the respondents, silent, and at the worst for the respondents, confirmatory of that view, I think that is the view that ought to be adopted." As regarded the articles of association their Lordships thought they did not vary the matter, except in merely giving every shareholder one vote for every share. That provision, however, was held to apply only to the case where a poll was taken. The utmost effect of this decision will be possibly to make the demand for a poll more frequent.

THE Conflicting claims of the Statutes of Limitations, which are in force in different countries, came before the Queen's Bench Division last Tuesday, in the case of The Alliance Bank of Simla and the United Bank of India v. Brine. The defendant had executed a bond in India, action upon which was admitted to be barred by Indian law, but not by English law. The question was, whether the point must be decided by the lex fori or the lex loci contractus. This point, though not of common occurrence, is not a new one; indeed, the judgment pronounced was arrived at, seemingly a little against the LORD CHIEF JUSTICE's inclination, only in deference to the great strength of the authorities cited. Counsel for the plaintiffs cited Don v. Lippmann (5 Cl. & Fin. 1), where a bill of exchange made and given in France was held by the House of Lords (overruling the court of session) to be barred in Scotland by virtue of the Scoth Irw, though it would not have been barred in France under French law. The British Linen Company v. Drummond (10 B. & C. 903), in which it was held by the Court of Queen's Bench that an action for a debt incurred in Scotland was barred in England by virtue of the English law, though it would have been otherwise in Scotland under the Scotch law; and Huber v. Steiner (2 Bing. N. C. 202), in which it was held by the Court of Common Pleas that an action on a promissory note made and given in France would lie in England by virtue of the English law, although it was barred in France by the French law. The authority of these cases was admitted to be decisive, and judgment was given for the plaintiffs, Mr. Justice MELLOR expressing a doubt whether even the insertion into the bond of an express condition that it should be subject to the Indian law, would have been sufficient to bar the plaintiff's right of action in this country. It was admitted that the Indian law operated only as a bar to the action, and not as in extinction of the claim itself. But for this admission the result would have been far less certain than it was; for the distinction was actually taken, apparently for the first time, in the last case above cited; and the judgment of the Court, as given by Lord Chief Justice TINDAL, is made to depend upon the failure to prove the allegation of fact upon which the distinction depends, and appears rather to have been in favour of the validity of the distinction itself.

MR. STONOR, the judge of the Southwark County Court, delivered judgment a few days ago in a case of some importance so far as regards the law relating to pawnbrokers. The case to which we refer is that of the Singer's Manufacturing Company v. Clarke. The action was brought to recover the value of a sewing machine which had been unlawfully pledged with the defendant, and subsequently given up to the holders of the pawn-ticket on payment of the loan and interest notwithstanding that the defendant had notice that the machine was the property of the plaintiffs, who demanded possession of the same. The machine in question was hired on the 16th Oct. 1878, under a hiring agreement, which provided that it should remain the sole property of the company until the amount paid for hire equalled the full purchase-money. Before any instalments were paid, it was pawned with the defendant. Shortly afterwards one of the plaintiffs' clerks, seeing it on the defendant's premises, at once gave him a printed notice of demand on the part of the company. The defendant refused to comply with such notice unless the provisions of the Pawnbroker's Act 1872 were carried out. On the 13th Jan. 1879 the machine was redeemed by the pledger. No notice of the redeeming was given to the plaintiffs, but they discovered the fact on 17th Feb. Sect. 25 of the Pawnbrokers' Act 1872 provides that the holder for the time being of a pawn ticket shall be presumed to be the person entitled to redeem the pledge, and, subject to the provisions of the Act, the pawnbroker is required, on payment of the loan and profit, to deliver the pledge to the person producing the pawn ticket. The 30th section provides for the delivery to the owner of property unlawfully pledged. Such delivery may be ordered in three cases, first, when the pawner is convicted in a court of summary jurisdiction of knowingly pawning the property of another; secondly, where a person is convicted of having feloniously taken, or fraudulently obtained that which way pawned; thirdly, when in proceedings before a court of summary jurisdiction it appears that the property was unlawfully pawned. But when the order for delivery up is made the court will order either payment to the pawnbroker of the amount of the loan or any part thereof, or delivery without payment. The pawner in this case does not appear from the report before us to have been convicted, nor was there any order of delivery made as required by sect. 30. The plaintiffs accordingly had not done everything which ought to have been done in order to render their claim

upon the pawnbroker effectual. Under those circumstances, the question to be considered is whether the pawnbroker was not compelled to act as he had done. The 31st section of the Act provides that if a pawnbroker without a reasonable cause, proof of which lies on him, neglects or refuses to deliver a pledge to the person entitled to have delivery thereof under the Act, he is guilty of an offence, and a court of summary jurisdiction is empowered to order the delivering of the pledge on payment of the amount of the loan and profit, and may impose a penalty or not in its discretion. The inference to be drawn from these sections seems to be that the claim of the plaintiffs cannot be upheld, and this was the view taken by his Honour. The question, however, whether this Act overrides the rights of an owner at common law may have to be determined in the Court above.

