid to the company's general account with the abovementioned bank. Upon an application by the liquidator that the three directors might be settled on the list of contributories in respect of the amount unpaid on their shares: Held, that the payments made by the directors in respects of the calls were made bona fide, and not in breach of their duty towards the other shareholders, and must therefore be allowed to them: (Re Wincham, &c. Company; Hallmark's case, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 659). Per Jessel, M.R.: Directors are trustees for the shareholders, and if they exercise their powers in breach of trust for their own benefit, they are liable, like all other trustees, to make good to their cestuis que trust the consequences of their breach of trust. But directors are trustees for the company and its members, not for the creditors of the company. The creditors have certain right against the company and its members, but they have no higher or special right against a director than against any other member of the company. They have only those statutory rights against members of the company which are given to them by the Act after the winding-up. There is nothing to prevent the directors from paying a debt of the company, for which they are themselves liable, in priority to other debts, provided that the payment does not amount to a fraudulent preference, under sect. 164 of the Act of 1862. The payment was not any breach of trust or of duty towards the only persons for whom the directors were trustees: (Ib.) HIRING AGREEMENTS. A trader hired of an upholsterer certain furniture of the value of £65, and an agreement was executed which provided that £10 should be paid on signing the agreement, and the balance by monthly instalments of £5, and that the hirer should deposit with the upholsterer promissory notes for the total amount of the furniture by way of collateral security, and without prejudice to the upholsterer's title to the furniture; but if the furniture should be seized under the power there in contained, the notes or so many of them as should then be current, should be given up on demand and become void. The agreement further provided that in the event of non-payment of any instalment, the upholsterer might seize and retake possession of the furniture as in and for his former estate, and any moneys already paid to him were to be forfeited, and that on payment of the full sum of £65, the furniture should become and be the property of the hirer, but till the pay ment of the whole sum it should remain the sole and absolute property of the upholsterer, and that it was only lent on hire to the hirer. The hirer after paying £15 under the agreement, filed a liquidation petition, and afterwards, two instal ments being in arrear, the upholsterer took pos session of the furniture. Held, that as no property in the furniture passed to the debtor until payment of all the instalments, the licence given by him to the upholsterer to seize the furniture could not amount to a bill of sale, and there fore no registration was requisite. Case remitted to decide whether the furniture was in the reputed ownership of the debtor, or whether the custom of hiring furniture was so well-known as to exclude the operation of the reputed ownership clause of the Bankruptcy Act: (Ex parte Crawcour, 39 L. T. Rep. N. S. 2.) INJUNCTIONS TO RESTRAIN ACTIONS. A., B., and C. were in partnership together, car rying on business under the style or firm of T. C. and Co. and were also individually trustees of the will of T. C., deceased, a former partner in the firm. The firm having presented a liquidation petition, under which resolutions were passed for a composition, was subsequently adjudicated bankrupt. Previously, however, to the adjudica tion, an administration action had been brought by beneficiaries under the will of T. C., deceased, charging A., B., and C., and also a firm of B. and Co. with breaches of trust and fraud in the administration of the testator's estate, under which a receiver had been appointed, and he, by order of the court, had taken possession of the property of the firm, and was carrying on the partnership business. Held, upon appeal discharging the order of the County Court, that an order in bankruptcy restraining the administration action, was an improper exercise of the power of the court, inasmuch as the matters in dispute could be better considered in the administration action in Chancery than in the Court of Bank. ruptcy: (Ex parte Charlton; Re Charlton, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 295.) INSOLVENT DEBTOR'S CONTROL OVER PROPERTY. A. filed a petition for liquidation by arrangement, and his creditors accepted a composition to be paid in three instalments. After the first instalment had fallen due, but before the others were due, A. entered into a contract for the sale of his leasehold property. The purchaser required evidence that the first instalment had been paid, and the others secured according to the terms of the composition: Held, that the creditors resolution to accept a composition left A. absolute control over his property, and that the purchaser was not entitled to the evidence demanded. Per Malins, V.C.