POYNDER (Chas.), Henley-on-Thames. June 20; Street and Co.. solicitors, 27, Lincoln's-inn-fields, Middlesex. PEIRCE (Priscilla), Dover, widow. June 24; H. S. Boyton, 5, St. Martin's-place, Dover. PULLEINE (Jas.), Clifton Castle, Thornton Watlass, and Crakehall, both of North Riding, York, Esq. July 9; Bockett and Sons, solicitors, 60, Lincoln's-inn-fields, Middlesex. PANIZZI (Sir Anthony), K.C.B., 81, Bloomsbury-square, Middlesex. July 4; Iliffe and Co., solicitors, 2, Bedfordrow, Middlesex. PETERS (Jno.), formerly of Rose Cottage, Streatham-place, Brixton-hill, Surrey, late of Hyde Cottage, Streathamhill (formerly called 1. Streatham-paragon, Brixton-bill), Surrey, gentleman. June 20; Pritchard and Sons, solicitors, 9, Gracechurch, London. PITTMAN (Robt.), 9, Kingsland-road, Middlesex, builder. June 24; A. E. Tower, solicitor, 90, Lower Thames-street, London. PACKHAM (Benjamin), 27, Bond-street, Brighton, licensed victualler. July 1; T. A. Goodman, soliciter, 150, Northstreet, Brighton. PRIOR (Wm.), Sawbridgeworth, Hereford, bricklayer and builder. June 14; Wm. Poole, Knight-street, Sawbridgeworth. PICKLES (Theodore B.), Foxholes-lane, Rochdale, schoolmaster. July 1; Jno. Standring, solicitor, King-street, Rochdale. POCOCK (Geo.), King's-roed, Brighton, and Burgess-hill, Sussex, silk mercer and draper. July 1; F. S. Champion, solicitor, North Gate House, Pavilion, Brighton. RICKARDS (Maria), Beeston, Nottingham, spinster. June 16; Richards and Woodward. solicitors, 7, Weekday-cross, Nottingham. ROBERTS (Abigail), Farnley Tyas, near Huddersfield, widow. July 10 Learoyd and Co., solicitors, Buxton-road, Huddersfield. BICHARDSON (Geo.), Monkwearmouth, Durham, retired publican. July 10; R. Simey, solicitor, 59, John-street, Sunderland. RYALL (Elizabeth), High-street, Cheltenham, widow. July 1; Winterbotham, Bell and Co., solicitors. Cheltenham. ROBARTS (Wm. H. G., formerly of 15. Lombard-street, London, late of 12, Half Moon-street, Piccadilly, Middlesex, Esq. June 14: Reyrouse and Co., solicitors, 99, Cannon-street, London. RIVINGTON (Elizabeth), Lonsdale Villa, Penrith, widow. ROBERTS (Jonathan W.), Farnley Tyas, near Huddersfield, brewer. July 10: Learoyd and Co., solicitors, Buxtonroad, Huddersfield. KOLLS (Benjamin), senior, Weymouth and Melcombe Regis, Dorset, gentleman. July 12: Tizard and George, solicitors, 75, St. Thomas-street. Melcombe Regis. RYLANCE (Wm.), Whitefield, Pilkington, Lear Prestwichcum-Oldham, and of Crosslane, Salford, Lancaster, paint and varnish manufacturer. Aug. 18; Boote and Edgar, solicitors, 18 and 20, Booth-street, Manchester. ROGERS (Samuel), Lothbury, Bucks, farmer, and 22 and 23, High Holborn, wine and spirit merchant, and 2, Bernersstreet, Oxford-street, Middlesex, soda water manufacturer. June 24; Thomson and Co., solicitors, 62, Cornhill, London. RANICARS (Ann), late of Southport, Lancaster, and formerly of Wigan, widow. June 28, R. G. Marsden, solicitor, 20, Old Cavendish-street, London SHARPE (Henry J.), Ham-common, Surrey. June 20 Ipswich ton. SEATON (Ann), Bentley, York, widow. SAWDY (Edwd.), Stoke Damerel, Devon, gentleman. Aug. START (Louisa), 9, Castle-place, Church-road Nursery, Tottenham, late of 188, Oxford-street, Stepney, Middlesex, widow. July 1; Heath and Parker, solicitors, 12, St. Helen's-place, Bishopsgate-street, London. SMITHIES (Sarah), formerly of Thirkleby, late of Sowerby, both of York, widow. June 13; W. H. Cobb, solicitor, 19, Blake-street, York., SPESCE (Jno.), 212, Tichfield-road, Aston-juxta-Birmingham, Warwick, gentleman. June 30; Sanders and Co., solicitors, 67, Colmore-row, Birmingham. SMITH (Thos.), King's Head hotel, Barnsley, York, inn keeper. June 30; Newman and Sons, solicitors, Barnsley SHITE (Emma), Victoria Vaults, Leamington, widow and licensed victualler. June 30; Overell and Son, solicitors, Leamington. SMITH (Thos. S.), 29, Belmont-road, West Derby, Lancaster SAUNDERS (Samuel), 4, Commerce-place, Hackney, draper. STOTT (Mary), 11, Brook-lane, Glodwich, Oldham, spinster. TAYLER (Chas.), formerly of Nottingham, veterinary surgeon, late of 8, St. John's-vilas, Upper Holloway, Middlesex, gentleman. July 1; Butler and Parr, solicitors, Bank chambers, Nottingham. THREADKELL (Wm.), Barham, Suffolk, farmer. June 15; Jao. Fox, 5, Museum-street, Ipswich. THOMPSON (Jno. R.), Cheadle, Chester, Esq. June 21; Little and Lamonby, solicitors, Penrith, Cumberland. TANKER (Fredk.), Buckles Farm, Abbey Wood. Erith, Kent, farmer. June 13; Pritchard and Sons, solicitors, 9, Gracechurch-street, London. THICK (Chas.), formerly of Firgrove House, Yate, Glou cester, late of West End House, Wickwar, Gloucester, and of Chipping Sodbury, and 13, Corn-street. Bristol, solici tor. June 30; E. A. Ha ley, solicitor, St. Werburgh'schambers, Small-street, Bristol. TRAVIS (Anne), 1, Oak-street, Morton, Lancaster, spinster. June 30; Haime and Co., solicitors, 5, Norfolk-street, Manchester. TINKER (Fredk.), Backles Farm. Abbey Wood, Erith, Kent, farmer. June 13; Pritchard and Sons, solicitors, 9, Gracechurch-street, Lordon. TOMLIN (WM), 24, Wenban-road, Worthing, surgeon. July 22: A. Parsons and Bird, solicitors, Elden chambers, Wheeler-gate, Nottingham. TOLLER (Thos.), formerly of Gray's-inn, Middlesex, and late of Hampstead, Esq. June 12; Toller and Sons, solicitors, 25, Knightrider-street. Doctor's-commons, London. TAYLOR (Eliza), formerly of Rose Brae, Victoria Park, Wavertree, near Liverpool, late of 10, Russell-road, Rock Ferry, Chester, widow. July 1; Wright and Co., solicitors, 17, Water-street, Liverpool. TAYLOR (Geo. W.), Hyde Lodge, Hyde-road, Manchester, gentleman. June 20; Sale and Co., solicitors, 29, Boothstreet, Manchester. London. VAN ROON (Herman S.), 1, Ladbrook-square, Notting-hill, Middlesex, and 48, Finsbury-square. Middlesex, Esq. Aug.1; Wansey and Bowen, solicitors, 28, Moorgate-street, WAKELING (Mary), 40, Maddox-street, Regent-street, Middlesex, widow. June 24; Routh and Co., solicitors, 14, Southampton-street, Bloomsbury. WRAY (Harriet), formerly of Leven, York, late of Clarendoncrescent, Leamington, spinster. July 5; H. W. Bainton, solicitor, Beverley. WISE (Rebecca), East Mailing, Kent. June 25: Norton and Son, solicitors. West Malling, Kent, and of Maidstone. WESTMORLAND (Priscilla Anne, Dowager_Countess of), 29, Portman-square, Middlesex. June 30; Farrer, Ouvry and Co., solicitors, 66, Lincoln'-inn-fields, Middlesex. WOOLLTORTON (Jno.), formerly of 18, Euston-place, Newroad, St. Pancras, Middlesex, late of Oulton next Lowestoft. June 14; R. B. Nicholson, solicitor, Lowestoft. WILLS (Geo.), Narboro', gentleman. July 5; Miles and Co., solicitors, Cank-street, Leicester. WINTER (Rev. Alfred L.), Dare Vicarage, near Faversham, Kent. June 14; R. M. and F. Lowe, solicitors, 2, Tanfield-court, Temple. WILSON, formerly TEALE (Anne), Leeds, widow. July 1; Wood (Wm.), Branstone-road, Burton-upon-Trent, retired baker. July 3; Richardson and Small, solicitors, Burtonon-Trent. WEBSTER (Robt.), formerly of Elgin, N. B., 'afterwards of July WILLIAMS (Rev. Isaac), Littleboro', Notts. July 1; Ryland and Co., solicitors, 7, Cannon-street, Birmingham.. WILSON (Lieut. Henry A.), formerly of Mhow, East Indies, late of Oundle, Northampton. July 1; Hores and Pattisson, solicitors, 52, Lincoln's-inn-fields, Middlesex. WELLS (Richard B.), Wood-street. Waltham tow, Essex, whitesmith and ironmonger. June 20; Lindo and Co., slicitors, 12, King's Arms-vard, Moorgate-street, London. WILLIAMSON (Parbara E.). Plas-n-Morfa, Holywell, Fint, spinster. July 20; Edwd. H. Williamson, Plas-yn-Morfa, WRIGHT (Susanna), Lincoln, widow. June 16; Toynbee, Larken, and Toynbee, solicitors, Linco.n. WHITE (Thos.), Stratford-upon-Avon, oil and colour merchant. June 27; elatter, bon, and Gibbs, solicitors, Warwick-road, Stratford-upon-Avon. Holywell, Flin. WRIGHT (Peter), Plass