THE application of the doctrine of part performance to take a case out of the Statute of Frauds is so well established that it is not surprising to find an attempt being made, as in Brittain v. Rossiter (40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 240), to extend the doctrine to a new set of circumstances. That case was an action for wrongful dismissal. At the trial it appeared that the agreement between the plaintiff and defendant was a verbal one. It was concluded on a Saturday, and the employment was to commence on the following Monday. The plaintiff served for part of the year, and was then dismissed. At the trial Mr. Justice HAWKINS ruled that the plaintiff's evidence showed a complete contract on the Saturday, and that if the service was to be for a year, and was not to commence until the following Monday, the case came within the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. 2, c. 3), and the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. The Exchequer Division refused a rule for a

new trial. The Court of Appeal, however, granted a rule nisi on the ground that there was evidence of part performance of the contract to take it out of the Statute of Frauds, and on the ground that there was evidence of hiring independently of the Statute of Frauds. It was conceded on behalf of the plaintiff that the Court of Chancery formerly would not grant a specific performance of such a contract, but it was argued that the Judicature Act 1873 had altered that rule. The of sub-sect. 24 7th paragraph of that Act provides that the High Court shall have power to grant, either absolutely or on reasonable terms and conditions, all such remedies whatsoever as any of the parties thereto appear to be entitled to in respect of any legal or equitable claim properly brought forward by them respectively, so that, as far as possible, all matters so in controversy may be completely and finally determined. It was contended that, acting under the jurisdiction by this section conferred, the Court might give effect to the equitable principle that a statute shall not be made the instrument of fraud, the fact that the contract was not put into writing being due to the defendant's default. Lord Justice COTTON pointed out, however, that the above paragraph should be read in connection with paragraph 4, which provides that the courts shall recognise all equitable estates, titles, and rights, and all equitable duties appearing incidentally in the course of any cause or matter in the same manner in which the Court of Chancery would have done; whilst paragraph 7 merely gives to any of the parties all the relief he is entitled to, but does not give him new rights or remedies. "There are certainly cases,' observed Lord Justice BRETT, "in which this principle of part performance has be applied to contracts which could not be be enforced under the statute, being contracts for the sale of lands, but it has never been extended further or applied to such a case as the present. The Courts of Chancery would not decree specific performance of such a contract as this; and in practice they could hardly do so." His Lordship characterised the decisions of those courts relating to part-performance as "bold decisions." Lord Justice THESIGER expressed himself in a somewhat different way, although it does not follow that he did not think the decisions bold ones. "It has been held in the Courts of Equity," said his Lordship, "notwithstanding the words of the Statute of Frauds, that when a purchaser has entered into possession of land in pursuance of a contract, which was not in writing. . . . the Court may look into the contract and admit evidence to show what the terms of it were." Upon principle, however, be could not see why the Court should not treat an entry upon service in the same manner, and apply in this case the principle which it would apply in the case of a contract for the sale of land. It is certainly somewhat illogical to make part-performance sufficient on the one hand to take a case out of the statute under one set of circumstances, but not on the other. This fact, nevertheless, does not concern the granting a new trial upon the ground stated.

The cases which have been decided upon the law of trade marks are so numerous, and additions are growing so rapidly, that that branch of law is fast becoming one of large proportions. The decision of Mr. Justice FRY in the case of Orr, Ewing and Co. v. Johnson and Co. (40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 307) is one of the latest additions. The facts present no difficulty. The plaintiffs were manufacturers of Turkey red yarn. This they exported to Aden