-The whole principle of composition requires that the debtor should have control over his property. Such control is left to him to enable him to pay the composition. It would be absurd to accept a composition and then to tie the debtor's hands so that he could not pay it. If the composition fails the creditors have their remedy. They can make the debtor a bankrupt, and for that purpose default in payment of the composition is made a continuing bankruptcy. But until the creditors interfere by taking proceedings under the Act, the debtor has complete dominion over his property: (Re Kearley and Clayton's Contract, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 92.) PRESTON COUNTY COURT. Tuesday, June 10. (Before W. A. HULTON, Esq., Judge.) Re IRVING; Ex parte FELL. Assignment-Fraudulent preference-Pressure. E. Oglethorpe (Clark, Oglethorpe and Son) for applicants. Wm. Whelan (Holden and Whelan) for the trustee. His HONOUR.-This was the case of an application for an order directing the trustee in this liquidation to deliver up to the Messrs. Fell certain furniture and household effects assigned to the Messrs. Fell by Irving under and by virtue of a bill of sale. The hearing of the application came on at the last court, when Mr. Whelan appeared for the trustee under the liquidation, and Mr. Oglethorpe for the Messrs. Fell. The case was argued at length, and I reserved my judgment. It appeared that in July last Irving opened an account with the Messrs. Fell by the purchase of some furniture, for which he paid. In August and September he purchased other articles of furniture before the end of the year 1878 he contracted and other goods, for which he did not pay; and a debt with the Messrs. Fell for furniture and other goods to the amount of £54 3s. 8d. For this sum the Messrs. Fell sent in their bill at the end of the year, and the amount was not disputed by Irving. In February of this year the Messrs. Fell received information which made them feel anxious about the account, and on the 11th Feb. Mr. John Fell called on Irving at his office on the subject, and requested a payment on account. This was not complied with, and Mr. Fell then asked for a three months' bill. Irving consented to give it, and Mr. Fell left to procure the necessary document, but on his return he found the office shut up. He called there more than once in the course of that evening, but he was not able to see Irving. The next morning he called on Irving again, and saw him. Mr. Fell asked him then to give a bill of sale over the furniture and goods; Irving agreed to give him a bill of sale, but stipulated that certain articles in the house, which he had purchased from another firm, should be excepted. This was assented to by Mr. Fell, and the bill of sale was drawn up and executed. It is dated the 12th Feb. 1879, and is made between Robert Irving of the one part, and the Messrs. Fell of the other part, and, after reciting that Irving was indebted to the Messrs. Fell in the sum of £54 3s. 8d. and that Irving had agreed to secure the repayment thereof, it is witnessed that Irving did grant and assign to the Messrs. Fell, their executors, administrators, and assigns, all and every the household goods and furniture, stock in trade, plate and plated articles, household linen, books, china, and other household effects whatsoever then being or which should thereafter be in, upon, or about the was messuage or dwelling house occupied by Irving, and situate and numbered 26 in Portland-street in Lancaster, except the kitchen chairs, the caneseated bedroom chairs, and the three French bedsteads then being therein, and also all other the personal estate whatsoever of or to which Irving then was or should be entitled, to hold the same to the said Messrs. Fell, their executors, administrators, and assigns absolutely, provided that if Irving should on demand in writing by the said Messrs. Fell as therein mentioned, pay unto the said Messrs. Fell the said sum of £54 3s. 8d. and interest thereon as therein mentioned, the said deed should be absolutely void. It was admitted that the said bill of sale properly executed and attested, and it was further admitted that the deed was duly 25th March 1879 Irving petitioned this court for and properly registered. It appears that on the arrangement, and that on the 27th March the Messrs. Fell, by a notice in writing, demanded from Irving payment, within forty-eight hours, of the sum of £54 10s. for principal and interest on expenses incurred by them in and about the prethe said bill of sale, and of £3 5s. 6d. the costs and paration of the said bill of sale. The question in the case was whether the giving the bill of sale, under the circumstances, was a fraudulent preference by Irving of the Messrs. Fell. A previous point was alluded to by Mr. Whelan, but I did not understand him to press it strongly. The bill of sale was solely given to secure an antecedent debt; and, had the whole of Irving's property been included in the security, the transaction would clearly have been an act of bankruptcy, and the deed would have been void. But only a portion of the property was transferred to the Messrs. Fell, and I am unable to say that the exception was merely colourable. The amount appeared to be substantial, and the reason assigned by Irving for stipulating for the exception, and which was at once allowed by Fell, goes far to exclude the idea of its having been colourable. The point then in the case turns on the effect of the 92nd section of the Bankruptcy Act, and that depends on the question whether the transaction was entered into by Irving with a view of giving the Messrs. Fell a preference over his other creditors. Now it has been held in many cases, some of which were cited by Mr. Oglethorpe, that it is the voluntary sponoffence, and that it will not be a fraudulent predebtor has been even partly influenced by pressure, ference within the meaning of the section, if the Cairns in a very recent case, or