chattel in market overt, and if it turns out that the chattel has been found by the person who professes to sell it, the purchaser will not obtain a title as against the real owner. If it turns out that the chattel has been stolen by the person who has professed to sell it the purchaser will not obtain a title. If it turns out that the chattel has been stolen by the person who has professed to sell it, the purchaser will not obtain a title. If it turns out that the chattel has come into the hands of the person who professed to sell it by a de facto contract, that is to say, a contract which has purported to pass the property from the owner to him, then the purchaser will obtain a good title, even though afterwards it should appear that there were circumstances connected with that contract, which would enable the original owner of the goods to reduce it and to set it aside, because those circumstances will not be allowed to interfere with a title for valuable consideration obtained by some third party during the interval while the contract remained. In this case the court held that this was not one of those cases in which there is de facto a contract made which may afterwards be impeached and set aside on the ground of fraud, but a case in which the contract had never come into existence, and accordingly that the property had never passed from the respondents. In a subsequent case, that of Moyce v. Newington (39 L. T. Rep. N. S. 535), the contract between the vendor and the fraudulent third person was held to have passed the goods. In that case the plaintiff purchased some sheep in an open market recently established under a local Act, paid a fair price for them, and removed them to his farm. The person from whom he purchased them had obtained them just before from the defendant for a cheque upon a bank which had no account in his name; but the plaintiff knew nothing of this. When the cheque was dishonoured the defendant took criminal proceedings against the drawer, and afterwards got him convicted for obtaining the sheep under false pretences. On the day before the conviction the defendant, with a policeman, removed the sheep from the plaintiff's to his own farm, and the plaintiff now brought this action to recover them. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, holding it to be settled law that, though a seller is induced to sell by the fraud and false pretences of the buyer, and though it is competent to the seller by reason of such fraud to avoid the contract, yet, till he does some act so to avoid it, the property remains in the buyer; and that if he in the meantime has parted with the thing sold to an innocent purchaser the title of the latter cannot be defeated by the original seller. These two cases illustrate clearly the principles which relate to the passing of property obtained by the fraud. In the first there was no actual passing of property from the original vendor to the fraudulent third person, so that he could not give a good title to it to the defendant; in the second there was an actual passing of the property and the contract not having been set aside before sale to an innocent vendee the latter was held entitled to keep it. The present case of Babcock v. Lawson differed considerably in the facts from both these, though the principle upon which they were decided was held equally applicable. The plaintiffs, who are merchants at Liverpool, had lent to another firm of merchants there their acceptances for the sum of £11,500, on the security of a certain quantity of flour, under a memorandum addressed to the plaintiffs in these terms, "As security on our part we have warehoused in your name certain lots of flour, and in consideration of your delivering it to us or our order as sold, we undertake to pay yon proceeds of all sales thereof on receipt." The plaintiffs' paid their acceptances as they became due, and had paid them to the amount of nearly £7000, and, in the meantime the borrowing firm applied to the defendant to advance them the sum of £2500 on the security of 1500 sacks of the flour which he agreed to do, not knowing that it had already been warehoused as security to the plaintiffs, and stipulating for absolute possession of the flour, and for the power to sell it. In order to give such possession the borrowing firm brought to the plaintiffs a note stating that they had sold to the defendant the 1500 sacks of flour, the proceeds of which they engaged to pay to the plaintiffs; and thereupon the plaintiffs gave them a delivery order, under which the flour was delivered to defendants, who thereupon advanced the £2500, and then sold the flour in the Liverpool Market for £2647. The borrowing firm paid only £500 to the plaintiffs, who, being unable to obtain more of the proceeds sued defendant for the value of their property on the ground that the transfer had been obtained from them by fraud. The court gave judgment for the defendant on two grounds. Assuming as to which they had doubt that the contract conferred on the pledgees a special property in the flour, and gave them more than the mere custody, so that they might know of a sale, this was subject to the right of the pledgors to have the flour given up to them on their finding a purchaser, for the purpose of a sale by them as owners without any intervention by the pledgees, and the flour having been surrendered intentionally, and the possession parted with, the contract of pledge was, for the time being, at an end. The transaction might as between the pledgor and pledgee, have been revoked as obtained by fraud, so long as the flour remained in the hands of the pledgors; but when prior to any such revocation, the property in the goods had been transferred by the owners for good consideration to a bona fide transieree, the defendant, the latter acquired an indefeasible title, and on this ground alone he was held entitled to judgment. The Court thought that the fact that the flour, having been parted with by the plaintiffs with. a view to its being sold, had been pledged instead, made no difference, inasmuch as it having become revested in the pledgors by the act of the pledgees, the former were as competent to dispose of the goods by way of pledge as by way of sale; and, further, that it would make no difference if the money was advanced by the defendants before the flour was actually delivered. The court stated also that there was another ground upon which they were of opinion that the defendant was entitled to judgment. That was, that where one of two innocent parties must suffer from the fraud of a third, the loss should fall on the one who enabled the third party to commit the fraud. Here the borrowers were allowed by the plaintiffs to appear as the ostensible owners of the flour, and to exercise uncontrolled dominion over it. It would therefore be unjust and inequitable that the defendants, who had innocently advanced money on the flour in the ordinary course of