Bombay, and other places. For many years they had affixed on the bundles in which this yarn was made up a ticket, which they said caused it to be known in the Bombay market as "Bhé Hathi," ie., two elephant's yarn. The ticket was of a triangular shape, and of a green colour. On it was embossed in gold a triangular banner, supported at two corners by an elephant, and between the two elephants was a crown. The name of the plaintiffs firm was printed on the banner in Goozerattee characters. The defendants, too, were manufacturers and exporters of Turkey red yarn. Recently they had commenced using a ticket which was similar in shape and colour to that of the plaintiffs. It had also two elephants on it in the same place as in the plaintiffs, but turned in the opposite direction. Between them was the figure of a Hindoo idol. There was a banner, as on the plaintiffs' ticket, but on it was the name of the defendants' firm in English letters. An application made by the the plaintiffs to have their tickets registered was refused by the Court of Appeal (38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 695). An appeal to the House of Lords is pending. They claimed in this action an injunction to restrain the defendants from using the above ticket, and from otherwise imitating the plaintiffs' tickets. The evidence went to show that the native weavers in the country, who were the ultimate purchasers of the yarn would probably be deceived. Mr. Justice FRY having answered in the negative the question whether a purchaser of ordinary caution and ordinary intelligence would be deceived so as to take one ticket for the other, even if the two tickets were not before him, went on to consider whether the defendants had taken a material and substantial part of the plaintiffs' ticket. To determine this his Lordship considered two things, first, whether a large part of the tickets which impressed the eye, or was a significant part of the tickets, had been taken : secondly, the mode in which the plaintiffs' goods have been accustomed to be sold, and what people have called those goods. He arrived at the conclusion that the defendants took that which was a material and substantial part of the plaintiffs' ticket, and that consequently the burden was thrown upon the defendants of showing that their ticket did not deceive purchasers. This is founded upon the statement of the law by Lord Justice JAMES in Ford v. Foster (27 L. T. Rep. N. S. 219). "The plaintiff makes the primâ facie case that he has a plain trade mark, a material and substantial part of which has been taken by the defendants. Then the onus is, under those circumstances, cast upon the defendants to relieve themselves from that prima facie liability. Mr. Justice FRY then proceeded to inquire whether the defendants had so appropriated the material part with due precautions to prevent error. For this inquiry, the authority of Lord O'HAGAN in The Singer Machine Manufacturing Company v. Wilson (38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 303) may be quoted: "If one man will use a name, the use of which has been validly appropriated by another, he ought to use it under such circumstances, and with such sufficient precautions that the reasonable probability of error should be avoided, notwithstanding the want of care and caution which is so commonly exhibited in the course of human affairs. I do not say that the mere possibility of deception should suffice to make appropriation improper, but the chance of misleading should be jealously estimated with a view to this consideration, even though ordinary attention might have been enough to protect from mistake." This inquiry likewise was decided in favour of the plaintiffs, and an injunction was accordingly granted. Struggle was made on behalf of the defendants for the recognition of the principle that where there is no actual identity of trade mark, the Court will require proof of actual deception; but, as the learned judge put it, the point against the defendants was that they were alleged to have taken that part of the plaintiffs' mark which had given a name to the plaintiffs' goods. objection to the plaintiffs' claim by reason of the refusal to permit the registration of his mark appears to have been insisted upon. By the Trade Marks Registration Act 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 33), the right of traders to take proceedings to protect their trade marks which had been in use, as the plaintiff's had, previously to the passing of the Act of 1875, is left as if the Trade Marks' Registration Acts had not been passed.

No

In an action against several defendants, and where, as to some, the plaintiff has made default in replying and giving notice of trial, there is no time fixed by the rules when such defendants can move to dismiss. The difficulty is, that the time for delivering the other defences may have been extended, and, therefore, that the "last of the defences," may not yet have been delivered so as to compel the plaintiff to reply under Order XXIV., r. 1, to these defendants who have duly delivered their defences. A plaintiff not desirous to proceed with his action may have what used to be called in the old Court of Chancery pocket defendants, and under the new rules may extend the time for the defences of such defendants, and so keep an action hanging over the other defendants, there being no time pointed out in which he is bound to proceed. The question as to what defendants should do under such circumstances arose in a case of Ambroise v. Evelyn, before the MASTER of the ROLLS on the 9th inst. The action was against several defendants, and the claim was delivered on the 14th Dec. 1878. Three of the defendants put in their defence

on the 21st Feb. 1879, and no step bad subsequently been taken by the plaintiff. The three defendants having succeeded in ascertaining from the chief clerk that no order had been made extending the time for the other defences, moved, on the 9th inst. under Order XXXVI., r. 4 and 4a., to dismiss the action for want of prosecution on the ground that more than six weeks from the close of the pleadings had elapsed, and the plaintiff had given no notice of trial. It was contended that under Order XXII., r. 1, the time for delivering a defence was eight days, unless the time was extended by the Court, and as no order for the purpose as to the other defendants had been made, the time for the delivery of their defences had expired and the plaintiff therefore had only three weeks from 21st Feb. 1879, within which to reply. For the plaintiff, his solicitor made an affidavit in which he stated that the time for delivering one of the defences would not expire untit the 21st inst., as it had from time to time been extended by consent to that date, to await the result of a petition for liquidation presented by such defendant, and which was then fixed for adju lication. The affidavit also stated that no letter prior to the notice had been written to the plaintiff to inquire in what state the action was. On this the plaintiff's counsel argued that "the last of the defences" had not yet been delivered, and therefore that according to Order XXIV., r. 1, the time for reply had not yet expired. The MASTER of the ROLLS in his judgment said the point was a difficult one, and that it was a curious fact that the plaintiff might give time for a defence, and orders even might be drawn up for that purpose, and yet a defendant could not ascertain that such was the case. It was no part of the duty of the chief clerk to give such information, and he did not imagine they would. Under the old practice the difficulty as to one defendant moving to dismiss had always been got over by the defendant first of all writing to the plaintiff's solicitor, and asking him how the suit stood, and that he intended to move to dismiss. It was understood that the solicitor was bound to answer, and the defendant then would know what course to adopt. Under the new rules he considered that was also the proper way to ascertain how the action stood, and a motion to dismiss should not be made until such a letter had been written. He further considered it an unnecessary expense to require that in every extension of time an Order of the Court should be drawn up for the purpose, and therefore that the plaintiff's mode of procedure had been perfectly regular. The result was that the "last of the defences" had not yet been delivered, and therefore that the plaintiff's time for reply had not yet expired; no order would therefore be made on the motion, and the costs under the circumstances would be costs in the action. The judgment of such an authority on the present practice as the MASTER of the ROLLS will be extremely useful to practitioners on such a doubtful point, which must be one constantly arising in practice, and as to which, moreover, the rules themselves afford no clue as to the right course to adopt.