Issa, Ruabon, Denbigh, farmer and timber merchant. July 1; Chas. Richards and Son, solicitors Llangollen. WARREN (Geo.). late of 2, King David-lare, Shadwell, formerly of St. Dunstan's-road, Mile-end, Stepney, and previously thereto of the Coach and Horses, West India Dock-road. Limehouse, all in Middlesex, carpenter and joiner. July 10; W. H. Swepstone, solicitor, 51, Limestreet, London. WILLIAMS (Catharine). Abersychan, Trevethin. Monmouth, widow. June 1; A. W. Boodle, solicitor, New Swindon. WOOD (Rev. Jno.), Grinshill, Salop. July 19; Rev. J. R. Wood, Christ Church Parsonage, Penrith WILLS (Wm.), Coxlev, St. Cuthbert in Wells, Somerset, gentleman. June 30; Wm. J. Welsh, solicitor, Wells, Somerset. YOUNG (ANN), 174, East India Docks-road, Poplar, Middlesex, spinster. June 13; Baker and Nairne, solicitors, 3, Crosby-square, London. YOUNG (Brook), Fingcot, Bucks, Esq. July 1; Jno. Parker and Son, solicitors, High Wycombe. Bucks. YOUNGER (Thos.), 14, Worcester-terrace, Bishopwearmouth, Durham, surveyor. June 9; W. Bell, solicitor, 23, Lamp ton-street, Sunderland. ZWILCHENBART (Rodolph), Liverpool, and of Wavertree, near Liverpool, Esq. July 21; Bateson and Co., solicitors, 25, Castle-street, Liverpool. REPORTS OF SALES. Wednesday, May 21. By Messrs. ROGERS and CHAPMAN, at the Mart. South Kensington.-1, Wetherby-terrace, term 91 yearssold for £1435. Westminster -Nos. 64, 65, 68, and 69, Vincent-square, term 22 years-sold for £2460. LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL. Inquiries, as to Students' Societies, as to Service under Articles, as to the several Examinations, as to admission on the Roll of the Supreme Court, as to being called to the Bar, and as to taking out and renewal of solicitors' annual Certificates, should be addressed to the Editor (Law Students' Department). THE number of candidates examined at the April Final Examination at the Law Institution was 156; of these 114 passed, and 42 were postponed. INTERMEDIATE Examinations will be held in the hall of the society, Chancery-lane, London, on the following days in 1879, viz.: Thursday, the 19th June, at ten; Thursday, the 6th Nov., at ten. ARTICLES of clerkship (whether original or supplemental) dated on any day during June must be enrolled at the Petty Bag Office, Chancery-lane, on or before the same day in the month of December next, and when articles are enrolled and registered on any day during the month of June they must be entered at the Law Institution on or before the same day in the month of September next. See 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, ss. 8 and 9, and 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, s. 7. Failure to comply with these statutory requirements often entails a loss of time upon articled students. THE regulations as to re-admission on the roll of solicitors, and as to taking out and renewal of annual certificates, issued on the 2nd Nov. 1875, are still in force, and provide in effect that if any solicitor of the Supreme Court, after having at any time taken out a stamped certificate, shall, for the space of a whole year from and after the expiration thereof, have neglected to renew the same for the following year, or has failed to obtain such a certificate within twelve months from the date of his admission on the Roll, the registrar shall not afterwards grant a certificate to such solicitor, except under an order of the Master of the Rolls, and for the purpose of obtaining such an order the applicant shall, six weeks before the application is intended to be made, give notice thereof as in the case of an original admission, and the affidavits in support of such application shall be filed at the Petty Bag Office, and a copy thereof shall at the same time be left with the clerk of the Petty Bag, to be delivered by him to the Registrar of Solicitors, and the order for such taking out or renewal, shall (if made) be drawn up on reading such affidavits, and an affidavit of such copies having been left and notices given. Upon an application to dispense with the required notice of intention to take out or renew a certificate, a summons must be served on the Registrar of Solicitors calling on him to show cause within ten days' notice why such taking out or renewal of certificate should not be allowed; and if no cause be shown to the satisfaction of the Master of the Rolls, he may make an order for allowing such certificate to be issued. EVERY gentleman applying to be admitted a solicitor of the Supreme Court must, six weeks at least before the first day of the month in which he shall propose to be admitted, cause to be delivered at the Petty Bag Office a notice in writing, signed by himself, containing a statement of his then place of abode and the name or names and place or places of abode of the person or persons with whom he has served as an articled clerk during the continuance of his articles of clerkship, and containing, in addition thereto, a statement of his place or places of abode or service for the last preceding twelve months, and the clerk of the Petty Bag reduces all such notices into an alphabetical list under convenient heads, and, three weeks at least before the first day of the month named in such notices, affixes such list in some conspicuous No. 17, Dorset-street, term 21 years-old for £400. No 1, Dorset-place, term 21 years-sold for £135. Pimlico.-21, Moreton-street, term 50 years-sold for £560. 19. Moreton-terrace, term 50 years-sold for £550. 131, Lupus-street, term 51 years-sold for £1200, No. 15, Winchester-street, term 48 years-sold for £705. Detached residence, "Tyson House," term 91 years-sold place in the Petty Bag Office, and also at the for £1750. By Mr. F. STATHAM HOBSON, at the Mart. Brixton.-Freehold ground rents of £341 15s. 61. per annum -sold for £10,900. Effra-road. The residence called Effra Villa, with grounds, freehold-sold for £3010. Tuesday, May 27. By Messrs. RUSHWORTH, ABBOTT, and RUSHWORTH, at the By Mr P. D. TUCKETT, at the Mart. Birkenhead. The lease of Barytes Company, comprising house and range of workshops, with plant and machinery -sold for £3000. -sold for £25-5. By Messrs. HARDS, VAUGHAN, and JENKINSON, at the Mart. Bermondsey.-205, 207, 209, and 211, Jamaica-road, freehold Greenwich.-92, Blackheath-hil', freehold-sold for £575. Charlton.-No. 2, Ann's-place, term 41 years-sold for £200. Woolwich.-A ground rent of £3 per annum, term 34 years -sold for £35. Ground rents of £5 78. per annum, term 34 years-sold for £65. Nus. SA, and 9, Robert-street, term 34 years-sold for £130. By Messrs. DEBENHAM, TEWSON, and FARMER, at the Mart. Essex.-Ingatestone, the residence known as The Huskards, and 78. Sr., copy hold-sold for £2000. time aforesaid furnishes the secretary of the Incorporated Law Society of the United Kingdom with copies of the said list. EXAMINATIONS AT THE INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY, U.K. APRIL, 1879.-FINAL EXAMINATION. AT the examination of candidates for admission on the roll of solicitors of the Supreme Court, the examination committee recommended the following gentlemen, under the age of twenty-six, as being entitled to honorary distinction : 1. Edward Joseph Algar, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Hore, Monkhouse and Hore, of Liverpool. 2. Robert William White, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Gray and Pannett, of Whitby; and Messrs. Bell, Brodrick, and Gray, of London. 