commercial dealing, should be sufferers through the improvident conduct of the plaintiffs with the borrowers, or their want of proper caution. In the case of Moyce v. Newington the Lord Chief Justice stated. that in the American Courts the preference given to the right of the innocent purchaser when a contract fraudulently obtained has not been avoided by the original vendor, is treated as an exception to the general law, and as resting on the above principle that whose one of two innocent parties must suffer from the fraud of a third the loss shall fall on him who enabled such third party to commit the fraud, and observed that he should rather prefer to accept that view than the reasoning on which the conclusion is based in our own text writers. Babcock v. Lawson cannot fail to be regarded as an important case as settling a point of law which at first sight does not clearly appear to be settled by previous decisions. SOLICITORS' JOURNAL. entrusted to him by the Treasury Solicitor for the | The solicitor, as an officer of the court, ha purposes of the prosecution. The solicitor admitted the receipt of the sum in dispute which THE learned member of the Bar who fills the re- amounted only to £13, but stated in effect sponsible position of Solicitor to the Treasury that it was payable to certain witnesses in appears to have an exaggerated notion of the the case, who being indebted to him, he (the extent to which the High Court of Justice is ready the sum. solicitor) had, by mutual arrangement, retained The solicitor, however, had refused to tɔ exercise its summary powers over solicitors, as inform the Treasury Solicitor of the nature of the officers of the Supreme Court of Judicature. On services rendered to the witnesses in connection Tuesday last an application was made to the with which the said sum had been so retained, and Queen's Bench Division on behalf of the Solicitor solicitor to render an account, and to answer hence the application for an order directing the to the Treasury for the exercise of such certain matters stated in an affidavit filed on powers against a solicitor (the term attorney behalf of the Treasury solicitor, and one of the being still almost invariably used by counsel reasons advanced in favour of granting such an when making such applications, notwithstand- order was that according to the rules of the ing the provisions of sect. 87 of the Judica- Treasury every farthing of public money ought to ture Act 1873). The application against the be accounted for; a very proper rule, notsolicitor was shortly as follows: The Treasury we should say-confined to Her Majesty's Solicitor had employed him to conduct a prosecu- Treasury. The Profession will be glad to hear tion upon agency terms, and it was alleged that that the Court was of opinion that no case he had not duly accounted for certain money had been made out warranting such an application. committed no misconduct, and the application was therefore refused. The mere refusal to account to the Treasury in a particular way, according to a particular rule, was regarded by Treasury officials as a ground for dragging a solicitor before the court, although the money was distinctly accounted for. The court ought to look with considerable concern upon such applications, which, if granted, would have the effect of placing solicitors as regards the ordinary affairs called for. The fact is, that the matter sought to of life in an unfair position at once unique and unbe inquired into, as it appears to us from the short report which is before us, was not within the province of the Treasury Solicitor, but concerned alone the solicitor employed by him and third persons. Most certainly, every farthing of public money should be accounted for, just as much as the Treasury Solicitor should be cautioned not to squander and throw away public money by making foolish applications to the court of the kind in question. THE annual general meeting of the members of the Incorporated Law Society of the United Kingdom will be held in the Society's Hall, Chancery Lane, London, on Friday the 11th of July next, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, for the purpose of electing a president and vice-president of the society, and on this occasion, as usual, ten members of the council will go out of office in rotation, and of these, nine offer themselves for re-election, and we see no reason why their re-election should not take place, especially as two new members will have to be elected, one in the place of Mr. Charles Reynolds Williams (the member of the council who does not offer himself for re-election), a London solicitor, who has served on the council for many years, who was admitted in Hilary Term, 1838, and who is the senior partner in the firm, Messrs. Williams, James and Wayson. The second vacancy is caused by the retirement of Mr. Frederick George Davidson, also a London solicitor, who was admitted on the Roll in Michaelmas Term, 1850, and who is a member of the firm of Messrs. M. and F. Davidson and Burch. We understand that to fill these two vacancies several members of the society will take the field, and we can only hope that those two gentlemen will be elected who are known from experience to have taken a genuine and earnest interest in promoting the welfare of the entire profession rather than of a particular class or section of it. There are those amongst us who think that the council of the society is not at the present time sufficiently representative, and it is this impression, which must partly account for the fact that the large majority of the members of the Profession are not members of this society. Three auditors will also have to be elected at the annual meeting, and upon this subject we direct attention to the somewhat unusual certificates at the foot of the printed copy of the society's accounts accompanying the circular convening the general meeting, as signed by the two non-profesProbably the qualified form of these certificates is to be accounted for by the discredit in which former auditors were rightly or wrongly involved during the time when a former clerk of the society was found to have made painfully large defalcations. We remind members of the society that the name of every person intended to be proposed to fill any of the vacant offices, must be transmitted in writing to the secretary of the society not later than Friday the 20th inst., but the mere nomination of any gentleman is useless unless followed up by combined action on the part of his friends. We understand that the new president of the society is to be Mr. Nathaniel Tertius Lawrence, the present vice-president of the society. A number of interesting notices of motion have been given to which we shall refer in our next issue. sional auditors. THE practice of the now defunct Court of Queen's Bench, and which still obtains in that division of the High Court of Justice in regard to criminal informations lodged