COMPENSATION IN CRIMINAL CASES.

SEVERAL cases which have recently been prominently before the public have made the discussion of this question a matter of importance. Indeed, no moment more favourable than the present has, we think, ever occurred for the complete settle nent of the question in all its aspects. There have been times when the public have been roused by some notorious case to a sense of the hardship entailed on prosecutors in being put to the expense of prosecuting; at other times sympathy has altogether been with prisoners who, after having been put to great expense in defending themselves against false accusations, have been acquitted, or who, after having been convicted, and serving the whole or part of their sentence, have been shown to be innocent. Instances of both these classes of cases having occurred in unusual numbers of late, the state of public feeling is presumably such that a short summary of the law on the subject, with a few observations thereon, may not unreasonably be expected to merit attention. We propose to consider the question in the following order: (1) Compensation to prosecutors; (2) Compensation to prisoners. Now with regard to the first head the law stands thus; if the prisoner be convicted, and the offence is a felony, the court may, if it think fit, upon the application of any person aggrieved, andi immediately after such conviction, award any sum of money not exceeding £100 by way of satisfaction or compensation for any loss of property suffered by the applicant through or by means of the said felony, and the amount awarded for such satisfaction or compensation shall be deemed a judgment debt due to the person entitled to receive the same from the person so convicted: (33 & 31 Vict. c. 23, s. 3.) The power conferred on the court by this section does not refer to misdemeanours, and is limited in felonies to cases where the applicant has sustained a loss of property. No compensation can be awarded under this section in respect of personal injuries, and the meaning of the section appears to exclude its application from cases where personal injuries caused by the felonious act have incapacitated the prosecutor from earning his livelihood, and so occasioning him a loss of property.

To sum up then, the law at present stands thus: When a person is injured by an act which amounts to an indictable offence,

except in the cases within the section above cited, the offender, if the case be a felony, must first of all be brought to trial, before the civil courts can be put in motion to adjudge compensation to the injured party, for whom no compensation can be given by the criminal court which tries the offender. If the offence be a misdemeanour, in no case has the court which tries the offender power to grant compensation to the person injured, but the latter is in this respect in a better position than if the crime were a felony, in that he can bring his action at once, whether he does or does not subsequently prosecute.

The distinction made between the two classes of felonies is extremely illogical, and so is the exclusion of misdemeanours from the operation of the section. In his Digest of the Criminal Law, Mr. Justice Stephen, observing on this defect in the law, says: "Why not allow of compensation for injuries to the person as well? Would it not be better still to enact (possibly with a few special reservations as to offences like libel) that whenever any person was tried for any crime, anyone injured by it might claim damages, and prove the amount after the prisoner's conviction before the jury which had convicted him ?"

The only apparent objection that can be raised to this is that it would cause great inconvenience, and interfere very much with the ordinary course of business at assizes and sessions. If that were really so the objection would be a fatal one, for the time now occupied by criminal trials is quite long enough to interfere seriously with the business of the civil courts; but an examination of the cases which most frequently come before the courts of criminal law in respect of the parties concerned shows that, as a rule, the offender's circumstances are such that no compensation could be paid by him, and consequently it would be useless to trouble the jury to assess any.

We are not in a position of course to say with what frequency applications under sect. 3 of 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23, above cited, are made in all the criminal courts annually, but judging from our own experience at circuit and sessions, and the surprise which we once saw a learned judge evince when such an application was made to him, we think they cannot be very frequent; and, if our opinion be correct, this would be a strong argument against the objection we have noted above. Whilst, however, the average poverty of offenders is an argument in favour of an extension of the power of granting compensation, the average poverty of prosecutors is a still stronger one in the same direction. For although in most cases no award of compensation would be of any use, cases do arise where the offender can afford to pay, and it is in these cases that the extension would be of great practical value. The prosecutor has, of course, his remedy by action, but except in very rare cases he would prefer to have compensation limited to £100 awarded to him at once and without trouble, to being obliged to go through all the anxiety, worry, and expense of a prolonged litigation in the civil courts, even though he might thereby perhaps get more. Moreover, where he is a man of no means, his only chance of getting any compensation is, that his case may be taken up by a speculative solicitor, who will take care that whatever be the amount of compensation awarded the greater part finds its way into his pocket. By sect. 423 of the Criminal Code (Indictable Offences) Bill the power of a criminal court to grant compensation up to £100 to a prosecutor was extended to all indictable offences, but by the amended Bill the power of awarding compensation is altogether abolished by the repeal of sects. 3 and of 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23. We are curious to know what reasons have induced the commissioners to abolish this power. Their high standing and experience forbid the notion that such an important change was made without due deliberation; until, however, we have read the arguments they put forward for the change, we shall not but consider that it is one to be regretted.