a demand for security. In the words of Lord under pressure, it is the pressure you are to look to; it is the pressure you are to take as the causa causans of the payment, and not any intention of giving a preference to particular creditors:" (Tomkins v. Saffery, 3 App. Ca. 225.) Now, I think it very clear that the bill of sale in this case was given under pressure. There was a demand made by Mr. Fell on Irving, and the first step towards the giving the security did in fact proceed from Fell: (see Smith v. Pilgrim, 2 Ch. Div. 134.) He called on Irving for payment of the account, it was at his suggestion that Irving promised on the 11th Feb. to give the three months' bill, and, when that negotiation failed through the default of Irving, it was equally at his suggestion that the hold, therefore, that the bill of sale in this case is bill of sale was promised and executed. I must not affected by sect. 92, and is valid. The application must be granted. taneous act of the debtor which constitutes the "If it was made that this action was brought in consequence of the defendant pulling down the building, and taking away the materials, &c. This being the case for the plaintiffs the defendant offered to enter upon some evidence; but the judge held that he could not dispute his landlord's title, and stopped his evidence and gave a verdict for the plaintiffs. This was an appeal against his decision as wrong in point of law. R. S. Wright was for the appellant, the defendant. A. L. Smith was for the plaintiffs. The COURT said-and it was admitted by the plaintiffs' counsel that the ground given by the judge for his decision was clearly wrong, as a tenant could show that his landlord's title had expired, and under the new Statute of Limitations, no rent having been paid by a yearly tenant for more than twelve years, he would acquire the title. It was urged, however, on the part of the plaintiffs, that it was proved that in 1869, within the twelve years, they resumed possession; but, as to this, the counsel for the defendant asserted that he had the key in his hands at the trial, and was ready to give evidence to show that the case for the plaintiffs as to their resumption of possession was all unfounded, but that the judge stopped his evidence on the ground that he could not dispute his landlord's title, and upon that The COURT said that, as this was clearly wrong, and it appeared that the real question had not been tried, the case must go down for a new trial. CASTLEBERG v. KENYON. Landlord and tenant-Nuisance-Removal by tenant-Liability of landlord. THIS was an appeal from the County Court of Wandsworth in a case in which a tenant sued his landlord to recover money he had been forced to pay under the Public Health Acts in the removal of a nuisance caused by defective drainage, &c., and it raised an important question as to the liability of landlords and 18 & 19 Vict. c. 121), the owner is to make good tenants in such cases. Under the Act of 1855 and proper drainage, and if it appears that the drainage is bad, there may be notice to the done, then the occupier is liable to a penalty and owner or occupier to do it, and if it is not the present case, the notice being given, the the board may do it and charge the owner. then sought to recover the amount from the landoccupier, to avoid the penalty, did the work, and lord, who refused to repay him or to allow it out disallowed the claim, and the tenant thereupon of the rent. The County Court judge, however, appealed. In Kenelm Digby appeared [for the plaintiff, the tenant, who appealed. M'Cail appeared for the landlord, the defendant. The contention for the defeudant, the landlord, was, that the board was to do the work if the business to do it himself; but owner did not do it, and that the tenant had no defence. The owner was ultimately liable, and COCKBURN, C. J. said this was not an honest the occupier was liable to a penalty meanwhile if the work was not done, and, in order to avoid the tage of such an objection in answer to such a penalty, as the owner would not do it, he did it himself. It was dishonest to seek to take advanclaim-a claim to be reimbursed by the landlord for the expense of work done under legal compulsion for the necessary improvement of his own property. LUSH, J. said, the effect of the enactment was, that the landlord was ultimately liable for the work, but that the tenant was compellable by penalty to do it, in case of default of the landlord. It was urged that under the Nuisances Removal Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 121), there was an order necessary, and this order had not been obtained. COCKBURN, C.J., however, said that the ultimate liability was on the owner, and the tenant was practically compellable to do the work if the landlord would not do it; so that, on the whole case, the judgment of the court was for the plaintiff, the tenant, that he was entitled to recover from the landlord the amount he had paid. said, was to throw the ultimate liability on the The effect of the legislation on the subject, they owner, though the tenant might be called upon in the first instance to do the work. Landlord and tenant-Possession-Non-payment of rent for twelve years-Statute of Limitations THIS was a County Court appeal, and the first case, it is believed, which had arisen under Lord Cairns's new Limitation of Actions Act, which shortens the period of limitations in actions for land from twenty years to twelve. The case was this:-The action in the County Court of Hertford was to recover possession of a cottage which had been the property of a family