in that division, is evidently not as well understood as it ought to be either by solicitors or the Bar. In a case of Reg. v. Wyman and another, the printer of a newspaper called Truth attended before the Queen's Bench Division on Tuesday last (the first day of Trinity sittings) for the purpose of receiving judgment. Counsel and solicitors for the prosecutor and for the defendant also attended, only to be informed by the Master of the Crown Office that certain rules of court forbade the passing of sentence until the first four days of the sittings next after conviction, have elapsed; the purpose of the rule no doubt being that the person convicted shall have an opportunity to move the court, if advised that there is any ground for doing so. Then, again, when a conviction takes place, and the defendant obtains a rule nisi for a new trial, upon the argument of that rule the defendant must be present in court. In a case of The Queen (on the prosecution of Howard) v. Holbrook and others the three defendants were all present on each of two occasions when rules nisi for new trials were made absolute. The presence of defendants under such circumstances is required by long-continued practice, insisted upon by the judges at a time when the criminal law was administered with greater severity than it is at present. MR. COWEN'S Supreme Court of Judicature (District Courts) Bill stood for second reading in the Commons on Wednesday last, but was not reached. The principle of this Bill is merely a more complete recognition of the principle which governed Mr. Cowen's County Court Bill of last session, which aimed at a very considerable increase of the jurisdiction of County Courts, whilst the present Bill simply aims at establishing district courts of the High Court of Justice. In other words, putting all professional pecuniary considerations out of the question, the issue is as to whether we are to have centralisation or localisation in regard to the administration of the civil legal business of the country. The second reading of Mr. Cowen's Bill' is to be opposed by Mr. G. B. Gregory, who is EDWARD LAWRENCE LEVY was recently con- We have received a publication in pamphlet form under sect. 32 of the solicitors Act of 1843. The fact is the provisions of this section are difficult of enforcement, and for the credit of the profession a more strongest enactment is called for. IN our issue of the 31st May, page 79, in referring to a case of Nicholson (solicitor) v. The Incorporated Law Society, we suggested that it was not likely that the defendants costs of two actions brought by Mr. Nicholson against solicitors at St. Neots would be paid out of the funds of the Law Society. We are surprised to observe from the annual accounts of the society for the year ending 31st December last, that the amount of these two bills of costs has been so repaid. The annual report of the council of the society is not, however, yet in the hands of the members of the society, and as that report is to contain explanations upon the subject, it will be unfair to offer ing generally, we may safely say that it is a any opinion upon the question at present. Speakcourse of doubtful expediency for the council of the Law Society to pay the costs of solicitors who are members of the society in proceedings by such solicitors against solicitors who are not members. PRIOR to the time when the Common Law Procedure the consideration of the High Court of Justice. QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. The court, as thus constituted, sat on this, the first day of Trinity Sittings, to hear motions, &c.. THE QUEEN v. WYMAN AND ANOTHER. Criminal information for iibel-Practice. This was a prosecution against Truth for libel.. The printer was convicted, and he now attended in compliance with his recognisances for the purpose of receiving sentence. There were affidavits on the part of the defendant in extenuation, and on the part of the prosecutor in aggravation. Master MELLOR pointed out that, according to the rules of court, the sentence could not be passed until after the four first days of the sittings, and accordingly the case was put off until next week. IN THE MATTER OF A SOLICITOR OF THE This was an application on the part of the solicitor for the Treasury against a solicitor, whom he had retained to conduct a prosecution, for not duly accounting for certain money intrusted to him for the purposes of the prosecution. It appeared that a certain sum of money had been advanced by the solicitor for the Treasury to the solicitor, part of which would be payable to witnesses as subsistence money,' or for expenses, and the whole had been accounted for except the sum in dispute, and the bill of costs had been paid. The sum in dispute was a sum of £13 out of that which the solicitor represented as having been paid to the witnesses, but which, it appeared, had been satisfied by setting off certain sums alleged to have been due to him from them for certain services, the nature of which, however, he had refused to specify. This was an application on the part of the solicitor for the Treasury to -compel him to give an account of the sum in dispute, showing how and in what way he had paid it. Muir M'Kenzie, on the part of the solicitor for the Treasury, moved for an order calling upon the solicitor to answer the matters stated in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Solicitor for the Treasury, urging that the money was public money, and that according to the rules of the Treasury every farthing of it ought to be accounted for; but The COURT, after hearing him, thought that no case of misconduct was made out which would warrant such an application. Such an application could only be founded on some kind of misconduct, and the mere refusal to account in a particular way or according to the rules of the Treasury, did not amount to such misconduct. It was not as though the money had not been paid or accounted for in any way. It had been paid and accounted for in a certain way-that is, by mutual arrange. ment and set off; and it did not appear that the witnesses had been wronged, or that there had been anything morally wrong on the part of the solicitor. The application, therefore, was refused. CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. LAST DAY OF PROOF. BINNS (Wm.), Bradley Mills. Keldwick, York, stuff manufacturer. July 1; Wood, Killick, and Hutton, solicitors, Bradford. July 17; M. R., at twelve o'clock. BROOKE (JOS.), Ossett-street, Side Ossett, York, joiner and builder. July 18; Fredk. S. Wooler, solicitor, Batley. July 25; V.C. H, at one o'clock. BULL (Edwin), formerly of 16, Holles-street, Cavendishsquare, Middlesex, late of Bioemfontein, South Africa, Nov. 1; C. U derwood, solicitor, 13, Holles-street, Cavendi-h-square, Middlesex. Nov. 12; V.C. H, at one o'clock. FRASER (Wm.). 