3. Frederick Dutton, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Dawes and Son, of London. books: The council of the Incorporated Law Society have accordingly awarded the following prizes of To Mr. Algar, the prize of the Honourable Society of Clement's Inn. Value 10 guineas. To Mr. White, the prize of the Honourable Society of Clifford's Inn. Value 5 guineas. To Mr. Dutton, the prize of the Honourable Society of New Inn. Value 5 guineas. To Mr. Wood, Mr. Sayer, Mr. Jesson, and Mr. Clegg, prizes of the Incorporated Law Society. Value 5 guineas each. The examiners have also certified that the following candidates, under the age of twenty-six, whose names are placed in alphabetical order, passed examinations which entitle them to Commendation: William Henry Hazard, who served his clerkship to Mr. Thomas Hazard, of London; and Messrs. Gamlen and Son, of London. John Thompson James, who served his clerk ship to Mr. John Webster, of Whitehaven; and Messrs. Helder, Roberts, and Gillett, of London; and Messrs. Davis and Justice, of Newport, Mon. Augustus Leverton Jessop, who served his clerkship to Mr. Leverton Jessop, of Bradford; and Messrs. Sharp and Ullithorne, of London. Stuart Metcalfe Johnson, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Swainson, Roper, and Son of Lancaster; and Messrs. Brownlowe and Howe, of London. BIRMINGHAM LAW STUDENTS' SOCIETY. THIS Society held its 645th meeting on Tuesday evening last, the 20th inst., in the Library of the Birmingham Law Society, Mr. E. B. Rawlings in the chair. The moot point for discussion was, "Is the rule in Shelley's case applicable to personal estate?" Smith v. Butcher (L. Rep. 10 Ch. Div. 113; 27 W. Rep. 281), Comfort v. Brown (L. Rep. 15 Ch. Div. 146; W. Rep. 226), and cases there cited. Mr. Plant opened the debate in the affirmative and was supported by Messrs. Kemp, O'Connor, and Taylor. Mr. Crockford opposed in the negative, and was supported by Messrs. Cross, Cutler, and Samuel. After an impartial summing-up by the chairman, on the point being put to the meeting, a large majority of votes was given in favour of the negative. A vote of thanks to the chairman concluded the meeting. LAW STUDENTS' DEBATING SOCIETY. AT the weekly meeting of this society, held at the Law Institution, on the 20th inst., Mr. Ellis, LL.B. being in the chair, the following question was discussed. "Is a creditor who has obtained a judgment against a limited company, and, by reason of the promises of the company, has forborne to isssue execution until a petition to wind up the company has been presented by another creditor, and the company has admitted its insolvency, entitled to proceed with his execution and be paid in full." The cases cited for reference being Ex parte Railway Steel Company (L. Rep 8 Ch. Div. 103), and Re Printing and Numerical Registering Company (L. Rep. 8 Ch. Div. 535). The question was opened in the affirmative by Mr. Serjeant, who quoted several cases in support of this view, and the following gentlemen then addressed the society: Mr. Royle and Mr. Seymour maintaining the affirmative, and Mr. Collins, Mr. Bower, Mr. Eady, LL.D., Mr. Green, and Mr. Heppell, arguing that the creditor is not entitled to proceed with his execution. The opener replied and the chairman, having summed up, put the question to the meeting, when it was decided in the negative. LONDON LAW STUDENTS' DEBATING SOCIETIES-JOINT DEBATE. THE Law Students' Debating Society, and the United Law Students' Society held a joint meeting at the Law Institution, London, on the 27th May, Mr. C. Swinfen Eady, LL.D., in the chair. The question appointed for discussion was, "Ought the rights and privileges of landowners to be curtailed?" Mr. A. H. Spokes, and Mr. J. S. Rubinstein of the United, supported the affirmative, and Mr. J. W. Mills, and Mr. W. R. Lloyd Jones, of the Law Students' Debating Society, the nega tive. Some of the chief arguments for the former view of the question, were that the practice of entail was carried to the extent of a compulsory law, and prevented the estates being dealt with for eighty to a hundred years, and it injured the owner in reducing his income, prevented the farmers from being able to properly cultivate their land, and created serious injury to the country from the view of political economy; and the remedy consisted in freeing the land from the present restricted condition in which it could be dealt with, so as to concentrate capital in fully developing the agriculture of the country. Also that the land was limited, while money was not; and it existed for the population, and not for an aristocracy. The opposite view was supported on the grounds that the Settled Estates Acts afforded ample security for those life owners who desire to lay out capital in improvements, and that the remedy sug. gested lay in the hands of the owners themselves, and that the arguments against settlements would extend to all classes of property. That money could always be employed in England more advan tageously in trade, which took away the raison d'etre for the existence of small landed proprietors as on the continent, and both corn could be grown and cattle be reared more profitably on large estates than on small, as shown by English land producing more per acre than the land of any other European state. The debate being open Mr. Moyle, Mr. Napier, and Mr. Parsons supported the affirmative, and Mr. Vansommer the negative. After the reply of the opener the chairman put the question to the meeting, which, owing to the lateness of the hour, was much reduced in numbers, when the division was nine votes in support to ten against the motion. Majority for the negative one. THE last meeting of the season was held on Tuesday the 20th May last, at the Law Library, Aldine Court, at which there was a numerous attendance of both solicitors and law students. The chair was occupied by W. Smith, Esq., and, after the usual business of the society had been transacted a very able and interesting paper was read by Herbert Hughes, Esq., solicitor, on "Election, Satisfaction, and Performance." After the conclusion of the paper the meeting was addressed by Herbert Bramley, Esq., the hon. sec. of the District Law Society, and several other solicitors. A hearty vote of thanks was given to Mr. Hughes for his kindness in reading his paper, and a like vote of thanks to the chairman brought the meeting to a close. MAGISTRATES' LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. LOCAL GOVERNMENT-SANITARY AUTHORITY -EXPENSES OF SEWERING AND LEVELLING STREET-OWNER AT THE TIME OF THE COMPLETION OF THE WORK.-The appellant, in the early part of 1875, was owner of certain premises gave him, and the other adjoining owners, notice abutting upon a street which the respondents then to sever and level, under sect. 69 of the Public Health Act 1848; this notice not being complied with, the respondents had the works required executed by contract. In May 1876 the appellant disposed by sale of the whole of his interest in the premises. In July 1876 the expenses of this work were duly apportioned upon the adjoining owners, and notice of his apportionment was served upon the appellant. In Dec. 1876 the final balance for the work was paid to contractor by the respondents. Held, upon a case stated, that the appellant was not, in these circumstances, the owner in default under sect. 69 of the Public Health Act 1848, or sect. 150 of the Public Health Act 1875, and that the respondent's remedy under these sections, and sect. 62 of the Local Government Act 1858, or sect. 257 of the Public Health Act 1875, was only against the owner of the premises at the time when the work was completed: (Hinton v. Swindon New Town Local Board, 40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 424. Q.B.) THE SUMMARY JURISDICTION BILL. THIS Bill, which purports to amend the law relating to the summary jurisdiction of magistrates, will undoubtedly receive the sanction of the Legislature during the present session of Parliament. It has already been submitted to the scrutiny of a select committee, and has passed through the committee of the whole House. It will unquestionably greatly improve