named Field, near Stevenage, and of which one Samuel Sells (the father of the defendant) had been the tenant for a great many years prior to his death, which occurred in 1870. For four years before he died, however, he paid no rent, and at his death his son, the defendant, entered into possession, and he also paid no rent, and no rent had been paid since 1864, which was more than twelve years before Unqualified the action. The case for the plaintiffs, however, was, that in 1869 one of them went down to see the cottage, found it empty, received the key from the defendant's wife, and left it locked up; and Judgment therefore for the plaintiff. CHELTENHAM COUNTY COURT. Person-Sect. 70, B.A. 1869—Con- IN the case of William Schollar, late of Bakerstreet and Coal wharf, Llanthony-road, Glouces ter, but now of 206, High-street, Cheltenham, Mr. of your Honour's power to order Mr. Hall to His HONOUR said that he would grant an Smith said that in the meantime he would give His HONOUR said that he did not know about licensed victualler and coal merchant, Mr. A. H. His HONOUR directed Mr. Hall to be called, which was done, but Mr. Hall was not in attendance. His HONOUR (to Mr. Smith).-Can you satisfy me that I have the power to make the order you ask for? Smith. Yes, your Honour. This is money that Mr. Hall has wrongfully received belonging to the debtor, and which therefore ought to be added to the estate for the benefit of creditors. His HONOUR.-I dare say it may be, but is it not a matter of action ? Smith repeated that under sect. 70 any person acting as attorney or solicitor, not duly qualified, was liable to be committed for contempt of court. His HONOUR.-Has Mr. Hall done so ? Smith.-Yes, sir; the petition is in Mr. Hall's handwriting. His HONOUR. Is that practising in court? Supposing that he acts as a law stationer, or as the clerk to a law stationer, is that practising in this court? Smith.-No, sir, I think not; but Mr. Schollar's application goes to the effect that Mr. Hall undertook to do certain work for certain money, that he actually did certain portion of that work, and that when within the precincts of the court to file the petition, then Schollar paid Mr. Hall a sovereign, because, as Hall alleged, he had lost the stamp and wanted another. Surely Mr. Hall's attendance as the debtor's agent, filing his petition, is an acting within the meaning of the 70th section. His HONOUR said that there were two or three views of the matter. It was possible that the £11 was obtained under false pretences, and it was very possible that the money might be recovered for failure of consideration; but he could not at present see any practising in the court to bring Mr. Hall under the 70th section. Smith.-The filling up of the petition is in Mr. Hall's handwriting. His HONOUR.-Yes, but if he did it for a law stationer or duly qualified practitioner, that would not render him liable for contempt. Any law stationer may supply these forms, and it does not require much brains to fill them up. Smith. The agreement was that Hall was not only to file the petition but to carry the liquidation up to its final proceedings, and to include all costs and expenses. There were no other costs except professional. He had seen Mr. Hall yesterday, who said that he should not attend the court. His HONOUR said that if he were dealing with a solicitor he should know what to do, but they were dealing with a man who was neither a solicitor nor a barrister, so far as he knew; at all events, one who was not an officer of the court, and that was his difficulty. He did not see his way at present, at all events, to committing for contempt of court. Smith. I don't think there can be any question undertaking handed to them, when they lent the money. With respect to that transaction, the plaintiffs were content with the security which they held, and were not suing. On the 2nd July 1873 one of the plaintiffs again came to Manchester, and, proceeding to the offices in Lloyd-street, made a further loan to the society through Mr. Lea of £50, receiving an undertaking and acknowledgment similar to the previous one. No promissory note, however, was received in respect of this £50, and although application had been made for the amount it was still owing to the plaintiffs. He (Mr. Jordan) did not know what the defence was to be, except that he gathered from the correspondence that the defendants were going to say that the money never reached them, being in fact embezzled by Mr. Lea. The answer to that was simple. If the society employed an agent to borrow money, the moment he borrowed, -a debt was contracted that bound the principals in the matter, and subsequent conversion of the money by the agent affected the principals and not the lender. He submitted that Mr. Lea was held out in Manchester by the society as their agent to borrow money, and they ratified and adopted his acts by issuing promissory notes for the moneys taken by him on loan. If the society ever withdrew the authority of Mr. Lea to borrow money May 23.