113, Sandringham-road, Hackney, Middlesex, gentleman. July 8; Juo. Greenfield, solicitor, 37, Queen Victoria-street, London. July 17; M. R., at eleven o'clock. FROST (Thos.), North Benfleet, Essex, yeoman. June 20. A. Leslie, solicitor, 31, Conduit-street, Bond-street, Middlesex. July 8; V. C. B.. at twelve o'clock GALLOWAY (Jno), South Wharf, Paddington, of Prescott House, Eaton Rise, Ealing, Middle-ex, and of Ramsgate, Kent. June 30; E. Maitland, solicitor, 17, Knight Rider street. Doctor's Commons, London. July 10; V.C. M., at twelve o'clock. GREENWOOD (Richd.), Batley Carr, Batley, York, woollen manufacturer. June 30. Thos. E. Nevin, solicitor, Dewsbury; July 8; V. C. B., at twelve o'clock. HADEN (Jno. 63, Cregoe-street, Birmingham, lamp manufacturer. July 2. Arthur Wright, solicitor, Birmingham. July 14 V. C. B, at twelve o'clock. HILL (Maria), 11, Grove-road, Holloway, Middlesex, widow. June 30. Clement Francis, solicitor, Cambridge. July 10: V. C. M., at twelve o'clock. HOLYOAKE (Geo.), Osmands, near Droitwich, Esq. July 4; J. Riley, solicitor, 32, Queen-street, Wolverhampton. July 18; V.C.H., at twelve o'clock. RAIT (Henry), formerly of 5, Mountjoy-place, Dublin, late of Thicket road, Anerley, Surrey, gentleman. July 1; E. W. Haines, solicitor, 10, Serjeant's-inn, Fleet-street, London. July 15, M. R., at eleven o'clock. WILSON (Christopher), Streatham. Surrey, Esq. June 28; Birne and Lucas, solicitors, 22, Surrey-street, Strand, Middlesex. June 30; V.C. H., at twelve o'clock. CREDITORS UNDER 22 & 23 VICT. c. 35. Last day of Claim, and to whom Particulars to be sent. ANDERSON (Lucy), 81. Nottingham-place, Middlesex, widow. Aug. 1: Monckton, Long, and Co., solicitors, 17, Lincoln'sinn-fields, Middlesex. ARTHAND (SARAH), formerly of 17, Davies-street, Berkeley. ALDAM (Wm.), Normanton, York, station master. Aug. 1; BOUSFIELD (Robt.), Rookby, Kirkby Stephen, Westmoreland, yeoman. July 14; Thos. H. Preston, solicitor, Kirkby Stephen. BETHELL (Wm. T.), Rise, East Riding, York, Esq. Aug. 1; H. W. Bainton, solicitor, Beverley. BACON (JO). Derby-road. Hasland. Chesterfield, brick manufacturer. June 21; Gratton and Marsden, solicitors, 5, Knitesmith Gare, Che-terfield. BUCKLEY (Jane), Wisbeach, Cambridge, widow. June 80; Jas. D. Collins. solicitor, Wisbeach. CORNWELL (Vincent), Sutton, Surrey, gentleman. July 10; Mercer and Co., solicitors, 19 and 20, Queen-street, Deal. -COATES Wm.), York, surgeon July 31; Leeman and Co., solicitors, 16, Co ey-street, York. COLE (Hannah), 167, Kennington-road, Lambeth, Surrey, Spinster. July 15; W thall and Compton, solicitors, 19, Gt. George-street, Westminster. DARLING (Wm. W., 15, Albi n-street, Kingston-upon-Hull, seed crusher. Aug 1; R. H. Barker, solicitor, Templebuildings, Bowi Alley-lone, Hull. DANIEL Wm.), Broughton, near Pershore, gentleman. July; Bower and Co., solicitors, 36, Paradise-street, Birmingham. DUNN (Henry W.). Wakefield, West Riding, York. and of The Heath, Wakefield, cornfactor. Aug. 1: Harrison and Beaumont, solicitors, Chancery-lane, Wakefield. EDWARDS (Mary Ann), formerly of Weston-super-Mare, late of Bulwell, Notts. July 10; Burton. Son, and Eking, solicitors, Long row, Market place, Nottingham. FRANKHAM (Charlotte N., Fairfield, Liegham Court-road, Streatham, Surrey, spinster. July 15; Dawes and Son, solicitors, 9 Angel-cour, Throgmorton-street, London. GREEN Anne), R gent-street, Cambridge, widow. Sept. 1; S. R. Ginn, solicitor, 64, St. Andrew's-street, Cambridge. GRIFFIN (Chas.), White House, Pauntley, Gloucester, gentleman. July 1; S. Whiteside, solicitor, 20, Wellingtonstreet, Gloucester. GOLDING (Frances), formerly of Liverpool, late of Waterloo, Lancaster, widow. June 18; Bateson and Co., solicitors, 26, Castle-street, Liverpool. GOSLING (Jas.), formerly of Sonning, Berks, late of Twyford, farmer. July 23; Chas. J. Cave, solicitor, Bracknell, Berks. sex. GEARY (Sir W. R. P.), Bart., Oxonhoatle, Kent. July 1; Thos. White and Sons, solicitors, 11, Bedford-row, MiddleGARFORTH (Wm. S.). Steeton. near Leeds, gentleman. June 30; Taylor and Co., solicitors, 5, Piccadilly, Bradford. HADLEY (Wm. R.), Chart Way-place, East Sutton, Kent, farmer. June 24; F. S. Stenning, solicitor, 50, Earl-street, Maidstone. HORNSHAW (Mary), York, spinster. June 30; B. Dent, solicitor, 16, Blake-street, York. HEPWORTH (Wm.), New Town Tavern, Huddersfield, innkeeper. July 1; Laycock, Dyson and Laycock, solicitors, Huddersfield. HUGHES (Arthur), formerly of New Inn, Gledrid, late of Gobowen, Salop, gentleman. Aug. 1; Minshalls and Parry-Jones, solicitors, Oswestry. HARRISON (Richd.), Holgate.road, York, joiner. Aug. 1; J. P., H., and J. K. Wood, solicitors, 12. Pavement, York. HARRISON (Chas.), 12, Carlton-crescent, Southampton, gentleman. July 8; Sharp and Co., solicitors, 71, Frenchstreet, Southampton. JONES (Anne), Threapwood, Chester. June 30; Brown and Oxford. (Eliza), Wentworth-terrace, Wakefield. York, widow. July 1; Mander and Son, solicitors, Crowncourt, Wakefield. PUGH (Jas. O.), Llandisilio, Montgomery, gentleman. Aug. PEARSON (Ann), Caldbeck, Cumberland, widow. Aug. 6; PETERS (Jno.), formerly of Rose Cottage. Streatham-place, ROSE (Herbert), Binfield. Berks, farmer. July 23; Chas. J. SWEET (Jas.), Broad-street, Nottingham, bookseller. July 10; Burton. Son and Eking, so.icitors, Long-row. Marketplace, Nottingham. TREVELYAN (Sir Walter C.), Bart., Wallington, Northumberland, Nettlecombe Court, Somerset, and Seaton, Devon. July 1; Gregory and Co., solicitors, 1, Beaford-row, Middlesex. WEAR (Jno.), Whitehaven. Cumberland, colliery steward. June 30; Brockbank, Helder, and Brockbank, solicitors, Whitehaven. WILKINSON (Barbara), Harrington, Cumberland, widow. June 30; Brockbank, Helder, and Brockbank, solicitors, Whitehaven. WEBBER (Margaret), 71, Gower-street, Bedford-square, and of Covent Garden, Middlesex, widow. July 9; Sti'eman and Beale, solicitors, 16, Southampton street, Bloomsburysquare, Middlesex. WEAVER (Jno.), Hunt End, Worcestershire, shopkeeper. June 24 E. C. Browning, solicitor, Church-green, East Redditch. By Messrs. WINSTANLEY and HORWOOD, at the Mart. Mile End-Nos. 152 to 158 (even), Jubilee-street, term 31 years-sold for £1265. By Messrs. NORTON, TRIST, WATNEY, and Co., at the Mart. By Mr. F. STATHAM HOBSON, at the Mart. Stoke Newington-The residence called Grassmere and 2 acres, term 86 years-sold for £3280. Notting-hill-Freehold ground rents of £92 per annumsold for £2180. Barnsbury-5, Richmond-grove, term 57 years-sold for £365. By Mr. C. HUNT, at the Mart. Islington-8, Blackstock-road, with stabling, freeholdsold for £1010. By Messrs. EDWIN SMITH and Co., at the Mart. City of London-3, College-hill, freehold-sold for £2900. No. 63, Cheapside, freehold-sold for £15,809. No. 68, Fleet-street, freehold-sold for £9500. LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL. Inquiries, as to Students' Societies, as to Service under Articles, as to the several Examinations, as to admission on the Roll of the Supreme Court, as to being called to the Bar, and as to taking out and renewal of