the practice of the criminal law as connected with the summary procedure before justices of the peace. But, although the improvements will be considerable, it will still leave the law open to many adverse criticisms which more practical knowledge would have avoided. It is perhaps the misfortune connected with Bills of this kind that those who are called upon to perfect them are not the persons best informed upon the subject. An experienced magistrates' clerk or two, if examined before the select committee, would have very greatly assisted that body in perfecting the measure now under consideration. Many communications have already appeared in these columns pointing to defects in the Bill, and we now purpose drawing attention to one more of the shortcomings of this intended enactment. By sect. 13 (1), it is enacted that "where a person who is an adult, is charged before a court an indictable of summary jurisdiction with offence, which is specified in the first column of the first schedule to this Act, and is not comprised in the second column of that schedule, and the court at any time during the hearing of the case become satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to put the person charged upon his trial for the said offence, and further are satisfied (either after such a remand as is provided by this Act or otherwisel that the case is one which, having regard to the character and antecedents of the person charged, the nature of the offence, and all the circumstances of the case, may properly be dealt with summarily, and may be adequately punished by virtue of the powers of this Act, then the court shall cause the charge to be reduced into writing, and read to the person charged, and shall then ask him whether he is guilty or not of the charge: and if such person says that he is guilty, the court shall thereupon cause a plea of guilty to be entered, and adjudge him to be imprisoned, with or without hard labour, for any term not exceeding six months." Thus far the section is not open to objection. It proceeds, however, thus: (2) The court, before asking, in pursuance of this section, the person charged whether he is guilty or not, shall explain to him that he is not obliged to plead or answer, and that if he pleads guilty, he will be dealt with summarily, and that if he does plead or answer, or pleads not guilty, he will be dealt with in the usual course; with a statement, if the court thinks such statement desirable for the information of the person to whom the question is addressed, of the meaning of the case being dealt such points, but we should say that the mere fact of with summarily, or in the usual course, and of the subscribing the memorandum is not in itself within the prohibition referred to (sect. 10 of Solicitor's Act 1860).-ED. STUD.'S DEPT.] assizes or sessions (as the case may be) at which such person will be tried, if tried by a jury. The court shall further state to such person, that he is not obliged to say anything unless he desires to do so, but that whatever he says will be taken down in writing, and may be given in evidence against him upon his trial, and shall give him clearly to understand that he has nothing to hope from any promise of favour, and nothing to fear from any threat which may have been held out to him to induce him to make any admission or confession of his guilt, but that whatever he then says may be given in evidence against him upon his trial, notwithstanding such promise or threat." The first remark that suggests itself is, that whilst the justice is directed to make a statement to the accused, inviting him, if he thinks fit, to say anything; he is afterwards to give him clearly to understand that he has nothing to hope or fear from any promise of favour or any threat. This portion of the enactment is taken from the very clumsily drawn 18th section of the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42 (Jervis's Act), which, however, is more explicit than the present proposed enactment, inasmuch as the justice is not merely directed to give the accused " clearly to understand," but he is required "to state to him, and give him clearly to understand," &c. It is thus left to the justice in his own way to give the accused to understand, no form of words being provided. But in truth this latter caution as to any promise or threat, is quite unnecessary except in cases where there is any reason to believe that a promise or threat has in fact been used. To resort to this very lengthy oration in every case is ridiculous. In nineteen charges out of twenty the criminality of the accused is made conclusive by the evidence, and such a caution, given under such circumstances, is simply nonsensical and out of place. Indeed, so much so is it considered by our benches of justices that it is almost disregarded by them, and we know that the practice with the metropolitan police magistrates is to omit it except in cases where there is a surmise that a promise or threat has been resorted to. Some greater attention should have been paid to this subject than it appears it has received, for we find the same absurdity of language embodied in the caution as at present exists; we allude to the statement which the magistrate is to make to the accused, "that he is not obliged to say anything unless he desires to do so." Now, whether the accused desires or not to say anything, he is not obliged to say it, and by telling him that he is so obliged, if he desires to say anything, may create a very false impression upon his mind by causing him to suppose that he is then and there under a positive legal obligation to state his defence. We observe that the learned commissioners who have revised the Criminal Code Bill have struck out these absurd and misleading words. It is to be hoped that, before this Bill receives the Royal assent, the section to which we have referred will undergo revision, especially with the view of making the giving of the caution as to any threat or promise of favour, discretionary with the justice upon his opinion whether or not in the particular instance it is advisable to give it. A JUSTICES' CLERK'S VIEW OF THE (Continued from page 65.) Sect. 6 is one of great practical importance. It provides that the court of summary jurisdiction, by whose conviction or order any sum is adjudged to be paid, may (1) Allow time for payment; (2), Direct payment to be made by instalments: and, (3), Direct that the person liable to pay shall be at liberty to give, to the satisfaction of the court, security, with or without a surety or sureties, for the payment of the sum, or any instalment thereof, where a sum is to be paid by instalments. If default is made in payment of any one instalment, the same proceedings may be taken as if default had been made in payment of all the instalments then remaining unpaid. The instalments are to be paid at such time and place, and to such person as the court may specify. The power of allowing time for payment under a conviction or an order exists now, excepting when expressly prohibited by statute: (Parker v. Boughey, 31 L. J., N. S., 272, M. C.) It is occasionally exercised by some benches of magistrates, but the practice is by no means uniform. Justices, however, do not at present possess the powers of adjudging the payment under a conviction or order to be made by instalments, or of taking security for such payment, and in the opinion of the writer, such powers ought not to be conferred; at any rate as regards a penalty. Penalties are intended, and should operate, as punishments for offences, and the leniency and consideration now for the first time proposed cannot fail to reduce them to the level of County Court debts, and thus deprive them of much of their deterrent effect. Moreover, the machinery of a criminal court is not adapted for the collection of instalments, or the enforcement of securities, and such processes would be attended with considerable practical difficulty. Amongst the various attempts which of late years have been made to reduce the severity of our laws, it is curious to notice, by way of parenthesis, that the 16th sect. of the Act 3 & 4 Vict. c. 110 has been permitted to remain on the Statute Book. It was originally intended to be an experi(1) By Thomas Cousins, Clerk to the Justices of the Borough of Portsmouth. the ment for a year. but it has been continued from COMPANY LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. WINDING-UP AGREEMENT FOR LEASE SANCTION OF THE COMPANY.