We come now to the consideration of the other aspect of compensation; that of compensation to persons wrongfully accusedwhich may be considered conveniently first with regard to those acquitted at their trial, and those whose innocence is established after sentence. With regard to the first, by far the most numerous, it is undoubtedly a fact that the great majority owe their escape not to their innocence but to some failure in establishing their guilt. For these, of course, no compensation should be awarded; but it seems scarcely open to argument that a prisoner who is acquitted upon evidence which completely establishes his innocence should receive no other satisfaction than is contained in the verdict of a jury, and perhaps a remark of the judge that he leaves the court without a stain on his character. It may be said that the accused has his remedy in the shape of an action for malicious prosecution; but in most instances he is so poor as to render such a proceeding impossible— very often, indeed, he has to sell everything he possesses to provide means for his defence. Moreover such actions are most difficult to prove, and the prosecutor is as a rule in such circumstances that to bring an action against him would be futile. Therefore it comes to this, that unless the court has the power of awarding compensation up to a certain sum to be paid by the prosecutor when he has the means and out of a county or some similar fund when he has not, a man may have to undergo all the torture of a criminal trial, and that incidental to it, and on being acquitted have nothing but the verdict of a jury to set off against it all.

To the objection that, to provide that the court which tries the offence shall assess the amount of compensation, would be to impose too much additional work on the ordinary business of the criminal courts, the same answer applies as we have already used with regard to the question of compensation to prosecutors, only it applies with still greater force in that the power would have to be exercised in much fewer cases. With regard to those cases where an innocent man has served the whole or part of his sentence, there cannot, we think, be two opinions. The only difficulty that arises is as to the amount of compensation, this, we think, is not so great but that it would be possible to frame a scale which, having regard to the position in life of the person, his actual pecuniary loss on account of his sentence, the time served, and the damages he is likely to suffer, would ensure proper compensation being given in all cases. Luckily such cases are extremely rare, but it is fitting that when they do occur we should not let any supposed difficulties stand in the way of doing justice. The great reformer, Sir Samuel Romilly, once had in contemplation the passing of an Act enabling criminal courts to give compensation, as will be seen from the following passage extracted from his memoirs :

What I have in contemplation to do, however, compared with what should be done is very little. It is only, in the first place, to invest criminal courts with a power of making to persons who shall have been acquitted a compensation to be paid out of the county rates, for the expenses they will have been put to, the loss of time they will have incurred, the imprisonment, and the other evils they will have suffered; not to provide that there should be a compensation awarded in all cases of acquittal, but merely that the court, judging of all the circumstances of the case, should have a power if it thinks proper, to order such a compensation to be paid and to fix the amount of it; a similar power to that which it now has under two Acts passed in the reign of Geo. II. to allow the expenses of the prosecution, and a compensation for loss of time and trouble to the prosecutor.

It may be objected that we under-estimate the difficulties attending the working of any such scheme of compensation as we have discussed; but at any rate we think that, after the criminal trials which have been brought into notice of late, the subject is one which it would be well to discuss thoroughly.

LEASES, VOID OR VOIDABLE.

THE GOVERNORS OF MAGDALEN HOSPITAL v. KNOTTS AND OTHERS. IT is gratifying to see that the House of Lords in its decision in The Governors of Magdalen Hospital v. Knotts and others on the 5th inst., has been able to do substantial justice by affirming the decision of the Court of Appeal in the same case (38 L. T. Rep. N. S. 634).

As involving wider issues it is even more gratifying to see that this result has been arrived at on grounds which altogether dispense with the aid of the particularly glaring piece of sophistry contained in the judgment of the Court of Appeal as delivered by Lord Justice Thesiger. The questions in the case it may be remembered were, whether a lease for more than twenty-one years granted in 1783 by the governing body of the Magdalen Hospital at the rent of a peppercorn if demanded was within the restraining statutes of 13 Eliz. c. 10 and 14 Eliz. c. 14 ? and if so whether such lease was void under the statute ab initio, or voidable only as from the date when the lessors by some overt act expressed their election to consider and treat it as void? and if the lease were to be considered voidable only, whether the Statute of Limitations began to run against the Governors as from the execution of the lease?

The differences of legal opinion developed in the course of the litigation were remarkable. The Master of the Rolls, before whom the action was originally set down, overruled a demurrer by the defendants, the persons in possession, who insisted that, whether the lease were void ab initio or voidable only, the period of limitation ran from its execution, and that they had therefore acquired a title. The action being afterwards transferred to the court of Mr. Justice Fry, he felt himself bound by the decision of the Master of the Rolls. That decision proceeded on the ground that the lease was only voidable at the election of the governors of the charity, and that they had not exercised such election until the issue of a writ for recovery of the property in 1876, the Master of the Rolls considering that, notwithstanding the very strong language of the 13 Eliz. c. 10, as applied to such a lease, which was to "be utterly void and of non-effect to all intents, constructions, and purposes," he was bound by the common sense of the case and by previous authorities. In the course of his judgment he asks: "Could it be tolerated that a charity, or a bishop, or a rector should grant a lease, say for twenty-two years when a twenty-one years lease only was authorised, and, because no rent was received for twenty-two years, the lease being granted at a peppercorn rent, the tenant should hold the fee simple against the Church or charity? The mere statement of such a proposition shocks one's intellectual conceptions." Having arrived at the conclusion that the lease was voidable only, it seems to have followed in the mind of the Master of the Roils, as an inevitable consequence, that the bar of the Statute of Limitations was out of the question.