solicitors' annual Certificates, should be addressed to the Editor (Law Students' Department). A LAW student points out that to which we have before referred, namely, that students who present themselves for the intermediate examination in January next, labour under a great disadvantage. They are required to prepare themselves in the four volumes of the seventh edition of Stephen's commentaries on the laws of England. Many students (having been only able to procure this work a few months ago, owing to its being out of print) will have less than 12 months in which to prepare If, themselves for examination next January. therefore, cramming is resorted to, clearly the council of the Law Society are partly responsible for this objectionable practice. A NOTICE issued from the Petty Bag Office, in April 1877, requires that no assignment of articles be made, but that further articles be entered into, reciting that the original contract has been put an end to by mutual consent (or by the death of the master, or as the case may be). INTERMEDIATE Examinations will be held in the hall of the society, Chancery-lane, London, on the following days in 1879, viz.: Thursday, the 19th June, at ten; Thursday, the 6th Nov., at ten. LAW STUDENTS' DEBATING SOCIETY. AT the first meeting in the month, on the 3rd inst., Mr. Garrett, M.A., in the chair, the usual resolution was passed that the annual dinner of the Shoreditch-No. 201, freehold house with shop-sold for society take place in the month of July next, the £20:0. No. 103, Bishopsgate-street, term 15 years-sold for £1050. A freehold cottage, with stabling adjoining-sold for £400. Hyams and By Messrs. DRIVER and Co., at Cambridge. Cambs, Swaffham Prior--Enclosures of land, containing C3a. Ir. 36p., freehold-sold for £3865. remainder of the evening was occupied with the business of the society. On the following Tuesday the 10th inst., Mr. C. S. Eady, LL.D. in the chair, a paper was read by Mr. A. M. Ellis, LL.B., Lord Beaconsfield's novels "Coningsby,' "Sybil," and "Tancred;" a discussion followed in which Mr. Neale, Mr. Royle, Mr. Van Sommer, and Mr. Lloyed Jones spoke on the subject, and Mr. Ellis replied. on UNITED LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY. AT the meeting of the above society at the Law Institution on Monday last the following moot was opened by Mr. C. Grafton in the affirmative: A testator devises his property to his wife, to be at her disposal in any way she may think best for the benefit of herself and family; does the widow take absolutely, so as to be able to give the whole of the property away from the family?" (Lamb v. Eaves, L. Rep. 16 Ch. Ap. 597). Messrs. Gatey, Swepstone, Kaius Jackson and Moyle supported, and the affirmative was carried unanimously. On Wednesday last at Clement's Inn Hall, Strand, Mr. T. Bateman Napier proposed, "That the claims of Greece to an extension of territory should be supported by this country." Messrs. Kelke, Parsons and Spokes supported, and the motion was carried unanimously. We are requested to state that the annual dinner of the society will be held at the Pall Mall Restaurant, at 7.30 p.m., on Wednesday, 25th inst-, Mr. Serjeant Parry in the chair. Members are not required to come in evening dress. Students' Queries. ARTICLED CLERKS EMPLOYMENT OF.-Do the provisions restricting articled clerks from accepting any office or employment apply equally to clerks whose articles have expired, but who have not passed their inal? INQUIRER. No; see sect. 10 of the Solicitors Act 1860.-ED. STUD.'S DEPT.] INTERMEDIATE EXAMINATION.-I am told that it is likely the whole four volumes of Stephen's Commentaries will be selected for the intermediate examination in 1880; should this be so, it will give a large number of country students great trouble to read and master them in the short time at their disposal. I was only able to get the 7th edition a month or two ago, and as I go up for my examination in January next, it 2650 [At present students presenting themselves for the -I was articled 11th July 1877. Can I present my. If for five years, yes; provided the examination is EXAMINATIONS.-I shall be articled in July; when [It is impossible to answer such a question, as you do management to be constituted for the said dis impliedly, though not in express words, authorised by the statute, and the plaintiff's were therefore entitled to have the verdict entered for them with costs, and also to an injunction restraining the defendants from carrying on the hospital so as to be a nuisance to the plaintiffs or any of them; but, following the course adopted in The AttorneyGeneral v. Colney Hatch Asylum, the issue of the injunction would be suspended for three months, with liberty to either side to apply Held, also, that an authority amounting to a discretion was vested in the managers of the asylum district, and the Legislature could not have intended to make them mere irresponsible instruments to carry out the orders and directions of the Poor Law and Local Government Boards; which orders and directions must be taken with reference to the statutory powers conferred upon those bodies respectively, and cannot be so dealt with as to vary the provisions of the statute, or to enlarge or cut down the responsibility arising out of anything done by the board or the managers: (Hawley v. Steele, 37 L. T. Rep. N. S. 625; L. Rep. 6 Ch. Div. 521; 46 L. J. 782, Ch.) distinguished: (Hill v. The Managers of the Metropolitan Asylum District, 40 L. T. Rep. 491. Ex.) MARITIME LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. SHIPMENT "PER VESSEL OR VESSELS Plaintiffs DIVISIBLE CONTRACT-RESCISSION. contracted to sell to defendants about 25 tons (more or less) Penang black pepper, Oct. and Nov. shipment, from Penang to London, per sailing vessel or vessels the name of the vessel or vessels, marks, &c., to be declared to the buyer in writing within sixty days from date of bill of lading." Plaintiffs within the contract time declared 25 tons of pepper shipped in one vessel, of which 20 tons were properly shipped and declared, but 5 tons were shipped in Dec., and defendants in consequence refused to accept the whole quantity. Subsequently plaintiffs declared 5 tons of Nov. shipment in substitution for the 5 tons shipped in Dec., but this declaration was made more than sixty days after date of bill of lading, and defendants refused to accept it. On the vessel arriving in England, plaintiffs, as a performance of their contract, tendered the 20 tons properly shipped and declared, and the 5 tons properly shipped but declared after the contract time had elapsed. Defendants refused to accept any of the pepper so tendered, and plaintiffs claimed damages for such refusal. Held, per Cotton and Thesiger, L.JJ. (Brett, L.J. dissenting), that the contract time for declaration was an essential condition; that the contract was not divisible; and that defendants therefore were entitled to reject the whole 25 tons. Brandt v. Lawrence discussed and distinguished. Per Brett, L.J.: The defendants were bound to take delivery of the 20 tons, as the plaintiffs to deliver the 5 tons according to the contract was a breach as to part only of the damages: (Reuter and Co. v. Sala and Co., 40 consideration, which could be compensated in L. T. Rep. N. S. 476.) COMPANY LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. SUNDAY OBSERVANCE-ACTION FOR PENAL-trict," and in the execution of their duties as such TIES-COVIN AND COLLUSION.