-An arrangement, which had been come to between a company and its creditors, had been approved by a large majority of the debenture holders at a meeting held under an order of the court, the majority exceeding that of three-fourths required by sect. 2 of the Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act 1870; and it was, after the order of the court had been made, approved by a general meeting of the shareholders of the company. The company was in An order having been voluntary liquidation. made by Malins, V.C. sanctioning the agreement, certain of the debenture holders appealed. Held (affirming the decision of Malins, V.C.), that there had been a substantial compliance with the requirements of the Companies Act 1862 and the Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act 1870. Where the approval of the shareholders of a company, by the requisite majority, has been given to an honest arrangement between the company and its creditors, such approval is not a condition precedent to giving the sanction of the court: (Smith v. The Dynevor, &c., Company, 40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 409. Ct. of App.) - ARBITRATION COSTS-INCORPORATION OF STATUTES CONDITION PRECEDENT- - LANDS CLAUSES ACT.-A special Act empowered defendants, a railway company, to lower two streets, persons injured thereby compensation to be ascerand provided that the company should pay to tained by arbitration before a special tribunal. The special incorporated the Lands Clauses Consolidation Acts 1845 and 1869, except where expressly varied by this Act." The Lands Clauses 66 Consolidation Act 1845 constitutes different kinds of arbitration with respect to questions of disputed It has been found by all who have had any experience in magistrates' courts that the fees ought not to be too low, or litigation too cheap. No hardship can arise from the tables of fees now in operation being adhered to. for, since justices' clerks have been paid by salary in lieu of fees, justices throughout the country have ample powers of remitting fees on account of poverty, or other reasonable cause (14 & 15 Vict. c. 55, s. 12). If the section under consideration were to become law, some curious anomalies would arise. Take one of them: A man is convicted of a serious assault, and fined £5including costs, and in default of payment a month's imprisonment. He is unable to pay the penalty, and suffers the alternative punishment. In this case, the costs of the proceedings, including the information, hearing,-PRACTICE.-An action was commenced in the conviction, and commitment,, fall on the injured complainant, unless the court can fairly remit them on account of poverty or other reasonable cause. But supposing the assault to be of a trumpery character, and the defendant is fined 2s. 6d. only, the uninjured complainant's very trivial grievance would be redressed free of expense to him. A very considerable increase in the present vast number of school board informations would probably be amongst the effects of the proposed clause. is unquestionably a valuable provision. It pro- It is further proposed that in case of a recog- (To be continued.) SIR JOHN LAMBERT, the permanent secretary WINDING-UP-ACTION AGAINST LIQUIDATOR Exchequer Division against the liquidator of a company which was being wound-up in the Chancery Division, claiming damages for injuries sustained through the negligence of the company. A motion by the liquidator to transfer the action from the Exchequer Division to the Chancery Division was refused on the plaintiff undertaking to amend his writ by suing the liquidator personally; the plaintiff's right to prove against the company in the winding-up not to be prejudiced thereby (Re Thames Steam Ferry Company, 40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 422. Fry, J.) ALLOTMENT OF SHARES-ACCEPTANCE BY POST-CONTRACT.-A contract is binding upon the proposer as soon as the letter of acceptance, withstanding such letter never reaches him, proproperly directed to him, has been posted by any person to whom the proposal has been made, notvided that there is no unreasonable delay in natural mode of transmitting the acceptance is accepting the proposal, and that the ordinary and through the post. A., who resided at Swansea, B. company to the manager of the company, on handed a written application for 100 shares in the the 30th Sept. On the 20th Oct. the B. company, allotment of 100 shares to A., directed to the whose office was in London, posted a letter of address at Swansea that A. had given in his form of application. This letter of allotment never against A. for the amount of a call due in respect reached A. Held, in an action by the B. company liable to pay the call: (The Household, &c., Comof the 100 shares alloted to him, that A. was pany v. Grant, 40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 426. C. P.) reading-room and lectures, for the use and mutual improvement of the members. By some of the rules of the institution all the property of the institution was vested in the trustees thereof for the time being, and the institution was not to be dissolved except by the resolution of nine-tenths in number of the members present at a specially called general meeting, to be confirmed by a like resolution at a subsequent meeting of the same character. There was no building fund in connection with the institution, but there was a "sinking fund" established to pay off a mortgage on the premises occupied by, and which was the property of, the institution. A testator having bequeathed a sum of money "unto the trustees for the time being of the institution, to be applied by them towards the building fund in connection therewith," it was held, by the Exchequer Division (Kelly, C.B. and Huddleston, B.), that the institution was not a charitable institution so as to bring the case within the terms of the Mortmain Act (9 Geo. 2, c. 36), but that the bequest was void as tending to create a perpetuity. The cases of Carne v. Long (2 L. T. Rep. N. S. 552; 2 De G. F. & J. 75; 59 L. J. 503) and Thomson v. Shakespeare (1 L. T. Rep. N. S. 398; 2 De G. F. & J. 399; 29 L. J. 276, Ch.) in point and followed: (Re Dutton 24 L. T. Rep. N. S. 430. Ex.) IN MARITIME LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. SHIP CHARTER-PARTY-ACTION FOR DELAY DISCHARGING DUTY OF CHARTERERREASONABLE TIME-PORT OF DISCHARGE. Where the time to be allowed for unloading is not named in a charter-party, the charterer is bound to provide at the port of discharge sufficient appliances of the kind ordinarily in use at the port for the purpose of unloading, and it is no answer to a claim for damages for delay in unloading to show that the delay was caused by the crowded state of the port: (Wright v. New Zealand Shipping Company, 40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 413. Ct. of App.) INSURANCE MONEY OWING TO UNDERWRITERS BY ASSURED-DEFENCE BY ASSIGNEE OF THE POLICY.