When, however, the case comes into the Court of Appeal it is not a little curious to observe that while maintaining that the lease was voidable and not void, the Court of Appeal, in its anxiety

to do substantial justice, arrives at what appears to us the astounding conclusion that in the case of a merely voidable lease the Statute of Limitations begins to run as from its execution. According to the Court of Appeal the path of escape from the consequences to ecclesiastical bodies or charities of improvident alienations made by them, which the Master of the Rolls thought so intolerable, viz., by treating those alienations which offend the restraining statutes as existing and actually effective until the alienors elected otherwise, is to be shut up altogether. Fortunately, as we shall see, the House of Lords though not actually called on to reverse the view taken by the Court of Appeal, in regard to the proper mode of applying the Statutes of Limitation to leases voidable but not void, referred to it in terms which do not support it.

We come now to the judgments of the House of Lords, as delivered by the Lord Chancellor. The House agreed that the appellants were a hospital within the 14 Eliz. c. 14, and therefore also of the 13 Eliz. c. 10, but, differing from the courts below, held that the lease was void ab initio, and not merely voidable. Lord Cairns said, "The Court of Appeal, considering themselves bound by authority in this respect, have treated the lease as voidable, but, treating it as voidable, have held that the right to enter and avoid it accrued to the hospital immediately after the lease was made, and was therefore barred at the end of twenty years, &c. . I do not think it necessary to examine the reasoning by which the Court of Appeal arrived at this construction of the Statute of Limitations, or to say how far I should be prepared to concur in it because I must submit to your Lordships that the lease was ab initio not merely voidable but void." The Lord Chancellor went on to show that in the case of a purely eleemosynary corporation, where the office bearers and members of the corporation have no personal interest, the object of the statute was to protect the property of the charity by making it absolutely inalienable except in the mode and to the extent provided for by the statute; that in such a case there was no intention to protect a successor against a predecessor, and that, although there might be some difficulty in understanding how certain cases with regard to ecclesiastical corporations with a head came originally to be decided as they were, neither they, nor ordinary cases between landlord and tenant, had any application to the case under consideration. The Lord Chancellor further remarked that if the lease had been voidable, the hospital might affirm it, which they clearly could not do. Such a lease might also prejudice the corporation, because the grant would be good until avoidance, and avoidance would not carry with it any right to recover the mesne profits. Holding, then, that the lease of 1783 was absolutely void, the House decided that the respondent, or those whom they represented, having been in possession from 1783, without having paid rent or entered into the relation of tenants, there was nothing to prevent the bar of the Statute of Limitations. We may still be thankful that we have a House of Lords.

THE BANKRUPTCY LAW AMENDMENT BILL.

CONCLUDING ARTICLE.

AMONGST the clauses of Part VIII., thirty-two in number (clauses 120 to 151), there are comparatively few new provisions. The first of general importance is clause 142, which relates to solicitation for proxies and appointments. It enacts that where it appears to the satisfaction of the court that any solicitation has been used by or on behalf of a trustee or receiver in obtaining moneys or in procuring the trusteeship or receivership, except by the direction of a meeting of creditors, the court shall have power, if it think fit, to order that no remuneration shall be allowed to the person by whom or on whose behalf such solicitation may have been exercised, notwithstanding any resolution of the committee of inspection or of the creditors to the contrary. Here a direct blow is struck against the practice of soliciting proxies. The utility of the provision, however, must depend upon the exertions made by the creditors themselves to obtain a proper administration of the assets of a bankrupt or debtor.

The two following clauses are also new. The 143rd provides that if a creditor accepts the office of trustee, he shall not be allowed to vote on any question affecting his remuneration, or conduct, or security, as such trustee. The vote of the trustee or receiver, or of his partner or clerk, either as a creditor or as proxy for a creditor, will not be reckoned in the majority required for passing any resolution affecting the conduct or remuneration of or security to be given by such trustee or receiver. All this points to the greater restriction which it is intended to place upon persons occupying in the future the positions of trustee or receiver.

The provision which provides that the solicitor to the Treasury is to be deemed a creditor in respect of costs payable to the Crown officer is also new (clause 145). In any action or proceding after the passing of the Bill, in which any law officer of the Crown sues or is sued in his official capacity or in respect of ar ything done or omitted to be done by him in such capacity, and any sum of money or any costs is or are ordered to be paid to him in such action or proceedings, the solicitor to the Treasury

may, in his official name, take all necessary proceedings under the Act or otherwise, in order to recover payment of such sum or costs, and for that purpose he is to be deemed, so far as regards such sum or costs, to be a creditor of the person ordered to pay the same. This right is not intended, however, to prejudice any other remedy of the Crown or of such officer in respect of the sum or costs so ordered to be paid.