-A judgment remanagers, the defendant, under the authority of covered in an action by arrangement between the the said Act of 1867, and with the sanction and parties in order to protect the offenders against by direction of the Poor Law Board, purchased in bona fide actions for the penalties is covinous and 1868 a plot of land at Hampstead for hospital purcollusive. The plaintiff sued the defendants to poses, in the north-western district, and thereon recover a penalty under 21 Geo. 3, c. 49, s. 1, for by the like direction erected, on a sudden outburst keeping open the Brighton Aquarium on Sunday, of smallpox in the metropolis, temporary build15th Aug. Subsequently to the issuing of the writings which they opened and used as a smallpox in the plaintiff's action, the solicitor of the de- by direction of the Local Government Board, hospital from Dec. 1870 to July 1872. In 1874, fendants obtained permission from one R. to who had been substituted for the Poor Law instruct a solicitor to bring an action in R.'s name Board, the defendants erected on the site of the for penalties incurred for keeping the Aquarium said temporary buildings, and in lieu thereof, open on the 15th Aug. and the several Sundays permanent and substantial buildings specially intervening between that date and the 7th Oct.; designed and fitted up by them for the reception it being understood that R. should not issue execu- of patients suffering from contagious or infectious contract was divisible, and the incurable failure of tion or claim the penalties, but that the company diseases, and in March 1876, opened the same as a might do what they pleased with the judgment so to be obtained in R.'s name. At the time of hospital for smallpox patients, from which time to making this arrangement neither R. nor the soli- from smallpox had been brought from all parts of the present large numbers of persons suffering citor to the company were aware of the plaintiff's the metropolis to, and been received and detained action. The object of the arrangement with R. and many still were at, the said hospital, with the was to protect the company against any action which might be brought for any of the several consent and by the authority of the defendants. penalties, and also to obtain as early as possible a houses and lands adjoining the hospital, brought The plaintiffs, severally owners and occupiers of remission of the penalties by the Home Secretary an action against the defendants in which they under 38 & 39 Vict. c. 80. R. had nothing more claimed damages in respect of injuries sustained to do with the action brought in his name. Judg- by them from the erection and maintenance of ment was signed by default on 28th Oct. This the hospital, which the plaintiffs alleged was a judgment the defendants pleaded in bar of the nuisance to the neighbourhood in general, and to plaintiff's action, and the plaintiff replied that the the plaintiff's in particular, owing to the probable judgment was obtained by covin and collusion. Held, that the judgment obtained under R.'s spread of disease by infection, to the effect of the name was no bar to plaintiff's action, because it dead-house, and to the bringing to and from the was in reality no judgment, as R. was only a hospital of the patients in ambulances, and to the visiting of the patients by their relatives; and nominal plaintiff, and the plaintiff and defendants they claimed also an injunction to restrain the were in substance identical. And per Cotton and Thesiger, L.JJ., that, inasmuch as the result of defendants from using their said lands and buildthe proceedings in R.'s action was to defraud and ings as a hospital for smallpox or any other inprejudice a third party, the judgment could not be fectious or contagious disease; the defendants, a bar to plaintiff's action, being covinous and on the other hand, denying that the hospital was collusive: (Girdlestone v. The Brighton Aquarium that, if it were, they were justified and protected a nuisance or a source of danger, and contending Company, 40 L. T. Rep. N.S. 473.) from liability in what they had done by having NUISANCE-METROPOLITAN ASYLUM DIS-acted bona fide in the execution of duties imposed TRICT-ERECTION OF SMALLPOX HOSPITAL- upon them by the Legislature and in obedience to INJURY TO ADJOINING PROPERTY-LIABILITY the orders of the Local Government Board. The OF MANAGERS. The defendants were a body duly constituted and incorporated by the name of "The Managers of the Metropolitan District" under and by virtue of the Metropolitan Poor Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 6), pursuant to an order of the Poor Law Board, dated the 15th May 1867, whereby certain unions and parishes within the metropolis, as defined by the Metropolis Local Management Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), including the parish of Hampstead, were "combined into a district termed the Metropolitan Asylum District,' for the reception and relief of the poor in the said district infected with or suffering from... smallpox . . . to be under a board of jury having found that the hospital was a nui- NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. RAILWAY POWER TO GRANT BUILDING RIGHTS OVER LAND TAKEN-LANDS CLAUSES ACT.-A railway company, having acquired land under their special Acts (which contained no provision as to the sale of superfluous lands, but with which special Acts the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, was incorporated), excavated the land to the surface, constructed their line in the excavation, and then covered it over with an arch and girders, and replaced the soil. Held, that they had no power to grant building rights over, or building leases upon, the crown of the tunnel so formed. The meaning of "land" defined as used in the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845 (Re the Metropolitan District Railway Company and Cosh, 40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 482. Fry, J.) REAL PROPERTY AND NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. CHARITY-LEASE BY-VOID OR VOIDABLESTATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-The appellants were the governors of a charitable hospital founded in 1758, and incorporated by Act of Parliament in 1768. In 1783 the then governors of the hospital granted a lease of certain lands of the hospital to the respondents' predecessors in_title for ninety-nine years at a peppercorn