-The 31 & 32 Vict. c. 86, which enables assignees of marine policies to sue thereon in their own names, provides that "the defendant in any action shall be entitled to make any defence, which he would have been entitled to make if the said action had been brought in the name of the person by whom, or on whose account, the policy had been effected." Held, in an action by the assignees of a policy, that the underwriters were entitled, under this provision, to set up a counter-claim for money owing to them, at the time of the assignment, by the person by whom the policy had been effected: (Pellas v. Neptune Marine Insurance Company, 40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 428 C. P.) BANKRUPTCY LAW. DIGEST OF BANKRUPTCY DECISIONS (Continued from page 66.) A. in 1873 made advance to B. upon his verbal undertaking to give a bill of sale when required. No bill of sale was asked for by A. during his life; but some years after his death, which occurred in 1874, viz., in 1877, his executor hearing that a judgment had been recorded against B., and that subsequently a debtor's summons had been issued against him, required B. to give the promised security, whereupon B. executed the bill of sale in question, comprising substantially all his property, upon an understanding that it was not to be acted unless B. was pressed by his creditors, of which he was to give notice to the executor. Some weeks afterwards a debtor's summons was served upon B., which having been communicated to the executor of A., the latter at once took possession of the property, and sold it at a fixed sale, at which only one bidder was present, and which had been advertised only three days previously. Held that the execution of the bill of sale was a fraudulent preference, and the proceeds of the sale were ordered to be given up to the trustee notwithstanding the alleged belief on the part of the executor that the bankrupt was solvent at the date of the execution of the bill of sale: (Ex parte Bolland, Re Dobson, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 326.) Per the Chief Judge: With the distinct understanding between the two parties, and with the promise on the part of the debtor faithfully to perform his part of the contract, that if any creditor should press him he was to give notice to the bill of sale holder; he did so give notice, and the bill of sale holder took possession, and sold the whole of the property the next day. I do not entertain the slightest doubt that such a trans action comes within the whole of the decisions on the subject, and if I were to hold that it was a bona fide transaction, it would be a most mischievous decision. The bill of sale is good for nothing: (Ib.) In the affidavit filed under the 1st section of the Bills of Sale Act 1854, with a copy of the bill of sale, the grantor was described as Joseph Wood, of Sache Hall Farm, in the county of Chester, farmer. The grantor's real name was Joseph. but he had assumed and was known generally by the name of Joseph Albert. The farm was not in the county of Chester, but in the county of the city of Chester. There was no evidence that there was any farm of the same, or any similar name, in the county of Chester. Held, that the description was sufficient. Semble, that a mistake in the affidavit as to the grantor's name would be immaterial, the 1st section of the Act of 1854 making no provision as to the name, but only requiring a description of the residence and occupation of the person making or giving the bill of sale: (Ex parte Hattie; Re Wood, 39 L. T. Rep. N. S. 373.) bill of sale as Solicitor, Blomfield-street, in the An attesting witness was truly described in a City of London." In the affidavit he described himself as "Solicitor, 16, Blomfield-street, in the City of London," and went on to state 66 I reside at Grove House, Acton, in the City of London." There are three Actons in England, two in counties distant from London, and one in the County of Middlesex, and in this Acton the witness resided, Held, that the affidavit sufficiently described the witness's residence, because, after rejecting the impossible description of Acton as being in the City of London, the statement in the affidavit that he resided at Acton, coupled with the description of him as a solicitor carrying on business in the City of London, would lead persons of ordinary intelligence to conclude that the Metropolitan Acton must be meant: (Blount v. Harris, 39 L. T. Rep. N. S. 465.) B., a trader, sold the furniture in his private residence to J., and at the foot of an inventory of the furniture signed a receipt in these words: "Received of and from J. the sum of £600, being the amount of purchase money in respect of the goods, chattels, &c., mentioned in the foregoing inventory." This document was not registered as a bill of sale. On the day on which B. signed the receipt he delivered a chair to J. in the name of all the furniture; and J. verbally agreed to let the furniture to B., in whose apparent possession it remained till after he had filed a liquidation petition, Held, that the document was a bill of sale within the Bills of Sale Act 1854, and was void as against the trustee in the liquidation for want of registration: (Ea parte Cooper; Re Baum, 39 L. T. Rep. N. S. 521). Per James, L.J.: The document is as complete an assurance of the goods contained in it, and would be as effectual to give title and right to possession for all purposes whatever, as if it had been extended in any amount of conveyancing language, engrossed on any number of skins of parchment, and sealed with any quantity of sealing wax. It is a document which does assure the goods, and does transfer them from one perso 1 to another. To hold that such a document is not a bill of sale requiring registration under the Act would be to make that Act merely a plaything for verbal ingenuity: (16.) COMPANIES. The 18th section of the Judicature Act 1875, does not so far assimilate the rules in the winding up of companies to the rules of bankruptcy as to give the collector of the Queen's taxes a right to distrain on the goods of a company in liquidation: (Re Regent United Service Stores, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 130) The rule that in the winding-up of a limited company a contributory who is also a creditor of the company is not entitled to set-off against calls made before or in the winding-up, either his debt or any dividend which may come to him on his debt applies to the case where the estate of a deceased contributory is insolvent: (Re West Hartlepool Iron Company, Limited, 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 139.) The 101st section of the Companies Act 1862, provides that the court may, at any time after the making an order for winding-up the company, make an order on any contributory for the time being settled on the list of contributories directing payment to be made, in manner in the said order mentioned, of any moneys due from him or from the estate of the person whom he represents to the company, exclusive of any moneys which he or the estate of the person whom he represents may be liable to contribute by virtue of any call made or to be made by the court in pursuance of this part of the Act; and it may, in making such order, when the company is not limited, allow to such contributory by way of set-off any moneys due to him or the estate which he represents from the company, or any independent dealing or con tract with the company, but not any moneys due to him as a member of the company in respect of any dividend or profit; provided that when all the creditors of any company, whether limited or unlimited, are paid in full, any moneys due on any account whatever to any contributories from the company may be allowed to them by way of setoff against any subsequent call or calls: (Ib.) Per Bacon, C.J.: If the contributory becomes bankrupt a set-off is allowed, but I cannot say that this case is analogous to bankruptcy. I am strongly of