The 148th clause is interesting, inasmuch as it provides that a married woman who has contracted any debts otherwise than as the agent of her husband or some other person, shall be liable in respect of her separate estate to all the provisions of the Act, and shall be entitled in respect of her debts to all the benefits of the provisions of the Act. This settles the law (see Re Heneage, L. R. 9 Ch. 307). It is little short of absurd to allow to any class the rights of property without requiring them to undergo the liabilities attaching thereto.

The clauses relating to the transfer of estates (clause 150 and 151) are new. The former provides for the transfer of estates from the registrars of the London court to the official assignee, and for the filling up of vacancies in the office of assignee; the latter for the transfer of estates on a vacancy in the office of trustee in liquidation under the Bankruptcy Act 1869. The next clause provides for the transfer of outstanding property on the close of bankruptcy or liquidation proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act 1869.

Part IX. relating to persons having privilege of Parliament, consists almost entirely of re-enactments of various sections in the Act of 1869. The provisions, however, of the Rankruptcy Disqualification Act 1871, in reference to the bankruptcy of a peer are (by clause 154) made applicable to the case of a peer against whom a provisional order has been made under this Act.

Part X. is concerned with unclaimed or undistributed funds and dividends. It provides (clause 159) that such funds or dividends in the hands of any person who may have been empowered to collect, receive, or distribute any funds or dividends under any Act of Parliament mentioned, Schedule 4, or any petition, resolution, deed, or other proceeding under or in pursuance of any such Act, which has remained or may remain unclaimed or undistributed for three years after the receipt of the same by any such persons, shall be deemed to be vested in the Crown, without prejudice, however, to the rights of persons who may be entitled to any sum so vested to have the same paid to them. By the same clause powers are given to the Lord Chancellor, with the concurrence of the Treasury, to appoint one or more persons to receive and get in all such unclaimed or undistributed funds or dividends under such regulation as may be prescribed by the Treasury, and to pay to any person entitled any sum so vested. Persons interested in such property or dividends may apply to the Court of Bankruptcy, and the court having jurisdiction may order any trustee, manager, or receiver, to file in court an account of the sums received and paid by him, and may direct and enforce an audit of such account, and the payment of the balance in hand to the creditors entitled thereto, or to the person appointed as aforesaid; but the audit is not to extend beyond six years before the passing of the Act. A trustee, receiver, or other person having any such funds or dividends in hand, or under his control, may, on filing an affidavit verifying the amount proposed to be paid, and showing the matter in respect of which it has arisen, pay such funds or dividends to one of the persons appointed to receive the same.

The Bill contains four short schedules. The first gives the description of traders; the second, the scale for remuneration of trustee or receiver; the third, a list of county courts; and the fourth, a list of statutes relating to unclaimed dividends. The proviso annexed to Schedule I. is of great importance," provided always that every person coming within the above description of traders, and having ceased to trade, shall be deemed a trader for the purposes of this Act during such time not exceeding two years after he shall have ceased to trade, or any debt contracted by him while in trade to an amount sufficient to support a bankruptcy petition remains unpaid." The list of county courts contains three additions, viz. :-The Courts of Wandsworth, Greenwich and Woolwich, and Brentford.

While we are upon the subject of the Bankruptcy Law we may notice a pamphlet which has been written with respect to the cause and remedy of bankruptcy. The aim of the writer has been to show how non-preventible bankruptcies may be modified, and how fraudulent bankruptcies may be made preventible. His suggestions are the following: Compel traders to adopt a style and title conveying a true indication of their business, out of which they would go at their peril if bankrupt; let no one carry on two or more occupations without notification thereof; people who trade without capital should style themselves agents; agents should not be freed from liabilities; the regular monthly posting-up of books to be compulsory; every trader and every member of a trading firm to sign each year a statement of assets and liabilities, all such statements to be verified by an auditor who is to be responsible for the accuracy of such statements as to facts as well as figures; any wilful mis-statement in the books or annual statement to be a misdemeanour. Instead of the words for value received, &c., accommodation bills should be

translation, as might be expected, is scholarly. We may suggest that an index would render the work still more useful.

Light and Air. By BANISTER FLETCHER. London: Batsford. MR. FLETCHER is the author of a number of useful practical textbooks. In this, the last of the series, he has produced a textbook intended for architects and surveyors. We think lawyers may derive benefit from a perusal of its pages. The author shows, in a tabulated form, what constitutes ancient light; how the light is acquired; how it may be jeopardized or lost; what non-actionable damage may be done to ancient light, and the relative position of servient and dominant owners. The practical part of the book is likewise very useful.

A Summary of the Principles of the Law of Simple Contracts. By C. M. PLUMPTREE, Barrister-at-Law. London: Butterworth. THIS small volume is apparently the result of the combined labour of at least three persons, viz.: the author and his two friends mentioned in the preface. Its object is to state a fairly accurate summary of the leading principles relating to the law of simple contracts, and to illustrate those principles by cases. We are sorry that we cannot congratulate Mr. Plumptree either in the choice of his subject or in the result of his labour. There is no novelty in the author's mode of treating the law, nor is he free from the vice of qualifying his statement of the law by a mere reference to the name of a case under the formula "but see." Instances of this vice will be found at pages 55, 62, and 181. Mr. Plumptree is certainly unfortunate in his reference to Kelner v. Baxter (p. 55), for he omits to mention how the court of equity have qualified that decision.