rent. In an action to recover possession of the demised premises: Held, that the appellants being a “hos pital" within the meaning of the stat. 13 Eliz. c. 15, as explained by 64 Eliz. c. 14, the lease was void ab initio by virtue of sect. 3 of the former Act, and that the Statute of Limitations ran from the execution of the lease, and that the action could not be maintained. Judgment of the Court of Appeal affirmed, for different reasons: (Governors of Magdalen Hospital v. Knotts, 40 L. T. Rep. N.S. 467. H. of L.) BANKRUPTCY LAW. DIGEST OF BANKRUPTCY DECISIONS (Continued from page 86.) WHERE a creditor of a company in liquidation brings an action against it his action will be stayed on the application of the official liquidator, although it appears that the assets of the company are only sufficient to defray the liquidator's charges (Rose v. Garrden Lodge, &c., Company, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 101.) : The minute book of a company contained a resolution that "the 608 shares applied for be allotted:" the number of shares on the register was 608, which included fifty shares to H. H. was a director, and attended directors' meetings, but alleged that he never applied for shares, and had received no notice of allotment; he took no steps, however, to have his name removed until the presentation of the petition. Held, that the attendance of H. at directors' meetings, as one of the directors was not sufficient to fix him with knowledge of the allotment and state of the register, and that he could not be made a contributory in respect of the fifty shares: (Re Winchan Shipbuilding Company, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 660). G. being possessed of the equity of redemption of freehold property, contracted in Jan. 1872 to sell it to parties purporting to act on behalf of a company for £5500 in shares, and £3500 in cash. The company was registered shortly afterwards, and in the following December it adopted the contract, and subsequently took a conveyance. In Nov. 1872 P. and B., mortgagees of the property for £3000, agreed with G. to release their charge on payment of £2000 in cash, and £1000 in shares of the company. This agreement was carried out and shares described in the certificates as fully paid up were allotted to them by the company. These shares were, as appeared from the evidence, to the knowledge of P. and B., part of the vendor's shares, and were issued as fully paid up to them by nominees of G. The company having gone into liquidation the liquidator applied for an order to enforce payment of a call upon these shares in the winding-up on the ground that the contract of Jan. 1872 had never been registered. Held, that P. and B. must be treated as holders of unpaid shares, the contract not having been registered under the provisions of the Companies Act 1867, s. 25. The shares were within sect. 25, and the holders having taken them with knowledge that they were liable to be paid for in cash Nicoll's case did not apply: (Re Potter and Brown's case, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 757.) Per Jessel, M.R.: This section, which was intended to prevent fraud, has been made the instrument of fraud. That is, it has allowed companies to make people pay for shares which they were under the honest belief were fully paid up. The Crown has priority over the general creditors of a liquidating company in respect of property tax due from the company on the winding-up where no distress or entry in respect thereof has been made (Re Henley and Company, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 742; 39 ib. 53.) Per Malins, V.C., with regard to the Crown debts, the general law on the subject does not admit of much doubt. There has never been any doubt that with regard to certain debts the Crown has priority over general creditors; as to other debts the Crown has not that priority. The Act of Parliament having prescribed the mode in which the debt shall be recovered and the nature of that debt, the question is whether when a company is wound up, the Act of Parliament has reserved or whether it necessarily implies, that the Crown has priority over the general creditors. The bankruptcy laws are of much older date than the Winding-up Acts. The object of the former is two-fold; first of all to distribute the assets of a debtor or bankrupt equally among his creditors; and, secondly, to relieve the debtor from the amount of his debts in order to make him a free man again. The primary object of the winding-up Acts has been to insure the equal distribution of a company's assets among its creditors. The proposition seems to be wholly unsustainable, the law having provided that all the liabilities are to be paid pari passu, and their being no reservation of the rights of the Crown whatever, that it was intended to reserve the right of the Crown to any extent whatsoever (Ib.) A petition for winding-r.p a company had not been served at the registered office of the company, but service had been accepted by a solicitor on its behalf, and he had been instructed to take proceedings with reference to it, at a meeting attended by all the directors. Held, that as the solicitor had been duly authorised to act for the company, his acceptance of service rendered it unnecessary to serve the petition at the registered office: (Re the Regents United Service Stores Association, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 84.) A waterworks company incorporated by Act of Parliament cannot be wound on the petition of holders of debentures or mortgages created under the powers of the Act. Such holders have no remedy except that of the appointment of a receiver given them by the Act: Re Herne Bay Waterworks Company, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 324.) After the completion of the voluntary winding up of a company, under the Company's Act of 1862, and the expiration of the three months mentioned in sect. 143, from the date of the registration of the return made by the liquidators to the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies, of the holding of the final meeting under the liquidation, at the expiration of which period of three months, sect. 143 provides that the company shall be deemed to be dissolved, a creditor, whose debt has not been paid, presented a petition for a compulsory winding-up order. Held, that the petitioner had assented to what had been done in the voluntary winding up, and therefore it was not necessary in this particular case to decide whether the court had any jurisdiction to make a compulsory windingup order; but held that after the expiration of three months, the court had, in the absence of fraud, no jurisdiction to make a winding-up order: (Re Pinto Silver Mining Company, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 336.) Per James, L.J.: A voluntary winding-up has a statutory force equally with a winding-up by the court. Ample protection is given to all creditors by the provisions of sects. 