opinion that the general law enunciated by the statute must prevail, and that the case is clearly governed by decision, although it is against the natural justice of the case, and against the law as applied to cases where a contributory is bankrupt. But the principle is, it is said, that the engagement to take shares is equivalent to having paid down the money, and that it remains, paid or not paid, a fund to satisfy the creditors, and that no subsequent transactions between the company and the shareholder who becomes a creditor ought to disturb that state of things. That is the theory, and it is enough for me to say that by repeated decisions it has been established that there can be no set-off in the state of circumstances here exist ing, and the fact that this deceased shareholder's insolvent, cannot alter the law so established: (Ib.) estate is being administered by this court, and is Three directors of a company being liable as contributories for the amount unpaid on their shares, and also as guarantors in respect of a guarantee to a bank, a creditor of the company, and no calls having been made, it was resolved at a director's meeting at which those three directors were present, that "in order to reduce the balance due to the bank it is recommended that the At the date of this resolution the company was directors do pay up the amount of their shares.” insolvent. The three directors paid to, and took secretary of the company, the secretary having a receipt from a person calling himself the prorefused to receive them, sums equal in amount to the amount due on their shares, which sums the pro-secretary paid to the account with the above mentioned bank. Upon company's general an application by the liquidators that the three directors might be settled on the list of contributories in respect of the amount unpaid upon their shares: Held, that the payments made by the directors in respect of the calls were made bona fide, and not in breach of their duty towards the other shareholders, and must therefore be allowed to them: (Re Wincham, &c. Co., 38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 659.) DUDLEY COUNTY COURT. (Before RUPERT KETTLE, Esq., Judge.) Bill of sale-Attestation- Passing of property- In this case the debtor, William Henry Meese, a tin-plate worker, of Queen's Cross and Wellington-road, Dudley, gave to Messrs. Gordon and Sons, of Wolverhampton, a bill of sale for £100 immediately preceding the filing of his petition, under the following circumstances. Having executed a bill of sale and missed a payment, the assignee came to Dudley and waited upon the assignor (Meese), who, in fear of a seizure, at once filed his petition. Two hours later Messrs Gordon seized the goods and sold them. The bill of sale was attested by a solicitor, whose evidence showed what portions he had explained to the debtor. In delivering judgment his HONOUR said it was a case of considerable importance, and there were three points for his decision. The first was, whether the bill of sale had been properly attested, the second was, whether it was necessary to give notice to the assignor before the property mentioned in the bill of sale passed to the assignee: and the third question was, whether the property brought upon the premises of the assignor vested in the assignee after taking possession under the bill of sale. Upon the first point he decided that the bill of sale was not fully explained, and the attetsation was not sufficient in law. On the second he held that the waiting upon Meese immediately before his filing of his petition was not a sufficient demand, and that the trustee was entitled to notice and to the proceeds of the sale. The neces sity for a demand was difficult, but, considering that no place was fixed for the payment, but only a date for the payment of instalments, he did not think, upon the authorities, that the property was vested in Gordon until he had done something that indicated the exercise of an option to possess himself of the goods instead of receiving the money. On the third point he held that the trus tee was entitled to all the property brought upon the premises after the bill of sale. His judgment then was for the trustee, and that the money should be paid over to him, and the assignee who sold up should pay the costs in that motion. COUNTY COURTS. ALFRETON COUNTY COURT. (Before W. FFOOKS WOODFORDE, Esq., Judge.) HIS HONOUR said: This action was tried before me missioners, or by any municipal or other public COUNTY COURT JURISDICTION.-Mr. Bedwell, PARLIAMENTARY EXPENSES.-An Act of Parliament of the year 1847 makes provision for the "taxation" of the costs charged by Parliamentary agents, solicitors, &c., in respect of private Bills in the House of Commons. Mr. Raikes has charge of a Bill which proposes to extend the provisions of this Act to the charges of Parliamentary agents, solicitors, and others, in respect of obtaining, promoting, or opposing any provisional order or provisional certificate, or any Bill for at the last April court, when, although the amount confirming the same. The Bill further includes within its scope the charges in respect of the claimed was small, yet, as many other cases depend-promotion of any Bill by public trustees or comed on this decision, I postponed my judgment. The claim was for demurrage on the hire of sacks. The plaintiffs, in addition to being common carriers, are also lenders of sacks upon conditions printed on the back of their receipt notes. The facts were these: On the 23rd June last, 200 sacks, which had been hired of the plaintiffs by the consignors, who are large cornfactors, were conveyed full of wheat from the station to the Alfreton station for delivery, at the latter, to the defendant the consignee. The charges, as well for the hire of the sacks, as for the carriage of them full, had been paid by the consignors. On the arrival of the sacks at the Alfreton station, the plaintiffs refused to deliver them to the defendant's servant (his son), unless he first signed a receipt note, whereupon he signed it, and took the sacks to defendant's premises, where they were kept seven days beyond the twelve days allowed by the conditions; for this detention one halfpenny a sack was claimed by the plaintiffs. The defendant contended that under these circumstances there was no contract entered into between himself and the plaintiffs, and that the consignors and the plaintiffs were alone the contracting parties. I am of opinion that the defendant's contention is correct. The condition on which the plaintiffs chiefly relied was as follows: "No. 8. Consignees and others receiving grain in the company's sacks must sign the full sack receipt book, and will be charged demurrage for the sacks at the rate of one halfpenny per sack per week for any period that they may retain the sacks beyond that charged for upon the grain by the sending station." Now, it was argued by the plaintiffs' solicitor that, although the plaintiffs were under contract with the consignors to deliver to the defendant, the consignee, the sacks in question, yet that, as the defendant had received, as admitted on the receipt-note, a copy of the conditions, and had by his agent, his son, signed the receipt-note, which contains the above, with other conditions, he had made an additional agreement, and was bound by it. Now, to this it must be answered that the son was only the agent of the defendant to receive the sacks, and not an agent to enter into any such agreement with the plaintiffs; and further, that as the plaintiffs were under a contract with the consignors to deliver the sacks to the defendant, they could not be allowed to allege a breach of that contract as a foundation for a new one. The defendant was not privy to the agreement between the consignors and the