NEW EDITIONS.

The fourth edition of Griffith's Married Woman's Property Acts (London: Stevens and Haynes) is edited by Mr. W. G. Walker. We are glad to see that the authorities have been brought down to the date of publication, and that the index has been enlarged.

The sixth edition of Smith's Legal Forms for Common Use (London: Effingham Wilson) was called for by the Married Women's Property Act Amendment Act 1874. The fact that this small volume has reached its eleventh thousand shows that it supplies a want. Mr. Smith has added in this edition some remarks upon warranties of horses. In his statement that "a purchaser ignorant of the instructions you may have given to servant or agent employed to sell, can hold you bound by any warranty made by that person even though 'contrary to your instructions,"" the author appears to have overlooked the distinction founded upon Brady v. Todd (9 C. B., N. S., 592).

SOLICITORS' JOURNAL.

IN consequence of the recent action of some of the Chancery Chief Clerks, it is very necessary to call attention to the precise terms of rule 20, of the 35th Consolidated General Chancery Orders of the 14th Feb. 1860. It is, however, due to the chief clerks in question to say that their recent action-at least so far as those attached to the Master of the Rolls Court are concerned-in regard to the rule referred to, has been in consequence of express directions from Sir George Jessel. The rule referred to reads thus: Where, upon the hearing of the summons to proceed, or at any time during the prosecution of the decree or order, it appears to the judge, with respect to the whole or any portion of the proceedings, that the interests of the parties can be classified, he may require the parties constituting each or any class to be represented by the same solicitor; and where the parties constituting such class cannot agree upon the solicitor to represent them, the judge may nominate such solicitor for the purpose of the proceedings before him; and where anyone of the parties constituting

such class declines to authorise the solicitor so nominated to act for him, and insists upon being represented by a different solicitor, such party shall personally pay the costs of his own solicitor of and relating to the proceedings before the judge, with respect to which such nomination shall have been made, and all such further costs as shall be occasioned to any of the parties by his being represented by a different solicitor from the solicitor so to be nominated." On the strength of this rule, some of the chief clerks have of

late suddenly come down upon solicitors who Many experienced magistrates' clerks have prohave been for a long time past attending pro-nounced the Bill to be faulty, even in its latest ceedings in chambers in administration actions, shape, and there is at present a fair prospect that for which attendances the customary allowances it will become law without its being subjected to have been made by such chief clerks, who have the prophylactic influence of experienced and required them in effect to show cause why they practical criminal lawyers. should not for the future be excluded from attending the inquiries, &c., in chambers at the expense Ar a recent meeting of the Council of the Legal of the estate. The words of the rule certainly are Practitioners' Society, a discussion took place as "at any time during the prosecution of the decree,' &c. What we desire to particularly complain of on to introducing into the Government County Courts Bill a clause enabling County Court this point is that chief clerks do not usually im-judges to deal with persons who send sham process pose upon themselves the duty of classifying the to alleged debtors, with the view of frightening interests of the parties at the outset of the pro- such persons into payment of the alleged debt. ceedings in chambers. It appears to us that in The following clause is suggested as likely to meet cases contemplated by the above rule the soli- such cases: citor for the executor should, so soon as the action Any person, not being himself or herself the creditor gets into chambers, take out a summons in general of the alleged debtor, or not being a duly certificated terms for directions as to which solicitor of the solicitor of the Supreme Court of Judicature in Engsolicitors of the respective parties interested land, who shall transmit, or cause to be transmitted, should be allowed to have the conduct of the to any debtor, any circular, letter, or other communica action, or should be allowed to attend the pro-debt or damages, and containing any express or implied tion in the form of a demand for payment of an alleged ceedings at the expense of the estate. What is threat, or any intimation that, in default of payment, wanted in these cases is uniformity and certainty such person will be enabled or is of right, empowered, of practice. Few things can be more undesirable as an agent of the alleged creditor, to issue legal process than that a solicitor should be allowed his costs against such alleged debtor, or any person who shall of attending proceedings, and yet be liable to directly or indirectly transmit to or cause to be served have it suddenly intimated that his client, and County Court process, or which may be calculated, or upon any alleged debtor any document purporting to be not the estate, must pay his costs for future was manifestly intended to deceive an alleged debtor, attendances. and induce him or her to regard such document as actual County Court or other legal process, shall be by fine or imprisonment; and any County Court judge deemed to have committed a misdemeanour punishable in whose district such offence shall have been com mitted, is hereby empowered to direct a prosecution, and to commit for trial such person so offending, in the same manner and with the same powers, and under judge is now empowered to direct the prosection for and subject to the same conditions, as a County Court perjury of persons appearing to him to be guilty of that offence in proceedings before him.

WE are much afraid that the Summary Jurisdiction Bill (a Government measure) is passin through its several stages in Parliament without attracting that amount of attention which it deserves, even at the hands of those who practice before criminal courts of first instance. The Bill passed the second reading on Monday last, after having been re-committed.