132, 136, 137, and 142 of the Companies Act 1862, and the greatest inconvenience would result if it were held that the proceedings in a voluntary winding-up could be re-opened after a lapse of years: (Ib.) Per Thesiger, L.J.: This court has no jurisdiction to order the winding-up of a company, which has been de facto wound-up under the Companies Act. If proceedings are to be taken at all, they must be taken before the expiration of the three months: (Ib.) Sect. 10 of the Judicature Act 1875, by which, in the administration of the estates of deceased persons, and in the winding-up of a company, the same rules are made to apply, as to the rights of secured and unsecured creditors, and as to debts and liabilities provable, and as to the valuation of annuities, and future and contingent liabilities, as may be in force for the time being under the law of bankruptcy, does not assimilate the administration of such insolvent estates and the winding-up of companies in all respects to the administrators of bankrupt estates, but only in respect of the debts and liabilities provable; consequently the priority of payment secured by the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, in favour of local rates, &c., does not extend to the winding-up of a company, or of the administration of the estates of insolvent deceased persons: (Re Albion Steel and Wire Company, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 207.) Where on the winding up of a company the official liquidator remains in possession of the premises for the convenience of the winding up, and with a view to the realisation of the property to better advantage, distraint for rent accrued due subsequently to the date of the winding-up order, will be allowed: (Ex parte Richardson, 33 L. T. Rep. N. S. 143.) Per Hall, V.C.: It is now clearly settled that the court, notwithstanding sect. 163 of the Companies' Act 1862, may, under sect. 87 of the Act, give leave to distrain. The question is in what cases that leave should be given. Leave will not be given to distrain for rent which has accrued due before the winding-up: (Ib.) Execution creditors issued a writ to recover an amount exceeding £50 against a company, and lodged it with the sheriff. Three days afterwards a winding-up petition was presented by other creditors, and a winding-up order made thereon. Held, that the 10th section of the Judicature Act 1875, by which, in the winding-up of companies, the rules of bankruptcy are to apply, made the 87th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1869 applicable, by which, in an execution, the sheriff is to retain the proceeds of sale for fourteen days, and is to pay them over to the trustees in bankruptcy if within that period the debtor is made a bankrupt. The execution creditors, therefore, lost their security, and were only entitled to come in with the other creditors under the petition. The term secured creditors" embraces one whose security is obtained by legal process, as well as one whose security is by contract: (Re Printing &c. Company, 33 L. T. Rep. N. S. 676.) 66 An insurance company, having passed a resolution for a voluntary winding-up, the policyholders presented a petition for a compulsory order, alleging the fact of the voluntary winding-up that they and others had been induced to insure their lives by fraudulent misrepresentations, and that under these circumstances the company was admittedly dishonest: held, that the resolution to wind-up voluntarily was an admission of insolvency which made a preliminary inquiry under the Life Assurance Companies' Act 1870 unnecessary. That the petition alleged sufficiently acts to make a case for a compulsory order, and was not demurrable: (Re British Alliance Company, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 600.) Per Malins, V.C.: It is said that there is no debt of £50, but it is not necessary under the Companies' Act, where it is proved that the company cannot pay its debts, to prove a demand under sect. 80. The court is only to be satisfied that the company is insolvent, and that the company has admitted by the resolution to wind-up voluntarily. There is therefore no necessity for a preliminary inquiry: (Ib.) Arnold, for the defendant, submitted that the action could not be maintained and cited the case of Noble v. The Governor and Company of the Bank of England (33 L. J. 81, Ex.), where a similar point had arisen with regard to the sheriff's court. Glyn, for the plaintiff, contended that, under the 87th section of the Common Law Procedure Act 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 125), a County Court has the power" to order that the loss of such an instru ment should not be set up, provided an indemnity to the defendant was given to the satisfaction of the court against the claim of any other person." His HONOUR said, that the section in question had not been extended by Order in Council to County Courts, as the previous sections with respect to attachment of debts and equitable defences had been, and held that the defence must prevail; and directed a nonsuit with costs, but with liberty to the plaintiff to bring another action. Nonsuit accordingly. WAKEFIELD COUNTY COURT. Tuesday, May 20. (Before Mr. Serjt. TINDAL ATKINSON, Judge.) HOULDSWORTH AND ANOTHER v. SEAL AND ANOTHER. Public Health Act 1875-Bond to secure costs of Preliminary meeting to pass a resolution to adopt-Resolution passed, but Act not carried into effect. His HONOUR said:-This is an action brought by the plaintiffs to recover from the defendants the sum of £12 2s. for expenses incurred by the plaintiffs in convening a meeting under the provisions of the Public Health Act 1875. The defendants, with other inhabitants in the township of Sandal Magna, were desirous, in the early part of 1878, to have the township constituted a local government district, and entered into a bond, binding themselves, in the event of a resolution to carry this intention into effect not being passed at a duly convened public meeting, to pay the expenses incurred by the plaintiffs in calling such meeting. At the meeting the following resolution was submitted to it and carried, namely :-"That it is expedient that the township of Sandal Magna, in the parish of Sandal Magna, in the West Riding of the county of York, should be constituted a local government district within the meaning of the Public Health Act 1875." A poll was demanded, and the voting being in favour of the motion, the plaintiff, Mr. Walker, who acted as the chairman and returning officer, on the 9th April 1878, declared the resolution duly passed. The usual application was upon this made to the Local Government Board for their consent to constitute the township into a local government district, and an inspector, Mr. Harrison, was sent down from London to make a local inquiry and report thereon. The result of this inquiry was that on the 8th July the board, in a |