plaintiffs, although doubtless an interested party, and consequently was entitled to the delivery, free of any condition whatever. The plaintiffs, in fact, undertook, as common carriers, for which service they had been paid by the consignor, to convey these sacks to the defendant, and so had no right to stop them in transitu, and refuse to give them up unless the defendant bound himself to be answerable for their detention. I therefore hold that there was no legal consideration for this agreement, and the plaintiffs must be nonsuited. LEGAL NEWS. THE will of Mr. Henry Hodgetts Deacon, late of Doctors' Commons, proctor and solicitor, and of Clapham, who died on the 17th ult., was proved on the 10th inst., by Mr. William Cope Deacon, the son, Mr. W. H. Evans, and Mr. J. G. Hum phry, the executors, the personal estate being Sworn under £16,000. The testator gives to his wife, Mrs. Elizabeth Deacon, his household furniture and effect, and £200; and legacies to his sons, daughters, sons-in-law, daughters-in-law, executors, and clerk; the remainder of his property is to be held upon trust for his wife for life, and then for his five daughters, he having, as he recites, provided for his sons in his lifetime.-City Press. SCOTCH ENTAILS.-Mr. James Barclay has introduced a Bill relating to the law of entail in Scotland. His proposal is that the right of an heir of entail to present an application under the Acts relating to entailed estates shall not be affected by a subsequent alteration of circumstances such as the birth of an intervening heir or the death of any of the heirs of entail whose consent to the application ought to be obtained or dispensed with. The Bill also extends one portion of the Scotch Entail Act of 1875 by providing that in no case is the death of the applicant to invalidate the procedure. "A BARRISTER" writes to the Pall Mall Gazette: "It appears from the law report in the Times of Saturday that the Lord Chief Justice has been complaining that the judicial strength of the Queen's Bench Division crippled by the temporary absence of Mr. Justice Lush on the Criminal Code Commission"-is unequal to the numerous and distracting demands made upon it under the existing system of procedure. May the suggestion be hazarded-not for the first, nor indeed for the twentieth, time-that the difficulty might be arranged, and all ground for complaint removed, if the common-law judges would condescend, not merely to obey the letter, but to act in the spirit of the provisions of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876? By the 17th section of that Act it is ordered that every action and proceeding in the High Court of Justice shall (with certain exceptions thereinafter provided for)" so far as is practicable and convenient, be heard, determined, and disposed of before a single judge." Power is then given for the assignment of certain business to divisional courts-a provision, by the way, which was construed " very liberally by the judges who framed the rules for carrying it outand the divisional courts are to be constituted of "two judges and no more," except in cases in which it seems expedient to the president and a majority of the judges of a division that a larger number of judges should sit It is evident that this latter provision was inserted with a view to cases of extraordinary urgency and importance, and that it was the intention of the Legislature that under ordinary circumstances no more than two judges should sit at a time in a divisional court. How has this intention been respected by the judges? I find from the same report that on Friday-the very day on which the Lord Chief Justice made his complaint-his lordship, Mr. Justice Mellor, and Mr. Justice Manisty were sitting together as a divisional court of the Queen's Bench Division, and that the only case which the reporter has thought worth recording as having been decided by them was an application for a new trial in an action in the Lord Mayor's court, where S. T. Chambers was alleged to have misdirected the jury, the whole amount at stake being £30. "Oxoniensis," that judgeships, more especially County Court judgeships, should be thrown open to solicitors. My impression is that the low rank of solicitors in the social scale is attributable to the uniform tariff of charges to which all are bound to submit, and whereby the services of all are put upon an equal pecuniary standard of value. Every solicitor of standing who is conscious of the value of his counsels and labour, and of the large original outlay and subsequent long years of work which have built up the very experience which gives value to those counsels and labour, must have felt at times the utmost repugnance to see his services rated at the same price as that of the merest fledgling in the Profession. Why should it not be competent to solicitors by a notice (to be printed in legislatively adjusted type if you will) to be fixed up in their offices to acquaint all those seeking their advice or assistance that they charge stated fees, thereby assisting those who honour them with their confidence by restricting the number of clients. This is the course pursued at the Bar by counsel who, as they find they have by their ability, created a demand for their services fix a restrictive fee below which no brief will be accepted. So it ought to for the attendance all day long in court of one of Essex-street, Strand. THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE (OFFICERS) BILL.-By this important Bill, it is proposed to establish a central office of the Supreme Court of Judicature. The central office is to be under the control and superintendance of officers called masters of the Supreme Court of Judicature. The first masters of the Supreme Court of Judicature will be the existing masters of the Queen's Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer Divisions, and others (see sect. 8.) Provision is made for the appointment of future masters, and by section 10 it is provided that "A person shall not be qualified to be appointed a master of the Supreme Court unless he is, or has been, a practising barrister or solicitor of five years' standing. Now, I think it would be an opportune moment to get a provision made by this Bill, whereby the qualifications of the taxing-masters and chief clerks of the judges in the Chancery Division may henceforth be this, viz., the having been solicitors of five years' standing. At present no person is qualified to become a Chancery taxing-master who has not been a solicitor of twelve; or, to become a chief clerk of a Chancery judge, who has not been a solicitor of ten years' standing. It seems to me that if it be considered that five years' practice is sufficient to qualify a gentleman for the office of a common law master, who performs important duties in addition to the taxation of common law costs, the same number of years must be sufficient to qualify him for the other offices. I should like to see the salaries of all the offices which may be held by solicitors fixed by this Bill; as, by sect. 15, a power is reserved, in pursuance of which they may at some future time be cut down, this might be avoided if the matter were taken up in time. JAMES RAWLINSON. Upper Holloway, N. SALE OF GOODS-WARRANTY.-An action was tried to-day in the City of London Court, in which the plaintiff sued the defendant, a provision dealer, for the price paid for certain tins of compressed beef, sold by the defendant to the plaintiff, but which were found to be totally unfit for human food. It was held, that because there was no written warranty, the plaintiff could not recover. I think I am right in stating that the leading authorities on the subject are all agreed that in contracts for the sale of provisions by provision dealers there is an implied warranty |