-On the case being called on, Smith on their behalf-which they did not do, he conadmitted that he could find but one case at all tended, till long after the transactions in question bearing upon the point, where the defendants-they never gave any notice of the fact to the having become insolvent and obtained their dis- public, as they were bound to do, and certainly no charge were again employed to collect sums of such notice was ever received by the plaintiffs. money, which, instead of applying to its proper Further in the memorandum received unon the purpose, they applied to their own use. the Court held that the money should be repaid to lending of the money the sum advanced was mentioned as a loan to the society." His Honour the persons for whom it was collected, or that the knew perfectly well that as Mr. Lea gave the defaulters should be committed for contempt of receipt in that form he had no liability in the court. matter whatever. Liability attached in that case for the benefit of Schollar, and having applied to the principals. He submitted that Mr. Lea money received on account of that person to his borrowed the money for the society, and was their own purposes, he should be called upon to refund authorised agent; that he was held out as such to that money, or else be committed for contempt of the plaintiffs in the prior transaction of the £100: that the plaintiffs had no notice of his authority to borrow ever having been revoked; and that therefore in this case, which he understood was a test case involving a considerable amount of money, the society must be liable for the money lent. There Here Hall constituted himself a trustee His HONOUR, in giving judgment, said that he had taken time to consider the application, which was founded on two grounds-one, that under sect. 70, Hall should be committed for being guilty of contempt of court by practising within it, not being solicitor, attorney, or barrister. He did not think that what Hall did amounted to a practising in court, or anything analogous thereto. What he had done was only what any scrivener with a head on his shoulders and a pen in his hand might have done. According to the receipts that had been produced the charges seemed to have been made for stamps and other items; that certainly had nothing to do with practising in court. Therefore, so far as the order for committal was concerned, Hall had not rendered himself liable to committal under that section of the Act. Then as to sect. 72 he had power as judge to decide all questions of law and fact within the bankruptcy coming under the cognisance of the court. It was very doubtful whether the section applied to persons outside the bankruptcy at all. At all events he was not bound to exercise the jurisdiction if he possessed it, but he might leave to the party applying to bring an action for the recovery of the money. He did not think that he should in a case of this sort exercise his discretion in such a way as to deprive the party of his right to have the matter tried by a jury, if he thinks fit, and he should therefore leave Mr. Smith to raise the question in an action, and the present application must be refused. MANCHESTER COUNTY COURT. (Before J. A. RUSSELL, Esq., Q.C., Judge.) Principal and agent-Contract. Jordan appeared for the plaintiffs. Miss Charlotte Dakeyne and Mr. Alfred Fazakerley, formerly managing clerk with Messrs. Keighley Lea and Co., were called in support of the plaintiffs' case. Heywood asked that the plaintiffs should be nonsuited. He pointed out that in the rules of the Brunswick Building Society there was not one word which gave the secretaries (Messrs. Keighley Lea and Co.) authority to take loans on behalf of the society. By their twelfth rule the society delegated to their directors the power to borrow money, and even if the directors delegated that authority to the secretaries, it would be ultra vires and not binding upon the society. The secretary per se had no implied authority to borrow money, and he submitted that the fact of Messrs. Keighley Lea and Co. being entitled under the 3rd rule of the society to receive members' subscriptions did not give them a general power to receive money on behalf of the society. Admitting for the sake of argument-though he did not admit it in factthat, knowing Mr. Lea had borrowed money in his hands beforehand, the directors accepted the loan and gave the promissory note, he submitted that they could not ratify the act of Mr. Lea in taking the loan, because it was, as he had previously shown, unlawful. He contended that the utmost the secretary could do with regard to loans was to receive the propositions to lend money and to bring them before the directors, and when the directors authorised him to accept the loans they would become binding on the society. Further than this, he submitted that upon the plaintiffs' case there was not the smallest amount of evidence of authority in respect of the receipt of loans being given to the secretary. Mr. Jordan would urge that because a promissory note was obtained by the plaintiffs for the first £100 the directors were bound to give a similar note for the £50; but he contended that that was not so. The secretary, having no authority to receive the money, was really doing a wrongful act in taking it, and if he held it in his hands prior to the directors deciding whether they would have the loan or not, he held it as holder for the lender and not for the society. The mere fact that Mr. Lea pretended that he was authorised by the society to receive the money on account of them did not bind them at all. And then the fact in reality was that the society were ignorant of the transaction with the plaintiffs until it was brought before them as a proposition to lend, they not being aware that the secretary had fraudulently pretended to have power to receive the loan. In point of fact this giving of undertakings and this pretended authority on the part of the secretary was a fraud upon the society, and there was not a tittle of evidence to show that the directors were aware of the fraud. The documents given to the plaintiffs when the money was paid by them was, |